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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

M.V. FRUNZE-MILITARY THEORIST



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USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
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Moscow M.V. FRUNZE--VOYENNNYY TEORETIK in Russian 1985 (signed to press 17 Oct 84) pp 1-444, 448

[Book by Col Gen Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev, doctor of military sciences, "M. V. Frunze--Military Theorist" Voenizdat, 50,000 copies, 448 pages. Reviewers: Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Prof, Lt Gen D.A. Volkogonov; Honored Scientist of the RSFSR, Doctor of Military Sciences, Prof, Lt Gen V.G. Reznichenko; Honored Scientist of the RSFSR, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof N.N. Azovtsev]

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Annotation: The military theoretical work analyzes the scientific activities of the prominent Soviet military leader and theorist M. V. Frunze and discloses his role in the elaboration of Soviet military doctrine and the most important provisions of Soviet military sciences as well as the importance of his military theoretical heritage under present-day conditions.

The work is designed for a broad range of military readers.

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In science there is no broad highway,
and only a person can reach its shining
heights who, disregarding fatigue,
clammers over its rocky paths.

K. Marx

INTRODUCTION

1985 marked the centennial birthday of Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze, a prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state, the student and associate of V. I. Lenin, a prominent military theorist and famous military leader of the Red Army. From 60 years ago, the Central Committee of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)], in notifying the workers of our nation of the death of M. V. Frunze, pointed out that his personal history is a reflection of our party's history. And this is truly the case. The life and activities of M. V. Frunze have merged together with the party's heroic struggle for the cause of communism.

Over his eventful, significant life he was part of the glorious cohort of Leninist Bolsheviks who, under the conditions of the underground, the repression of the Tsarist regime and in harsh revolutionary clashes, prepared the suppressed masses to storm the Russian autocracy, led their struggle for the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and then in a protracted and fierce armed struggle against foreign interventionists and the internal counterrevolution, defended the world's first worker and peasant state. M. I. Kalinin said that "the biography of M. V. Frunze should be a reference book for indoctrination, for training and for tempering the Bolshevism of our communist youth." (1)

In the ranks of the Communist Party there were numerous revolutionary heroes, party and state leaders, legendary military leaders and chiefs. More than one generation will be enthralled by their feats, self-sacrifice, by the greatness of the deeds perpetrated by them. But many investigators of the life and activities of M. V. Frunze as well as simply readers both in our nation and abroad will be most struck by the fact that a person who emerged from the lower classes and did not receive a special military education became not only an outstanding military leader, an expert in military affairs but also a prominent military theorist. Frequently the bourgeois press has written about him as an unexplainable miracle but the outstanding military successes and scientific accomplishments of M. V. Frunze are completely natural and historically determined.

Of course, the personal gifts of M. V. Frunze played their role in this. But of crucial significance was the circumstance that V. I. Lenin and the Bolshevik Party, in preparing the proletariat for the revolution, gave a great deal of attention to the recruitment and indoctrination of military cadres

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dedicated to the revolution, winning over to the side of the revolution those persons who could demonstrate their abilities and talents with maximum benefit and devote themselves to serving the people. The life and activities of M. V. Frunze are a remarkable example of this.

In the words of V. I. Lenin, "any revolution is only worth something if it is able to defend itself" is not only a generalizing of the enormous historic experience of the international proletariat's revolutionary struggle, but also acutely poses the task of training cadres capable of defending the revolution.

The revolutionary masses have repeatedly fostered talented leaders from their midst. At the same time, one of the reasons for the defeat of many revolutions and armed revolts was that there were few of these leaders and they were poorly trained in military terms. A lack of military experience and knowledge in a majority of the leaders was one of the reasons for the defeat of the Paris Commune and was also felt in the fate of the Bavarian and Hungarian Soviet republics as well as many other revolutionary actions. "No class in history has achieved rule," wrote V. I. Lenin, "if it did not put forward its own political leaders, its own progressive representatives capable of organizing the movement and directing it."(2)

M. V. Frunze belonged precisely among such leading figures of our party and state. He was marked by indefatigable, ebullient revolutionary activity, and wholehearted practical work to carry out party assignments and a desire to profoundly understand and analyze the new historical processes and their impact on the development of military affairs. He left a great military theoretical heritage. The value of his military works is primarily in the fact that they were created on a basis of Marxism-Leninism and are permeated with a spirit of party loyalty. They generalize the experience of the organizational development of the Armed Forces of the world's first socialist state and in the first, most difficult years of their development.

M. V. Frunze wrote over 200 theoretical works, not counting orders and other official documents. The most complete, three-volume collection of his works was published in 1926-1929. This included 110 works. Not included in this collection but published in other editions were 74 works. In recent years, another 20 works have been found. In various forms 31 editions were published of M. V. Frunze's works in Russian, 21 in the languages of the Soviet peoples and 17 in foreign languages.

Over 220 books and pamphlets (9 of them in foreign languages) and 550 articles have been written about Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze; 5 bibliographic indices have been prepared. These works thoroughly examine his activities as a revolutionary, a political leader and a military figure and his practical work of strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state and the development of the Armed Forces. Basic evidence about him can be found in the party documents including the materials of congresses, conferences and plenums, the works and judgments of V. I. Lenin and the memoirs of V. K. Blyukher, A. S. Bubnov, S. M. Budenny, K. Ye. Voroshilov, S. I. Gusev, V. V. Kuybyshev, G. K. Ordzhonikidze and other prominent leaders of the Communist Party and Soviet state. The correspondence between M. V. Frunze and V. I.

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Lenin is of exceptional value. A large portion, some 50 documents, from this correspondence has been provided in the collection "M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny" [M. V. Frunze on the Fronts of the Civil War] (Moscow, 1941); six documents were published in the journal ISTORICHESKIY ARKHIV [Historical Archives] (No 3, 1958). The correspondence and meetings between M. V. Frunze and V. I. Lenin have been given a systematized treatment in the Lenin Biographical Chronicle.(3)

The revolutionary and generalship activities of Frunze have been examined, in our view, most completely and reliably in the book by a group of authors who had a good personal knowledge of the military leader "M. V. Frunze. Zhizn i deyatelnost" [M. V. Frunze. Life and Activities](4); in the biographical sketch of S. A. Sirotinskiy, the former adjutant of M. V. Frunze "Put Arseniya" [The Path of Arsenius]; in the books by V. L. Arkhangel'skiy "Frunze," V. Lebedev and K. Ananyev "Frunze" (from the series "The Life of Famous People"), the memoirs of F. Novitskiy (the journal ZNAMYA [Banner], No 10, 1940); in the novel of M. Kolesnikov "Vse uragany v litso" [Facing the Storms] and a number of other works.

These sources were also basically employed in writing the first chapter of the book "M. V. Frunze--voyennyy teoretik." The description of the generalship and military-theoretical activities of M. V. Frunze is based upon an analysis of the history of the Civil War and the organizational development of the Red Army during the first half of the 1920's and the numerous archival documents, including documents from the M. V. Frunze Museum at the Military Academy bearing his name. The numerical material has been given considering chiefly the data from the "Istoriya KPSS" [History of the CPSU],(5) "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia](6) and official documents.

However, with the comparatively extensive number of books and articles dealing with M. V. Frunze in our military literature, there is not a single work which examines in detail the activities of M. V. Frunze as an outstanding military theorist. Several candidate dissertations have been prepared on this subject; an analysis of the military theoretical views of M. V. Frunze on individual questions and a certain systematizing of the available material can be found in a number of articles published in newspapers and military journals. But they, as we would point out again, do not provide an integrated examination of the military theoretical heritage of M. V. Frunze and an analysis of this from modern positions. For this reason, special research is required for disclosing the rich content of his works and for employing their basic provisions under present-day conditions. Moreover, in a number of instances the military theory views of M. V. Frunze have been artificially and unsoundly employed for justifying individual incorrect ideas on the questions of military science and which appeared at certain stages in the development of military theoretical thought. Among the publications dealing with individual aspects of the military theoretical activities of M. V. Frunze, the greatest attention should be given to the works of N. N. Azovtsev, I. G. Viktorov, A. V. Golubev, I. M. Zhernosek, I. A. Korotkov, A. A. Kosyukov, V. P. Pavlovskiy, Ye. N. Tsvetayev, S. N. Shishkin(7) and certain other works.

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Among the works dealing with M. V. Frunze published abroad, we should note the book by W. Jacobs "Frunze: The Soviet Clausewitz. 1885-1925." (8) The author of this book, although recognizing M. V. Frunze as a major military theorist and military leader, in a number of places endeavors to play down his role as a military thinker. Like other bourgeois military theorists (Garthoff, Ericson, White and Berkhin), Jacobs views the theoretical ideas of Frunze from the viewpoint of bourgeois ideology and largely presents them to the reader in a tendentious, distorted form.

The author of the book "M. V. Frunze--voyenny teoretik" sees his goal in, to a certain degree, supplementing the existing research on the military theoretical activities of M. V. Frunze and above all examining the influence of the sociopolitical and military events which shaped him as a military theorist, his role in elaborating Soviet military doctrine and the most important provisions of Soviet military science, as well as the importance of Frunze's military theoretic heritage for modern times.

The author has endeavored to analyze the military theoretical views of Frunze primarily from the viewpoint of to what degree they have withstood the test of time and in what areas they have undergone further development in the subsequent stages of the development of military science, in being guided here by the Leninist thesis "do not forget the main historical link, examine each question from the viewpoint of how a certain phenomenon arose in history, what were the main stages in the development of this phenomenon and from the viewpoint of this development of it examine what the given thing has become at present." (9)

Proceeding from this it can be said that the entire history of the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces as well as the military theory and practice of socialism has convincingly shown the viability of the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army and the military theoretical views of M. V. Frunze based on this. These were apparent with particular strength and persuasiveness in the outstanding victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War.

In addition to a general recognition of this historical fact for contemporary research, it is also very important to examine the sources of the viability of our military theory and analyze in greater detail why even at the stage of its genesis it was able to predict in a correct and scientifically sound manner as well as what subsequently was not confirmed in practice and why. For science this is the most important and fundamental question, since the correctly understood sources and patterns of military scientific analysis and foresight can provide inestimable aid in a sound resolution of the present-day problems of military theory and practice.

The book makes no claim to be an exhaustive analysis of the entire wealth of the military theoretical heritage of M. V. Frunze. The author has endeavored to examine only the most important, underlying, military theoretical views of the outstanding Soviet military thinker which are of greatest importance under present-day conditions. This work, like any work dealing with M. V. Frunze, cannot provide a substitute for a careful study of his own works where the reader will find a multiplicity of ideas and statements on general

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methodological questions of military science, military doctrine, the theoretical and practical questions of military art, the organizational development and training of the army and navy which have maintained their pertinence in our times, too.

The author wishes to express gratitude to all comrades who participated in reviewing the manuscript and in preparing it for publication. Special gratitude is extended to Prof Tatyana Mikhaylovna Frunze and Col Gen Anatoliy Georgiyevich Pavlov for valuable comments and recommendations made on the book's contents.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 3 Nov 1925.
2. V. I. Lenin, PSS, [Complete Collected Works], Vol 4, p 375.
3. "Vladimir Ilich Lenin: Biograficheskaya khronika" [Vladimir Ilich Lenin: Biographical Chronicle], Moscow, 1970-1982.
4. "M. V. Frunze. Zhizn i deyatelnost" [M. V. Frunze. Life and Work], I. K. Gamburg, P. Ye. Khoroshilov, G. A. Sanovich, G. A. Bragilevskiy; edited by F. N. Petrov, Moscow, 1962.
5. "Istoriya KPSS" [History of the CPSU], Moscow, 1980.
6. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Moscow, 1976-1980, Vols 1-8.
7. N. N. Azovtsev, "V. I. Lenin i sovetskaya voyennaya nauka" [V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science], Moscow, 1981; I. G. Viktorov, "M. V. Frunze i voprosy sovetskoy voyennoy ideologii" [M. V. Frunze and the Questions of Soviet Military Ideology], a dissertation, Moscow, 1951; A. V. Golubev, "M. V. Frunze o kharaktere budushchey voyny" [M. V. Frunze on the Nature of a Future War], Moscow, 1931; I. M. Zhernosek, "Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze o roli i zadachakh tyla i snabzheniya v voyne" [Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze on the Role and Tasks of the Rear and Supply in War], a dissertation, Moscow, 1952; I. A. Korotkov, "Istoriya sovetskoy voyennoy mysli" [The History of Soviet Military Thought], Moscow, 1980; A. A. Kosyukov, "Voyenno-teoreticheskyye vzglyady M. V. Frunze" [The Military Pedagogical Views of M. V. Frunze], Moscow, 1960; V. I. Pavlovskiy, "Filosofskiye voprosy voyny, armii i voyennogo dela v trudakh M. V. Frunze" [Philosophical Questions of War, the Army and Military Affairs in the Works of M. V. Frunze], a dissertation, Moscow, 1973; Ye. N. Tsvetayev, "Voyenno-teoreticheskaya deyatelnost M. V. Frunze posle grazhdanskoy voyny (1921-1925)" [The Military Theoretical Activities of M. V. Frunze After the Civil War (1921-1925)], a dissertation, Moscow, 1954; S. N. Shishkin, "M. V. Frunze--One of the Creators of the Soviet Army," in the book: "M. V. Frunze. Polkovodcheskaya deyatelnost" [M. V. Frunze. Generalship Activities], Moscow, 1951.

8. Walter Darnell Jacobs, "Frunze: The Soviet Clausewitz. 1885-1925," The Hague, Martinus, Nijhoff, 1969.
9. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 39, p 67.

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CHAPTER 1: A PROMINENT PARTY AND SOVIET STATE LEADER, A NEW TYPE OF PROLETARIAN MILITARY LEADER

Basic Stages in Revolutionary and Military Activities

Development of the revolutionary fighter. In order to better understand the content and the entire profundity of the ideas set down in the theoretical works of M. V. Frunze, it is essential at least cursorily to take a look at those events during which his revolutionary activities were carried out as well as those conditions and circumstances which shaped him as a prominent figure in our party and the Soviet state as well as a military leader and theorist.

Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze was born on 2 February (21 January according to the old style) 1885 in the town of Pishpek, now the city of Frunze, and capital of Kirghiz. The development of M. V. Frunze's personality was largely influenced by his family, primarily his mother and father, by the specific conditions of life in the Turkestan Kray, but most importantly, of course, by the revolutionary events which developed in Russia, by the struggle of the working class and the suppressed masses of people for their social liberation, by the Leninist revolutionaries and other progressive persons of those times, by constant self-education, by a serious attitude toward the reading of artistic and political literature and a special infatuation with military literature. All of this determined the activist position in the life of Mikhail Vasilyevich.

His father, Vasilyi Mikhaylovich Frunze, came from a peasant background from the Tiraspol District of Kherson Province, but by nationality was a Moldavian. After completing a feldsher [middle-level medical personnel] school in Moscow, he was inducted into the army and sent to serve in Turkestan. Having done his military service, V. M. Frunze in 1879 remained to live in Pishpek, where he worked as a feldsher. The mother of M. V. Frunze, Mavra Yefimovna, was born in a family of Russian immigrants from Voronezh Province.

In the Frunze family, like in all worker families, where they all worked to earn their way, the main influence on the children was not the formal teachings of the parents but rather the example of their unstinting labor, honesty and order and the ability to share the last of their food with relatives and friends. Vasilyi Mikhaylovich was a zealous worker. In an area

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where diseases flourished and there were virtually no doctors, a feldsher's work required special dedication. He hurried to help at any time of the day and night, in any weather, to the most distant village, to persons who often could not even pay him. For his responsiveness and kindness, Vasilii Mikhaylovich won great respect among the local inhabitants.

Under the conditions of the Tsarist autocracy, where certain peoples dominated others and in every possible way a prejudiced attitude was instilled towards the national minorities, this was not to the liking of the authorities. In 1895, V. M. Frunze was dismissed and forced to live and work far away from his family in the neighboring Syrdarya Oblast. Two years later he died at the age of 45. The family was left poverty stricken.

Even when V. M. Frunze was alive, due to his meager salary, the mother, in order to maintain the family with five children, had to work long and hard, and show resourcefulness and keenness of wit. After the death of her husband, the entire burden of supporting and rearing the children rested on her shoulders. Strong willed, tenacious and endowed with wisdom, she independently learned to read and write and instilled curiosity and a love of reading in her children.

According to information of biographers, Mikhail Frunze, regardless of all the hardships of life, grew up optimistic and sociable. By the age of five, he could read and at the age of seven went to school. Later he studied at the gymnasium [secondary school] in Vernyy (now Alma Ata). The mother was unable to pay for his schooling and only after great trouble and harassment and due to the great abilities and tenacity of Mikhail himself did she succeed in gaining a scholarship for him. He completed the gymnasium with a gold medal.

One is struck by his amazing diverse curiosity and his constant directed gravitation, or even more accurately, first for reading and reflecting on what he had read and a constant search for answers to the vital questions which life posed. This habit of reading at any opportunity and a profoundly rooted inner need for constantly improving his knowledge were to run through the entire life of M. V. Frunze.

Here it is essential to bear in mind that at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries in Russia there existed the most diverse political currents and artistic and political literature corresponding to their views. It was not easy to understand immediately on whose side truth lay. Progressive literature was banned and the reading of this involved a definite risk. It was published in limited runs. For this reason, there was little guidance, one had to make one's own way to the roots of each theoretical notion taking nothing on faith, and arrive at certain conclusions as a result of working through in one's mind an enormous amount of diverse and often contradictory judgments and defend one's convictions in a fierce struggle against hostile views.

This has both negative and positive aspects. Profound convictions were developed but these were acquired over too long and often torturous ways. Not everyone succeeded in immediately holding correct positions and this led certain young persons to ideological confusion and hesitation.

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The Marxist revolutionaries in all corners of Russia, including in Turkestan Kray, did a great deal to propagandize truly scientific political knowledge, but for understanding the entire profundity of revolutionary ideas it took serious study, and these had to be not merely learned but also gained by hard experience.

This path of gaining knowledge in labor and struggle was also followed by the young Frunze and this caused his (like the other leaders of the Bolshevik Party) profound ideological conviction, broad erudition, high intellectual culture, a careful, anxious attitude toward truly scientific knowledge and the ability to understand and assess each new word in science.

In the memoirs about M. V. Frunze it was pointed out that Pushkin, Lermontov, Koltsov, Chekhov and Gorkiy were his favorite writers. He read a great deal of Belinskiy, Dobrolyubov, Chernyshevskiy, Nekrasov and Pisarev. He was fond of reading the works of explorers and travelers, particularly the courageous pioneers of Asia such as Semenov-Tyan-Shanskiy, Przhevalskiy, Potanin, Severtsev-Mushketov and Grum-Grzhimaylo.

He received his first exposure to revolutionary ideas while studying in the gymnasium where he attended self-education circles. His brother Konstantin commented: "From my brother's letters, one could see that the 'self-education circles' which we had bequeathed to the younger gymnasium generation and in which we supplemented gymnasium science with a familiarization with literature on the questions of history, philosophy and natural science, had significantly altered their physiology. Social sciences and chiefly political economy now held the central place in them. These circles had begun to assume a revolutionary cast and militant nature." (1)

The circles also studied the works of G. V. Plekhanov and V. I. Lenin and these reflected the upsurge in the revolutionary movement of Russia. Social-democratic ideas became evermore popular among the student youth. Young Frunze came into contact with students who had come to the center of the nation for their vacations and with political exiles and he took an active part in the organized protests in the gymnasium and in the city. All of this had a great impact upon his ideology.

Very early on, M. V. Frunze showed an interest in military affairs and this was expressed not only in the reading of books about military campaigns but also in developing the qualities which subsequently were to be very essential in the revolutionary struggle and in military service. He was always particularly moved by the stories of veterans about the campaigns of the Russian Army. Judging from the letters and memoirs, he learned to ride early and together with his father or brother loved to go hunting during which they made long hikes which helped to instill endurance, boldness and resourcefulness. During vacations, M. Frunze used any opportunity to travel and study new areas. For example, in the summer of 1903, he with a group of comrades made a hike to Lake Issyk-Kul and the Tyan-Shan Mountains. In 68 days they covered around 3,000 versts.

During such trips and in his daily life, Mikhail Vasilyevich saw backwardness, the disenfranchisement and poverty of the indigenous population which was

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exposed to a double suppression--the Tsarist autocracy and the local feudal lords. He made a thorough study of the morals and customs of the Kirghiz, the Kazakhs and other nationalities and he knew Kirghiz which subsequently helped him in dealing with representatives of the Turkic peoples, particularly on the Eastern and Turkestan fronts. His knowledge of these peoples was gained not from hearsay or references but rather by immersing himself in their life. A vital interest and respect for the life, customs and language of the other peoples were inherent to Frunze over his entire life.

Russian was his mother tongue and for this reason he studied it most. During his studies in the gymnasium and institute and while in exile and prison, he also showed a deep interest in foreign languages. Mikhail Vasilyevich had mastered English, French and German as well as a little Italian and Polish, but in November 1923, he was humble about this writing on his personal party card: "I only read French and English." For this reason, one can understand his extreme amazement and even indignation when during a visit to Turkey in 1921, he encountered certain Soviet comrades who, having worked several years in this country, could not even say a few sentences in Turkish. Incidentally, a considerate attitude to the life and language of other peoples has always been and remains an indication of a person's high culture and breadth of his views.

Frunze's internationalism arose not only out of a theoretical understanding of its importance and formal recognition, but was organically inherent to him, deriving from his nature and the interest in uniting all peoples in the revolutionary struggle.

By the time he completed the gymnasium, M. V. Frunze was already well acquainted with the ideas of Marxism and was inwardly ready to dedicate his entire life to the struggle for the cause of the people. He decided to enter the economics department of the St. Petersburg Polytechnical Institute. To his elder brother he wrote: "You ask why the economics department? Dear Kostya, economics is the basis of everything! You and I can cure a patient but in a year or a month he will die from hunger, from filth and from the cold in his wretched life! The treatment must be deeper, we must change all of life so that there is no poverty or hardships for anyone at any time.... I am not searching for an easy life. But I do not want to say to myself when I am older: I have lived my life but to what good? What has become better in the world as a result of my life? Nothing? Or almost nothing?... No, to profoundly understand the laws which govern the course of history, to immerse myself in reality, to become part of the most progressive class of modern society, the working class, to live for its thoughts and hopes, its struggle, and to fundamentally redo everything--this is the goal of my life now." (2) The entire subsequent life of M. V. Frunze was dedicated to this great cause.

Revolutionary activities. Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze arrived in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1904, on the eve of the first Russian revolution. Having entered the university, he immediately took an active part in the stormy sociopolitical life. The intensified exploitation of the workers and the humiliating defeat of Russia in the war against Japan caused the cup of human patience to overflow. After the events of 9 January 1905, mass antigovernment demonstrations by the proletariat broke out throughout the

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nation. During the first year of his student life, in 1904, Frunze joined the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, having immediately sided with its Bolshevik wing. Taking an active part in the activities of the various Bolshevik organizations, he became more closely familiar with the life of the capital proletariat, he spoke in worker circles and carried out responsible party assignments.

Frunze was an earnest and dedicated student in the polytechnical institute. In truth, in being engaged in revolutionary activities, he often missed lectures but he read a great deal, particularly Marxist literature, amazing professors and students alike with his unusually broad erudition. For such subjects as political economy, state law, the history of Russian law, psychology and the history of philosophy, Mikhail Frunze in a short period of time had passed the exams for the fourth year, while a majority of his fellow students had difficulty in mastering these sciences even in the first year.

"Having a good mastery of French and English," M. Kolesnikov relates in his novel, "he could quote European economists from primary sources. He could disagree with the textbooks and instructors and his comments on any teachings were full of calm keenness of mind and were striking in their paradoxicalness."(3)

The well known Russian scientist, Prof M. M. Kovalevskiy, who felt that a true personality is apparent primarily in independence of judgments, valued most in M. V. Frunze his involvement with science and his desire to reach independent conclusions and generalizations on a basis of a profound understanding of scientific knowledge and its active, creative perception.

M. V. Frunze was also present at literary evenings. At M. V. Annenskiy's he met A. M. Gorkiy, V. G. Korolenko and other well known literary figures.

Mikhail Frunze also took an active part in propagandizing Marxism among the workers and the revolutionarily-inclined students. The police learned of his revolutionary activities. On 28 November 1904, during a student political demonstration M. V. Frunze was apprehended by the police.

From that moment, Mikhail Vasilyevich became a professional revolutionary and worked in the underground. Having illegally returned to St. Petersburg, on 9 January 1905, he took part in the demonstration by the people on Palace Square. His feelings during these days can be judged by the letter to his mother: "Dear Mama, you have your son Kostya and you have daughters. I hope that they do not leave you and will be concerned for you at this difficult time but as for me you must be ready to bid farewell.... The flows of blood shed on 9 January require retribution. The die is cast, the Rubicon is crossed and the path determined. I am dedicating all of myself to the revolution...."(4)

Hence began underground revolutionary work that was full of dangers, concerns and hardships. In May 1905, the Moscow Committee of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party] sent Frunze to Ivanovo-Voznesensk. Here, at the center of the textile industry with a large number of a revolutionarily-inclined proletariat, he headed and revolutionary workers movement and gained

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serious political and combat tempering. He had to work under unbelievably difficult conditions. Regardless of the persecution from the police including continuous round-ups, searches, raids and arrests, the underground revolutionary work of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers under the leadership of M. V. Frunze (party nickname Trifonich) became evermore active and broader. In May 1905, a universal strike of the textile workers started involving around 70,000 workers. The meetings were held initially outside of the city on the Talka River and then in the city center. Frunze, as a rule, spoke at these meetings. He was able to speak simply and understandably for the workers and at the same time, clearly and persuasively.

One of the first soviets of worker representatives in Russia was established for leading the strike and this was highly regarded by V. I. Lenin. M. V. Frunze did a great deal of work with the members of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Soviet and presented to them an analysis of the course of the revolutionary struggle in the nation and raised specific questions of the leadership of worker actions during a political strike. As was pointed out by the party leaders and workers, he became the soul of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk organization. He repeatedly traveled to Shuya, Kokhma, Teykovo and Vichuga in order to secure the support of the workers from these cities for the Ivanovo-Voznesensk textile workers.

M. V. Frunze endeavored to make the worker actions highly organized and united and was decisively against any manifestation of anarchy and disorder. Even during the first days of the strike he established a worker combat militia for protecting order and the worker meetings. He made a great effort to secure weapons for the militia members and instill strict discipline in them; he used any opportunity to conduct military exercises with them.

Regardless of the repeated bloody reprisal against the workers by the Tsarist authorities, the political strike of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk secretariat lasted 72 days. As was pointed out by V. I. Lenin, "The Ivanovo-Voznesensk strike showed unexpectedly high political maturity on the part of the workers. Fermentation throughout the entire central industrial area continuously grew stronger and wider after this strike. Now this fermentation began to break out and began to turn into a revolt."(5)

After the end of this strike, upon the decision of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk RSDRP Committee, M. V. Frunze was sent to organize party work in the town of Shuya, where the sway of the SRs and Mensheviks was strong among the leadership of the party organization. The passivity and indecisiveness of the leaders had led to a situation where, although the Shuya workers had supported the strike in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, their action had not been sufficiently organized.

During the work in Shuya, Frunze (the new party alias of Arseniy [Arsenius]) did a great deal to increase the militance of the local party organization and skillfully passed on the experience of the struggle of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers. Self-education circles were organized for conducting exercises with the workers.

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Upon the proposal of M. V. Frunze, armed worker militias were organized in Shuya. The most aware and boldest workers were selected for the people's militia. Frunze worked out fighting manuals for the worker militias and these demanded unswerving fulfillment of orders, the observance of discipline and the study of military affairs. He organized the manufacturing of weapons and ammunition in special shops drawing on the forces and means of the workers themselves. Frunze himself constantly exercised at a firing range, he shot well and systematically taught this art to the militia members. The city police, learning of the strength of the organization of the Shuya militia members, were afraid of them and often did not even dare intervene in conducting the meetings.

In recalling his work among the workers, M. V. Frunze wrote: "One must be amazed by the colossal energy and the thirst for knowledge which the progressive workers showed. Employed for a large part of the day in heavy labor, in living and feeding themselves in the most impossible manner, they found sufficient force to attend illegal meetings, lectures, propaganda circles and organizational sessions. All of this occurred in a situation of constant danger of being apprehended, beaten or even killed. They met in the rain, in the snow, in the forests, in barns, storehouses and so forth."(6)

Speaking at the worker meetings were not only Bolsheviks but also SRs, Mensheviks and anarchists. In such debates it was impossible to make one's presence felt by reading a prepared text, in counting on quotations or one's position as a leader. In order to defend Bolshevik ideas and lead the working masses, vivid, convincing speeches were of course required.

In relying upon Leninist theses, M. V. Frunze was able in a clear and logical manner to set out the most complicated questions of the revolutionary struggle and the transformation of social life, in giving apt comparisons and cleverly repudiating the arguments of his enemies. Regardless of the fact that he had to speak several times a day, he prepared carefully for each speech.

M. V. Frunze also gave great attention to working with the student youth and peasantry in speaking long with young workers and former peasants who on Sundays went home to the countryside from the city.

The strikes which swept through the entire nation in the summer and autumn of 1905 and the mutiny on the battleship "Potemkin" marked a new upsurge in the revolutionary struggle. During the October All-Russian Political Strike, Frunze was again back in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. This time bands of the Black Hundred [a conservative political organization] had organized mass pogroms, round-ups and searches and cruelly beat persons suspected of belonging to revolutionary organizations. In order to decisively rebuff these provocations, Frunze acted in a very effective and openly military manner. Under the very difficult conditions, he was able not only to strengthen the actions of the militant worker militias of Ivanovo-Voznesensk but also shift here a portion of the worker militias from Shuya and Kokhma.

The police were constantly on the trail of Frunze and repeatedly endeavored to arrest him. He had to change his residence virtually every day. In October 1905, M. V. Frunze in returning from an underground party meeting at night was

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apprehended by a Cossack patrol and cruelly beaten. Having put a rope around his neck and then attached it to a saddle, the Cossacks forced the horse to gallop and dragged him for several versts unconscious.

The October All-Russian Political Strike brought the working class to the superior form of struggle, armed insurrection. On 7 December 1905, upon a decision of the Moscow Soviet, an armed insurrection was started by Moscow workers and this was picked up in many other cities. When this became learned of in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, upon the proposal of M. V. Frunze at a session of the Bolshevik Committee, it was decided to send a detachment of the people's militia to help the rebel Moscow workers. In a short period of time the militia members trained by him had been assembled from Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Shuya, Kokhma and other cities in Vladimir Province. The first detachment of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk militia headed by Frunze arrived in Moscow, it broke into Krasnaya Presnya and together with the Moscow workers for 9 days heroically fought against the Tsarist troops. However, the forces were unequal. Tsarist troops shifted from St. Petersburg and Warsaw sealed off all approaches to the city and the revolt was put down. In this most complex and seemingly hopeless situation, M. V. Frunze showed great courage, cool headedness, the ability to correctly assess the combat situation and high command qualities. With his detachment he succeeded in breaking through the solid ring of encirclement and return in an organized manner to Ivanovo-Voznesensk.

In April 1906, Frunze was elected a Bolshevik delegate to the Fourth RSDRP Congress in Stockholm. There he met with V. I. Lenin and had a long conversation with him. Vladimir Ilich approved the experience of establishing a "worker university" on the Talka River as well as the militia groups and the training of cadres for a future armed insurrection of the proletariat. The speeches of V. I. Lenin at the congress and contact with Bolshevik delegates from other regions of the city had an enormous impact on Frunze and they broadened and deepened his understanding of the tasks confronting the party as well as the tactics for actions in the further revolutionary struggle. Participation in the congress work gave him a new charge of enthusiasm and confidence in the correctness of the path he had chosen in working with the workers as well as methods for combating the Mensheviks and SRs.

In a report on the results of the congress at the Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Frunze explained Lenin's ideas on the careful, thorough preparation of the proletariat's armed action considering the experience of the 1905 revolution as well as on the need to skillfully combine legal and illegal forms and methods of the struggle of the working class in the new situation. He threw himself headlong into revolutionary work to organize the practical fulfillment of the congress decisions.

While after the 1905 revolution the Mensheviks had begun saying: "There is no need to resort to arms," the Leninist Bolsheviks drew the completely opposite conclusion: "We must resort to arms more decisively, energetically and offensively...."(7)

M. V. Frunze thoroughly and soundly analyzed the course of the Moscow armed insurrection and the actions of the people's militia during the strikes. He

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saw that the workers and the militia members had acted boldly and intrepidly but they clearly lacked military ability and organization. Experience again showed that the well organized military force of the Tsarist autocracy had to be opposed not only by revolutionary enthusiasm but by equally well organized and trained armed workers. For this reason, Frunze carefully generalized the experience of the barricade battles and strikes, the organization, training and actions of the worker militia.

In this context Frunze began to study military literature more tenaciously. He was particularly captivated by the profundity and at the same time inspired simplicity of the conclusions and discoveries of the book by F. Engels "Anti-Duhring" and in his other works on military questions. All military history and military campaigns and engagements took on a completely new light in the context of Marxist ideas. Much of what up to then had been confused and had engendered only hazy guesses now assumed a more profound sense. Random and seemingly contradictory events and phenomena gained an ordered and clear configuration subordinate to iron logic and objective laws. For example, it became clearer why the same armies and generals under some conditions won victories and under other suffered defeat. Hannibal who had won a famous victory at Cannae suffered a crushing defeat at Zama; Napoleon after a series of brilliant victories at the very height of military art was overtaken by major defeats. Wherein lay the source of invincibility for Suvorov, why did some generals win victories with smaller forces while other, regardless of a superiority in forces, were crushed? What were the reasons for the initial successes and the subsequent defeats of many armed revolts of the masses of people such as Spartacus, Pugachev, the Paris Commune and the Russian proletariat in 1905? From an analysis of the events of military history, an entire system of reasons for victories and defeats became apparent and these were related not only to the military conditions for waging war but also to the political and economic ones.

M. V. Frunze during the years of revolutionary struggle and in his subsequent periods of state and military activity reflected a great deal over all of this and more and more was convinced of the erroneousness of bourgeois theories which considered violence to be the prime factor determining all events and phenomena in social life. Historical experience, including the lessons of the just ended Russo-Japanese War, convincingly showed the correctness of the law discovered by Engels: material production is the determining factor in the development of society and in ensuring its military might. The influence of inspired military leaders at best is limited to the fact that they adapt to the method of waging battle to the new weapons and new fighters which have arisen in line with the new economic and sociopolitical conditions for waging war.

As often as any thinking person rereads these ideas of F. Engels he rediscovers them for himself, for life has constantly confirmed their truthfulness by ever-new facts.

A more profound study of Marxist literature on war and the army and the experience of the first Russian revolution evoked in M. V. Frunze an even more passionate thirst for military knowledge. He realized that a knowledge of the general patterns in the development of society and the revolutionary struggle

and the phenomena of war and the army, in providing dependable ideological and methodological guidelines, at the same time must be combined and complemented with specific knowledge in various areas including politics, economics, military science and by the gaining of revolutionary and military experience. He was evermore convinced that only by a profound study of Marxism-Leninism, military history and an analysis of events of contemporary reality would it be possible to elaborate a developed political and military thinking and learn to find correct solutions under the most complicated conditions of the revolutionary struggle and military engagements.

Frunze carefully analyzed the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, again and again he turned to study the life and activity of outstanding generals and military thinkers and he read articles from the "Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences," the works of Clausewitz, Leer, Maslovskiy, Astafyev, Vaskakov, Milyutin, Mikhnevich, Delbruck and other military theorists and figures of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries.

In December 1906, Frunze arrived in St. Petersburg for passing examinations in the polytechnical institute. In completely dedicating himself to intense revolutionary work full of hardship and anxiety, he still continued to zealously follow the institute curriculum and carefully prepared for the exam sessions. Of course he had to work basically at night. Up to 1907 (up to his arrest), Frunze had successfully passed the exams for the fourth year. This again shows how serious he was about his education and the mastery of scientific knowledge, showing constant will and tenacity. At the same time, this also shows his great abilities.

In January 1907, Frunze returned to Shuya and continued his revolutionary and party work. After a series of successfully conducted strikes, his authority as the party organization leader had increased even more. In the same year he was elected a delegate to the Fifth (London) Party Congress. However, soon thereafter he was arrested and was unable to participate in the congress. In a search of him they found party literature and a weapon.

Frunze's influence on the workers can be judged from the fact that he was arrested at 0600 hours and by 0900 hours all the plants and factories in Shuya had begun to strike with the demand to liberate Arsenius. The authorities were forced to request additional detachments of police and troops from other garrisons.

Frunze served his sentence at the Vladimir Central, where he was immediately elected a prisoner elder. In spite of the strictest bans, he organized protests against the arbitrariness of the prison authorities, he conducted political work among the arrested and taught the illiterate. He also was very concerned with self-education. For a long time he planned his escape but the attempt did not succeed.

For revolutionary activities, for attempting to escape and accused of attacking the policeman Perlov, Frunze in January 1909 was sentenced to death, put in irons and moved to death row. This was a severe testing of his will and endurance, particularly if it is considered that each night someone was led off to execution. But even then Frunze did not lose his self-possession.

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He demanded his books which had been taken away from him in sentencing; he continued studying English, following his rule of life that as long as a person remained alive he should study.

After a supplementary investigation in February 1910, Frunze was sentenced to 4 years of hard labor, but in September of the same year, as a result of a second court trial, he was again sentenced to death by hanging. However, under public pressure under the conditions of the growing worker movement, in October 1910, the death sentence was replaced by 6 years hard labor.

Frunze again prepared to escape from prison, but one of the prisoners betrayed him. Frunze was put in irons. His health was greatly undermined and he developed pulmonary tuberculosis. Regardless of this, he was moved to the Nikolayev Convict Prison known for its particularly harsh conditions. Heavy, fatiguing work lasted 12-14 hours a day and beatings were administered for failure to fulfill the norms.

Still here, too, he succeeded in obtaining books of interest to him on military questions as well as reading them. He worked out for himself a definite program and, in following it, endeavored as much as was possible to consistently study the history of the major wars and military art. When they refused to hand over the books, he announced a hunger strike. According to the memoirs of S. A. Sirotinskiy, among the books which Frunze demanded were English and French textbooks, books on the campaigns of Suvorov, Kutuzov, Napoleon, Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. There were also "Politicheskaya ekonomiya v svyazi s finansami" [Political Economy in Relation to Finances] by Khodskiy and "Vvedeniya v izucheniye prava i npravstvennosti" [Introduction to the Study of Law and Jurisprudence] by Pitrazhitskiy. When the books had been read, and there were never enough of them, he began to relate what he had read to his neighbors in the cell or to himself, quoting by memory excerpts from the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin. He knew entire excerpts from "Nauka pobezhdat" [The Science of Winning] by A. Suvorov and other manuals by him. He took a close interest in the course of the Balkan War which had broken out in 1912.

With complete justification N. Kolesnikov commented: "Any external manifestation of fear was repugnant and unnatural for Frunze. He did not believe that one could degrade oneself to such a degree. However precious life may be, what except for self-deprecation could come from a convulsive, senseless clinging to it? Moral superiority over the enemy was already a victory...."(8)

After 7 very difficult years spent in a convict prison, in 1914, Frunze was sent into exile by stages to Siberia. Along the way he was held at the Butyr Prison in Moscow as well as the Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk and Aleksandrov deportation prisons. The last moves were made on foot and this was unbearably hard for persons exhausted by long years of forced labor. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that as a sign of protest against the arbitrariness and bestial handling of the arrested persons by the prison authorities and guards, hunger strikes were repeatedly organized.

M. V. Frunze served his exile in the village of Manzurka, Verkholenskiy District of Irkutsk Province. In order to secure the means of existence, Frunze, like other exiles, was forced to work extensively in heavy physical labor.

Due to his activity, sociability and personal charm and, most importantly, to his experience in the revolutionary struggle, soon thereafter Frunze became an organizer of social life among the exiles. He did a great deal to help the sick and exhausted and the newly arrived comrades. In the village they organized lectures, they read abstracts and held meetings both with the exiles as well as local residents. Frunze ardently supported and explained Lenin's ideas on the imperialist war which had commenced and which was alien to the interests of the people and actively spoke out against defensive [that is, to defend Russia] attitudes.

The world war disclosed much that was new in the methods of conducting military operations. Mikhail Vasilyevich carefully followed the course of the first operations which were described in detail in the newspapers. With the receipt of each new paper, a stormy debate of military events commenced. Frunze kept a map of the theater of military operations, he analyzed the course of the operations and frequently correctly predicted their possible results. Many of his exile friends were amazed by his extensive military knowledge. But Mikhail Vasilyevich himself, as any person who thoroughly studies one or another question, the more he studied military questions the more he was convinced how much still had to be learned.

He scrimped in everything to subscribe to military books and journals from Irkutsk. What Frunze read on the history of wars and military arts, including in foreign languages, went beyond the range of a professor in a military academy. He always endeavored to describe what he had read to comrades and helped them acquire military knowledge. This, of course, contributed to a sounder assimilation of the knowledge. The military affairs circle organized by him for the exiles was called the "Military Academy." In a word, as a revolutionary of the Leninist school, he considered it essential to constantly master military knowledge. Frunze's successes in the study of military art were also aided by a profound analytical mind and great military talent which were inherent to him.

Regardless of the relatively tolerable conditions of existence, life in exile could not satisfy Frunze and being forced to remain on the sidelines depressed him. He longed for room for active revolutionary activities. He particularly wanted to reach the front area where, in his opinion, major political events were about to occur. He was constantly trying to escape. However, as a result of a raid by the police and a search of the apartments where the exiles lived, 14 persons, Frunze included, were arrested and sent to the Irkutsk Prison.

In August 1915, at one of the deportation points, Frunze succeeded in escaping. At Irkutsk, with the help of party comrades, he obtained documents in the name of Vasilenko and traveled to Chita, where he found work as an agent under the statistical department of the settlement administration. Traveling often, Mikhail Vasilyevich was able to contact and conduct political work among the

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workers and he participated in the work of the Chita RSDRP Committee. For a certain time he even gave public lectures on political and economic subjects and reviewed the situation in the theater of military operations; he was one of the editors of the sociopolitical journal VOSTOCHNOYE OBOZRENIYE [Eastern Review].

Such activity could not help but attract the attention of the police administration. Having learned of his pending arrest, M. V. Frunze decided to leave Siberia for European Russia. This step involved a great risk. But, having surmounted all difficulties, in April 1916 he made his way to Moscow and then to St. Petersburg. The party committee sent him to the Western Front where up to 1.5 million soldiers were concentrated. Moreover, at the military enterprises and bases in the West of the nation there were tens of thousands of workers mobilized from the industrial regions of the nation. Intensifying the work of the Bolshevik organizations in the front area had assumed great importance. V. I. Lenin, as is known, pointed to the necessity of providing serious propaganda and agitation among the soldiers and officers in preparing for armed insurrection and establishing military organizations in the RSDRP(b) [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (Bolshevik)].

Under the name of Mikhaylov, M. V. Frunze arrived in Minsk at the end of April and began serving in one of the sections of the Committee of the Western Front of the All-Russian Zemstvo Union. A revolutionary situation had developed in the nation and the stronger revolutionary mood in Minsk and other frontline cities was particularly apparent. No end could be seen to the war where hundreds of thousands of people senselessly lost their lives. The intolerable conditions of trench life, sickness and poor supply caused great bitterness and dissatisfaction among the soldiers. As a result of the continuous mobilizations, many persons opposed to the war ended up on the front and they brought with them the sad news of the hardships of the war which fell on the shoulders of the population, of hungry times, strikes at the plants and the devastation of the countryside. All of this contributed to the development of revolutionary work but it had to be well organized and directed into the necessary channel.

On the Western Front there was no organizationally formalized party center. For this reason, M. V. Frunze with his inherent energy, purposefulness and tenacity set to this work. Along with I. Ye. Lyubimov, A. F. Myasnikov and other comrades, he succeeded in establishing such a center and developing active political work among the soldiers and workers. The Bolsheviks showed that only by a revolution could the war be ended. The work in the zemstvo union provided Mikhail Vasilyevich with an opportunity to travel to the front. He succeeded in establishing underground party cells in the 3d and 10th Armies and in certain rear units.

However, it is essential to bear in mind that wartime laws were in effect in the front area and particularly strong police supervision had been established. For this reason, revolutionary activities were the most dangerous here and required great caution and strictest conspiracy. In order to be able to work among the soldiers directly on the front line, M. V. Frunze using the documents of some other person as a volunteer signed up for the 57th Artillery Brigade. But the extremely suspicious attitude shown toward him by

the brigade's command and the police caused him to return to the zemstvo union.

Work on the Western Front became an unique military academy for M. V. Frunze. Here with particular clarity he saw how the nature of the war was changing, subordinating all the life of the state and society to its own interests, how the boundary between the front and the rear was being obliterated and how the new technical means were altering the methods of conducting military operations, encompassing enormous territories and involving millions of people in bloody battle. He could not help but notice how the material requirements of the war were growing without restraint and what an enormous impact on the war was had by the attitude of the masses of people to the war and the moral-political state of the army caused by this.

In visiting the forward and rear units and coming into contact with many most diverse individuals, Frunze had an opportunity to gain a rather complete and dependable notion of the situation at the front and see with his own eyes the severe and fierce face of war.

In studying the course of military operations from the newspapers and other announcements, with his own sharp and attentive view he noticed that under approximately the same conditions of a solid, stationary front the Russian troops on the Western Front and the Germans at Verdun, regardless of the significant concentration of troops and enormous losses, had not been able to break through the defenses while A. A. Brusilov on the Southwestern Front had successfully carried out this mission but he had not been able to turn the operational-tactical success into a strategic one. Even then the question arose for Frunze: how to escape from this blind alley in the future? All these thoughts and observations came in useful for him during the period of the Civil War.

M. V. Frunze after a brief interruption because of illness returned to Minsk and continued working in the combat units of the Western Front where Bolshevik influence had grown stronger. When Minsk learned about the February Revolution in Petrograd and the overthrow of the Tsarist government, he summoned an emergency meeting of the leaders of the Bolshevik Initiative Center and representatives of the 3d and 10th Armies. The meeting adopted a decision to form soviets of worker and soldier deputies and these were bodies which should provide leadership over the revolutionary struggle.

On 4 March, the first legal meeting of the Minsk Bolsheviks and representatives from the party organizations of the Western Front units was held. M. V. Frunze gave a speech at the meeting on the present moment and the tasks of the proletariat. On 5 March at a meeting of the soviet of worker deputies, upon his proposal, a decision was adopted of establishing a people's militia from the workers to maintain revolutionary order. M. V. Frunze was elected its chief. In carrying out in practice Lenin's thesis concerning activity and decisiveness in the revolutionary struggle, he did everything to take the initiative and paralyze the actions of the counterrevolutionary forces. During the night of 5 March, a worker detachment under his leadership released the political prisoners from prison and disarmed the Minsk police.

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Here everything was carried out in such an organized, efficient and unexpected manner that the police were unable to put up any resistance.

On 8 March, the unified soviet of worker and soldier deputies was established in Minsk. This provided an impetus for the forming of soviets in many cities and population points of the province. Here M. V. Frunze made skillful use of the experience of establishing the soviets and combat militias in Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Shuya. The militia established by him comprised the basic nucleus of the Minsk revolutionary forces and was supported by detachments of armed workers.

V. I. Lenin on 20 April 1917, in an article "On the Proletarian Militia" published in the newspaper PRAVDA wrote that the establishing of a worker militia was of gigantic, crucial significance. "The revolution cannot be guaranteed and the success of its victories cannot be ensured and further development of it is impossible, if this measure does not become universal, is not carried to the end and realized throughout the country."(9)

Of enormous historical significance for the further development of the revolution and the activities of the Bolshevik party was the arrival of V. I. Lenin on 3 April 1917 in Petrograd and his April Theses which outlined the specific ways for moving from a bourgeois democratic revolution to a socialist revolution.

Proceeding from Lenin's ideas, M. V. Frunze devoted particular attention to strengthening Bolshevik influence on all the worker organizations and winning over the masses of soldiers to the side of the revolution. Of great importance in this context was the establishing of soldier committees which were to assume leadership over all army formations and units. Frunze with a group of comrades traveled to the forward positions of the Western Front and there organized the fraternizing of Russian and German soldiers. He approached the German positions and spoke before the Russian and German soldiers. When the Provisional Government took the decision to continue the war and to go over to the offensive, the Minsk Bolsheviks did a great deal to thwart this offensive.

After the July events in Petrograd and the collapse of the offensive on the front, dual rule came to an end. The counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie, having seized power, dealt fiercely with the Bolsheviks and the revolutionary soldiers. A military dictatorship was established on the front. Mass arrests started of the members of the soldier committees. The Bolshevik party now set out to prepare for armed revolt.

In this very complex situation Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze worked days without end: he visited many population points and troop units, he spoke several times a day to the workers, soldiers and peasants, urging the overthrow of the bourgeois government and the transfer of all power to the revolutionary proletariat. The indefatigable activities among the peasants made Frunze their generally recognized ideological leader. The Bolsheviks began to receive ever-greater support from the peasants. In July 1917, the Second Congress of Peasant Deputies from Minsk and Vilna Provinces elected Frunze its chairman, regardless of the opposition of the SRs and Mensheviks.

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At the end of August, a counterrevolutionary move was commenced by Kornilov. He moved the troops of the Western Front most loyal to the bourgeois government against revolutionary Petrograd. The Bolshevik Party headed by V. I. Lenin raised the masses of people to fight against the counterrevolution. On 28 August 1917, the Provisional Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Western Front to Combat Kornilov and the Staff of the Revolutionary Troops of the Minsk Area were established. Direct leadership over the struggle against the counterrevolutionary revolt on the Western Front was entrusted to M. V. Frunze.

Mikhail Vasilyevich, in knowing the disposition of the troops of the Western Front, organized the actions of the revolutionary forces skillfully and with a good understanding of the situation. During these critical days, the detachments of the Minsk police and the worker militia trained by him acted outstandingly.

First of all they surrounded the major railroad junctions and stations (Minsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Bobruysk and Gomel) and instituted control over the movement of troops by rail. Frunze's headquarters constantly received reports and information on the movement of the Kornilov troops. Frunze also maintained constant contact with the soldier committees of the troop units. All of this made it possible to take prompt measures to parry the actions of the Kornilov troop. Having received information on the movement of the Wild Division against Orsha by rail, M. V. Frunze called on S. M. Budennyi who was the chairman of the regimental committee and deputy chairman of the divisional committee of the Caucasian Cavalry Division and through him saw to it that the Wild Division was unloaded from the cars. In approximately the same manner, the movement of many other Kornilov units against Petrograd was checked.

As a result of the energetic activities by the Bolshevik organizations in Belorussia and on the Western Front and the decisive actions of the worker militias and police established by Frunze, the Tsarist ploy was paralyzed and the dispatch of troops from the Western Front to Petrograd was thwarted. This contributed to the rapid defeat of the Kornilov counterrevolutionary coup.

For more than a year, M. V. Frunze worked on the Western Front and in Minsk and there gained great and merited authority, proving himself to be a major political leader. His fame as an unbending and courageous revolutionary, a gold and valorous fighter, an able political leader and organizer of the masses became widespread.

After the defeat of the Kornilov coup in 1917, the party again sent M. V. Frunze to Shuya, where by this time around 20,000 troops were deployed. An enormous mass of workers assembled to meet him at the station. A meeting was held. The city streets were full of people. In speaking to the workers, Frunze urged them to rally around the Bolshevik Party and to fight for the true liberation of the workers.

In September at a city meeting of the Shuya Bolsheviks, Frunze was elected the secretary of the party committee. He initiated extensive organizational work to prepare for armed revolt and constantly carried out the line of seizing power on the spot, not waiting until this would happen at the center. He gave

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particular attention to the formation and training of the Red Guard detachments. Regardless of his enormous busyness, he found time to conduct systematic military exercises personally with them.

Political work among the peasantry was intensified. As a result, the soviet of peasant deputies which prior to this had been under the influence of the SRs, in September went over to the side of the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks also won a victory in the elections to the zemstvo and city administrations. Thus, as M. V. Frunze recalled, even 1.5-2 months prior to the October Revolt the dictatorship of the proletariat had actually been established throughout the Ivanovo-Voznesensk area.

The news of the victory of the armed insurrection in Petrograd was greeted with great joy in Shuya and Ivanovo-Voznesensk. "I do not recall," wrote M. V. Frunze, "a single instance of protest or dissatisfaction from any groups whatsoever. All the opponents of the coup among the intelligentsia and the urban petty bourgeoisie could not say a word contrary with the mood which existed among the people. Certainly the coup in Shuya occurred without the shedding of a drop of blood, without a single shot being fired."(10)

When news was received from Moscow on street battles in the city against government troops, Frunze, as the chairman of the Revolutionary Committee, issued orders to the chief of the Shuya Garrison for dispatching three draft companies with weapons to aid the Moscow workers. The Shuya detachment numbering around 900 persons arrived in Moscow and it included not only soldiers but also worker militia. Even before this Frunze himself had left for Moscow in order to clarify the situation and direct the detachment's actions.

After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the party and people were confronted with a completely new task of strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat, defending the revolution's victories and building a new, socialist society. Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze threw himself into this work as the leader of the party organization and the chairman of the soviet of worker, soldier and peasant deputies of Shuya.

In line with the opening of actions against the young Soviet Republic by German imperialism and the intensification of counterrevolutionary forces, the question arose of establishing the Worker-Peasant Red Army [RKKA]. The establishing of one of the first detachments of the new army from workers and soldiers of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk area, was entrusted to M. V. Frunze. Later, on the basis of this detachment, the 57th Shuya Regiment of the Red Army was organized.

At the end of March 1918, the party sent M. V. Frunze to Ivanovo-Voznesensk where he was elected the chairman of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Provincial Executive Committee. Soon thereafter he became also the secretary of the district party committee. This was a difficult time in the establishing of Soviet power on the spot. Hunger raged through the nation and it was particularly sharply felt in Ivanovo-Voznesensk Province which was supplied chiefly by imported grain. M. V. Frunze devoted a great deal of attention to establishing food detachments and to seeking out other sources for acquiring

grain for the workers. In accord with the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars [SNK] of 28 June 1918, enormous work was carried out to nationalize and organize industrial operations. In the aim of training personnel for the textile industry from the workers, Mikhail Vasilyevich in 1918 worked to open a polytechnical institute in Ivanovo-Voznesensk.

As throughout the party, in February-March 1918, fierce debates were conducted in the Ivanovo-Voznesensk party organization on the question of concluding the Brest Peace. The severe conditions of this treaty caused universal indignation. M. V. Frunze underestimated the danger of the position of the "leftist communists" who were against the signing of the peace and did not immediately understand all the complexity of the existing military-political situation and the fatal consequences of continuing the war against Germany for the cause of the revolution. He assumed that the situation was still not hopeless and it was essential to go and fight whatever the cost. Regardless of his enormous political experience, in the given instance the military aspect of the thinking of M. V. Frunze took an upper hand over higher political considerations. At one of the sessions of the Fourth Extraordinary Congress of Soviets in March 1918, he abstained from voting in the ratification of this treaty, having not immediately grasped all the wisdom and farsightedness of Lenin's political line. Subsequently, Mikhail Vasilyevich profoundly realized the erroneousness of his views and sincerely recognized the correctness of Lenin's position on the question of concluding the Brest Peace.

In July 1918, M. V. Frunze participated in the work of the Fifth Congress of Soviets during which the leftist SRs revolted. All the Bolshevik delegates were thrown into suppressing the revolt in various areas of Moscow. Frunze led the actions of the first Moscow military courses [cadets] in the area of Kursk Station and the Pokrovskiy Barracks. Here one could see his ability to rapidly master the situation and by intelligent actions and efficiency take command over the various groups of workers and soldiers involved in suppressing the revolt.

On the following day, 7 July, the White Guard revolt in Yaroslavl became known. Upon the recommendation of Ya. M. Sverdlov, all the Yaroslavl delegates returned home and Frunze went back to Ivanovo-Voznesensk to mobilize the forces with the aim of providing help in suppressing the revolt. Within 24 hours he had succeeded in organizing, arming and dispatching to Yaroslavl a combat detachment numbering 400 men and later additional detachments of communists and workers from Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Shuya, Kineshma and Teykovo were dispatched there. But Frunze did not limit himself to this. He sent persons to Yaroslavl to study the situation and having learned about the insufficiently organized and indecisive actions to suppress the revolt, he wrote a letter to the commander of the Moscow Military District N. I. Muralov with specific proposals to accelerate the elimination of the revolt.

PRAVDA on 16 July 1918 wrote: "At a critical, terrible moment for the revolution the Ivanovo-Voznesensk communist organization was up to the situation and showed iron discipline, organization and the ability with a firm proletarian hand to completely defend the cause of proletarian revolution and socialism."

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On 11 August 1918, at the Ivanovo-Voznesensk District Party Conference which discussed the question of mobilizing the communists in relation to the Czechoslovak counterrevolutionary coup, a decision was taken to recommend M. V. Frunze to the post of military commissar of the Yaroslavl Military District. To the request from the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars on this question, Ya. M. Sverdlov highly praised the political and professional qualities of M. V. Frunze and the party sent him into military work for which he had prepared himself, in essence, all his life. On 22 November 1918, at a session of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Provincial Committee, M. V. Frunze was simultaneously elected the chairman of the provincial committee.

The Yaroslavl Military District (after the suppression of the coup in Yaroslav, the district headquarters was shifted to Ivanovo-Voznesensk) included eight provinces: Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Vladimir, Severo-Dvina, Kostroma, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Tver and Yaroslavl. In terms of the scale and nature of activities and the missions carried out, the position of military commissar was essentially the position of the military district commander. F. F. Novitskiy, who worked at the headquarters of this district, correctly noted that M. V. Frunze in this position was not only the leader of all military administrative work but was simultaneously the main chief, that is, the district commander. His personal volitional and command qualities and his profound Marxist training as a widely informed political leader represented an ideal combination of qualities required of a major commander, while his revolutionary task was the soundest guarantee of his support among the masses.

In order to organize work over the extensive territory of the Yaroslavl Military District, he first of all began by recruiting and training personnel for directing the most important areas both within the district staff as well as on the spot. It must be said that Frunze always had a special feeling for professional and capable persons. He could not only find them, but also select a suitable job for each. He showed greatest concern in training commanders who were communists from the workers and peasants and without whom it would have been impossible to fill the basic positions with skilled cadres and establish a battleworthy army.

In the aim of accelerating the training of command and political cadres for the formations and units being organized, Frunze established special courses. At these courses he himself frequently conducted exercises, continuing to work tenaciously at improving his own military knowledge. He was also obliged to do this by the preparations for the exercises, particularly with the command and supervisory personnel of the courses and units being organized. Until late at night he sat over his books and maps.

As was already pointed out, M. V. Frunze was involved in military affairs, taking a direct part in the armed struggle against the Tsarist autocracy and heading the armed actions of the proletariat. But, having become a major military leader, he set to studying military art with particular zeal and primarily the experience of World War I. The demand of V. I. Lenin for the proletariat to seriously study military affairs became a law for Frunze. He studied the works not only of Russian military theorists but also foreign ones. From memory he could schematically reproduce on paper or a classroom

blackboard the campaigns and engagements of the past as well as the Russo-Turkish, Russo-Japanese and First World wars. Here he was not afraid to seek advice and had long conversations on the most complicated operational-strategic and military-tactical questions with specialists from the old Russian Army. On these questions he was greatly aided by the former general of the Tsarist Army F. F. Novitskiy.

M. F. Frunze belonged among those leaders who are not threatened by intelligent and capable subordinates and associates and who value and are able to spot any manifestation of initiative and creativity by them. He never endeavored to show that only he had thought up all the good ideas, he did not hide or leave on the sidelines those with whom he worked out one or another question. For this reason in any collective which was led by Mikhail Vasilyevich, a situation of good will, a spiritual upswing and creative cooperation was always established and when people successfully complement one another in what they are able to do best of all. For example, Frunze and Novitskiy complemented one another very well and with great benefit for the cause during their work in the Yaroslavl Military District and later on the Eastern and Turkestan Fronts.

The precise operation of the Yaroslavl Military District assumed particularly great importance due to the fact that the district was the immediate rear of the Northern and Eastern Fronts and supplied these with human and material resources. In carrying out the decisions of the party and the Fifth Congress of Soviets concerning the organization of a regular RKKA, Frunze initiated enormous political and military organizational work on the district territory. From September 1918 through February 1919, just in Ivanovo-Voznesensk Province over 70,000 persons were mobilized. The district fielded 2 divisions, separate units and dispatched to the front some 65 draft companies for the operational army. The organizing of these formations and units involved great difficulties, for not only were there not enough trained cadres but also weapons, supplies and other materiel. Extraordinary measures were required even to the point of requisitioning lacking supplies from the local bourgeoisie as well as great organizational abilities to seek out all of this and ensure the carrying out of the set missions.

Frunze visited many military commissariats which were carrying out the most important missions and he sent out his closest associates for supervising and providing help on the spot. Being extremely attentive to others, he at the same time showed great exactingness for himself and for subordinates. Even at that difficult time when the new army was just being established, he worked decisively against sloppiness in dress and violations of patrol duty. He demanded systematic holding of exercises and training with the units being organized, including drill exercises. Even then he had an amazingly profound and precise understanding of the specific features of military service and primarily such a particular feature of it where the entire process of military instruction and indoctrination should be constantly tested against what would be needed against actual combat.

In accord with the instructions of V. I. Lenin and the party Central Committee, Frunze devoted great attention to universal military instruction

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for the populace and constantly saw to it that each citizen of the Soviet Republic was ready to defend the socialist fatherland with weapons in hand.

All this diverse work was carried out unconditionally under the leadership of the party committees and the bodies of Soviet power and with the active participation of all the party organizations and communists. The achievement of M. V. Frunze was primarily in the fact that he was one of the most convinced, able, disciplined and creative executors of the decisions and will of the party and the Soviet state and at the same time, as an active party fighter, he was able to work with the party and soviet bodies, to rely on them and direct their efforts in carrying out major tasks.

On the fronts of the Civil War. By the start of 1919, the Soviet Republic, surrounded on all sides by enemies, continued to remain in a fiery ring of fronts the total length of which reached 8,000 km. After their victory over Germany, the Entente nations increased their intervention against the Soviet nation. In considering the failure of their first campaign, they decided to organize a new campaign against Soviet Russia but now on a broader scale. They planned to launch concentric attacks aimed at the republic's capital, Moscow, and the main thrust from the east. In this context, in the spring of 1919, a particularly difficult situation had arisen on the Eastern Front, where the grouping of Kolchak troops numbering over 300,000 men with 211 guns and 1,300 machine guns was opposed by our troops numbering a little more than 100,000 soldiers, 370 guns and 1,182 machine guns (Diagram 1).

In going over to the offensive, Kolchak endeavored to throw the Soviet troops back behind the Volga, to capture this important line and cut off the center of Russia from the lines of communications providing supply from the south, and capture the grain reserves of the Volga and Urals. The Eastern Front again, as in the summer of 1918, became the main front of the Soviet Republic. In the "Theses of the RKP(b) Central Committee in Relation to the Situation on the Eastern Front" written by V. I. Lenin it was demanded that all the forces and revolutionary energy of the working masses be focused on the defeat of Kolchak and on liberating the Volga, the Urals and Siberia. As a result of the party, Komsomol and trade union mobilizations, the troops of the Eastern Front received 15,000 communists, 3,000 Komsomol members and 25,000 trade union members.(11)

Many prominent leaders of our party and the Soviet state were assigned to the front. M. V. Frunze was also among these. Considering his high military and organizational qualities, the party Central Committee decreed to appoint M. V. Frunze to the post of commander of the 4th Army of the Eastern Front. The Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers bid fond farewell to their recognized leader and sent with him to the front a military detachment organized from communists and progressive workers.

At the end of January 1919, M. V. Frunze assumed command of the 4th Army. Everyone knew him as an intrepid and dedicated revolutionary and a man of outstanding organizational and military administrative abilities. Of course, this meant a great deal. But in order to successfully command an army on the front, it was also essential to have developed operational-strategic thinking, the ability to quickly analyze a complex situation and a knowledge of the

principles of operational and tactical leadership of the troops, the forms and methods of preparing and conducting operations and troop command under the conditions of the rapidly and unexpectedly changing situation in the course of the Civil War. And in all justice it must be admitted that, regardless of the most difficult conditions under which Frunze had to operate, for all these qualities he surpassed the most optimistic expectations of his friends.

The generalship activities of M. V. Frunze on the fronts of the Civil War have been widely and thoroughly examined in our literature, and these are convincingly reflected in his orders and instructions to the troops. For this reason the author would like to take up only certain aspects of his practical work during this period and which are of substantial significance for the shaping of his military theoretical views.

From the very outset of his generalship activities, Frunze above all draws attention by the profound and organic combining of the political and purely military or operational aspects of the question in his decisions and actions. This was exceptionally important under the Civil War conditions. After the issuing of a combat order, each time when the situation allowed, he endeavored in a comprehensible manner to explain the importance and significance of the mission to be carried out, turning not only to the commanders and commissars but also directly to the Red Army masses. He combined military operations to decisively defeat the enemy with delicate and skillful work to break down the enemy and win away confused elements of the workers from the White Guards. This was most clearly apparent in measures related to the Urals Cossacks and the population of Turkestan Kray. He devoted special attention to the strengthening of military discipline, order and organization.

On the questions of establishing a regular, disciplined army, he consistently carried out Lenin's theses voiced at the Eighth RKP(b) Congress and was against the military opposition which defended partisan methods.

By the time M. V. Frunze arrived at the Eastern Front, the military-political and strategic situation there was difficult. The imperialist states had begun a new anti-Soviet campaign by the united forces of the domestic counterrevolution and the foreign intervention concentrating their main efforts against the Eastern Front. The Kolchak troops, going over to the offensive, were advancing toward the Volga.

The 4th Army of the Eastern Front numbering a total of 17,000 men was assigned for operations on the Turkestan sector and occupied a front around 350 km long. The army formations consisted basically of Red Guard and partisan detachments, they were poorly armed, under strength and poorly trained in combat terms. Many commanders still had not overcome their partisan attitudes and they underestimated the military specialists and generally military training and discipline. There were frequent instances when the soldiers removed commanders and appointed others; questions of going over to an offensive or holding one or another point were discussed at meetings; a designated attack was arbitrarily put off. In the climate of unbridled anarchy in certain units there were counterrevolutionary actions by kulak [rich peasant] and SR elements who, in maintaining contact with the Whites, refused to carry out the command's orders for an offensive. Individual units

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went over to the enemy side. In the Orel-Kurilov Regiment, the commander and commissar were murdered. Somewhat later, the new commissar of this regiment, N. Chistyakov, and the RVS [revolutionary military council] member of the 4th Army, G. D. Lindov, were cruelly killed. Such units with poor discipline and their ranks full of vacillating and sometimes even hostile elements opposed the crack Kolchak troops and the counterrevolutionary Cossacks under the command of experienced generals and officers.

Under such conditions it was impossible to immediately commence effective actions. The new commander had first of all to make these troops controllable, to strengthen their discipline and bring them into a battleworthy state. At the same time it was essential to be concerned with preparations for the operation. For this reason, upon taking over the army, its new commander devoted particular attention to political work in the troops and to the strengthening of military discipline.

M. V. Frunze demonstrated an exceptionally profound understanding of the importance of not only political but also military indoctrination for the Red Armymen and commanders. He skillfully combined methods of persuasion with high commander exactingness. The army commander was unswerving in carrying out his own decisions. He took decisive measures to check the anarchy and disorder. In the worst units a majority of the commanders and political workers was replaced and some of them reduced in grade. Taking their places were young, energetic and disciplined Red commanders from the workers and peasants. At the same time, the experience and knowledge of the old military specialists were skillfully used.

Due to exceptional tenacity, unbending will and great organizational abilities, Frunze was able in a short period of time to alter the situation in the army and significantly increase its battleworthiness.

This provided an opportunity not only to stop the enemy but also to launch a powerful counterstrike. The carrying out of this counterstrike involved a major risk, but due to the establishing of a strong assault grouping and decisive actions, it was brilliantly executed. Under the most difficult conditions, M. V. Frunze was able to exploit the success, to prepare and successfully carry out an offensive operation to defeat the large grouping of White Guard troops and liberate Urals Oblast.

In the generalship traits of M. V. Frunze in conducting this operation, one important circumstance merits attention. The command of the front ahead of the 4th Army was given the mission of preventing the enemy from reaching the routes leading to the Middle Volga in the sector of Samara, Syzran. From the standpoint of the formal concepts of military art, in this situation defensive operations would have been most effective and this actually was demanded from the army from above. But, considering the specific features of the military-political and operational-strategic situation, Frunze was convinced that the stubborn defense of the most important areas had to be combined with active offensive operations. This idea was correct, for such actions increased the fighting spirit of our troops and had a demoralizing effect on the enemy. Regardless of the extent of the front, the threat of an enemy breakthrough and the shortage of his own forces, Frunze was able to concentrate significant

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forces on the crucial sectors. He succeeded in undertaking a number of active operations coming out in the enemy's flank and rear, using gaps in the enemy battle formations. On the question of the operations of the 4th Army, the commander of the Eastern Front S. S. Kamenev commented: "The work of your army surpassed all expectations, the only bright page from the present days of the front."(12)

F. F. Novitskiy thus described the activities of Frunze in the position of army commander: "From the very first days of his combat service, having immediately taken up the major post of army commander, that is, a post which in the old times would have been attained at the end of one's military career, Mikhail Vasilyevich immediately began to carry out his combat work in the full sense of the word brilliantly and according to all the laws and rules of military science."(13)

However, as a whole the situation on the Eastern Front remained difficult. In line with the growing threat, the party Central Committee as before considered the Eastern Front to be the main one and focused its basic efforts on the defeat of the Kolchak Army. M. V. Frunze was appointed the commander of the Southern Group of Forces of the Eastern Front and this group consisted of four armies. Regardless of the bad situation, he constantly sought to intensify operations using the entire group of forces. As a result of carefully conducted reconnaissance and a profound assessment of the situation, Frunze took a bold decision to launch a strike from the Buzuluk area against the flank and rear of the main grouping of Kolchak's western army.

Preparations for the operation were carried out in a maximum short time. The troop regrouping and the organizing of the assault grouping in the Buzuluk area were carried out in a situation where the enemy was continuing the offensive and our troops were retreating. Yet even under these conditions, all the preparatory measures were carried out in a profoundly planned and most careful manner.

Frunze skillfully combined the work involved in planning the operation with practical work for training the troops. He was fully aware that the adopting of the plan and the issuing of combat orders were just the start of preparing for the operation and he carried out enormous organizational work to implement the measures in accord with the set plans. He gave particular importance to reconnaissance and to a constant knowledge of the enemy's position. He visited the units which were to carry out the most responsible tasks and he carefully watched the execution of the issued orders, the transporting of ammunition and the preparing of the lines of communications, showing in this unshakable firmness, consistency and strong exactingness in carrying out his plans. In preparing the operation he did a great deal to bring the troops up to strength and improve their supply. He sent to the most undependable units worker detachments which had been sent to help him from Ivanovo-Voznesensk. In considering that the troops of his armies would be basically opposed by the Orenburg and Urals White Cossacks and under the conditions of the absence of a solid front, he took measures to increase troop mobility and for this purpose organized new cavalry units, confiscating horses in a number of instances from the rifle and rear units. Along with V. V. Kuybyshev and other party workers,

he conducted great political work in the troops as well as among the population of the front area.

In carrying out all the measures to prepare for the operation, the commander made certain that the plan for the operation was kept secret and he promptly purged the rear of the operational army of counterrevolutionary elements. From the viewpoint of the operational situation, the moment for going over to the offensive on the southern sector of the front was rather successfully chosen as the Kolchak troops were drawn out and had still not regrouped to launch new attacks. Initially S. S. Kamenev even assumed that the commander of the Southern Group was in too great a hurry but then supported Frunze's idea of a rapid preparation for launching the counterstrike against the flank of the Kolchak troops as this idea seemed not only bold but also completely sound. When A. A. Samoylo who was appointed instead of S. S. Kamenev to the position of front commander endeavored to halt the offensive by the troops of the Southern Group, M. V. Frunze showed exceptional principledness and successfully defended his conviction of the need to continue the offensive. In difficult and most crucial moments he had repeatedly turned directly to V. I. Lenin and received support from him. And this time as well, V. I. Lenin supported Frunze, demanding the further development of the offensive and the rapid capturing of the entire Urals.

In recalling the situation at that time after the Civil War, M. V. Frunze said: "The Kolchak troops had already advanced right up to the Volga; we were scarcely holding Orenburg which was surrounded on three sides; the army defending it constantly was trying to retreat; to the south of Samara the Urals Cossacks had broken through the front and were advancing to the north, threatening Samara and the Samara--Orenburg railroad. We were retreating almost everywhere.... It required not only colossal will but also a strong conviction that only the going over to the offensive would alter the situation.... Regardless of everything, we went over to the offensive and commenced a brilliant operation which led to the complete defeat of Kolchak." (14)

Thus, the well conceived, boldly and decisively carried out counteroffensive was crowned with success. In the course of three successively conducted operations--the Buguruslan, Belebey and Ufa--the troops of the Southern Group under the command of M. V. Frunze dealt a major defeat to the enemy (Diagram 2).

In the course of the operation, M. V. Frunze employed methods of troop command which were progressive for those times. During the period of World War I the commanders and staffs of the fronts and the armies usually were a great distance away from the troops, they were late in receiving situational data and for this reason were unable to promptly respond to changes in the situation. Some of the staff workers who were old specialists endeavored to employ these methods also during the period of the Civil War. M. F. Frunze decisively rejected such practices of troop command and control. During the period of developing the offensive and in other active combat operations, he endeavored to be closer to the troops. For this purpose he assigned from the staff personnel an operations group (field staff) which ensured effective troop command for the commander. He could often be seen in the attacking

extended lines, at the most dangerous places. By his own example he inspired the commanders and Red Armymen, demonstrating personal braveness and intrepidity. On 9 June 1919, at the Battle of Ufa, the commander's horse was killed underneath him and he himself received a concussion, but regardless of this, continued to remain on the battlefield.

The Soviet government, in high recognition of M. V. Frunze's actions to defeat the enemy, appointed him commander of the Eastern Front. Under Frunze's leadership, the success of the Southern Group developed into a general counteroffensive by the troops of the entire front. As a result, the Kolchak armies were defeated and their remnants thrown back beyond the Urals.

During his activities on the Eastern Front, M. V. Frunze showed himself to be an outstanding military leader of the Leninist school. He worked in close collaboration with such remarkable figures and military leaders as V. V. Kuybyshev, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, F. F. Novitskiy and D. M. Karbyshev as well as many other commanders and commissars. Of the combat commanders, he particularly valued V. I. Chepayev. D. A. Furmanov has written vividly and aptly about this: "And along with them (Frunze and Kuybyshev.--M. G.) were the inseparable, the loyal and the best whom only Frunze could find, know and esteem such as Fedor Fedorovich Novitskiy.... These were the raw material for Frunze and Kuybyshev and from this precious raw material they extracted the most essential, from this extract they created their plans and from the plans they stitched together the mighty net into which Kolchak was to fall.

"...Frunze knew how to choose his assistants. You could not doze with Frunze as he could get inside you, mobilize every bit of your mind, will and energy, galvanize you to action and force your heart to beat and your thoughts to move in time with his. Anyone who has worked with Frunze will recall and know with what unabated joy he completely and totally devoted his thoughts, feelings and energy during those extraordinary days."(15)

With the splitting of the Eastern Front into the Eastern and Turkestan, M. V. Frunze assumed command of the Turkestan Front. The spring and summer of 1919 were one of the most critical periods in the course of the Civil War. After the defeat of the basic Kolchak forces, the imperialists of the Entente placed their main hopes on Denikin in the aim of launching the main thrust against the Soviet Republic from the south. The RKP(b) Central Committee, upon the initiative of V. I. Lenin, on 9 July turned to the party and all the workers with the letter "Everyone Into the Struggle Against Denikin!"

The Turkestan Front was given the mission of primarily completing the defeat of the Southern Kolchak Army and providing aid to the Southern Front of the Red Army and to prepare and conduct an operation to liberate Turkestan. The appointment of M. V. Frunze to the Turkestan Front was not accidental as he had a good knowledge of the local conditions and the life of the peoples. Napoleon at one time said to his suite: Wherever you are, study the terrain as possibly you may have to fight on it. From this viewpoint a knowledge of Turkestan came in very handy to Frunze.

The troops of the Turkestan Front during this period were spread out from the Caspian Sea to the eastern regions of the Southern Urals. The new commander

sought to concentrate the main forces of the front on the crucial sectors and carried out a series of rapid offensive operations against the White Guard troops. As a result, economically very important regions were liberated from the enemy.

V. I. Lenin closely followed the support for coordinated actions of the Southern and Turkestan Fronts. He paid basic attention to preventing the link-up of the Denikin troops beyond the Volga with the Urals White Cossacks. For this reason he demanded that Frunze maintain constant supervision over this dangerous sector. In carrying out Lenin's instructions, Frunze personally traveled to the staff of the Special Group of the Southern Front and to the formations of the 11th Army fighting on the adjacent flank of this front, he saw to their close cooperation and organized the launching of a strike against Wrangel's Cossack Army.

In actions against the Urals White Cossacks, Frunze skillfully considered their attachment to population points. In defeating the White Cossack Army of Gen Tolstov, he demanded that his troops "remember that the aim of the actions is to deprive the enemy of its base and thereby force it to abandon further struggle." (16) And then he gave instructions on how to do this: "In order to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to organize and continue resistance, it is now essential to throw him back into the steppe, having occupied all the inhabited area along both banks of the Ural River." (17)

As a result of conducting the Aktyubinsk Operation, the troops of the Turkestan Front surrounded and completely routed Kolchak's southern army. Around 55,000 men alone were taken prisoner. Very indicative also was the Bukhara Operation carried out under the direct leadership of M. V. Frunze. Well organized reconnaissance, bold maneuvering, the successful choice of the moment for the assault, decisive and active operations combined with skillful political work in the units as well as active propaganda in the enemy troops made it possible to defeat the forces of the Bukhara emir. In a short period of time also defeated were the counterrevolutionary troops and the Basmack detachments in the Semirechye area, in the regions of Fergana, Khiva and Karsnovodsk as well as other regions of Turkestan (Diagram 3).

During the period of his command over the Turkestan Front, not only the generalship talent of M. V. Frunze was brilliantly apparent but also his talent as a political organizer and a keen diplomat who could thoroughly analyze the intricacies of the complex military-political situation which then existed in Turkestan.

Considering the complex political and military situation in Turkestan, upon the proposal of V. I. Lenin, the party Central Committee in September 1919 approved a decision to send a governmental commission to Turkestan and M. V. Frunze was to be a member of this. This commission carried out great work to provide help to the local party and soviet bodies in the struggle against the bourgeois nationalists and other anti-Soviet elements, to strengthen the unity of the party ranks, to carry out Lenin's nationality policy, to involve the local population in active sociopolitical life and economic construction and to organize national formations and units which were loyal to Soviet power. With the active involvement of M. V. Frunze, a new constitution was worked out

for the Turkestan republic and this was adopted in September 1920 by the Ninth Congress of Turkestan Soviets.

M. V. Frunze devoted particular attention to rebuilding the fuel supply. While engaged intensely in directing combat operations of the Turkestan Front, he found the time to visit mines, plants, and factories, seeking to return them to operation. All enterprises involved in the extraction and production of fuel as well as railroads were put under marshal law. In accord with the SNK decree signed by V. I. Lenin, Frunze was also largely concerned with the questions of expanding the irrigation system and cotton raising. He gave great importance to training national military cadres. For their instruction, at the Tashkent Infantry School, a special department was opened for 200 persons and at the Turkestan State University a military faculty was founded. Some 500 communists from the indigenous nationalities were sent into the units being organized.

All these measures initiated under the leadership of M. V. Frunze led to a fundamental improvement in the military-political situation in Turkestan and created favorable conditions for the subsequent socialist transformations.

In the autumn of 1920, the strategic situation was sharply aggravated in the south of the Soviet Republic. The Wrangel Army armed by English and French imperialists had gone over to the offensive. Upon the decision of the party Central Committee, the Southern Front was organized. V. I. Lenin forwarded a note to the republic RVS, proposing that Frunze be appointed commander of the Southern Front: "Frunze should be appointed commander of the front opposite Wrangel and this should be done now. I asked Frunze to talk with you sooner. Frunze said that he has studied Wrangel's front, he has prepared himself for this front and knows (from Urals Oblast) the means for fighting against the Cossacks."(18)

Having assumed the position of the commander of the front, Mikhail Vasilyevich first of all abandoned the passive defensive for repelling the attacks by the Wrangel troops and himself organized a series of active operations in the aim of improving the held positions. Within a short period of time, he had regrouped the troops and prepared an offensive operation. The troops of the front, in going over to the offensive, routed the enemy in Northern Tauria. But Wrangel pulled back his remaining troops into the Crimea and there created strongly fortified positions. Frunze headed the elaboration and organization of the offensive operation by the Southern Front to cross Sivash Bay and break through the deeply echeloned and heavily fortified enemy defenses (Diagram 4).

This offensive operation was prepared for thoroughly, covertly and carefully. It should be pointed out that Frunze even on the way from Tashkent to Moscow and in preparing for the operation studied closely all the existing military historical documents relating to military operations on the Crimean Peninsula as well as the military geographic references. He was particularly attentive to the experience of the Russian troops in 1737-1738, when they outflanked the Perekop positions from the east, crossing to the peninsula at the mouth of the Salgir River.

As in organizing other operations, the commander of the front skillfully combined boldness and breadth of operational-strategic thinking with the detailed elaboration of specific tactical questions related to the crossing of the Sivash, the breaking through of the defenses, map work for planning the operation with organizational and political work in the troops. One must note the fortuitous choice of the sector of the main thrust, the time for going over to the offensive and the commitment to battle of the cavalry formations considering the terrain conditions and the nature of the enemy defenses.

For the first time in the history of the Civil War, a deeply echeloned operational configuration of the troops was established with the 6th and 4th Armies in the first echelon and the 1st and 2d Horse Armies in the second. The 13th Army comprised the front's reserve. The sequence of troop operations and the procedure for cooperation of the infantry, artillery, cavalry and combat engineer units were thought out in all detail. Airplanes were skillfully used for conducting air reconnaissance and preventing the enemy's retreat. In a situation where the enemy was already expecting the resumption of an offensive, original methods were found to achieve surprise. Frunze devoted particularly much attention to the combat training of the troops considering the forthcoming specific combat missions. Engineer-fortified positions were established in a number of formations. The troops trained in attacking them and in crossing approximately those obstacles which they would encounter in the storming of the Turetskiy Rampart. Units of the 30th Rifle Division and other formations trained hard in crossing the straits.

As a result of all of this well thought out operational and organizational work, our troops successfully broke through the enemy defenses, they committed large horse forces to the engagement and completed the rout of the Wrangel troops in the Crimea. Characteristically in a short period of time they prepared and conducted two successive offensive operations (in Northern Tauria and the Perekop-Chongar) with an operational pause of just 4 days.

V. I. Lenin had high regard for the actions of the Southern Front in the Crimea. He pointed out: "...The Red Army showed unusual heroism, having surmounted such obstacles and fortifications which even the military specialists and authorities considered impassable. One of the most brilliant pages in the history of the Red Army is that complete, decisive and remarkably quick victory which it won over Wrangel."(19).

Thus, all the operations conducted under the leadership of M. V. Frunze were marked by boldness of conception, by a decisiveness of actions, by the skillful concentration of men and equipment on the main sectors and opposite that portion of the enemy grouping the defeat of which determined the success of the entire operation. Frunze gave great importance to organizing reconnaissance and to ensuring concealment and surprise of actions. He was marked by the ability to provide firm control of the troops and steadily carry out the adopted plans. He dealt strictly with the failure to carry out orders, and decisively condemned and thwarted any false democracy in the army or any manifestation of disorganization, laxness and lack of discipline. Frunze possessed exceptionally great capacity for work, courage and bravery. As on the Eastern Front, in crucial moments, when this was essential, he was often among the attacking fighters. Under the conditions of the Civil War,

this was completely justified. He not only understood but took to heart Lenin's words: "The personal example...means terribly much."(20).

M. V. Frunze, an ideologically convinced revolutionary, was also a remarkable political leader. He was able, relying on the party-political apparatus and the party aktiv, to unite the Red Army masses and inspire them to carry out the most difficult missions. High party principledness and strict exactingness were combined in him with great concern for his subordinates. He loved the working people and masses of soldiers and was constantly tied to them and they responded to him in the same manner.

In the Order of the Republic RVS of 30 December 1920, it was stated: "The Commander of the Southern Front, Comrade M. V. Frunze Mikhaylov, in successively holding the positions of the commander of the 4th Army, the Southern Group of the Eastern Front and the Eastern, Turkestan and Southern Fronts, brilliantly demonstrated in actuality his major natural military gifts.

"In constantly acquiring theoretical knowledge, he successfully applied it in practice, giving the Soviet Republic victories over its enemies in the East and in Turkestan and particularly in the South, where he routed the Wrangel Army and thus inscribed many glorious pages in the history of the defense of Soviet Russia."(21)

For outstanding contributions to the revolution and for operations successfully carried out in the years of the Civil War, M. V. Frunze was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and an honorific Golden Weapon. By the order of the republic RVS No 2881-1920, M. V. Frunze was assigned to the General Staff on equal footing with the "professional General Staff members" who had received their higher military education in the old Russian Army. This was a recognition of his great military knowledge and high level of generalship art. Thus, M. V. Frunze, one of the most talented products of our party, by the end of the Civil War had developed as an outstanding proletarian military leader and a new type of military chief.

The Activities of M. V. Frunze During the Years of Peacetime Construction

Commander of the troops of the Ukraine and Crimea. After the end of the Civil War, during years of peacetime construction, in following the instructions of V. I. Lenin, our party firmly carried out a line of the greatest possible strengthening of the nation's defense capability and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. V. I. Lenin demanded that we remember "the danger constantly hanging over us which will not cease as long as world imperialism exists...."(22) "...In setting out on our peacetime construction," he said, "we will make every effort to continue this without interruption. At the same time, comrades, be on guard and protect the defense capability of our nation and our Red Army like the apple of your eye...."(23)

The Tenth Party Congress in 1921 worked out a precise program for the postwar organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces basically by their qualitative improvement. These questions were given great attention at all the subsequent party congresses and Central Committee plenums.

In carrying out the ideas of the party and V. I. Lenin, M. V. Frunze was well aware that the end of the Civil War would not lift the military threat against the Soviet Republic. It was clear that the imperialists were assembling new forces to attack the Soviet nation. Under these difficult conditions the tasks of building a new socialist society and strengthening the defenses of the Soviet state were merged into one.

In December 1920, the party Central Committee and the Soviet government appointed M. V. Frunze the commander of the armed forces of the Ukraine and Crimea and a representative of the Republic RVS. Along with other prominent leaders of the party and the Soviet state, Frunze had to resolve such difficult problems as shifting the army to a peacetime standing, determining the ways for organizing national defense and developing the Armed Forces of the world's first socialist state. The carrying out of these tasks was complicated by the fact that in the party ranks there were persons who felt that in peacetime the Soviet state did not need a professional army. Nor was there a unity of views on the most important questions of military organizational development.

The tasks of converting the army to a peacetime footing had to be carried out in an extremely difficult situation. It was essential to demobilize and send home hundreds of thousands of Red Army men under conditions where transport was paralyzed and fuel was lacking; planned combat training had to be organized while the troop units were in disarray and the men were half hungry and half clothed; kulak bands roamed over the entire territory of the Ukraine.

A great deal of time and effort was spent on organizing the fight against banditry, and the bands wrecked the already war-devastated economy and disrupted the work of normalizing postwar life and establishing regular combat and political training in the troops. The fight against banditry assumed an acute political nature. This question was repeatedly discussed at the party conferences and congresses of the Ukrainian soviets.

At the end of December 1920, M. V. Frunze participated in the work of the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets and was elected a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee [VTsIK]. During the work of the congress, he met with V. I. Lenin who expressed concern over the fact that the elimination of the bands in the Ukraine was being drawn out.

To carry out this mission Mikhail Vasilyevich first of all mobilized the efforts of the party organizations, the soviet bodies and population and carried out a series of specific measures to split the basic mass of bandits away from their leaders. At the same time, he worked out and implemented a plan of military operations to defeat first of all the largest Makhno and Petlyura bands. In this instance Frunze showed a creative approach to organizing combat operations in considering the specific situational conditions. Here he skillfully employed the combat experience against the Basmacks in Turkestan.

Having carefully studied the nature of the actions of the Makhno bands which moved quickly from one place to another without engaging in major battles, Frunze reorganized the tactics of his troops. He decided to operate against

the bands in small, highly mobile detachments, using predominantly cavalry units and machine gun carts. A special "flying corps" was organized which was to constantly pursue, surround and destroy the bandit detachments. All the garrisons, troop units and facilities were given specific missions to combat the bandits. The establishing of the communist special purpose units (ChON) was a new form of military training and involvement of the workers in the active struggle against the bands. Frunze took direct part in military operations and in one clash was wounded. As a result of the active, coordinated and decisive operations, the basic forces of the counterrevolutionary bands were defeated at the beginning of 1922.

In being concerned with military affairs, M. V. Frunze also took an active part in the work of the party and economic organizations in the Ukraine, particularly in organizing work to rebuild the mines of the Donbass [Donets Basin]. He was also appointed the deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SNK and deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Economic Conference and was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party [CPU]. In speaking at worker meetings and to the Red Armymen, he decisively defended a Leninist position on all the questions of party and soviet construction.

As a member of the Ukrainian delegation in March 1921, M. V. Frunze participated in the work of the Tenth Party Congress at which he was elected a member of the RKP(b) Central Committee. For this party congress, together with I. S. Gusev, he had prepared theses on the reorganization of the Red Army. The basic ideas of these theses came down to the following: involving the broad working masses in the defense of the republic by systematic training; maintaining and strengthening the Red Army and arming it with modern weapons and military equipment. These proposals as a whole were adopted and Frunze participated in preparing the draft congress decision on military questions. The theses prepared by S. I. Gusev and M. V. Frunze and the subsequent activities of Frunze to elaborate a unified military doctrine were aimed at carrying out the resolution of the Tenth Congress "On Party Unity" and at combating fractionalism and opposition, including on military questions. As is known, the Tenth Party Congress interrupted its work because of the counterrevolutionary revolt in Kronshtadt; M. V. Frunze, along with other congress delegates participated in the storming of the fortress and the eliminating of this revolt.

At the 11th Party Congress (March-April 1922), Frunze came out decisively against the Trotskyite distortions of party line on military questions. Along with other delegates, he introduced a proposal for convoking a special conference of congress military delegates which would discuss in more detail the questions concerning the Red Army and a unified military doctrine. Trotsky and his supporters opposed this in every possible way. However, on 30 March and 1 April 1922, in accord with the Decree of the Plenum of the RKP(b) Central Committee of 25 March, the conference was held. It was attended by 72 delegates. The draft decree "On Strengthening the Red Army" read by M. V. Frunze was supported by a majority of the conference participants and later approved by the congress.

After returning from the congress, Frunze set to work to carry out its decisions. Without waiting for any instructions from above, he found the most

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effective ways to rationally combine the regular and territorial-militia units. He devoted particular attention to the training and indoctrination of the commanders and political workers. Regardless of the diversion of a significant number of troops to combat banditry and rebuild the economy, he constantly saw to it that the personnel and all the troops systematically engaged in military and political training. On 28 July 1921, he issued the Order "On the State Propaganda of Communism in the Red Army and Navy Units in the Ukraine and Crimea."

In line with the general cutback in the Red Army, the commander along with his staff thought out in detail the procedure and sequence of discharging the older Red Armymen so that all the basic formations and units maintained their battleworthiness and the possibility of a rapid remobilization in the event of war. He devoted great attention to organizing, equipping and establishing the training process in the military institutions of learning. Frunze's proposal to establish military faculties under the civilian higher institutions of learning was carried out. Without waiting for the completion of the elaboration and receipt of important documents from the center, he worked out military regulations, instructions and teaching aids.

At that time one of the most important tasks was to eliminate illiteracy among the Red Armymen in order to make each soldier a conscious citizen of the Republic and capable of mastering the evermore complex military affairs. Frunze also found time to be deeply concerned with such questions as the preinduction military training for the youth, military instruction for students in civilian institutions of learning and other matters related to the training of reserves for the Red Army.

M. V. Frunze considered one of the primary tasks to be organizing secure defense of the state boundaries. He did a great deal to increase the battleworthiness of the border troops, for erecting fortifications on the approaches to the state frontier and for building shore batteries on the Black Sea coast. As a whole, he was rather deeply involved with the concerns and needs of the Black Sea Fleet. He repeatedly visited the ships, he provided great help in the technical equipping and increasing the combat readiness of the fleet and sought the founding of the Bureau of Naval Propaganda in the Ukraine. He provided active support for the movement getting underway throughout the nation to develop the air force and to the "All-Ukrainian Society for Aviation and Navigation" which was established under his proposal.

Upon the initiative of M. V. Frunze, in March 1922, by a decision of the RSFSR SNK, a special commission was established to provide help to the Red Army. Upon the instructions of the RKP(b) Central Committee, sponsorship by the worker collectives was established over certain troop units.

The difficulty of carrying out all these tasks was aggravated by the fact that the organizational development of a new army had just commenced and it was necessary to follow an untrod path in solving many questions. There was no unity of views on the nature of a future war and the methods of waging it or on the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. There were no new regulations and other basic documents. While for many military theoretical questions to some degree one could rely on the military

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specialists from the old Russian Army, a completely new approach was essential for the military-political ones, from positions of the Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army.

Under these conditions particular significance was assumed by the broad development of military scientific work in the Armed Forces and by the greatest possible development of creativity on the part of the leading cadres and all the command-supervisory personnel. For this reason not formal command training was needed but rather creative political and military studies accompanied by profound reflection and related to the theoretical elaboration of the most important questions of the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces which had been raised by life and which had to be practically solved. One of the measures aimed at this was the establishing of a Permanent Conference on Questions of Broadening the Viewpoint and Military Knowledge of Commanders and Political Workers (chairman, M. V. Frunze) with the job of coordinating military-scientific work in the troops in the area of generalizing the experience of wars, working out new questions of military organizational development and propagandizing military knowledge.

During his command of the Ukrainian and Crimean armed forces, Frunze began intense work on studying and generalizing the experience of World War I and the Civil War, involving a broad range of command-supervisory personnel in this. R. P. Eydeman recalled how "even during the difficult years of 1920-1921, when seemingly there was no time to study, Comrade Frunze, while extremely burdened down with practical work in the Ukraine, while at leisure, barricaded himself behind books, including foreign ones, and armed with the Marxist method, worked on the development of his own military theoretical viewpoint and on studying not only the experience of World War I and the Civil War but also the classics of military affairs." (24) In giving great importance to the experience of these wars, M. V. Frunze at the same time cautioned against making a fetish of this, emphasizing that military affairs had continued to improve and for this reason it was essential to critically approach past experience and more profoundly consider the trends of further development. His military theoretical activities from the very outset were subordinate primarily to the interests of solving practical tasks and were marked by an analysis of the entire aggregate of facts, by the depth of arguing the proposed ideas and by the ability to clearly and aptly formulate his thoughts.

Even in his first articles such as "The Reorganization of the Red Army," "Protect the Revolution (the Red Army and the Revolution)," "The Military-Political Indoctrination of the Red Army," "The Main Military Tasks of the Moment" and others, M. V. Frunze raised the question of elaborating uniform views on the nature of the military tasks of the Soviet state, on the training and indoctrination of the Red Army and on elaborating a unified military doctrine. In July 1921, in the first issue of the journal ARMIYA REVOLYUTSIYA [Army and Revolution] published in Kharkov an article was published by M. V. Frunze entitled "A Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army" and this was his first major theoretical work. Subsequently, the ideas in this article were developed in a number of other works and speeches. In these, he defended the party line on preserving and strengthening the might of the Red Army. He

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convincingly showed the incorrectness and danger of the viewpoint of those who were insisting on an immediate transition to a militia system.

In November 1921, M. V. Frunze was appointed the head of an Extraordinary Diplomatic Mission to Turkey for concluding a treaty between the Ukraine and Turkey (treaties between Turkey and the RSFSR and Turkey and the Transcaucasian Republics had already been concluded). The mission's work was carried out in a period when the Turkish people, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, were waging a difficult struggle for independence against the Anglo-Greek interventionists. Frunze prepared carefully for the trip and studied the history and economy of Turkey as well as the course of military operations. Frunze's knowledge of foreign languages and the Kirkhiz language which is close to Turkish contributed to a direct and close contact with the state leaders and various strata of the Turkish population. The aim of the mission was successfully and quickly reached. During his stay in Turkey, Mikhail Vasilyevich gained a detailed knowledge of the situation in the country and the state of the Turkish army; he had long talks with residents of the cities and villages, with soldiers and military chiefs. He gave valuable advice to the leadership of the Turkish Army, proceeding from the experience of fighting against the interventionists during the period of the Civil War in the USSR. At the same time, he was also attentive to the combat experience of the Turkish Army.

After the termination of the talks, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) sent to Moscow and Kharkov telegrams which pointed out: "The mere fact that the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, for concluding a treaty of friendship in order to further strengthen the political and economic ties existing between both peoples has chosen Frunze, one of the outstanding political leaders and at the same time one of the valorous generals and heroic leaders of the victorious Red Army has caused particular gratitude on the part of the National Assembly." (25) This was proof that the accomplishments of M. V. Frunze in the revolutionary struggle and Civil War had gained international recognition.

Wherever M. V. Frunze worked--in Belorussia, on the Eastern and Turkestan Fronts and in the Ukraine--everywhere he profoundly considered and unswervingly carried out the basic tenets of Lenin's nationality policy, he sought their practical realization in resolving any political, economic and military questions and struggled for the greatest possible strengthening of the friendship of peoples.

In May 1922, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik) introduced a decision to establish a commission of representatives from the RSFSR and the Ukraine to resolve state relations between the republics. M. V. Frunze was selected as the commission chairman. From the very outset of the talks, he raised the question that the problem of relationships between the liberated peoples of former Tsarist Russia must be viewed more widely, not restricting oneself to talks between individual republics. He defended the ideas of V. I. Lenin on the pooling of efforts by the Union Republics on foreign and financial policy and on major economic questions; on the full unity in the area of national defense and military organizational development; on ensuring full equality of rights among the

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republics and on the development of a national culture and relative independence for the republics in economic activities.

From the report of M. V. Frunze, the Seventh All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets on 14 December 1922 approved a resolution supporting the Leninist idea of the voluntary unification of the Soviet Republics into a single united state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. At the First Congress of USSR Soviets, precisely Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze was instructed on behalf of delegations from the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, the Transcaucasian Federation and Belorussia to introduce the proposal on approving the Declaration and Union Treaty on Forming the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In being guided by the ideas of the party and the Soviet government, M. V. Frunze in all his subsequent work proceeded from the necessity of resolving all questions of military organizational development considering the common interests of the united Soviet state.

Due to the fact that on the questions of the organizational development and training of the Red Army, there were distortions and deviations from the party line which had not always been considered and corrected by the Republic RVS, in January 1924, the RKP(b) Central Committee set up a special commission for investigating the state of the Red Army with a membership of S. I. Gusev, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, I. V. Stalin, N. M. Shvernik, M. V. Frunze, I. S. Unshlikht and others.

The commission established that, along with positive aspects caused by the leadership of the Red Army by the RKP(b) and by the active work of the party organizations as well as many military and political leaders on the spot, on the practical questions of the organizational development and training of the Red Army there were dangerous distortions of party military policy and serious shortcomings. The report from the commission to the Central Committee Plenum in April 1924 stated: "At present, we do not have a Red Army as an organized, trained, politically indoctrinated and mobilization-ready force. In its present form the Red Army is not battleworthy."(26)

In actuality, the converting of the Armed Forces to a peacetime standing considering the new situation had been slowly carried out and there were no unified prescribed documents or unified combat training system; there was a gap between the central apparatus and the troops. The former People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, Trotskiy and his supporters, under various pretexts, had impeded the carrying out of party decisions on the questions of strengthening the Red Army.

The commission worked out a series of proposals aimed at improving the state of affairs in the Armed Forces. These proposals of the commission as approved by the party Central Committee became the program for the reorganization of the Red Army and its further organizational development. On 1 April 1924, the Plenum of the RKP(b) Central Committee approved the report of M. V. Frunze on the measures implemented and planned. The plenum emphasized the importance of reorganizing the administrative apparatus of the military department and the promoting of party personnel to responsible command and staff positions in all elements of the Red Army and Navy.

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At the head of the republic's Armed Forces. The Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the RKP(b) in January 1925 handed down the decree: "Whereas the leadership of the army is inconceivable without the full support for this leadership by the authority of the entire party; whereas without such support the danger is created of undermining iron discipline in the army; whereas the conference of political workers, on the one hand, and a fraction of the USSR RVS, on the other, have already come out in favor of the removal of Trotskiy from military work...to recognize as impossible the further work of Trotskiy on the USSR RVS."(27) The struggle against the Trotskyites and the other hostile elements on military questions was reflected in the general struggle in the area of policy, economics and ideology, since the forces of the Old World did not want to accept the revolutionary changes in society and were desparately resisting the construction of socialism.

Under these conditions, at the head of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic, there had to be a man with great revolutionary tempering and experience in political and military work, a figure having just authority in the nation and in the Red Army and capable of successively and skillfully carrying out the party decisions on the questions of military organizational development. Undoubtedly M. V. Frunze possessed all these qualities. In March 1924, he was appointed deputy people's commissar for military and naval affairs and deputy chairman of the RVS and in January 1925, the people's commissar and chairman of the USSR RVS.

At the 13th Party Congress, M. V. Frunze was elected a candidate member of the Politburo of the RKP(b) Central Committee and a candidate member of the Orgburo [Organizational Bureau] of the RKP(b) Central Committee. In April 1924, he was also confirmed as the chief of staff of the Red Army and later the chief of the Military Academy. Such centralization of leadership was caused by the need to eliminate the influence of hostile elements on the activities of the major elements in the central apparatus and to rapidly resolve the urgent problems of increasing the battleworthiness of the Red Army.

Having received great powers from the party Central Committee and in relying on the support of the Army and Navy party organizations, M. V. Frunze began to decisively surmount the resistance of the Trotskyites and carry out a fundamental reform in the area of the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. Prominent political and military leaders were placed in the major work areas in the central apparatus, including: A. S. Bubnov in the position of chief of the RKKA Political Directorate and M. N. Tukhachevskiy as the deputy chief of staff of the RKKA.

M. V. Frunze felt that it was essential "to give the army a more permanent and stable nature, to eliminate the turnover of its personnel, to establish conditions for its life and activities which were strictly regulated by the law and carry out a more energetic freshening and rejuvenation of the leading command personnel by promoting young forces."(28)

The severe economic situation in the country necessitated a further cutback in the size of the armed forces and the giving to them of a more compact and

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rational organizational structure considering the actual capabilities of the nation to technically equip and materially support the Army and Navy. M. V. Frunze with his inherent energy and organizational grasp set to solving all these problems. In a short period of time major measures were carried out to reorganize the central apparatus of the military department: its size was cut back by 40 percent, the organization was systematized and functions clarified. As a result of the reorganization carried out, the central organs of military administration consisted of three parts: the RKKA Staff which should be concerned with elaborating measures relating to national defense (together with the other state bodies), the questions of the organization of the army, its mobilization and strategic deployment, the elaboration of operational plans and the study of the experience of wars; the RKKA Inspectorate was in charge of training command cadres and the combat training of the troops and it exercised supervision over the carrying out of the decisions of the USSR RVS; the RKKA Directorate was to be concerned with the questions of routine army life, the service of command personnel, the registration and induction of persons liable for military service, logistical support for the camp assemblies and other measures related to combat training.

In the reorganization of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, special attention was paid to increasing its role as the leading party body operating with the rights of a section of the party Central Committee. The chief of the RKKA Political Directorate, A. S. Bubnov, was elected secretary of the RKP(b) Central Committee. In September 1924, the Regulation Governing the RKKA Political Directorate was approved and its apparatus, the political bodies of the military districts and fleets were reinforced with experienced party cadres. The system of supply and logistical support for the troops was systematized, while the control and command system was brought closer to the troops and naval forces.

The resolution of the 13th Party Congress held at the end of May 1924 pointed out: "The congress welcomes the steps initiated by the Central Committee for carrying out a completely necessary reform in the military department and the strengthening of it with political workers. In line with the role of the territorial formations on the question of national defense, the congress draws the party's attention to the necessity of the most energetic work to strengthen communist influence in them. The congress orders the Central Committee to take a series of measures to increase the number of communists among the Red Armymen and sailors."(29)

Thus, M. V. Frunze was one of the main organizers in carrying out the party and government decisions on military questions. Under his immediate leadership, a large range of measures was carried out to increase the combat and mobilizational readiness of the Red Army and to strengthen national defense; this has come to be known as the military reform of 1924-1925.

As a result of this reform, a mixed system for the organizational development of the Armed Forces, that is, regular and territorial, was reinforced, a new organizational structure was introduced for the units and formations, the system for the training of command personnel was reorganized, a new supply system was adopted for the Armed Forces and regulations and manuals were worked out and introduced in accord with the new demands upon the combat

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training of the Army and Navy. The bodies of military administration underwent a fundamental reorganization including the central, district and local military apparatus. The essence of this reorganization was, while maintaining centralized demand and control, to carry out a certain decentralization of this and increase the responsibility and initiative of the subordinate bodies and officials on the spot.

The party had always given great importance to the strengthening of one-man command in the army. V. I. Lenin in 1920 said that the experience in the organizational development of the Red Army "has moved, developing naturally, from random, diffuse collegiality, through collegiality raised to a system of organization permeating all army facilities and now, as a general trend, has reached one-man command, as the solely correct organization of work." (30) But during the period of the Civil War the conditions did not exist for fully realizing one-man command. In July 1924, the RKP(b) Central Committee adopted a decree on converting to one-man command in the Army and Navy and this was to be done stage by stage, in two forms: if the commander was a communist then he would combine the functions of line, administrative-economic and party-political leadership; in the remaining instances the commander performed only the first two functions while leadership over political and party work was entrusted to the commissar.

All of this helped to bring the personnel and structure of the Armed Forces into accord with the real economic and military capabilities of the nation, to improve their battleworthiness and better the leadership over the organizational development of the Army and Navy as well as the training and indoctrination of the personnel.

The range of activities of Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze was very broad. Along with military questions, he was largely and actively concerned with establishing the defense industry, particularly aviation and chemical, as well as organizing scientific research on the most modern types of equipment. He endeavored to utilize all the possible party, state and social levers to activate mass defense work, to involve the party, trade union and youth organizations in this and to make the strengthening of national defense a concern that was truly nationwide. For this reason he frequently spoke on these questions at party congresses and conferences and at the congresses of soviets, the peasantry, teachers, writers, volunteer societies and other organizations. He not only spoke but also took an active part in their work.

In the organizational development of the Armed Forces Frunze was particularly concerned with the new branches of troops. P. I. Baranov who at that time was at the head of the Air Forces thus described the activities of M. V. Frunze to establish the Air Fleet: "The development of Soviet aviation, its modern form of organization and the positing of navigation questions--all of this is linked with the name of Mikhail Vasilyevich. During Mikhail Vasilyevich's work in Moscow, the nature of army and strategic aviation, the nature and role of naval aviation in the general organizational development of the Air Fleet as well as the role and significance of the aviation industry were clearly defined, the Aviation Trust was established and the role and importance of research in the area of the Air Fleet were determined.... Mikhail Vasilyevich carefully followed each step in the development of the Air Fleet. According to

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his instructions, the fly-over of units in the May Day Parade, aviation maneuvers and so forth were organized."(31)

M. V. Frunze was responsible for beginning the organization of planned combat training for the Red Army units. In 1924 and 1925, he was present at many exercises and maneuvers, he worked for their instructive holding and was exacting in summing up their results. He gave primary importance to introducing the regulations into the life of the troops and to strengthening conscious military discipline.

Mikhail Vasilyevich realized well that it was possible to carry out the military reform in practice and implement its basic measures from the top to the bottom only by relying on the commanders and political workers who profoundly understood the essence of the military reform, who fully shared its basic ideas and out of inner conviction carried them out. For this reason he boldly promoted to leading positions at the center and in the troops the commanders and political workers from the new formations and he showed constant concern for their retraining in various courses and in military academies. For this purpose the training process was substantially revised in the RKKA Military Academy. During the 1924-1925 academic year, the compulsory study of Marxism-Leninism was introduced and the study of the experience of the Civil War was more widely carried out. All of this was reflected not only in the military history programs but also in the courses on strategy, tactics, political work and other subjects.

I. Dubinskiy, who at that time was studying in the academy, recalled: "Frunze knew the value of military knowledge. Immediately after the Civil War, having entered into a fierce theoretical dispute with Trotsky over the basic questions of the organizational development of the Red Army, he upturned everything in the academy. Having overcome the resistance of the conservatives, he forced the basic chair to long take leave of Julius Caesar, having directed the attention of the professors to the study of the military works of V. I. Lenin and to the mastery of Brusilov, Makenzen, Blyukher, Budenny, Primakov and Vostretsov."(32)

Military theoretical activities. The focus of all the activities of M. V. Frunze, including military-theoretical, was determined by the general conditions of the life and activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet states during the years of rebuilding the national economy and by the interests of defending the nation against imperialist invasion and increasing the combat capability of the Red Army.

After the victory in the Civil War over the foreign interventionists and domestic counterrevolution, the party and government focused their main efforts on eliminating the postwar chaos and turning economically backward Russia into a powerful socialist state. These tasks had to be carried out under extremely difficult conditions. The chaos, having paralyzed the entire national economy, was exacerbated by terrible hunger in the Volga Region and a number of other oblasts. In benefiting from this, the imperialist world began to intensify the economic and diplomatic blockade of the Soviet Republic. At the same time with the involvement of the English, American and French staffs, plans were hatched for a new attack on our country by an invasion of the

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Ukraine by Polish and Romanian troops together with the remnants of the Petlyura and other bands. Terrorists of the Savinkov type were sent into the nation. Ludendorff worked out a plan for the participation in the new intervention of a German "volunteer" army. Military operations were still continuing against the Japanese interventionists in the Far East and fighting was underway to eliminate the numerous kulak bands and detachments of Basmaaks in various regions of the nation.

The Red Army was still poorly supplied and was quartered in semi-destroyed barracks or in other facilities poorly adapted for this. Among a majority of the commanders and Red Armymen for several years there had been predemobilization moods. The difficulties of shifting the army to a peacetime footing which M. V. Frunze encountered in the Ukraine now confronted him in an evermore complex form and on a nationwide scale. Moreover, the Trotskyites and the other enemies of our party did not miss a single chance to use all these difficulties to cause dissatisfaction and to sabotage the organized converting of the Army and Navy to a peacetime status. The enemies, as K. Ye. Voroshilov recalled, sabotaged any vital work even relating to the positing of new problems in the area of military affairs.(33)

The Trotskyites were particularly zealous against the most important tenets of the Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army and their implementation in practice. In stating that Marxism-Leninism could not be applied to military affairs, they endeavored to ideologically disarm the military cadres and instill apolitical attitudes and reactionary antiscientific military-theoretical views in the command personnel. In spite of Lenin's instructions on the enormous importance of military science in the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces, they denied even the very possibility of scientific knowledge in the area of military affairs.

The hostile elements which had penetrated the party spread uncertainty among the command personnel, linking the possibility of the Red Army's success in a future war only to "permanent revolution." The danger of such a line was also in that it was hidden behind ultraleftist pseudo-Marxist phraseology and in a number of instances was carried out by persons holding high positions in the Red Army.

Antiparty views on military questions were fostered in every possible way by a certain portion of the military specialists. In holding leading positions on the editorial staffs of the military journals and on the chairs of military schools, they propagandized idealistic views about war. Thus, the former generals of the Tsarist Army, Gershelman and Shtyurmer and the professor of the Naval Academy Danilov, viewed coercion in isolation from political motives, depicting it as a natural manifestation of human nature. Danilov, in particular, asserted that a political goal was merely a flag to cover the true reason for a war.(34) The leaders of the Second International endeavored to equate the predatory wars of imperialism and the revolutionary wars of the Russian proletariat. They also had their supporters in our nation who proposed abandoning any philosophy. They endeavored to replace Marxist-Leninist methodology by Bukharinite "organizational science," considering it a universal scientific methodology.

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The danger of all this "work" was that it was carried out among the command personnel which was not still sufficiently trained in political and military terms. This led to the dissemination of incorrect views on military science and military organizational development. The Trotskyites initiated a particularly broad and malicious campaign after the appearance on the pages of the journal VOYENNAYA NAUKA I REVOLYUTSIYA of the theses of M. V. Frunze and S. I. Gusev, "The Reorganization of the Red Army." (35) When the results of the discussion at a meeting of military delegates to the 11th RKP(b) Congress on the basic military task of the moment were published in VOYENNY VESTNIK [Military Herald], Trotsky threatened to bring suit against the editors.

In this situation the acute task arose of quickly working out the scientific bases for the organizational development of a socialist state's armed forces and for achieving a unified understanding of them by the leadership personnel of the army and navy. Moreover, the experience of World War I and the Civil War, having fundamentally altered the views on the nature of war, also placed new demands on the training of the troops and naval forces, while there were extremely few cadres who could examine and interpret these new phenomena from Marxist-Leninist positions. All of this required an intensification of military scientific work and a decisive eradication of antiparty views on military questions.

The increase in the ideological-theoretical level of military-scientific work and the outcome of the struggle to overcome the antiscientific and antiparty views were enormously influenced by the first edition in 1920-1926 of the collected works of V. I. Lenin and the Lenin Collections which began to come out in 1924 and the publishing in 1923 of the book by F. Engels "Anti-Duhring" and his collected works in the collection "Stati i pisma po voyennym voprosam" [Articles and Letters on Military Questions].

Of great importance for the organizational development of the Red Army in the development of military science along a Leninist path was the conference of military delegates to the 11th Party Congress where the struggle for the confirmation of Marxist-Leninist ideas in military affairs assumed maximum acuteness. The Trotskyites completely ignored the experience of the Civil War and the influence of the new social system on military theory and practice and denied the necessity of elaborating a unified military doctrine. M. V. Frunze, K. Ye. Voroshilov, S. M. Budenny and M. N. Tukhachevskiy who spoke after Trotsky's report convincingly showed the harmfulness of such ideas and their theoretical and practical groundlessness.

Taking part with V. I. Lenin in the creative works on elaborating the theoretical bases for Soviet military organizational development were the prominent leaders of the party and the Soviet state V. A. Antonov-Ovseyevnko, A. S. Bubnov, K. Ye. Voroshilov, S. I. Gusev, S. M. Kirov, N. I. Podvoyskiy, I. V. Stalin and others. M. V. Frunze was one of the outstanding and talented organizers of military science who made a major personal contribution to the investigation of its most important fundamental notions. Of the other prominent communists who during the Civil War period had held important positions in the Red Army, most actively involved in military-scientific work were S. I. Aralov, I. P. Belov, R. I. Berzin, V. K. Blyukher, P. Ye. Dybenko, A. I. Yegorov, N. D. Kashirin, I. K. Kozhanov, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, I. P.

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Uborevich, R. P. Eydeman and I. E. Yakir. The first graduates of the RKKA Military Academy, A. V. Golubev, G. S. Isserson, K. B. Kalinovskiy, V. K. Triandafillov and others, were talented and profound military researchers.

In elaborating the bases of Soviet military science, particularly on the specific questions of the theory of military art, specific use was also made of the old military specialists such as M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, I. I. Vatsetis, K. I. Velichko, A. I. Verkhovskiy, A. M. Zayonchkovskiy, S. S. Kamenev, D. M. Karybshev, V. N. Klembovskiy, A. I. Kork, P. P. Lebedev, A. A. Neznamov, V. F. Novitskiy, A. A. Svechin, B. M. Shaposhnikov and others. While many of them had committed substantial errors on political and methodological questions, these researchers excelled in great knowledge in the area of military history, they systematized and analyzed enormous factual material and had mastered the art of a vivid, convincing exposition of the designated questions. Their works provided rich material for critical analysis and reflection. This applies particularly to the works of A. M. Zayonchkovskiy on the history of World War I, A. A. Svechin on strategy, B. M. Shaposhnikov on the organization of the higher military command bodies and K. I. Velichko and D. M. Karbyshev on military engineering.

Under the controlling influence of the party, in the troops and fleets congresses and conferences were held for the command and political personnel to discuss the experience of previous wars and the urgent problems of military theory and practice. This led to the organizing of volunteer military scientific societies of Red commanders in the aim of assisting the development of Soviet military science. This was an expression of the activeness and deep interest of the command and political personnel of our army in a correct solution to military questions and marked the genesis of authentically democratic collective forms for elaborating the urgent problems of military theory and practice. M. V. Frunze in this context wrote: "In establishing the first military-scientific societies...we aimed at satisfying two basic vital needs of the Red Army: in the first place, the necessity of analyzing the experience of the recent Civil War and the imperialist war which preceded it and, secondly, to facilitate work in the area of retraining and raising the military educational level of our command personnel to a high level.... Our military-scientific thought also began to work in these areas."(36)

One of the first military-scientific societies was established at the RKKA Military Academy in October 1920. In 1921, upon the initiative of M. V. Frunze, such societies and circles had become widespread in the troops of the Ukraine and Crimea.

On 22 May 1925, the first All-Union Conference of Military Scientific Organizations of the Soviet Union was held. This conference adopted a Regulation on the Military Scientific Society of the USSR and elected the society's Central Council of which M. V. Frunze was the chairman. The society, along with the elaboration of the problems of military science, was also given a broader task of providing voluntary assistance to the strengthening of national defense and involving the broad masses of workers in defense work.

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The military scientific societies for the command and political personnel, particularly in the leading military-scientific society of the RKKA Academy, posed and discussed fundamental questions of the Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army, the nature of a future war, the content of a unified military doctrine, the role of the masses of people in a war, the relationship of man and equipment and other major provisions of Soviet military science and military art. Giving reports were M. V. Frunze, K. Ye. Voroshilov, S. S. Kamenev, V. K. Triandafillov, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, R. P. Eydeman and other prominent military leaders and military scientists.

In the work of the military-scientific societies and military-scientific conferences during those years there reigned a creative spirit, there was a lively and free discussion of the posed questions and acute debates developed. All of this helped to awaken military-scientific thought and made possible the appearance subsequently of prominent military authorities and creative accomplishments in the development of Soviet military science. This was no accident. As experience showed, the lack of such debates in the scientific collectives, at meetings, conferences and in the press always led to a withering of creative thought.

The concern of M. V. Frunze for establishing and developing a military periodic press was also caused precisely by the desire for the greatest possible encouragement of creativity with the involvement of a broad range of the command and political personnel in this. Even during the course of the fierce engagements of the Civil War, the RVS of the Eastern and Turkestan Fronts published the journals VOYENNAYA MYSL [Military Thought]. The Ukraine and Crimea as well as other military districts published their own military journal. It should be pointed out that the most correct reflection of Marxist-Leninist ideas on military questions were to be found in the peripheral journals which were closer to the practices of military affairs and this was frequently countered by the central organs of military press where there was the influence of the old military specialists and the Trotskyites. M. V. Frunze on this question wrote: "We were let down by the thick journals which claimed a role of the central organs of the Red Army. It was a completely indisputable fact that none of them succeeded in the task of becoming a unified center for military-scientific thought...."(37)

M. V. Frunze was constantly concerned for broadening the publishing of periodical literature in the Armed Forces and for increasing the role of the military journals. In addition to the central military-theoretical organ, the journal VOYENNAYA NAUKA I REVOLYUTSIYA (38), the RKKA Military Academy also published the journal KRASNAYA ZORI [Red Dawn] and the collection "Krasnaya Armiya" [Red Army]. The military districts also had their own journals. As of January 1924, the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA [Red Star] began to be published as the organ of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs.

A special role was assigned to the leading journal VOYENNAYA MYSL I REVOLYUTSIYA. It was given the task of "rallying around itself all the scientific research forces for resolving the questions of the defense of the Soviet Union and the combat training of the army. It should become an organ

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of theoretical leadership for military-scientific activities both within the army and outside it."(39)

M. V. Frunze was one of the most active authors of our military press and a participant in military-scientific work as a whole. He gave great importance to the clear and efficient work of the military press, extensively employing it to propagandize Marxist-Leninist ideas on military questions and helping in every possible way to raise the ideological and theoretical level of the published articles. He also required his deputies, the workers of the central apparatus as well as the commanders and political workers from the troops and the fleets to appear in print. The editorial personnel of the journals included the leading personnel of the people's commissariat. Suffice it to say that I. E. Yakir was appointed editor-in-chief of the journal VOYENNIY VESTNIK, while M. V. Frunze personally headed the editorial staff of the journal VOYNA I REVOLYUTSIYA [War and Revolution].

M. V. Frunze was outstanding both as a practitioner and theorist of military affairs. Precisely an organic combination of theory and practice and a profound understanding of the essence of military practice made his theoretical research particularly vital and sound. There are leaders who view scientific work as an additional burden distracting them from their main practical work. M. V. Frunze never turned his military scientific activities into an end in itself; these stemmed organically from the creative nature of his practical work. He viewed theoretical examinations of various questions not as something divorced from practical service but as an inseparable component part of it and an indispensable condition for its great effectiveness.

As was already pointed out, M. V. Frunze turned constantly to the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, for a knowledge and skillful mastery of the Marxist-Leninist methodology contributed to a profound analysis of the investigated questions. He worked constantly to creatively employ the Marxist dialectical method in military science.

The value of the military theoretical activities of M. V. Frunze can be explained both by his talent as a researcher, by his constant effort to study the principles of military art and military history, and by his enormous experience gained both during the years of the Civil War as well as in the postwar years in those positions which the party entrusted to him. All of this served as a good base for his scientific creativity. As was rightly pointed out by A. S. Bubnov, "Lenin's theory and the enormous experience of leading large troop formations during the years of the Civil War on the various fronts and under various sociopolitical conditions provided the basic prerequisites for Frunze's work as a military theorist."(40)

While as the people's commissar for military and naval affairs, regardless of his great work load, M. V. Frunze continued to read a great deal and reflect on major theoretical problems. His desire to analyze military affairs in all details and to have his own opinion on a number of major questions of military theory and practice were an inner need for him, an expression of his high spiritual level and proof of his creative approach to resolving practical tasks.

Mikhail Vasilyevich also kept his interests in artistic literature and art and this no amount of work could weaken. At present, it will be surprising to many that V. I. Lenin in 1919 found the time to view a new Vakhtangov piece, that M. V. Frunze went to the theater during the very difficult 1920's and G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevskiy also did the same during the Great Patriotic War. B. M. Shaposhnikov over all his life was an ardent admirer of the theater. During the most intense periods of work, including the most difficult wartime, he contrived to find time to attend the theater. Persons with broad interests view the necessity of such spiritual enrichment not only as recreation or celebrating but also as a stimulus for subsequent, even more intense and creative work. Constant contact with art and literature helps to develop vivid thinking and a vital perception of reality and makes it possible to better feel the pulse of life and the mood of society. Without a broad view of life, proceeding solely from narrow special interests, it is impossible to orient oneself in sociopolitical life and, consequently, to work well.

M. V. Frunze, even during the last days of his life, before an operation, while gravely ill, continued to intensely read military literature. "Comrade Frunze," wrote A. S. Bubnov, "always loved military books...he always seized any opportunity to sit a bit and reflect on military questions. I knew Frunze's interest in military history even in the early years and saw him recently, lying in the Kremlin Hospital, with a pencil in hand re-reading and studying Foch's book "Introduction to War"(41) (he means the book by F. Foch "On the Conduct of War."--M. G.).

As is known, the founders of Marxism-Leninism showed exceptional scientific scrupulousness and conscientiousness for the facts quoted by them and on which their conclusions and generalizations were based. They were decisively against those who out of competitive considerations divided facts and arguments into advantageous and disadvantageous and used only those which confirmed their prejudiced viewpoint. K. Marx on this question commented: "...A person who endeavors to adapt science to such a viewpoint which does not derive from science itself...but from outside, to a viewpoint which is dictated by interests that are alien to science and external to it--such a person I would call 'base'."(42)

M. V. Frunze, in following this Marxist-Leninist tradition, in preparing his theoretical works showed exceptionally high conscientiousness. He approached facts and proof with particular care and attention; he could not tolerate subjectivity in judgments, stretching the point to favor one or another opinion. He not only could not support but showed unconcealed repugnance for persons who, without going into the essence of the matter, began to artificially pick the "facts" and "arguments" confirming their viewpoint.

M. V. Frunze always endeavored to compare and objectively analyze the entire aggregate of facts as they were in all their contradictoriness. Thus, in the course of work over a report or an article on unified military doctrine, he sought the advice of scores of persons who knew different aspects of this question and adhered to different viewpoints. These talks or meetings were conducted by him not formally and not for creating the appearance of a collective discussion. He sincerely endeavored to understand each participant

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of the discussion so as to consider as fully as possible all aspects and circumstances of the question. In the course of scientific debates, he always held a principled, party position and on ideological questions never compromised but at the same time saw to it that a scientific argument was not replaced by attaching political "labels" which at times came to be abused later, particularly in the 1930's. Frunze on this question followed the methods of V. I. Lenin who advised "in the most careful manner to see that the inevitable disputes and the inevitable clash of opinions did not degenerate into familiarity,"(43) so that this struggle did not lead to a confusing of views and for the mixing of enemies and comrades.

It is said that Indian philosophers have the habit of prior to the start of any dispute, both participants should relate the opponent's views in such a manner that the opponent confirms the correctness of the description. For it is felt that it is useless to debate without making certain that the disputed views are correctly understood and not distorted. M. V. Frunze understood this old truth well. Many of his appearances in print pursued primarily the goal of more profoundly discussing the most important questions of military organizational development, to find the truth and persuade the Red Army command personnel of the correctness of the various ideas proposed by him. All the comrades and work associates who knew him closely unanimously pointed out that he showed great attention and patience for opposing viewpoints, particularly on operational-strategic, organizational and military-technical questions. He always sought publicity of discussion for the most important questions among the admitted circle of persons and was always categorically against any sort of intrigues and discussions behind the scenes over the given questions. Completely alien to him was the desire to impose his opinion on other comrades or to continue to resist when persuasive arguments had been advanced.

At one time he arrived at the RKKA Military Academy to seek advice from instructors on the questions of the organizational structure of rifle and cavalry divisions. A draft decision had already been prepared on these questions by the RKKA Staff. Initially Mikhail Vasilyevich did not agree with certain provisions of this draft. But when he heard the well reasoned arguments by the academy leadership, he abandoned his former opinion. And he was sincerely pleased that it had been possible to find a more correct solution, emphasizing here that a recognition of his errors required as much courage as self-sacrifice in battle. I. S. Unshlikht on this question commented: "...I had not seen or met a person who responded so to others and who not only was able to give orders and instructions but also who could listen and consider others. I had not seen a person who could admit his errors as easily as he. He calmly, with his inherent gentle smile, agreed if the arguments were persuasive."(44)

Most of all M. V. Frunze could not tolerate and considered most dangerous those persons who falsely supported his opinion. He profoundly respected persons who were principled, convinced and able to defend their opinion with dignity.

In giving exceptionally great importance to the thorough working out and discussion of one or another question, considering various viewpoints, Mikhail

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Vasilyevich at the same time was against infinite agreements and the extended discussion of urgent questions, knowing well from history and from his own experience that bold, far-reaching decisions must sometimes be taken contrary to opinion and to the fierce resistance of conservatively thinking persons, while decisions based on too great compromises and satisfying everyone, as a rule, are the weakest or are completely useless. For this reason he was firm in taking decisions and in unswervingly carrying them out after the essence of the question had been brought out and the discussion completed. Suffice it to say that all the most important measures related to the reorganization of the central apparatus of the military department were thoroughly examined, discussed, worked out and actually implemented over several weeks, although there was no unanimous opinion on these questions.

After the decision had been taken and the order issued, M. V. Frunze demanded its strict and unswerving fulfillment. At the same time he spared no effort or time to explain the importance and essence of the decisions taken and convince others of their necessity. Here he proceeded from the recommendations of V. I. Lenin that the more profound the transformation which we wish to carry out, the more one must raise interest in it and a conscientious attitude and persuade ever-new millions and tens of millions of its necessity.(45)

Among individual comrades who were little acquainted with the works of M. V. Frunze and did not allow the idea that a great leader could be personally concerned with scientific work, sometimes there is the opinion that many of his speeches and theoretical works were prepared not by him personally but with the aid of subordinates and assistants. In such instances, involuntarily one might ask the question: And what happens to these people subsequently, why did they not write anything more for someone else? Frunze was a special and unique person who thought profoundly and broadly and was able to set out his ideas aptly, clearly and logically. For this reason no one except him could write in this manner. Of course, certain reference materials were obviously prepared but this raw material had to be thoroughly reworked. The main ideas of his works were not only written, but also lived through and forged in the process of gaining practical experience and years' long intense mental work.

Frunze, as is known, spoke a great deal in front of the most diverse audiences, sometimes several times a day. He, as a rule, prepared most carefully for each of these but at times circumstances developed in such a manner that he had to prepare literally on the way, during the move from one point to another. Regardless of this, his speeches were always informative, not routine and addressed to specific listeners and were closely linked with the urgent questions of daily life. This was achieved not only by his great abilities. Experience shows that one must prepare all one's life for such undertakings, constantly enriching one's memory by systematic daily work for oneself. Then they will not become a burdensome problem.

The speeches and theoretical works of M. V. Frunze are characterized primarily by the ability to spot the main thing in any examined question, and to set it out consistently and persuasively, drawing on weighty evidence. He was not a supporter of standard "jubilee" speeches and articles. Each time he found new

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aspects and facts in one or another historical event and closely linked this to the urgent problems of strengthening national defense and the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces.

It is not possible to strictly classify the military theoretical works of Frunze since, as a rule, virtually each of the works arising out of practical needs dealt to one degree or another with various aspects of Soviet military doctrine, military art, the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. But he devoted greatest attention to a review of the fundamental concepts of military affairs in accord with Marxist-Leninist teachings, to the nature and problems of a future war and to elaborating the most important provisions of military doctrine, the organizational development of the Red Army, the training and indoctrination of the personnel.

All these and other questions were reflected in the works of M. V. Frunze, such as "Krasnaya Armiya i yeye zadachi" [The Red Army and Its Missions] (1919), "Reorganizatsiya RKKA" [The Reorganization of the RKKA] (1921, jointly with S. I. Gusev), "Yedinaya voyennaya doktrina i Krasnaya Armiya" [Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army] (1921), "Wrangel" (1921), "Regulyarnaya armiya i militsiya" [The Regular Army and Militia] (1922), "Osnovnyye voyennyye zadachi momenta" [Main Military Tasks of the Moment] (1922), "Pamyati Perekopa i Chongara" [Memories of Perekop and Chongar] (1922), "Voyenno-politicheskoye vospitaniye Krasnoy Armii" [Military-Political Indoctrination of the Red Army] (a speech in 1922, published in 1929), "Krasnaya Armiya prezhde i teper" [The Red Army Previously and Now] (1923), "Itogi i perspektivy voyennogo stroitelstva" [Results and Prospects of Military Organizational Development] (1924), "Voprosy vysshego voyennogo obrazovaniya" [Questions of Higher Military Education] (1924), "Front i tyl v voyne budushchego" [Front and Rear in a Future War] (1924, published in 1925), "Lenin i Krasnaya Armiya" [Lenin and the Red Army] (1925), "Nashe voyennoye stroitelstvo i zadachi voyenno-nauchnogo obshchestva" [Our Military Organizational Development and the Tasks of the Military-Scientific Society] (1925), "Krasnaya Armiya i oborona Sovetskogo gosudarstva" [The Red Army and the Defense of the Soviet State] (1925), "Voyennaya promyshlennost--osnova nashey oboronosposobnosti" [The Defense Industry--The Basis of Our Defense Capability] (1925), "Ocherednyye voprosy voyennogo dela" [The Next Questions of Military Affairs] (1925), "Kadrovaya Armiya i militsiya" [A Professional Army and Militia] (1925), "Krasnaya Armiya i edinonachaliye" [The Red Army and One-Man Command] (1925) and others. These works subsequently had the greatest impact on the development of military theory and practice, the organizational development and training of the Soviet Armed Forces. Their importance was primarily that they, along with the speeches and articles of other party and military leaders, to a significant degree contributed to the final victory of Marxist-Leninist methodology in Soviet military theory and provided a powerful impetus for the further development of Soviet military science and the shaping of its most important provisions on the possible nature of a future war and the methods of conducting operations and combat actions.

While being concerned with a profound analysis of the experience of World War I and the Civil War, M. V. Frunze also devoted great attention to investigating and generalizing the experience of local wars. Even now, one must be amazed how he, with all his enormous involvement in political,

military and economic work, could find the time for a detailed study and investigation of the experience of the local wars occurring in the first half of the 1920's. For example, with great care he personally studied and generalized an enormous amount of documents (basically in French) related to the liberation struggle of the Rifs in Morocco against the Spanish and French colonialists. In 1925, this work was published under the title "Yevropeyskiye tsivilizatory i Marokko" [The European Civilizers and Morocco].

Also of great value are the major orders, directives, instructions and telegrams written by M. V. Frunze for under his leadership in the periods when he was working as the military commissar of the Yaroslavl Military District and the commander of the Eastern, Turkestan and Southern Fronts. At that time, M. V. Frunze turned directly to V. I. Lenin on the most important questions and constantly informed him on the course of military operations. In these report, replies and instructions of V. I. Lenin, it is possible to find many exceptionally valuable military-political and operational-strategic conclusions and recommendations making it possible to more profoundly understand the events of the Civil War.

In many of the listed documents, particularly in the orders and briefings on summing up the results of the conducted operations and combat actions, generalizing conclusions are drawn on the methods of carrying out operational-tactical tasks, on troop command and control, on party political work, manning and logistic support of the troops and all these are of great practical and theoretical significance. They were subsequently used by M. V. Frunze in his military theoretical works.

In such works as "Yedinaya voyennaya doktrina i Krasnaya Armiya," "Reorganizatsiya Krasnoy Armii," "Osnovnyye voyennyye zadachi momenta" and others, M. V. Frunze raised the question of elaborating uniform views of the nature of a future war and the methods of waging it, of the organizational development of the Armed Forces and of the training and indoctrination of the personnel. Here he emphasized that "one of the basic conditions for ensuring the maximum might of the Red Army is to turn it into a unified organism united from top to bottom not only by a common political ideology but also by a unity of views on the nature of the military tasks confronting the republic, the methods of resolving them and the methods for the combat training of the troops." (46) He for the first time provided the fullest definition of the concept of a state's military doctrine and this has basically remained even now. He felt that the defense of the Soviet Union should be organized "in the first place, on a clear and precise notion of the nature of a future war; secondly, on a correct and accurate considering of those forces and means which our probable enemies will possess; thirdly, on the same such consideration of our own resources." (47)

In the work "Reorganizatsiya Krasnoy Armii" and others, Frunze established the necessity of switching to the organizational development of the army on the basis of combining regular and territorial formations. The Red Army at that time in its technical equipping lagged behind the armies of the developed capitalist states. But Mikhail Vasilyevich profoundly believed that the nation's industrialization would provide an opportunity to eliminate this lag in the shortest time. In the article "Results and Prospects of Military

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Organizational Development" and other works, he disclosed the ever-increasing importance of the development of aviation, artillery, armored troops, and the means of air and antichemical defense, pointing out that the growth of equipment had caused an enormous increase in the number of troops and placed increased demands on the moral qualities of the soldier and on his psychological training. Here Frunze emphasized that our army had enormous moral and political superiority over the enemy. In order to fully realize this advantage in a war, it was essential to have well organized work in the area of the military-political indoctrination of the men. In such works as "Voyenno-politicheskoye vospitaniye Krasnoy armii," "Privet PURu" [Greetings to the Political Directorate of the RVS] and others, he disclosed the sources and ways for ensuring the high morale of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In a number of works ("Lenin i Krasnaya Armiya," "Veprosy vysshego voyennogo obrazovaniya" [Questions of Higher Military Education] and others), M. V. Frunze profoundly analyzed the activities of V. I. Lenin as the founder of Soviet military science and the leader of national defense, showing V. I. Lenin "as a leader of the proletarian revolution, as a leader not only in the area of pure politics, but also politics moving into armed struggle, into insurrection and then into civil war. In this area Comrade Lenin showed himself to be a most inspired strategist and tactician."(48) In speaking about Lenin's demand to use the major old specialists without fail, M. V. Frunze emphasized that by this Lenin wanted again and again to point up the importance of scientific preparation and the importance of science in all areas of Soviet work, including in military affairs. Loyal to this legacy, M. V. Frunze carefully followed all military theoretical innovations both in our nation and abroad. He also made a major contribution to the development of all sectors of military science.

Mikhail Vasilyevich acted decisively against the Trotskyites who denied military science and had a neglectful attitude to the general methodological questions of military theory. The Trotskyites and other opponents of Frunze accused him of supposedly "distracting" the command personnel and all the army from practical questions and a study of the regulations by his military theoretical problems. Similar arguments sometimes occurred in following periods of the development of military science. They were characteristic, as a rule, for individuals who had a poor understanding not only of theoretical questions but primarily were poorly prepared in practical terms. The references to practice were needed by them to conceal their theoretical ignorance.

Even in those times when our military science had just arisen, Frunze quite rationally replied to all this demagoguery that without a solution to general theoretical questions it was impossible on a scientifically sound basis to solve specific practical questions and establish viable regulations. We cannot, he said, advance military-theoretical thought further if this thought does not take root among our command personnel; this would threaten us with stagnation and military-theoretical backwardness and would be reflected in all our practical work.

Proceeding from these considerations, M. V. Frunze commenced his military-theoretical activities with the elaboration of precisely fundamental, general

theoretical questions related primarily to the elaboration of a uniform military doctrine. At present, life convinces us how profoundly right V. I. Lenin was when he warned: "...The person who takes to partial questions without first solving the general ones will inevitably at each step unconsciously for himself 'trip' on these general questions."(49)

M. V. Frunze viewed Marxist-Leninist theory as a powerful ideological weapon and an important source of strength for the socialist army. He constantly saw to it that the study of Marxism-Leninism in the military schools was properly organized so that all military disciplines were permeated with a spirit of Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, Frunze was against those who assumed that it was possible to become a good military specialist just by knowing Marxist theory. He emphasized that Marxist theory itself demanded from us a careful study of military affairs. He demanded that our military cadres in the area of operational-tactical training not live by the experience of just the Civil War but also consider the development prospects of military affairs, "for otherwise, with just the experience of the Civil War we, in the event of clashing with a well-armed enemy, could end up in a tragic situation."(50)

He constantly recommended that the military cadres not close themselves up within military affairs but be vitally interested in the achievements of other social and natural sciences. Even in 1922, he urged the military workers to establish contact with the nation's scientific centers and with scientists and fully utilize their scientific achievements in the interests of increasing the combat might of the Army and Navy. Frunze himself was a highly educated person and had profound political and military knowledge. He did a great deal to develop the curiosity of commanders and political workers and instill in them a respect for scientific knowledge.

In commemoration of the contribution of M. V. Frunze in the area of science, in the aim of encouraging military-scientific work, the Prize imeni M. V. Frunze was founded in July 1926. The first person to receive this prize was A. N. Lapchinskiy for the book "Taktika aviatsii i voprosy protivovozdushnoy oborony" [Aviation Tactics and Air Defense Questions] published in 1926.

M. V. Frunze closely followed all international events and took an active part in the work of the Comintern and in the ideological struggle to unmask the bourgeois fabrications and falsifications in the area of military theory and practice. He was particularly critical of foreign figures who endeavored to ascribe "red militarism" to the Soviet Republic. As is known, immediately after the Civil War, the Soviet Union reduced the size of its Armed Forces by 10-fold, curtailing them to the most essential minimum. Regardless of this, bourgeois propaganda even at that time raised its voice about "Soviet militarism."

In this context, M. V. Frunze, in a report at the Third Congress of USSR Soviets in May 1925, clearly and convincingly unmasked all the erroneousess of this propaganda. Using specific facts he showed that the capitalist nations which surrounded the Soviet Republic had many times less the population and territory than the Soviet Union but kept larger armed forces in comparison with the USSR. "It merely takes one of our comrades," he emphasized, "to comment on the need for attention to the defense of the Union

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and immediately in the foreign press a series of articles appears pointing to the preparation for war by the USSR. If no militaristic aspirations are found, then the comment is made that this peaceful tone has been specially set to conceal militant intentions and so forth to infinity. With such a situation, of course, it is impossible for us to persuade foreign states of our peaceful aspirations."(51)

But since, regardless of all the facts and peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union, the military preparations were continued by the capitalist states, M. V. Frunze said with full justification that "one of the most dependable guarantees for peace is not only our peace-loving policy but also a strong, powerful Red Army. The stronger our Red Army fist is, the more grounds the workers and peasants of our Union will have for confidence that their peaceful labor will not be disturbed and the fewer the persons who wish to intervene in our internal affairs."(52) The false assertions by bourgeois propaganda of the "excessive armaments of the Soviet Union" and the "Soviet threat" both then and now are needed by the imperialists to justify the arms race being carried out by them and conceal their aggressive attentions against the USSR and the other socialist countries.

In all his activities, M. V. Frunze proceeded from Lenin's thesis that the basis for the organizational development of the Red Army was the leadership by the Communist Party. In speaking on the occasion of the Sixth Anniversary of the RKKA Military Academy, he said: "No one can build anything or carry out his policy both in the nation and in the army outside the party and without it. As long as the party is strong and united, the Union of Soviet Republics is invincible."(53) He called the Communist Party the leader and guide of the Red Army and emphasized that "the Red Army has known and knows just this leader."(54) The Leninist principle of the party's leading role has remained the underlying basis of Soviet military organizational development in our times, too.

Certain traits of the military leader and theorist. From military history we know many great generals and outstanding military administrators. Peter I, Rumyantsev, Suvorov, Kutuzov and Napoleon proved themselves most vividly in both areas simultaneously. However, the qualities inherent to a general in a war and a military administrator are not always successfully combined in one person. Potemkin or Milyutin, for example, were good military administrators but they did not prove themselves in generalship in the field. Not all generals were sufficiently interested in military administrative work in peacetime. Thus, G. K. Zhukov, while an outstanding general of the Soviet school, himself in a conversation pointed out that he always felt more confident in any wartime position than in the postwar years.

As for M. V. Frunze, it can be said without exaggeration that his qualities of a general and military administrator and military reformer complemented each other very well and he demonstrated outstanding abilities in both fields. In truth, after the Civil War he spent too little time at the head of the Republic RVS, but what he did in this position in a short period of time shows a great deal.

Even more rarely in history we encounter examples of the combining in one man the qualities of outstanding general and theorist capable of major scientific generalizations of military experience with a profound penetration into the essence of the designated questions. A. V. Suvurov can serve as a great example in this regard. Napoleon left thoughts which are rich in content. But still Napoleon who performed brilliantly in a number of engagements as a general and who had 6 years of free time on Elba did not rise to those heights of generalizing the phenomena of war as did Clausewitz.

And it is completely natural that precisely the proletarian revolution produced such military figures as M. V. Frunze in whom the talent of a general is so well combined with the talent of a scientific researcher and theorist. Of particular significance were the profound knowledge and creative application of the Marxist-Leninist method and the Leninist school of organically combining and achieving a unity of theory and practice. Leaving an indelible trace in the mind of M. V. Frunze were the personal encounters which he had with V. I. Lenin.

The well known Soviet psychologist B. M. Teplov in his brilliant work "Um polkovodtsa" [The Mind of the Military Leader], on a basis of military history materials, has described the experience of a psychological investigation of a general's thinking.(55) Here he has set as his goal to study the "practical thinking," rightly asserting that for psychology this is of no less importance and no less interest than research on "theoretical thinking." Both types of thinking were important for such military figures as M. V. Frunze who combined the qualities of a general and a military theorist.

In analyzing the particular features of a "practical mind," B. M. Teplov has pointed out that a general must have two qualities--an outstanding mind and strong will power. He mentions Napoleon who compared the talent of a general with a square with the base being will power and the top the mind. Only a person in whom will power and mind are equal can be a major military figure. If will power significantly exceeds the mind, the general will act decisively and courageously but unreasonably; in the opposite instance he will have good ideas and plans but will not have enough courage and determination to carry them out. But since such a complete equilibrium is rarely encountered in a person, Napoleon felt that it was better to have more character than mind and in his marshals he valued primarily volitional qualities. Proceeding from these same considerations, M. I. Dragomirov has proposed that one might accept that the talent of a general is not a square but rather a rectangle, giving preference to will power. In his opinion, "of all human undertakings, war is a question that is to a significant degree more volitional than mental."(56)

However, as is shown by the psychological analysis of the activities of generals, it is incorrect to view the mind and will of a general as two equal capabilities and it is more correct to proceed from a unity of mind and will as was pointed out also by M. V. Frunze. "When they say," writes B. M. Teplov, "that a certain military chief has an outstanding mind but is devoid of such volitional qualities as decisiveness of 'moral courage,' this means that he does not have the mind which is essential for a general. The true 'general's mind' cannot exist in a person who is weak-willed, timid and weak-charactered."(57) He then went on to emphasize that persons who possess a

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limited mind cannot be truly decisive. An essential condition for decisiveness is a great mind, perceptiveness and courage.

In viewing the gifts of M. V. Frunze from this viewpoint, we see an amazingly complete combination of an outstanding mind, character and will. In actuality, in the head of a weak-willed military leader such a bold idea could not arise as making a counterstrike against the flank of the Kolchak troops under conditions where the entire front was retreating in heavy defensive battles. Moreover, it would have been impossible to carry this out without an enormous will power, tenacity and energy. On the other hand, the development of operational-strategic thinking and the ability to find successful and bold solutions strengthen the will, they add force and energy to carry them out and make it possible to more boldly take a risk and be daring. The proportional development of the mental abilities, the volitional and organizational qualities was viewed by M. V. Frunze as a most important condition in the training and indoctrination of command personnel generally.

The uniqueness of the mental abilities of M. V. Frunze was apparent primarily in the ability to foresee the development of events, to think not only for himself but also for the enemy, and to immediately see the whole and all the details, in bringing together, using the words of B. M. Teplov, "a synthetic force of mind and concreteness of thinking, and in the special gift of turning the complex into the simple, maintaining correctness of judgments, simplicity and clarity of thought under the most complicated conditions of the combat situation as well as in resolving the most confused and difficult theoretical problems.

M. V. Frunze himself devoted particular importance to intuition. In speaking on the anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin, he said: "In order to be a good strategist, equally in the area of pure politics as well as in military affairs, particular, specific qualities are required. The most important of them is so-called intuition, the ability to quickly assess the entire complexity of surrounding phenomena, to find the most basic thing and on the basis of considering this chief thing to find a certain plan of struggle and work." (58) He viewed intuition not as a random, fortuitous guess but as the ability for profound, scientific prediction, and the capacity to quickly take bold decisions requiring the preliminary accumulation of great knowledge, practical experience and extended mental work.

M. V. Frunze excelled in a flexible mind and firm will. Characteristic of his generalship art was careful planning of the forthcoming operations and the firm execution of the adopted decisions and elaborated plans. At the same time, this steadfastness was never turned into stupid stubbornness or obstinacy which, in the words of B. M. Teplov, destroys that very will which at first glance was its source. Mikhail Vasilyevich showed the necessary flexibility when the situation had changed and promptly adjusted his decisions and actions, showing here the Suvurov "good eye," speed of orientation as well as consideration and response to the change in the situation. Also inherent to him were many other qualities which characterize him as an outstanding military figure. At the same time, Frunze understood and directly mentioned certain weak points in his training: the lack of a systematic military education and experience in troop work on the inferior and middle levels. But

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he endeavored to make up for these gaps by constant self-education, by proximity to the troops, by frequent visits to the formations and units and by a desire to understand down to the last detail each new question of theory and practice.

The role and importance of any individual in history, particularly a highly-placed person, are determined ultimately not only by his abilities and potential but also by the deeds performed by him, by the results, by the effectiveness of his practical activities in one or another area of work assigned to him. Or, as is sometimes said by the scientists, this is the "dry residue" of a lived life, that is, what was done out of that which was not accomplished in this endeavor by predecessors.

Any other approach does not make it possible to judge objectively. Unfortunately, in certain memoirs and theoretical works, one can sometimes see a one-sided approach to assessing individual military figures. Often in describing them everything comes down to the fact that he was a charming and urbane person who spoke attentively and politely with everyone and so forth. But here nothing is said about the "dry residue" which he left after himself, why in the area where he worked, for instance, before the war and for which he was responsible so many completely unacceptable omissions were discovered and about which a good deal was said very persuasively at other points in these same memoirs.

Undoubtedly a good ability to deal with others is an embellishment for any leader. But in military service this makes sense only in the instance that it is combined with great, and if need be, strict and merciless exactingness for oneself and subordinates, when, regardless of any difficulties and obstacles and contrary to any resistance and miscomprehension, decisions and measures which correspond to the interests of the matter at hand are carried out. Such a position can also have severe consequences for one or another person, but ultimately from the viewpoint of the interests of the matter at hand, a party, principled line is the solely correct one. The showing of civil courage in peacetime is sometimes significantly more difficult than the showing of courage on the battlefield. V. I. Lenin copied out and emphasized the following significant words from the book by Clausewitz "On War and the Conduct of Wars": "The further we rise up the steps of the service hierarchy, the more thought, reason and comprehension prevails in activity; the more boldness which is a property of temperament retreats to the background; for this reason we find it [boldness] less and less in high positions, but on the other hand it is then all the more worthy of praise."(59)

At times mention is made that in and of himself the given leader was a very professional and able man but was not given the opportunity to develop as he should have. If we view the activities of M. V. Frunze from this aspect, he also had to work under far from ideal conditions. He frequently encountered not only disaffection but also covert and even outright opposition and at times sabotage. This was the case when he was appointed to the position of commander of the 4th Army since Trotsky did not hold the military abilities of Frunze in high regard. After appointment to this position, Mikhail Vasilyevich constantly encountered discrimination in the manning and supply of the army troops. While commander of the Southern Group of Forces, he received

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of ensuring national defense? Is it not possible, without harm to peaceful needs, to see to it that certain military goals are also achieved here."(63)

M. V. Frunze devoted great attention to the mobilization preparations and to converting to a wartime status industry, transport and the entire national economy. This consisted in the prompt and organized shift from the production of consumer goods to the output of products for military needs. He demanded that this be more flexibly considered both by the production workers and the military department.

Excessive military demands were not always advantageous even for the military themselves. Frunze pointed to the necessity of revising the supply articles adopted for the peacetime and particularly the wartime army, he sought the maximum use of those models which were consumer articles in peacetime and for which mass production had already been organized. Mikhail Vasilyevich proposed that here one could and should forego the interests which were not of crucial significance for the question, for the possibility of the mass receipt of supply articles by the army in wartime, without any additional effort and expenditure, completely compensated for their secondary shortcomings. On the other hand, he felt that the production of peacetime consumer goods if possible should be adopted to satisfy military needs. He showed the feasibility of this demand using specific examples of the production of motor vehicles, tractors, means of communications and so forth.

These important provisions on readying the nation for defense were set out by M. V. Frunze at the Third All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1925 and they were approved and put into legislation. These provisions were also considered subsequently in all the five-year plans. The Congress of Soviets pointed out that the preparation of the nation for defense requires industrial development which, without disrupting the normal growth of the productive forces, at the same time would establish a solid base for defense needs. The congress set for the Soviet government the following task: "...To carry out all of the necessary measures to raise the nation's defense capability by: a) the appropriate expansion of the military industry and the organizing of all the remaining state industry of the Union which even in peacetime would take into account wartime needs...."(64)

In organizing the fulfillment of the party and government decisions, Frunze called constantly for the search for the most effective methods for closer collaboration between the military departments, economic bodies, scientific centers and design bureaus and for the merging of military-scientific and scientific-technical work. He felt that scientists and inventors should work considering military needs. The military-scientific workers and the representatives of the military department were urged above all to set a correct direction for the activities of the economic and scientific-technical workers. "In practical terms," said M. V. Frunze, "this must be achieved by having our military-scientific societies organize circles at the corresponding enterprises and groups of enterprises and be concerned and interested in the questions of peacetime economic activity, viewing them from the defense standpoint. This work is of the most enormous importance. I draw your attention to it because I know from practical experience how the interests of

defense suffer if proper attention is not paid to this aspect of the issue."(65)

Mikhail Vasilyevich demanded that the supply directorates work in close contact with all the industrial enterprises and scientific-technical organizations of the nation. This contact should not be restricted to the central bodies but should also be carried out on the spot. The wisdom and importance of these demands were fully appreciated by us during the period of the Great Patriotic War and during the postwar years.

It should be pointed out that Frunze assigned an exceptionally important and major place to science and scientific workers in the question of increasing the nation's defense capability and the combat might of the Armed Forces. He carefully followed the major scientific discoveries and technical inventions and became firmly convinced that in a future war the role of scientific workers would be enormous. Even in 1921, he wrote (and later repeated and developed this idea many times): "...The outcome of future clashes to a much greater degree depends now upon the persons of pure science than upon the command. Any major invention or discovery in the area of military equipment can immediately create colossal advantages for the warring sides."(66) These words have a particularly timely ring in the age of scientific-technical progress, nuclear missile weapons and radioelectronic equipment.

In subsequent years, the Communist Party and the Soviet government carried out major measures to improve leadership over defense questions. In the spring of 1927, upon a decision of the Party Central Committee, the former functions of the Labor and Defense Council [STO] were restored. Prior to this, with the transition to peacetime construction, as was pointed out at the 15th Party Congress, the STO had gradually "lost its third letter" [the defense function]. After the party congress, the STO began to regularly assemble to resolve defense problems. Mobilization bodies were established under all the people's commissariats and these initiated work to prepare the national economy for the event of war; an industrial mobilization body was organized under the VSNKh [All-Union Council of the National Economy] as well as a special system under the Gosplan which should consider defense needs in elaborating all the national economic plans. As defense tasks became more complicated, the organization and functions of these state bodies continued to be improved. They played a major role in increasing the defense capability of the Soviet state on the eve of World War II.

In accord with what has been stated above, it can be concluded that M. V. Frunze considered the "technical aspect" to be the most important factor which decisively influenced the nature of war. Into this concept he invested the entire aggregate of human resources and technical means which could be employed in a war and a scientifically sound program for the technical equipping of the army and navy.

Even in 1920, immediately after the defeat of Wrangel, the technically best equipped enemy which the Red Army encountered for the first time, Frunze with great concern spoke about the technical equipping of our army. In 1921, his article "On the Reorganization of the French Army" appeared and here these questions were raised even more broadly and later his ideas about this were

developed in the article "Protect the Revolution" and other works. During the same year he wrote: "Our technical backwardness with each day is becoming evermore threatening. One need not particularly delude oneself and be content with references to the experience of the Civil War. It must not be forgotten that to a significant degree this was one-sided.... As for future conflicts, this question of technical superiority can be crucial and not in our favor, regardless of all the courage and valor of the Red Army. In order to avoid this and make the Red Army a truly powerful weapon for ensuring both our peacetime construction and the world revolution, it must be increased in technical terms at whatever the cost."(67)

The question of the technical equipping of the USSR Armed Forces was one of the major questions of Soviet military doctrine. The problem was that many incorrect views on the nature of a future war and the methods of waging it derived from a lack of trust in the prospects for the socialist transformation of the nation and primarily its industrialization.

Precisely this explains why certain old military specialists and other skeptics subsequently mistrusted the theory of a deep operation and other major achievements of Soviet military art. A. A. Svechin, for example, wrote: "...To operate roads and cumbersome means of long distance combat is possible only with the superiority of heavy industry, with extensive financial means and with the rich development of the railroad and highway networks. These prerequisites exist in the capitalist states of the West. To operate with chief means of close combat is possible only with the great enthusiasm of the masses and their readiness for self-sacrifice.... For the West, the mass is above all the mass or weight of the artillery, then the mass of tanks and the mass of airplanes.... The infantry mass is in the background, for secondary tasks. For the USSR, the mass is primarily the mass of infantry and the means of close combat. The means of close combat are of decisive significance."(68)

M. V. Frunze, regardless of the postwar economic chaos, held the opposite position on this question. He steadfastly defended Lenin's idea that the material base of socialism can only be highly developed, industrial production based upon the most recent scientific and technical achievements. Mikhail Vasilyevich was confident that if the technical equipping of the Armed Forces is considered to be a shock task, then, no matter how greatly we lagged behind, we would be able to overtake our future enemies.

The technical reconstruction carried out in the 1930's ensured the military-technical superiority of our Armed Forces over the enemy during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Time showed how farsightedly our party and government carried out these tasks and how prophetic was M. V. Frunze in this regard.

Man and technology in war. The social nature of the new type army. In reviewing the social and technical nature of a future war, Frunze clearly and from Marxist-Leninist positions defined the relationship of man and equipment in armed combat. He was against the two extremes which occurred at that time. In the first place, against those who underestimated technology and assumed that war could be won without it, by the mere number of troops and their high revolutionary spirit. Even the 1925 RKKA Field Manual approved by M. V.

Frunze demanded the abandonment of the opposition of the Red soldier's enthusiasm and enemy equipment and have the enemy's equipment be beaten by our equipment. Secondly, Frunze condemned those who made a fetish out of equipment, who imagined future engagements as a war of just machines and who instilled mistrust in the force of the Red Army confronted by well armed bourgeois armies.

M. V. Frunze recommended that we proceed from the immediate and more remote future. In the mid-1920's, the Red Army undoubtedly was inferior in technical terms to the armies of the main capitalist states and in the event of imposing war on our nation, during this period, we would basically rely on our sociopolitical superiority and other related factors which had ensured our victory in the Civil War. At the same time, Mikhail Vasilyevich was decisively against the rapid outfitting of the army and navy with modern equipment and any manifestations of the underestimating of equipment and he checked a nihilistic attitude toward this in the most ruthless manner. He also drew attention to the moral effect of equipment on man, he did not separate one from the other, he considered their opposition to be inadmissible and viewed them in a dialectical unity. He proceeded from the fact that the development of production and equipment comprises the objective material basis for the development of human society and man himself and the latter, in turn, accelerates scientific and technical progress.

Frunze openly belittled instances of blind worshiping of equipment and the attempts to give it primary significance and represent man as a simple attribute of technology. Of course, he said, it is extremely dangerous to underestimate the role of technology but one must not also become hypnotized by it. In giving enormous significance to technology, M. V. Frunze gave man the crucial role in a future war. "We must say," he emphasized, "that still the decisive role is played not by equipment as behind the equipment there always is a live man, without whom the equipment is dead."(69)

In following the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, M. V. Frunze gave enormous significance to the moral factor and viewed the influence on military doctrine of not only the material conditions but also the spiritual ones linked to the attitude of the masses of people toward war and national defense. In profoundly realizing that wars are waged now by peoples and that "in any war the victory is ultimately determined by the state of morale of those masses who shed their blood on the battlefield,"(70) he viewed the economic and moral aspect of the rear in a close unity.

The moral factor in a war has been taken into account in all times, but Frunze, being guided by the Marxist-Leninist teachings, approached it not abstractly, he saw its main sources in the socioeconomic relations of people and considered the dependence of the moral factor upon the social and state system and the political goals of the war. He emphasized that the prerequisites for the moral superiority of the Red Army over the bourgeois armies had been established by the Great October Socialist Revolution. M. V. Frunze called the Red Army the army of the future and the carrier of new ideals. The mass heroism of its fighters and commanders and their ardent enthusiasm ensured victory in the Civil War.

In giving great importance to international indoctrination of the men, Frunze emphasized that the Red Army indoctrinated in a spirit of fraternity of peoples in future military conflicts with capitalist armies would be the dependable defender of all suppressed nationalities. During the years of World War II, the Soviet Army honorably carried out its international duty and helped many peoples of Europe and Asia become liberated from German Naziism and Japanese militarism. Socialist internationalism under present-day conditions continues to remain one of the most important principles in the indoctrination of the Soviet Armed Forces and one of the fundamental provisions of Soviet military doctrine.

In accord with the given understanding of the essence and nature of a war, M. V. Frunze also approached the questions of the social nature of the armed forces of the dictatorship of the proletariat and their organizational development. He viewed the army and navy as a weapon for continuing politics by the means of armed violence and the chief means for waging war. He soundly worked out the historical purpose and principles for the organizational development and training of the armed forces. Running as a constant theme through the works of Frunze is the notion that the social nature, the historical purpose and organizational principles of the Armed Forces are a direct reflection of the state's social and economic system, its political structure and ideology as expressed in domestic and foreign policy.

Proceeding from the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, M. V. Frunze thoroughly analyzed the fundamental differences of the socialist state's army from the bourgeois armies. He pointed out that an army of a capitalist state is a tool for maintaining the exploiting system and the dominance of capital and an implement of imperialist policy, a policy of suppressing the workers and enslaving other peoples. The army of a socialist state is engendered by a new social and state system and is designed to defend the revolution's victories. The Red Army in political and moral terms is a direct copy or replica of our worker-peasant country. The waging of war requires the creation of multimillion armed forces. All the armed Soviet people will comprise a wartime army which will be a real Red Army.

Frunze unmasked the attempts by bourgeois military theorists to show the army as an organization standing apart from the class struggle and politics. He convincingly showed that in a class society the army and navy always were and remain an implement for the policy of the ruling class. The Red Army and Navy should be organized strictly on a class basis, being an expression of the union of the working class and the peasantry.

Frunze gave great importance to the socioclass unity of our Armed Forces. In comparing them with the bourgeois armies, he pointed out that the latter have advantages in technical terms and in skilled personnel. "But there," he wrote, "there does not exist the main condition which ensures military might: there is no union of the social upper classes with the social lower orders. The presence of a deep abyss dividing the class in command from the class of exploited, in essence, nullifies the efforts to establish a battleworthy military force."(71)

M. V. Frunze emphasized that the domestic and external functions of armies are determined by the class nature of the state. Bourgeois armies are an implement of national suppression while the Red Army is an army of friendship and fraternity of the peoples in the Soviet state. The armies of the capitalist states always have internal (suppressing the workers of their own nations) and external (enslaving the peoples of other countries) functions and the internal function is the main, determining one.

An army of the dictatorship of the proletariat serves the cause of defending the socialist state against the encroachments of internal and external counterrevolution. He correctly foresaw that after the defeat of the domestic counterrevolution and the strengthening of Soviet power, the socialist state from the viewpoint of internal conditions would not need a permanent army but as long as the military threat existed from the capitalist countries, the external function of our Armed Forces related to the defense of the fatherland against an outside attack would remain.

The political goals of a war and the political aspect of military doctrine also have a crucial impact upon the methods of waging a war and on the strategic and operational-tactical principles. Proceeding from this, M. V. Frunze considered that one of the important provisions of Soviet military doctrine was the necessity of indoctrinating the Soviet Armed Forces in a spirit of active and decisive operations. Our ideological opponents, in distorting this idea, have repeatedly endeavored to accuse the Soviet Armed Forces of aggressiveness. But Frunze repeatedly emphasized that our state does not intend any predatory actions and all its aspirations are aimed at ensuring peace. But if a war is forced on us, our army will act aggressively and decisively.

These are the basic views of M. V. Frunze on the political aspect of Soviet military doctrine. He also thoroughly elaborated the most important ideas of the military-technical aspect of military doctrine and these will be examined in more detail in the subsequent chapters of the book.

On Military Science and Military Art

One of the fundamental questions of military theory and practice. In being concerned with methodological problems of military theory and practice, M. V. Frunze showed great interest also in the question of the essence and relationship of military science and military art. This question was reflected in many of his works. While on an official mission to Moscow in May 1922, he took part in a discussion of this question. It must immediately be pointed out that he approached the given scientific problem from the solely correct, Marxist-Leninist positions. In order to better understand his views on the relationship of military science and military art and their importance, it is necessary to briefly recall the history of this question.

Disputes over whether the conduct of a war is a science or an art go back a long ways. Of all the great generals, A. V. Suvurov held the clearest position on these questions. He said that "a general must form himself by sciences," but "theory without practice is dead." He demanded that all officers constantly master "the science of war" and "the science of winning,"

and considered "blind bravery provides victory over the enemy" to be a deception. "Victory comes only from military art," and "one fights with skill and not numbers." Napoleon, although considering that the waging of war was more an art than a science, never doubted the necessity of theoretical bases for military affairs, that is, a military science.

However, both in the past and at present, bourgeois military theoreticians and military leaders have voiced the most different opinions on this question. Some of them, in viewing the conduct of a war as an art, have denied the presence of any patterns and, consequently, the possibility of military science. M. Dragomirov has written on this: "At present, no one would take it into his head to assert that there could be a military science; it is inconceivable just as the science of poetry, painting and music are inconceivable...."(72) Others (Jomini, Leer, Fuller), although recognizing the possibility and necessity of military science, reduced it merely to mathematical calculations and "standard norms" or viewed it as a system of eternal and unvarying principles and denied the objective nature of the laws of war.

Certain bourgeois military theorists (Lloyd, Willisen, Leval, Foch and Serrigny) endeavored to find elements of science and art in the conduct of a war. Serrigny assumed that the preparation for a war was the area of science while its waging was a art. Lloyd showed that a war has two aspects: the first or technical which involves the preparation of an army for the war and which can be normed by rules and reduced to mathematical principles; the second which relates to the conduct of a war and engagements cannot have any rules. Leval felt that strategy, like military affairs as a whole, is comprised of thought and its application, spiritual and material givens, logic and calculation, the speculative and positive, that is, it is related both to science and art.

The denying of the possibility of military science at times occurred over the identifying of natural and social sciences and the miscomprehension of the particular features of the manifestation of the natural laws of nature operating as a spontaneous force and the sociohistorical laws which operate not automatically but as the regular, cognitive activities of people themselves in the process of social practice.

In this context one cannot recognize as fully valid the accusation widespread in military literature directed at Clausewitz, one of the founders of bourgeois military science, that he completely denied the possibility of military science. One of the modern military philosophers S. I. Krupnov has correctly pointed out that Clausewitz "denied not military science generally but rather the attempts by von Bulow, Archduke Karl and others to establish a military science that was as precise, logically ordered as mathematics and capable of providing uniform answers to all questions arising in troop leadership and equally applicable to all wars. Such a military science, said Clausewitz, is impossible and he was correct.... Clausewitz was one of the first to understand the role of scientific theory for the leadership of a war and endeavored to work it out."(73) At the same time, it must be stipulated that Clausewitz considered war an area of chance and denied the existence of its objective laws which are the basis of any science.

A majority of the Russian military theorists on the eve of World War I saw elements of both science and art in military affairs. The Russian "Voyennaya entsiklopediya" [Military Encyclopedia] stated: "Each area of human creativity (including military affairs) goes through a phase of unconscious art and ultimately arrives at rational art which has a sufficiently sound science (principles, rules, forms, standards and so forth)."(75) The interpretation of military science and military art remained idealistic and metaphysical and military science was linked, as a rule, not with an understanding of objective patterns but rather reduced to a simple systematization of accumulated knowledge and to the elaboration of principles and rules for the conduct of military operations. The bourgeois military theorists were unable to ultimately resolve the question of the role and the relationship of science and art in military affairs.

A careful study of this question's history provides an opportunity to conclude that the disputes over whether the conduct of a war is a science or an art and these very concepts arose not accidentally but rather appeared as a reflection of that objective process which in one way or another made itself felt in the preparation for and conduct of a war. The mere fact that these questions were of concern not only to military theorists but also to such outstanding practitioners of military affairs as Suvurov and Napoleon shows that these questions were not idle ones. The history of military scientific thought knows repeated attempts to brush aside such complex questions and declare them, in particular the disputes on the essence of military science and art, to be scholastic and not of serious theoretical or practical significance. But life inexorably has forced us to return again and again to them, particularly at turning points in the development of military affairs.

It is no accident that the questions of the essence and relationship of military science and military art rearose during the first years of the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces. In line with the elaboration of the principles of Soviet military science, the questions of the attitude of Marxism toward military science and the nature of military affairs began to be actively discussed on the pages of the military journals and at theoretical conferences.

S. I. Gusev, in describing the situation on the military-theoretical front after the Civil War, has written: "Among the Red commanders who had lived through the tremendous experience of the 3-year Civil War, there was a strong need to theoretically analyze this experience which did not fit within the framework of that military science which had been inherited from Tsarism. With the greatest energy they rushed to study Marxism and dialectics. In this undoubtedly healthy move there were also certain hitches: novices in Marxism, they still had not gotten firmly on their 'Marxist feet' and made mistakes in applying the Marxist method to military questions. The involvement with Marxism also caused the reverse reaction in the military circles against Marxism, and a struggle started over the question of the applicability of Marxism to military science and to military affairs."(75)

In May 1922, at a session of the Military Science Council of the RKKA Military Academy, a discussion was held on the question "Military Science Among Other Sciences" in which M. V. Frunze participated.(76) Invited to the meeting were

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representatives from the staffs of the military districts, the higher military editorial council, students and instructors from the Military Academy and leading personnel from the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. Raised for discussion were the following questions: are military affairs a science or an art, their relationship to social and natural sciences; are the principles of military affairs eternal; military principles and the laws of science; the methods of Marxism and military affairs. The discussion was carried out under the leadership of Trotsky who initially argued strongly against holding it, but under the pressure of the army community was forced to agree.

Basically the old military specialists gave reports and they set out, in essence, views which had prevailed in Russia prior to the revolution. Prof S. G. Lukriskiy who gave the main report provided an analysis of the existing views and pointed out that military affairs are considered by some to be a science and by others the "elementary theory of a certain trade." The speaker, in viewing the theory and practice of military affairs as separate from one another, emphasized that the practice of military affairs in theoretical terms is based on many sciences. Experience, as the source of military theory, was described by him as rudimentary, primitive and limited in its achievements and very imperfect. "The road to understanding 'point blank'," he stated, "is the work of pure reason." He considered the underlying principles of military art to be permanent.

Prof A. Svechin advanced the notion that the theory of military art, in representing a cycle of practical military knowledge, cannot claim the title of a science due to the impossibility of its fully disclosing all aspects of military affairs; the latter also do not have their own specific principles, for they are common to any struggle, from a debate and boxing to the struggle between labor and capital, inclusively. Natural sciences exist in parallel and only in an external relation to the theory of military art.

A co-worker from the staff of the Kiev Military District S. Kvanin showed the existence of military science which studies war in common with sociology, but each of these has its own specific goal. War as a social phenomenon is the subject of sociology while war as military affairs is an area exclusively of military science. He voiced the opinion that Marxism is applicable only for solving particular problems in military science.

Prof A. Snegarev felt that military affairs in the preparatory process were almost a science and in the process of execution almost an art. He proposed the term "quasilearned art."

Prof A. Toporkov proposed that the nature of military affairs cannot be considered as an art, since by nature it is antiaesthetic and cannot be discovered by aesthetics. Prof F. Ogordnikov considered military policy the superior sector of military science and this policy, in his opinion, only could claim the title of a true science. Military science is the theory of military art and military politics.

V. Akhrov spoke about the possibility and utility of applying Marxism to military affairs. He saw the particular value of the Marxist method in

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uniting theory and practice which, in his words, under other conditions clash. In the opinion of G. Isserson, the practical value of the question "military science or military art?" is that its resolution provides an opportunity to work out sound criteria for the training of the fighter and chiefly the commander.

Trotsky in a disrespectful tone said that it was possible to be a superior fighter and even a general without giving any answer to the question of whether military affairs are a science or an art, as it was possible to be a good communist fighter without ever being concerned with the questions of materialistic philosophy. Can Marxism teach you to make bast sandals? asked Trotsky and, extending his irony to military affairs, categorically denied the possibility of employing Marxism in this area. In his words, a danger threatens those comrades who wish to build a military system by the methods of Marxism. Further (in his subsequent speeches) he asserted that there is and was no military science. There is a whole series of sciences on which military affairs are based. War is not a science. War is a practical art or skill. War is a trade for those who correctly study military affairs. By its nature, it is impossible to turn war into a science just as architecture, commerce, veterinary science and so forth cannot become a science. What is called the theory of war or military science, in his opinion, is the aggregate of practical procedures, methods of adaptation and skills corresponding to a certain task, that is, to defeat the enemy. To form the procedures of the military trade using the Marxist method, he stated, is the same thing as constructing a theory of architecture or a veterinary textbook using Marxism. With the aid of Marxism, it is impossible to construct a field manual, and this was his main conclusion.(77)

M. V. Frunze also spoke at this session. Unfortunately, his speech here up to now has not been published in any collection of his works. It has been written down in different versions. An analysis of the minutes shows that M. V. Frunze in his speech first of all drew attention to the fact that a correct understanding of the discussed questions was of fundamentally important significance for elaborating the military theoretical problems and the practices of military organizational development. He criticized the idealistic approach of A. A. Svechin and certain other participants in the discussion of the debated questions and emphasized the inadmissibility of denying a relationship between the phenomena of social life and military affairs.

M. V. Frunze pointed out that only from the positions of Marxism-Leninism was it possible to fully analyze and provide a correct reply to the question of the place of military science among the other sciences and the essence of military science and military art. If a war is the continuation of politics, a part of social life, then consequently military affairs is a continuation of political affairs. These are carried out by people in a class society and under these conditions not only the military-social but also the purely technical questions require a theoretical and political assessment from the viewpoint of the interests of the proletarian state. For this reason, military affairs is completely "within the sway" of Marxism which provides a key to a correct understanding of all sociopolitical and military-technical questions.

At the same time, M. V. Frunze pointed to the inadmissibility of a simplified, schematic approach to the use of Marxism. "If we correctly understand," he said, "the essence of the Marxist method, then we are confronted with a certain problem of the need to study military affairs with complete carefulness and seriousness. For solving the main military questions we must not employ fantastic research methods but approach them from the purely practical aspect."(78) By "fantastic methods" he meant the methods described in the course of the debate of the knowledge of "pure reason" and "eternal, unchanged principles."

M. V. Frunze convincingly showed all the falaciousness of the very positing of the question: either military science, or military art. He was the only one among the speakers who directly and definitely stated that "military affairs contain elements of both military science and military art."(79)

The above-described position of M. V. Frunze fully corresponded to the Marxist-Leninist scientific understanding of war, military science and military art. The founders of Marxism-Leninism, in giving enormous significance to elucidating the methodological questions of theory and practice, left a series of very important and valuable instructions which offer a key to a correct understanding of the questions concerning the relationship of military science and military art and the subject and content of military science. These instructions, undoubtedly, were taken into account by M. V. Frunze in giving the above-quoted definition of the designated concepts.

V. I. Lenin, in noting the complexity and difficulty of political leadership, wrote that "politics is a science and an art which does not drop from the skies or is given gratis...."(80) Since politics is a science it can be determined and carried out solely on a strictly scientific basis. If politics at the same time is an art, then it should be carried out in practice not only scientifically but also artfully and skillfully, considering the entire complexity of the specific historical situation. Consequently, if politics as a whole is a science and an art, then the continuation of politics by violent means, that is, the waging of war, as a part of politics can and should be a science and an art. If their essence is the same then the manifestation should also be the same.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism not only recognized the necessity and possibility of establishing a scientific theory about war, but in every possible way emphasized that only on a strictly scientific basis was it possible to correctly explain all the phenomena of a war and organize one's practical activities. At the First Congress of Labor Cossacks in 1920, Lenin directly stated that "without science it is impossible to organize a modern army...,"(81) having in mind military science first of all.

K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, in profoundly and thoroughly analyzing the phenomena of war and highly regarding the importance of military science, at the same time pointed out that the preparations for and conduct of a war are an art. K. Marx and F. Engels wrote that "a revolt is an art, just as a war is as well as the other types of arts."(82) V. I. Lenin in his works "Marxism and Revolt," "Advice of an Outsider," and other articles in 1917, repeatedly

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and with his inherent certainty, emphasized that "revolt, like a war, is an art."(83)

M. V. Frunze understood these questions in the same light. He referred to the above-quoted statement of V. I. Lenin in his work "Lenin and the Red Army" and analyzed it in detail. In his works Mikhail Vasilyevich more than 20 times uses the concept "military science" and "military art" in the sense of the two aspects of military affairs. Just in the work "Military Doctrine and the Red Army" he does this several times: on bringing doctrine "into accord with the basic provisions of military science and the requirements of military art"; on coordinating the particular features of the organizational development of the Red Army with "the demands of military science and art" and according "to the basic demand of military art and science."(84)

M. V. Frunze understood military science as the area of theoretical research on the basis of generalizing the experience of the preparation for and conduct of wars. The main task of military theory was to disclose the general and the essentially uniform in the phenomena of war and on this basis work out the methods for preparing and conducting armed combat. He viewed military art as an area of applying military knowledge in practice in carrying out certain tasks under specific situational conditions.

These questions were understood in this manner in all the official documents and military literature during the prewar years, during the period of the Great Patriotic War and after it until 1947. On 11 April 1947, reporting to I. V. Stalin were N. A. Bulganin, A. M. Vasilevskiy, A. I. Antonov and S. M. Shtemenko. In the course of the conversation, I. V. Stalin gave the following instructions: certain military theorists feel that military science and military art are equivalent concepts. Such theorists are profoundly wrong. Military science must not be identified with military art. Military science is a broader and more all-encompassing concept and it, military science, includes also military art with the latter being one of the component parts of military science. Military art includes tactics, operational art and strategy, that is, it is concerned with studying questions relating to the methods of conducting military operations and a war as a whole. Military science, in addition to the questions comprising military art, investigates the questions of the national economy, its material and human resources. This definition was also incorporated in a report at a ceremony in honor of the 30th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces in February 1948 and has become widespread in our military literature.

In explaining this, K. Ye. Voroshilov wrote: "In being an ordered system of authentically scientific knowledge concerning the entire **complex of questions related to modern war**, Stalin's military science, along with the purely military elements such as strategy, operational art, tactics, the organization and training of troops, **encompasses the total of sociopolitical, economic and moral factors** in their aggregate, the interaction and determining influence on military affairs as a whole (emphasis mine.--M. G.)."(85)

Such a definition also had a rational aspect, contributing to a more profound investigation of economic and moral-political problems. But it still ran contrary to the generally accepted understanding of the essence of science and

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art and contained a number of unsound and vulnerable points. In the first place, it did not correspond to the methods of classifying sciences, since military science alone cannot investigate such a complex phenomenon as war and the questions of strengthening national defense, including the economic and moral factors. Secondly, from the philosophical viewpoint, military science, like any other science, is a spiritual phenomenon and cannot include military art as a whole, but namely its practical aspect. From the above-given definition, the very essence of military science has been lost related to an understanding of the objective laws of armed combat. Thirdly, with such an approach military science and military art begin to differ mechanically from one another only in terms of the quantity and scope of questions encompassed by them, assuming that some questions relating to the preparation for a war and its conduct are resolved only by science (for example, an understanding of the moral and economic capabilities) while others, in addition, are an art (tactics, operational art and strategy).

In actuality, as V. I. Lenin taught and M. V. Frunze wrote, the preparation for a war and the waging of war as a whole are not only a science but also an art. This applies also to modern conditions.

The preparation for and conduct of armed combat are related to military science and military art. Here military art has its practical and theoretical aspects and the latter is a component of military science. The main thing in military affairs is the unity of military science and the practice of military art, and for this reason it is a question not of putting these concepts into opposition but rather a more profound elucidation of their specific features and those essential, unbroken ties which ensure their actual unity.

Military science and the practice of military art--two aspects of military affairs. For better understanding this problem, it is obviously necessary to examine from present-day positions what in actuality distinguishes these two concepts from one another. Why did the founders of Marxism-Leninism, in giving enormous significance to knowledge and to military science, at the same time consider it essential to emphasize that war is an art?

Science, as is known, is the result or aggregate of knowledge concerning nature, society and thought and concerning the objective patterns of their development acquired in the course of social historical life. Science arises on the basis of human production and practical activities and develops along with the development of social phenomena, in more and more accurately and profoundly reflecting reality, disclosing the essential relationships of phenomena and arming humans with a knowledge of the objective laws of the real world in the aim of their practical utilization.

By art one understands usually any matter or practical activity of humans which in addition to knowledge requires skill and mastery (military art, the art of leadership, the art of teaching and indoctrination and so forth). In the dictionary of V. Dahl, the word "art" is defined as "a science, knowledge applied to a matter; mastery requiring great ability." The meaning of this word is explained approximately in the same manner under present-day conditions.

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If military affairs are approached from such positions and their essence is carefully analyzed, it can be concluded that military art is an ability or mastery based upon profound theoretical knowledge and the ability to creatively apply them in practice. Just as literature and art (understood in the given instance as a depiction of reality in artistic images) have their own theory or science (art and literary criticism), military science, being the theory of military affairs, has arisen on the basis of investigating and generalizing the practical experience of armed forces in wartime and peacetime.

Historical experience shows that with all the diversity and complexity in the phenomena of war, inherent to them are internal, profound and essential relationships and they have something common, permanent and repeating with the force of necessity, and for this reason the forms and methods of armed struggle arise not out of the "free" will of the generals but are subordinate, like human activity itself, to objective laws which are independent of their will and awareness. This also explains the possibility and necessity of military science which is basically a system of knowledge dealing with the objective laws of a war and the methods of preparing for and conducting armed combat in a certain historical period. Arising as a reflection of the experience of military creativity, military science, like any other science, possesses a relative independence and has, in turn, an enormous impact on the practical activities of man, showing their way, opening up new prospects and suggesting methods for resolving the set tasks.

Another particular feature of the phenomena of war is that the patterns inherent to them, in being independent of the will and awareness of people, operate not with that irreversible inevitability of the laws of nature, but are manifested, as in all other social phenomena, through human activity. A knowledge of the laws of armed combat facilitates practical activity and provides an opportunity to foresee the development of events, to act consciously and more fully utilize the objective laws in one's own interests. But an understanding of the objective laws and the principles, methods and forms elaborated on their basis for armed combat cannot provide an answer to the question of how one should act in one or another situation let alone be capable of by themselves ensuring the achieving of victory in a war. For this reason the provisions of military science cannot be applied in all instances, regardless of the situational conditions, with the same constancy and uniform outcome as the laws of natural sciences.

The difficulty of the given question also is that in the course of a war, different objective laws are operating simultaneously and these often intertwine and contradict one another, creating the most contradictory situation which, in turn, are not permanent and change constantly in the course of armed combat. It is essentially important to consider that war is a bilateral phenomenon and that each of the belligerents consciously or accidentally endeavor to understand and utilize in their own interests the action of one or another objective law and impose their will on the enemy, discover its intentions, deceive the opponent and stun it with surprise and unexpected actions.

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In the course of armed combat all of this creates an exceptionally complicated, intense and constantly changing situation. For this reason, in order to be victorious it is not enough to have merely a knowledge of the patterns of war and military science. Military art is also required. If victory and defeat in a war were determined by the automatic action of objective laws, if the concepts of military science could be employed in practice with the same constancy as the laws of mathematics or physics, then military art would lose any sense and cease to exist as a concept. In actuality, it plays an enormous role and the outcome of armed combat depends largely upon how correctly the military leaders and commanders of all levels have assessed the objectively developing conditions, take effective decisions and how skillfully they carry them out.

This is why M. V. Frunze viewed military art as the ability to correctly assess the situation and take the most effective decision considering the specific situational conditions, the ability to employ all conditions and opportunities to defeat the enemy, as the ability to employ the troops with maximum effectiveness and the least losses. He saw one of the main tasks of the military cadres in selecting the most suitable methods and means in each given situation out of the multiplicity of diverse ones. Military theory cannot provide any pat solution but can serve only as a guiding principle.

One of the participants in the 1922 discussion, Ye. Smyslovskiy, wrote: "...The study of any science in no way guarantees the mastery of the art guided by this science and life offers us repeated examples of so-called 'educated fools' who, in mastering perfectly broad scientific knowledge, are completely incapable in the area of the corresponding art. It is one thing to know and another to be able."(86)

In a combat situation, military leaders and commanders must frequently encounter phenomena which are not provided for by any theoretical concepts or contradict them, and for this reason the necessity arises of seeking out completely new methods of action. This undoubtedly is the entire "secret," the entire complexity of military affairs. As a rule, in a war commanders who have high theoretical training fight more successfully. But instances are known when military leaders, in possessing great theoretical knowledge, are little suitable for practical activity, as they have not mastered the art of troop command and control under difficult conditions.

M. V. Frunze had precisely this in mind when in his speech of 8 May 1922, in emphasizing in every possible way the importance of scientific knowledge, at the same time said that "of course, there cannot be any science capable of teaching one 'to command' as this is the area of art."(87) This was confirmed with particular clarity in the course of the Great Patriotic War. In the beginning of the war, certainly there was not a military chief or commander who theoretically did not understand or from previous experience did not know the need to concentrate the main forces on the crucial sector, to establish assault groupings or provide dependable fire damage to the enemy. Still it took significant time and a great deal of effort and sacrifice before it was possible to master the art of carrying out these and many other tasks. In mastering military art, our command cadres and troops subsequently showed

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remarkable examples of the successful conduct of offensive and defensive operations and won outstanding victories over the enemy.

As is shown by military experience, including the generalship activities of M. V. Frunze, for manifesting a high level of military art, in addition to profound knowledge and high political awareness, it is essential to have developed operational-tactical thinking, a creative approach to the matter, the ability to quickly assess the situation and analyze it profoundly, as well as high organizational and combat-morale qualities such as courage, boldness and decisiveness, initiative and independence, firmness and tenacity in achieving the goal.

From the specific qualities needed by a leader both in the political area and in military strategy, M. V. Frunze particularly pointed to intuition, the ability for profoundly scientific prediction, the ability in the complex intertwining of contradictory events and phenomena to grasp the inner logic, the patterns of their development and in the common chain of political, organizational and other decisions and measures to find at each specific moment that specific link in the chain which one must seize with all one's strength in order to hold the entire chain.(88) V. I. Lenin was gifted to the highest degree with this genial capacity. M. V. Frunze urged our military cadres to learn this greatest art from him.

Mikhail Vasilyevich gave great importance to experience and practical skills in troop command and in performing other duties related to leadership of subordinates.

All these qualities are not innate or inherent only to "genial" persons, as certain bourgeois military theorists have asserted; they do not appear as a result of merely studying theoretical concepts; they must be systematically and constantly developed in the process of all military service. A close study of the history of operational and combat training indicates that, unfortunately, this circumstance is not always fully considered. There have been frequent instances when at exercises and drills, in essence, the possibility was excluded of manifesting any art, for the situation far from fully reproduced combat conditions and in playing through combat operations the decisions of the trainees and their actual actions were not always taken into account. Instruction in such exercises and drills came down to a formal applying of various theoretical concepts in practice. Such an approach to military training contradicts the nature of combat and an operation, it limits the creativity of the trainees and deprives them of an opportunity to show military art.

In the aim of eliminating this shortcoming, there have been repeated attempts to increase the time in practical exercises with officers in the troops and schools. Certain schools and academies introduced testing in state exams not only for theoretical knowledge but also practical skills. But all of these basically correct ideas and measures, as a result of their formal realization, did not make it possible to take a substantial step ahead in the mastery of military art. For instead of testing the ability to quickly size up a new situation and take an original decision stemming from its specific conditions, the student using a map or sandbox had to list the general theoretical tasks

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and questions which did not derive from the specific conditions of the enemy's position and actions, those of his own troops and the terrain, thus skimming over the surface of this objective reality.

M. V. Frunze considered the most dangerous in military affairs and in the training of military personnel when the very involved process of decision taking was replaced by the superficial, abstract application of theory to practice, when decisions did not stem from an analysis of the specific conditions but were drawn from theory. B. M. Shaposhnikov, in speaking at an analysis of the RKKK maneuvers in 1929, emphasized: "That degree of general tactical training which we now have can be described as the mastery of the general, purely external scheme for a decision, a general scheme for giving orders and controlling the troops. But true creativity and real art begin where this general scheme (undoubtedly an essential one) does not overshadow or obscure the particular features of each special case but helps to understand these particular features more quickly and certainly, and for each particular instance to provide a new decision which is original and determined solely by the particular features of the given situation. This is that superior school which borders on real art and which we still lack."(89)

Thus, it is the issue that military art is primarily the ability to apply a general concept in a specific situation. "It is absurd," wrote V. I. Lenin, "to make up a formula or general rule...which would be suitable for all cases. One must have one's head on one's shoulders in order to be able to make one's way in each individual case."(90)

From this it follows that military art begins where, on the one hand, profound theoretical knowledge and its creative application help the commander to better see the common link of occurring phenomena and more confidently orient himself in the situation and, on the other, the commander, without tying himself down to a general theoretical scheme, endeavors to go more deeply into the essence of the actually existing situation, establish its advantageous and negative features and, proceeding from an analysis of these, find original decisions and methods of action which conform best to the specific given conditions and the set combat mission. The maximum degree of conformity of the decisions and actions of the commanders and the troops to the specific situational conditions is a major law of military art, as precisely this expresses its main essence and defines the most essential and permanent links, the relationship of objective and subjective factors, the internal driving forces and the main reasons for victories and defeats in war.

Even in the postwar years there were periods when the importance of theoretical knowledge was emphasized correctly but sometimes one-sidedly and the necessity was underestimated of indoctrinating a whole series of qualities in the command personnel and without which military art was inconceivable. Here one could feel negatively an incorrect understanding of the essence of military art which is based upon creativity linked with the carrying out of specific combat tasks. For this reason a correct understanding of the nature and relationship of military science and military art is not only of methodological but also great practical significance, particularly from the viewpoint of the focus, forms and methods of troop instruction and the indoctrination of military cadres.

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According to Lenin, the conduct of a war as a whole, on any scale and in all its political and military aspects is a science and an art simultaneously and all historical experience in the development of military affairs, the experience of the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces in our times and the nature of carrying out missions in modern combat and operations clearly show that military science and the practice of military art are two interrelated and interdependent aspects of military affairs but which at the same time also have substantial differences.

One of the supporters of M. V. Frunze on military-political and military theoretical questions, S. I. Gusev, in speaking out against incorrect notions of the relationship of military science and military art wrote "that between science and art there is no metaphysical boundary which Trotsky has endeavored to establish. Science develops at the expense of art, art is based upon the victories of science and this process is infinite.

"...Science is the 'continuation' of art; in turn art becomes the 'continuation' of science. Any art is more or less 'scientific,' and any science is not so 'scientific' to be able to dispense with art. What in the 'examination' is a law in actuality becomes a rule. What is a law in science is a rule in art.

"The gap between science and art is the gap between past and present, between theory and practice. Such a gap is contradictory to the spirit of Marxism."(91)

Such an understanding of the relationship of military science and the practice of military art does not contradict the demand of studying the economic and moral capabilities both of one's own nation as well as that of the enemy. In this context let us examine how the content and relationship of military science and military art are influenced by the necessity of considering the economic and moral capabilities and whether the given circumstance can alter the stated understanding of these questions.

V. I. Lenin, as is known, thoroughly disclosed the significance of the economic and moral factors for waging war, having pointed out that wars are now waged by peoples and that "the link between a nation's military organization and all its economic and cultural system has never been as close as at present."(92) "In a modern war, as everyone knows, the economic organization is of crucial significance."(93) As was already pointed out above, M. V. Frunze also gave great importance to the economic and moral-political factors.

The importance of the economic and moral factors has immeasurably risen under present-day conditions. The economy of the belligerents now not only supports the waging of war but itself has become an object of military operations. The boundary line between the rear and the front more and more has been obliterated. Regardless of this, we do not have grounds to presently feel that the economic and moral-political questions exist solely in the scientific area and do not involve military art.

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In actuality, can one exclude from strategy and military art as a whole the questions of considering the economic and moral-political capabilities of both one's own country and that of the enemy? If one excludes such major and decisive questions under today's conditions, then this would lead to the emasculation of strategy, for without considering these questions there cannot be good strategic and operational plans. In keeping with the increased scope of armed combat and its encompassing of ever-new phenomena, strategy, like military art as a whole, cannot remain on the former level and it should undergo further development and encompass a broader range of questions corresponding to the nature of modern wars. As for the moral-political factor, it has always been considered and should be considered not only on the strategic but also the operational and tactical scales.

Characteristically, the authors of the book "O sovetskoy voyennoy nauke" [On Soviet Military Science], on the one hand, assert that military science is broader than military art, since in addition to the methods of conducting armed combat, it should also include the areas of knowledge "related to considering the influence of the economic and moral capabilities of the belligerents on armed combat." (94) On the other hand, in defining the specific content of military science, these sectors of knowledge are not included by them in the structure of military science. On page 243, where the structure of military science is described, these are not even mentioned. For this reason, it remains incomprehensible why military science is broader than military art. The authors assert: "...Military science is not restricted to just a study of the laws of armed combat, its essence and the elaboration of the forms and methods of waging it, that is, to military art. It also studies the forces and means of armed combat...." (95) However, there is and cannot be any abstract forms and methods of military operations in isolation from the means of armed combat and these very forms and methods are related primarily to the employment of certain means of armed combat.

The authors of the generally informative book on military science might not have noticed all these contradictions in their reasoning merely because for some reason they had to artificially narrow the essence of military art and correspondingly broaden the limits of military science. One is struck by the fact that at many points in the book the authors employ the concepts "military science" and "military art" as equivalent, as two aspects of military affairs. On page 225 it states that "war is a great art" and in another (page 187): "Tukhachevskiy introduced much that was valuable in elaborating Soviet military science and military art." One might ask why they would write this if, in their opinion, military science already included military art? There can only be one answer: the very initial position in positing the question is wrong, and with any artificial stretching of the point in science it is very difficult to tie the ends together and this stretching of the point makes itself felt.

This book quotes many well known military theorists and generals of the past on the questions of military science and military art, but this is done in a very unique manner, in a number of instances only that portion is given which confirms the thesis of the authors that military science is broader than military art. In particular, in setting out the military theoretical views of M. V. Frunze and S. I. Gusev, mention is not even made of their ideas quoted

by us above on the nature of military science and military art. Or, for example, reference is made to the pamphlet published in 1962 by MSU R. Ya. Malinovskiy "Bditelno stoyat na strazhe mira" [Vigilantly Guard the Peace], where it is directly stated: "...Military science is the theory of military affairs.... But military art is the application of the knowledge of military science in armed combat, the practice of military affairs which in our age is inconceivable without a scientific basis." (96) However, the authors of the book "O sovetskoy voyennoy nauke" suddenly conclude that the pamphlet of R. Ya. Malinovskiy examines the fundamental questions of Soviet military science and its most important part, military art, although the pamphlet not only does not state that military science is broader than military art or that military art (including its practical part) is incorporated in military science, but conversely, this thesis is rejected.

Undoubtedly, military science cannot be identified with the theory of military art, since the former, in addition to the theory of tactics, operational art and strategy, includes the theory of troop training and indoctrination, the theory of the organizational development of the Armed Forces and a whole series of other sectors. Also unjustified is the fear that such an understanding of military science and military art will mean the negation of all these disciplines and the discarding of them from military science, that it would reduce military affairs to the level of a trade and be an attempt to retreat to some "pure military art."

Undoubtedly, there is and cannot be any "pure military art." For example, take the questions of military training and indoctrination. In the practical activities of the military personnel in wartime, it is impossible to isolate these from tactics and operational art, since combat and operational training of the commanders, staffs and troops is one of the most important measures related to preparing combat and an operation. Moreover, combat operations themselves are an irreplaceable school for improving combat skill; in peacetime the art of conducting combat and an operation can be developed only in the process of combat and operational training.

The same can be said about military geography, topography and other special technical and administrative subjects. Military art cannot be reduced to the forms and methods of conducting armed combat. In resolving the practical questions of strategy or operational art, one must be concerned not only with the patterns and principles of military art, but also employ certain statistical data, resolve a whole series of organizational and military-technical problems, specifically consider the conditions of the theater of military operations, while the ability to orient oneself in the field and to employ its advantageous conditions for troop operations is also inseparable from the art of conducting combat and an operation. Precisely the strategic and operational considerations determined the establishing of horse, tank or air armies, although in military science the theoretical questions of troop organizational structure are examined by the theory of the organizational development of the Armed Forces.

Not only military affairs but also any other area of human activity have their history but because of this the corresponding scientific sectors do not become broader than the phenomena investigated by them. Military art both as a whole

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and in carrying out individual military tasks is inconceivable without the use of the experience of previous wars, operations and battles. Precisely the history of military art with good reason is one of the most important areas of military history. Its main task is to investigate the practically tested forms and methods of armed combat in the course of which the science itself is improved and a basis is established for elaborating its new provisions and conclusions.

Thus, the different aspects of military art are manifested in practical activities not independently and not separately from one another but in an organic unity and a close relationship, finding their specific reflection at one or another stage of preparing for and conducting the battle, the operation and the war.

The examination by military science of each sector of military affairs individually as well as their classification, as in other sciences, is caused by the need to systematize and to reduce to a definite system the knowledge gained on the patterns, forms and methods of armed combat in the aim of their more profound understanding. For example, no one would deny that training and indoctrination are a single and unbroken process. However, pedagogics examines and investigates each sector individually (didactics and the theory of communist indoctrination). Because of this pedagogics as a science does not become wider than pedagogical art.

The system of combat training also includes as independent subjects tactical and technical training, marksmanship and other special disciplines. But when tactics, as the art of conducting combat, is carried out in practice (in a combat situation or in an exercise), the tactical forms and methods of actions, maneuver, fire and attack, the control of weapons and combat equipment gain a specific manifestation in an organic unity and it is impossible to separate one from the other.

From all that has been said it can be concluded that military science and military art, as an area of practical activity, are not any mechanically addable elements which differ from one another in the quantity and scope of the studied questions. These are concepts which encompass the conduct of armed combat as a whole and are in an organic unity, expressing various aspects of military affairs. These concepts are not something born out of abstract thought. They arose out of the practice of military affairs. All military history shows that for the successful conduct of a war, in addition to well developed military theory and the arming of the military cadres with this theory, it is also essential to show creativity and the art of organizing and conducting combat, an operation and a war as a whole, starting from the supreme commander-in-chief and ending with each soldier.

Military art, as an area of practical activity, encompasses all aspects of military activities on strategic, operational and tactical scales in the preparation for and conduct of operations and combat actions. In this context the question arises of the relationship of the practice of military art and military practice generally.

From the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninist methodology, the practical structure includes such aspects as the need, goal, motive and purposeful activity in the aim of its individual acts, the subject at which this activity is aimed, the means by which the goal is achieved and, finally, the result of the activity.(97) By military practice one understands the aggregate activities of the Armed Forces in their historical development. Military art, in peacetime and wartime, to a significant degree encompasses the practical activities of the Armed Forces but military art certainly does not include all the listed elements and does not completely coincide with the practice of military affairs.

In the process of practical activity, the personnel of the Armed Forces must carry out all sorts of tasks, including purely military as well as other such as: construction, routine, administrative, medical and financial. All of these are aimed at ensuring the main task of achieving a high level of military art, but in terms of their nature their fulfillment does not always require the manifestation of the elements of military art.

Since the word "art" has come to be applied to any form of practical activity, when this activity is performed ably, skillfully and artfully, the opinion is sometimes voiced that military art also must be understood precisely only "as the able conduct of military operations based upon the creative application of military knowledge"(98) or as the ability to employ troops and naval forces with the greatest effectiveness. Of course, the desire to achieve this should always permeate military art; such an understanding is also correct from the formal terminological viewpoint.

But in life and objective reality, this question is significantly more complex to resolve. If one formally adheres to such a definition of military art, it may turn out, for example, that the Soviet Army at the outset of the Great Patriotic War or the Nazi troops over virtually the entire war did not have their own military art. However, this was not the case. We can say with full justification that in the last war Soviet military art won a convincing victory over the military art of Nazi Germany.

War is a bilateral phenomenon and military art is manifested in the clash of the sides, where, as a rule, one side wins a victory and the other suffers a defeat. And both sides without fail have their own military art, only the level of these differs. The history of military art is formed from the aggregate of the positive as well as the negative experience of conducting armed combat.

In history there have been numerous wars where opponents with a high level of military art engaged in combat and at times up to the last moment it was difficult to say which side would gain the upper hand and consequently (with a formal approach), it was impossible to determine which of these armies had actually mastered military art. But failures in a war often are determined not only by the level of military art but also by many other factors. Sometimes armies which have suffered a defeat (or a portion of them) have shown a rather high level of military art. One has merely to recall Waterloo, the heroic defense of Sevastopol during the Crimean War or the defense of Port Arthur during the period of the Russo-Japanese War.

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M. V. Frunze, in saying that military art has always been the special preserve of the ruling classes and access to it was forbidden to the people, commented well that "military art out of necessity has always been a progressive art and has always been based upon recent achievements of science and technology and placed rather high demands on its specialists."(99)

Considering what has been said, true military art at which one should aim should be unconditionally planned for victory over a strong and skillful enemy. It actually requires great ability and strategic and operational-tactical mastery. But the enemy will also endeavor to achieve this in the aim of surpassing the military art opposing it. For this reason in practical terms--in a general form and in terms of armed combat as a whole--military art is usually viewed as the application of military knowledge and experience in preparing and conducting military operations considering the specific situational conditions as well as in the process of the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. Military science is the theory of military affairs with the mission of investigating and generalizing primarily the achievements of military art and all aspects of the practical activities of the Armed Forces in peacetime and wartime.

Since military science and the practice of military art are viewed as two interrelated aspects of military affairs, certain researchers have assumed that the concepts of "military science" and "the theory of military art" should coincide. They consider as illogical the assumption that the theory of military art is merely a part of military science. This judgment is founded on the fact that for the manifestation of military art, particularly on the strategic scale, it is not sufficient to have a knowledge of the theory of strategy, operational art and tactics, but rather it is essential to have a knowledge of all areas of military science and, in addition, employ a large amount of knowledge from the area of political, economic, technical and other sciences. Proceeding from this it has been proposed to introduce the term "theory of armed combat" or "theory of preparing and conducting military operations" in place of the term "theory of military art" as a component of military science. In place of the term "theory of operational art" it has been proposed that the term be used "theory of preparing and conducting operations" (in the 1930's the term "operatics" was proposed).

From the purely theoretical viewpoint, this would not be more accurate. Moreover, the term "theory of military art," as a component of military science, although being somewhat arbitrary, has permeated our military vocabulary and our military literature so profoundly and military personnel are completely used to it that it has been recognized as ill-advised to alter the existing terminology on these questions and we have continued to employ it. Here the point is that the theory of military art, as a component part of military science, must investigate the laws and methods of conducting armed combat on the strategic, operational and tactical scales, in close correlation with the other sectors of military science. The main point is not which of the designated concepts is broader or narrower but rather a correct understanding of the essence of military science and military art.

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Such an approach to military science and military art cannot be viewed as the setting of these into opposition with one another or the isolating of them. It also cannot to any degree reduce the importance of military science or "debase military art to the level of a trade," since true military art, as was already pointed out, is possible only on a basis of profound military-scientific knowledge.

In returning to what has been said, we must re-emphasize that this has always been the viewpoint of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and the prominent Soviet generals and military theorists. In our times in many of the party and other official documents and in the various speeches and articles of the USSR minister of defense, his deputies and other military chiefs concerning the present-day conditions of military science and the practice of military art, military science and the practice of military art are viewed as two aspects of military affairs. For example, the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" states that "the victory in the Great Patriotic War showed the superiority of Soviet military science and military art and the high level of strategic leadership and combat skill of our military cadres."(100)

Of course, it is not merely a question of these highly authoritative definitions and statements but primarily tested historical experience and the understanding confirmed by modern practice of the nature of military science and military art. Their essence consists in the fact that, as in politics and in political leadership there is an immediate unity of the scientific theory concerning the development of society and the practical activities of our party and people (it would never enter anyone's head to say that political science is broader than politics itself), so in the practical activities of the Armed Forces and primarily our military cadres, there is an organic combination of military science and military art.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 6, pp 362-363.
2. "Syezdy Sovetov SSSR v postanovleniyakh i rezolyutsiyakh" [Congresses of the USSR Soviets in Decrees and Resolutions], Moscow, 1939, p 38.
3. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 37, pp 122-123.
4. D. Ryazanov, "Marxism in Military Affairs," VOYENNY VESTNIK, No 3, 1926, p 15.
5. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," 1927, Vol 3, p 28.
6. Ibid., Vol 2, pp 162-163.
7. K. Marx, F. Engels, "Soch.," 2d Edition, Vol 20, p 175.

8. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 38, pp 369-370.
9. Ibid., p 55.
10. Ibid., Vol 36, p 382.
11. Quoted in: M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 150.
12. Ibid., Vol 1, p 466.
13. W. D. Jacobs, op. cit., pp 91-92.
14. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 151.
15. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 39, p 57.
16. K. Marx, F. Engels, "Soch.," 2d Edition, Vol 7, p 509.
17. Ibid., p 513.
18. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 44, p 205.
19. Ibid., Vol 26, p 224.
20. Ibid., Vol 31, p 159.
21. Ibid., Vol 32, p 82.
22. M. N. Tukhachevskiy, "Izbr. proizv.," Moscow, 1964, Vol 1, pp 32-33.
23. See: "Materialy soveshchaniya komandnogo i komissarskogo sostava voysk Ukrainy i Kryma i flotov Chernogo i Azovskogo Morey" [Materials of a Conference for Command and Commissar Personnel of the Ukrainian and Crimean Troops and the Fleets of the Black and Azov Seas], Kharkov, 1922, pp 80-81.
24. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 15.
25. Ibid., Vol 2, p 253.
26. Ibid., pp 37-38.
27. Ibid., Vol 3, p 16.
28. P. N. Fedoseyev, "Dialektika sovremennoy epokhi" [Dialectics of the Modern Age], Moscow, 1978, p 171.
29. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 216.
30. Ibid., p 208.
31. VOYENNOYE DELO, No 2(65), 1920, pp 38-40.

32. Ibid., No 6(70), [1920], pp 162-166.
33. Ibid., No 8(72), 1920, p 231.
34. I. Vatsetis, "O voyennoy doktrine budushchego" [On the Military Doctrine of the Future], Moscow, 1923, p 8.
35. VOYENNOYE DELO, No 23, 24, 1918, p 3.
36. See: VOYENNOYE DELO, No 4(65), 1920, pp 98-99.
37. Ibid., No 12(76), 1920, p 354.
38. See: S. S. Kamenev, "Zapiski o grazhdanskoy voyne i voyennom stroitelstve" [Notes on the Civil War and Military Organizational Development], Moscow, 1963, p 62.
39. VOYENNOYE DELO, No 11(75), 1920, p 322.
40. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 207.
41. Ibid.
42. D. V. Ryazanov, "Marksizm i voyennoye delo" [Marxism and Military Affairs], Moscow, 1926, p 15.
43. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 210.
44. Ibid., p 211.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p 214.
47. Ibid., pp 411-412.
48. Ibid., p 211.
49. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," 1957, Vol 2, p 22.
50. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 219.
51. Ibid., Vol 3, p 74.
52. Ibid., p 218.
53. Ibid., Vol 1, p 209.
54. See: Ibid., Vol 3, pp 250-251.
55. VOYENNOYE ZNANIYE, No 14, 15, 1921, p 12.

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56. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 35, p 408.
57. Ibid., p 395.
58. Ibid., Vol 41, p 117.
59. Ibid., Vol 39, p 236.
60. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, pp 132-133.
61. See: Ibid., Vol 2, p 102.
62. Ibid., p 104.
63. Ibid., p 103.
64. "Syezdy Sovetov vserossiyskiye i Soyuza SSR v postanovleniyakh i rezolyutsiyakh" [Congresses of All-Russian and USSR Soviets in Decrees and Resolutions], Moscow, 1935, p 351.
65. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 254.
66. Ibid., Vol 1, p 254.
67. Ibid., pp 264-265.
68. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, No 59, 1929.
69. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 255.
70. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 121.
71. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, pp 361-362.
72. "Sbornik originalnykh i perevodnykh statey M. Dragomirova. 1858-1880" [Collection of Original and Translated Articles of M. Dragomirov. 1858-1880], St. Petersburg, 1881, Vol 1, p 444.
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74. "Voyennaya entsiklopediya" [Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, 1910, Vol 6, p 478.
75. S. Gusev, "Nashi raznoglasiya v voyennom dele" [Differences in Military Affairs], Moscow, 1925, p 5.
76. See: VOYENNAYA MYSL I REVOLYUTSIYA, No 3, 1922, pp 3-10; TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 33987, inv. 1, file 521, sheets 525, 538.

77. See: S. Gusev, "Nashi raznoglasia v voyennom dele," p 6.
78. KRASNAYA ARMIYA (Vestnik VNO Voennoy akademii) [The Red Army (Herald of the Military Academy Military Scientific Society)], No 14 and 15 (May-June 1922), p 157.
79. VOYENNAYA MYSL I REVOLYUTSIYA, No 3, 1922, p 8.
80. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 65.
81. Ibid., Vol 40, p 183.
82. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Revolyutsiya i kontrrevolyutsiya v Germanii" [Revolution and Counterrevolution in Germany], Moscow, 1940, p 99.
83. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 34, p 383.
84. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, pp 209, 217, 218.
85. K. Ye. Voroshilov, "Stalin i Vooruzhennyye Sily SSSR" [Stalin and the USSR Armed Forces], Moscow, 1950, p 68.
86. VOYENNAYA MYSL I REVOLYUTSIYA, No 3, 1922, p 19.
87. Ibid., p 8.
88. See: V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 36, p 205.
89. TsGASA, folio 9, inv. 28, file 597, sheets 89-90.
90. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 52.
91. S. I. Gusev, "Grazhdanskaya vojna i Krasnaya Armiya" [The Civil War and the Red Army], Moscow, 1958, p 196.
92. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 9, p 156.
93. Ibid., Vol 34, p 194.
94. "O sovetskoy voyennoy nauke" [On Soviet Military Science], Moscow, 1964, p 62.
95. Ibid., p 212.
96. R. Ya. Malinovskiy, "Bditelno stoyat na strazhe mira" [Vigilantly Guard the Peace], Moscow, 1962, p 50.
97. See: "Filosofskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary], Moscow, 1983, p 522.

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98. S. I. Krupnov, op. cit., p 63.
99. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 2, p 160.
100. PRAVDA, 17 June 1984.

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CHAPTER 3: CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF MILITARY ART

Strategic Views

Preceding Ideas

The strategic views of M. V. Frunze were shaped considering the previous experience during the transitional period in the development of strategy during the age of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Military strategy from its very genesis was viewed as a higher area of military art and the theory of strategy incorporated the most general ideas concerning war and the methods of waging it. As a sphere of practical activity for the superior military leadership, this arose deep in antiquity simultaneously with the rise of armed forces and wars. According to the Leninist theory of cognition, man in all areas of activity has moved from experience to theory. In accord with this, the theoretical principles of strategy have been systematized and elaborated gradually, on the basis of generalizing the experience of wars.

For this reason only arbitrarily, from the standpoint of a more or less ordered theoretical formulation can one speak about the genesis of scientific knowledge concerning war in the middle of the 18th Century. In actuality, military theory, including also the theory of military strategy, had appeared and existed in a rudimentary form with the rise of wars and developed in the process of the evolution of military affairs as a whole.

In the 19th Century, an effort was made to incorporate in the theory of strategy all knowledge related to war, identifying it [strategy] with military science as a whole. Leer viewed strategy as "the synthesis, integration of all military affairs, their generalization, their philosophy."⁽¹⁾ But independently of this, even at that time there existed as relatively independent areas of knowledge such subjects as tactics and fortification and later other sectors of military science also appeared.

Due to the major sociopolitical and economic changes related to the development of capitalism, military strategy also underwent further development. With the growth of capitalism into imperialism, the uneven economic and political development of the capitalist states increased and political reaction and a desire for military aggression grew stronger. The introduction of universal military obligations in a majority of the nations led to an enormous increase in the size of armies. Million-strong armies

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appeared in the theaters of military operations. As a result of increased production and the development of science and technology, just in three decades (the 1850's-1880's) the armies received more new types of weapons and ammunition than over the three preceding centuries. Strategic practices and theory were particularly strongly influenced by the construction of railroads and their use for transporting troops, the introduction of the telegraph and telephone in the practices of troop command and control, the replacing of the sail fleet by steam, the appearance of rifled weapons and in the course of World War I also tanks, aviation, chemical and other types of weapons.

With the introduction of machine combat equipment, motors and automatic weapons, troop mobility was increased, the times for the strategic deployment of the armed forces were shortened, the scope of military operations, their intensity and duration and the depth of fire effect were increased and, consequently, the depth of the strategic configuration of the troops rose. Armies, corps and divisions began to be deployed along a wider front and at a greater distance from the enemy. Solid fronts of great length appeared. The operation arose as an aggregate of military operations and engagements that were separated in time and space but united by a common overall plan. A war could no longer be won even by several engagements. A whole series of operations and campaigns had to be carried out for achieving the strategic aims of the war.

Many of these new phenomena made themselves felt even during the period of the Russo-Japanese War. But they were most fully apparent in World War I of 1914-1918 which required a substantial revision of the strategic views on the conduct of a war. First of all, the plan of the belligerents to achieve victory in a short maneuvering war did not come about. The losses and material requirements of the operational armies increased sharply and because of this the role of the economy, the moral-political factor in the war, the importance of reserves and the coordinated employment of all the armed forces also grew. Even during this period, there was an objective need for a unified military strategy, including for the ground forces and the fleet. But all these new factors were underestimated in the strategic plans and strategic leadership while theoretically they remained completely unelaborated.

Proceeding from the fact that an offensive is more advantageous than the defensive, but not realizing that both sides could not advance for a protracted time, at the outset of World War I all armies set decisive goals for themselves and endeavored to carry out strategic missions solely by the offensive while the possibility of a strategic defensive was completely ruled out. However, this war, like previous wars, refuted the subjective one-sided plans and by the end of the first year of the war both sides were forced to go over to the strategic defensive along a solid front and conduct a positional war. The problem of breaking through the defenses was solved in practical terms only on a tactical scale by the massed employment of manpower, artillery, tanks and partially aviation on narrow sectors of the front. The strategic aims were achieved in the course of the war by carrying out successive attritional operations and combat operations with extended operational pauses between them.

In a number of instances strategy began and ended with tactics. Ludendorff and certain other military leaders were even to say that tactics must be put higher than strategy. For this reason there were frequent instances when breakthrough sectors were chosen where it was tactically advantageous but not proceeding from operational-strategic considerations.

During World War I, new elements of strategic leadership (fronts, army groups) appeared. However, as a whole, command and control of the armed forces were far from conforming to the new conditions of waging war. The preparation and conduct of strategic operations demanded that the superior military leadership take into account a significantly greater number of the most diverse conditions and factors, but they endeavored in a majority of instances to approach the new phenomena of war using the old concepts of strategy. In commenting on this aspect of strategic leadership during the years of World War I, A. Ye. Snegarev has written: "Under such conditions could a modern strategist be satisfied with the old strategic formula for achieving a decisive battle? There could be no question of this. For him, there now must be such condensed brains, such vast knowledge and such exceptional scope and foresight. He must be a military man, a politician, an economist, a financial expert, an all-round technician and a true agitator." (2) And he concluded that the military leaders of those times were unprepared to carry out such strategic tasks.

However, certain essential changes which had appeared in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries in the nature and methods of carrying out strategic tasks had been reflected in the works of Clausewitz, Jomini, Moltke the Elder, Schlieffen, Lee, Mikhnevich, Foch and other military theorists and M. V. Frunze was well acquainted with their works.

On the principles of Soviet military strategy. The theoretical principles of proletarian military strategy, as was already pointed out in the previous chapters, were worked out by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. The practical aspect of Soviet military theory arose and developed along with the rise of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces in the course of a fierce struggle against foreign interventionists and domestic counterrevolution. Its major provisions (scientific principles and the art of strategic leadership) were elaborated by the party Central Committee headed by V. I. Lenin, considering the new historical conditions, the nature of the world's first state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its Armed Forces and the interests of defending the socialist fatherland. At the Seventh RKP(b) Congress, V. I. Lenin said that "at each Central Committee session on each major question of strategy--there was not a single time when the sessions of the Central Committee or the Central Committee Bureau did not resolve the basic questions of strategy." (3)

During the years of the Civil War and the foreign intervention in Russia, the irreconcilability of political goals and the acuteness of the military-political situation predetermined the decisive strategic aims and the active offensive nature of Soviet military strategy. In contrast to World War I, military operations during this period had a maneuvering nature. The strategic offensive was the main type of strategic actions and this, as a rule, was carried out by making successive offensive operations using the

of ensuring national defense? Is it not possible, without harm to peaceful needs, to see to it that certain military goals are also achieved here."(63)

M. V. Frunze devoted great attention to the mobilization preparations and to converting to a wartime status industry, transport and the entire national economy. This consisted in the prompt and organized shift from the production of consumer goods to the output of products for military needs. He demanded that this be more flexibly considered both by the production workers and the military department.

Excessive military demands were not always advantageous even for the military themselves. Frunze pointed to the necessity of revising the supply articles adopted for the peacetime and particularly the wartime army, he sought the maximum use of those models which were consumer articles in peacetime and for which mass production had already been organized. Mikhail Vasilyevich proposed that here one could and should forego the interests which were not of crucial significance for the question, for the possibility of the mass receipt of supply articles by the army in wartime, without any additional effort and expenditure, completely compensated for their secondary shortcomings. On the other hand, he felt that the production of peacetime consumer goods if possible should be adopted to satisfy military needs. He showed the feasibility of this demand using specific examples of the production of motor vehicles, tractors, means of communications and so forth.

These important provisions on readying the nation for defense were set out by M. V. Frunze at the Third All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1925 and they were approved and put into legislation. These provisions were also considered subsequently in all the five-year plans. The Congress of Soviets pointed out that the preparation of the nation for defense requires industrial development which, without disrupting the normal growth of the productive forces, at the same time would establish a solid base for defense needs. The congress set for the Soviet government the following task: "...To carry out all of the necessary measures to raise the nation's defense capability by: a) the appropriate expansion of the military industry and the organizing of all the remaining state industry of the Union which even in peacetime would take into account wartime needs...."(64)

In organizing the fulfillment of the party and government decisions, Frunze called constantly for the search for the most effective methods for closer collaboration between the military departments, economic bodies, scientific centers and design bureaus and for the merging of military-scientific and scientific-technical work. He felt that scientists and inventors should work considering military needs. The military-scientific workers and the representatives of the military department were urged above all to set a correct direction for the activities of the economic and scientific-technical workers. "In practical terms," said M. V. Frunze, "this must be achieved by having our military-scientific societies organize circles at the corresponding enterprises and groups of enterprises and be concerned and interested in the questions of peacetime economic activity, viewing them from the defense standpoint. This work is of the most enormous importance. I draw your attention to it because I know from practical experience how the interests of

defense suffer if proper attention is not paid to this aspect of the issue."(65)

Mikhail Vasilyevich demanded that the supply directorates work in close contact with all the industrial enterprises and scientific-technical organizations of the nation. This contact should not be restricted to the central bodies but should also be carried out on the spot. The wisdom and importance of these demands were fully appreciated by us during the period of the Great Patriotic War and during the postwar years.

It should be pointed out that Frunze assigned an exceptionally important and major place to science and scientific workers in the question of increasing the nation's defense capability and the combat might of the Armed Forces. He carefully followed the major scientific discoveries and technical inventions and became firmly convinced that in a future war the role of scientific workers would be enormous. Even in 1921, he wrote (and later repeated and developed this idea many times): "...The outcome of future clashes to a much greater degree depends now upon the persons of pure science than upon the command. Any major invention or discovery in the area of military equipment can immediately create colossal advantages for the warring sides."(66) These words have a particularly timely ring in the age of scientific-technical progress, nuclear missile weapons and radioelectronic equipment.

In subsequent years, the Communist Party and the Soviet government carried out major measures to improve leadership over defense questions. In the spring of 1927, upon a decision of the Party Central Committee, the former functions of the Labor and Defense Council [STO] were restored. Prior to this, with the transition to peacetime construction, as was pointed out at the 15th Party Congress, the STO had gradually "lost its third letter" [the defense function]. After the party congress, the STO began to regularly assemble to resolve defense problems. Mobilization bodies were established under all the people's commissariats and these initiated work to prepare the national economy for the event of war; an industrial mobilization body was organized under the VSNKh [All-Union Council of the National Economy] as well as a special system under the Gosplan which should consider defense needs in elaborating all the national economic plans. As defense tasks became more complicated, the organization and functions of these state bodies continued to be improved. They played a major role in increasing the defense capability of the Soviet state on the eve of World War II.

In accord with what has been stated above, it can be concluded that M. V. Frunze considered the "technical aspect" to be the most important factor which decisively influenced the nature of war. Into this concept he invested the entire aggregate of human resources and technical means which could be employed in a war and a scientifically sound program for the technical equipping of the army and navy.

Even in 1920, immediately after the defeat of Wrangel, the technically best equipped enemy which the Red Army encountered for the first time, Frunze with great concern spoke about the technical equipping of our army. In 1921, his article "On the Reorganization of the French Army" appeared and here these questions were raised even more broadly and later his ideas about this were

developed in the article "Protect the Revolution" and other works. During the same year he wrote: "Our technical backwardness with each day is becoming evermore threatening. One need not particularly delude oneself and be content with references to the experience of the Civil War. It must not be forgotten that to a significant degree this was one-sided.... As for future conflicts, this question of technical superiority can be crucial and not in our favor, regardless of all the courage and valor of the Red Army. In order to avoid this and make the Red Army a truly powerful weapon for ensuring both our peacetime construction and the world revolution, it must be increased in technical terms at whatever the cost."(67)

The question of the technical equipping of the USSR Armed Forces was one of the major questions of Soviet military doctrine. The problem was that many incorrect views on the nature of a future war and the methods of waging it derived from a lack of trust in the prospects for the socialist transformation of the nation and primarily its industrialization.

Precisely this explains why certain old military specialists and other skeptics subsequently mistrusted the theory of a deep operation and other major achievements of Soviet military art. A. A. Svechin, for example, wrote: "...To operate roads and cumbersome means of long distance combat is possible only with the superiority of heavy industry, with extensive financial means and with the rich development of the railroad and highway networks. These prerequisites exist in the capitalist states of the West. To operate with chief means of close combat is possible only with the great enthusiasm of the masses and their readiness for self-sacrifice.... For the West, the mass is above all the mass or weight of the artillery, then the mass of tanks and the mass of airplanes.... The infantry mass is in the background, for secondary tasks. For the USSR, the mass is primarily the mass of infantry and the means of close combat. The means of close combat are of decisive significance."(68)

M. V. Frunze, regardless of the postwar economic chaos, held the opposite position on this question. He steadfastly defended Lenin's idea that the material base of socialism can only be highly developed, industrial production based upon the most recent scientific and technical achievements. Mikhail Vasilyevich was confident that if the technical equipping of the Armed Forces is considered to be a shock task, then, no matter how greatly we lagged behind, we would be able to overtake our future enemies.

The technical reconstruction carried out in the 1930's ensured the military-technical superiority of our Armed Forces over the enemy during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Time showed how farsightedly our party and government carried out these tasks and how prophetic was M. V. Frunze in this regard.

Man and technology in war. The social nature of the new type army. In reviewing the social and technical nature of a future war, Frunze clearly and from Marxist-Leninist positions defined the relationship of man and equipment in armed combat. He was against the two extremes which occurred at that time. In the first place, against those who underestimated technology and assumed that war could be won without it, by the mere number of troops and their high revolutionary spirit. Even the 1925 RKKA Field Manual approved by M. V.

Frunze demanded the abandonment of the opposition of the Red soldier's enthusiasm and enemy equipment and have the enemy's equipment be beaten by our equipment. Secondly, Frunze condemned those who made a fetish out of equipment, who imagined future engagements as a war of just machines and who instilled mistrust in the force of the Red Army confronted by well armed bourgeois armies.

M. V. Frunze recommended that we proceed from the immediate and more remote future. In the mid-1920's, the Red Army undoubtedly was inferior in technical terms to the armies of the main capitalist states and in the event of imposing war on our nation, during this period, we would basically rely on our sociopolitical superiority and other related factors which had ensured our victory in the Civil War. At the same time, Mikhail Vasilyevich was decisively against the rapid outfitting of the army and navy with modern equipment and any manifestations of the underestimating of equipment and he checked a nihilistic attitude toward this in the most ruthless manner. He also drew attention to the moral effect of equipment on man, he did not separate one from the other, he considered their opposition to be inadmissible and viewed them in a dialectical unity. He proceeded from the fact that the development of production and equipment comprises the objective material basis for the development of human society and man himself and the latter, in turn, accelerates scientific and technical progress.

Frunze openly belittled instances of blind worshiping of equipment and the attempts to give it primary significance and represent man as a simple attribute of technology. Of course, he said, it is extremely dangerous to underestimate the role of technology but one must not also become hypnotized by it. In giving enormous significance to technology, M. V. Frunze gave man the crucial role in a future war. "We must say," he emphasized, "that still the decisive role is played not by equipment as behind the equipment there always is a live man, without whom the equipment is dead."(69)

In following the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, M. V. Frunze gave enormous significance to the moral factor and viewed the influence on military doctrine of not only the material conditions but also the spiritual ones linked to the attitude of the masses of people toward war and national defense. In profoundly realizing that wars are waged now by peoples and that "in any war the victory is ultimately determined by the state of morale of those masses who shed their blood on the battlefield,"(70) he viewed the economic and moral aspect of the rear in a close unity.

The moral factor in a war has been taken into account in all times, but Frunze, being guided by the Marxist-Leninist teachings, approached it not abstractly, he saw its main sources in the socioeconomic relations of people and considered the dependence of the moral factor upon the social and state system and the political goals of the war. He emphasized that the prerequisites for the moral superiority of the Red Army over the bourgeois armies had been established by the Great October Socialist Revolution. M. V. Frunze called the Red Army the army of the future and the carrier of new ideals. The mass heroism of its fighters and commanders and their ardent enthusiasm ensured victory in the Civil War.

In giving great importance to international indoctrination of the men, Frunze emphasized that the Red Army indoctrinated in a spirit of fraternity of peoples in future military conflicts with capitalist armies would be the dependable defender of all suppressed nationalities. During the years of World War II, the Soviet Army honorably carried out its international duty and helped many peoples of Europe and Asia become liberated from German Naziism and Japanese militarism. Socialist internationalism under present-day conditions continues to remain one of the most important principles in the indoctrination of the Soviet Armed Forces and one of the fundamental provisions of Soviet military doctrine.

In accord with the given understanding of the essence and nature of a war, M. V. Frunze also approached the questions of the social nature of the armed forces of the dictatorship of the proletariat and their organizational development. He viewed the army and navy as a weapon for continuing politics by the means of armed violence and the chief means for waging war. He soundly worked out the historical purpose and principles for the organizational development and training of the armed forces. Running as a constant theme through the works of Frunze is the notion that the social nature, the historical purpose and organizational principles of the Armed Forces are a direct reflection of the state's social and economic system, its political structure and ideology as expressed in domestic and foreign policy.

Proceeding from the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, M. V. Frunze thoroughly analyzed the fundamental differences of the socialist state's army from the bourgeois armies. He pointed out that an army of a capitalist state is a tool for maintaining the exploiting system and the dominance of capital and an implement of imperialist policy, a policy of suppressing the workers and enslaving other peoples. The army of a socialist state is engendered by a new social and state system and is designed to defend the revolution's victories. The Red Army in political and moral terms is a direct copy or replica of our worker-peasant country. The waging of war requires the creation of multimillion armed forces. All the armed Soviet people will comprise a wartime army which will be a real Red Army.

Frunze unmasked the attempts by bourgeois military theorists to show the army as an organization standing apart from the class struggle and politics. He convincingly showed that in a class society the army and navy always were and remain an implement for the policy of the ruling class. The Red Army and Navy should be organized strictly on a class basis, being an expression of the union of the working class and the peasantry.

Frunze gave great importance to the socioclass unity of our Armed Forces. In comparing them with the bourgeois armies, he pointed out that the latter have advantages in technical terms and in skilled personnel. "But there," he wrote, "there does not exist the main condition which ensures military might: there is no union of the social upper classes with the social lower orders. The presence of a deep abyss dividing the class in command from the class of exploited, in essence, nullifies the efforts to establish a battleworthy military force."(71)

M. V. Frunze emphasized that the domestic and external functions of armies are determined by the class nature of the state. Bourgeois armies are an implement of national suppression while the Red Army is an army of friendship and fraternity of the peoples in the Soviet state. The armies of the capitalist states always have internal (suppressing the workers of their own nations) and external (enslaving the peoples of other countries) functions and the internal function is the main, determining one.

An army of the dictatorship of the proletariat serves the cause of defending the socialist state against the encroachments of internal and external counterrevolution. He correctly foresaw that after the defeat of the domestic counterrevolution and the strengthening of Soviet power, the socialist state from the viewpoint of internal conditions would not need a permanent army but as long as the military threat existed from the capitalist countries, the external function of our Armed Forces related to the defense of the fatherland against an outside attack would remain.

The political goals of a war and the political aspect of military doctrine also have a crucial impact upon the methods of waging a war and on the strategic and operational-tactical principles. Proceeding from this, M. V. Frunze considered that one of the important provisions of Soviet military doctrine was the necessity of indoctrinating the Soviet Armed Forces in a spirit of active and decisive operations. Our ideological opponents, in distorting this idea, have repeatedly endeavored to accuse the Soviet Armed Forces of aggressiveness. But Frunze repeatedly emphasized that our state does not intend any predatory actions and all its aspirations are aimed at ensuring peace. But if a war is forced on us, our army will act aggressively and decisively.

These are the basic views of M. V. Frunze on the political aspect of Soviet military doctrine. He also thoroughly elaborated the most important ideas of the military-technical aspect of military doctrine and these will be examined in more detail in the subsequent chapters of the book.

On Military Science and Military Art

One of the fundamental questions of military theory and practice. In being concerned with methodological problems of military theory and practice, M. V. Frunze showed great interest also in the question of the essence and relationship of military science and military art. This question was reflected in many of his works. While on an official mission to Moscow in May 1922, he took part in a discussion of this question. It must immediately be pointed out that he approached the given scientific problem from the solely correct, Marxist-Leninist positions. In order to better understand his views on the relationship of military science and military art and their importance, it is necessary to briefly recall the history of this question.

Disputes over whether the conduct of a war is a science or an art go back a long ways. Of all the great generals, A. V. Suvurov held the clearest position on these questions. He said that "a general must form himself by sciences," but "theory without practice is dead." He demanded that all officers constantly master "the science of war" and "the science of winning,"

and considered "blind bravery provides victory over the enemy" to be a deception. "Victory comes only from military art," and "one fights with skill and not numbers." Napoleon, although considering that the waging of war was more an art than a science, never doubted the necessity of theoretical bases for military affairs, that is, a military science.

However, both in the past and at present, bourgeois military theoreticians and military leaders have voiced the most different opinions on this question. Some of them, in viewing the conduct of a war as an art, have denied the presence of any patterns and, consequently, the possibility of military science. M. Dragomirov has written on this: "At present, no one would take it into his head to assert that there could be a military science; it is inconceivable just as the science of poetry, painting and music are inconceivable...."(72) Others (Jomini, Leer, Fuller), although recognizing the possibility and necessity of military science, reduced it merely to mathematical calculations and "standard norms" or viewed it as a system of eternal and unvarying principles and denied the objective nature of the laws of war.

Certain bourgeois military theorists (Lloyd, Willisen, Leval, Foch and Serrigny) endeavored to find elements of science and art in the conduct of a war. Serrigny assumed that the preparation for a war was the area of science while its waging was a art. Lloyd showed that a war has two aspects: the first or technical which involves the preparation of an army for the war and which can be normed by rules and reduced to mathematical principles; the second which relates to the conduct of a war and engagements cannot have any rules. Leval felt that strategy, like military affairs as a whole, is comprised of thought and its application, spiritual and material givens, logic and calculation, the speculative and positive, that is, it is related both to science and art.

The denying of the possibility of military science at times occurred over the identifying of natural and social sciences and the miscomprehension of the particular features of the manifestation of the natural laws of nature operating as a spontaneous force and the sociohistorical laws which operate not automatically but as the regular, cognitive activities of people themselves in the process of social practice.

In this context one cannot recognize as fully valid the accusation widespread in military literature directed at Clausewitz, one of the founders of bourgeois military science, that he completely denied the possibility of military science. One of the modern military philosophers S. I. Krupnov has correctly pointed out that Clausewitz "denied not military science generally but rather the attempts by von Bulow, Archduke Karl and others to establish a military science that was as precise, logically ordered as mathematics and capable of providing uniform answers to all questions arising in troop leadership and equally applicable to all wars. Such a military science, said Clausewitz, is impossible and he was correct.... Clausewitz was one of the first to understand the role of scientific theory for the leadership of a war and endeavored to work it out."(73) At the same time, it must be stipulated that Clausewitz considered war an area of chance and denied the existence of its objective laws which are the basis of any science.

A majority of the Russian military theorists on the eve of World War I saw elements of both science and art in military affairs. The Russian "Voyennaya entsiklopediya" [Military Encyclopedia] stated: "Each area of human creativity (including military affairs) goes through a phase of unconscious art and ultimately arrives at rational art which has a sufficiently sound science (principles, rules, forms, standards and so forth)." (75) The interpretation of military science and military art remained idealistic and metaphysical and military science was linked, as a rule, not with an understanding of objective patterns but rather reduced to a simple systematization of accumulated knowledge and to the elaboration of principles and rules for the conduct of military operations. The bourgeois military theorists were unable to ultimately resolve the question of the role and the relationship of science and art in military affairs.

A careful study of this question's history provides an opportunity to conclude that the disputes over whether the conduct of a war is a science or an art and these very concepts arose not accidentally but rather appeared as a reflection of that objective process which in one way or another made itself felt in the preparation for and conduct of a war. The mere fact that these questions were of concern not only to military theorists but also to such outstanding practitioners of military affairs as Suvurov and Napoleon shows that these questions were not idle ones. The history of military scientific thought knows repeated attempts to brush aside such complex questions and declare them, in particular the disputes on the essence of military science and art, to be scholastic and not of serious theoretical or practical significance. But life inexorably has forced us to return again and again to them, particularly at turning points in the development of military affairs.

It is no accident that the questions of the essence and relationship of military science and military art reappeared during the first years of the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces. In line with the elaboration of the principles of Soviet military science, the questions of the attitude of Marxism toward military science and the nature of military affairs began to be actively discussed on the pages of the military journals and at theoretical conferences.

S. I. Gusev, in describing the situation on the military-theoretical front after the Civil War, has written: "Among the Red commanders who had lived through the tremendous experience of the 3-year Civil War, there was a strong need to theoretically analyze this experience which did not fit within the framework of that military science which had been inherited from Tsarism. With the greatest energy they rushed to study Marxism and dialectics. In this undoubtedly healthy move there were also certain hitches: novices in Marxism, they still had not gotten firmly on their 'Marxist feet' and made mistakes in applying the Marxist method to military questions. The involvement with Marxism also caused the reverse reaction in the military circles against Marxism, and a struggle started over the question of the applicability of Marxism to military science and to military affairs." (75)

In May 1922, at a session of the Military Science Council of the RKKA Military Academy, a discussion was held on the question "Military Science Among Other Sciences" in which M. V. Frunze participated. (76) Invited to the meeting were

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representatives from the staffs of the military districts, the higher military editorial council, students and instructors from the Military Academy and leading personnel from the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. Raised for discussion were the following questions: are military affairs a science or an art, their relationship to social and natural sciences; are the principles of military affairs eternal; military principles and the laws of science; the methods of Marxism and military affairs. The discussion was carried out under the leadership of Trotsky who initially argued strongly against holding it, but under the pressure of the army community was forced to agree.

Basically the old military specialists gave reports and they set out, in essence, views which had prevailed in Russia prior to the revolution. Prof S. G. Lukriskiy who gave the main report provided an analysis of the existing views and pointed out that military affairs are considered by some to be a science and by others the "elementary theory of a certain trade." The speaker, in viewing the theory and practice of military affairs as separate from one another, emphasized that the practice of military affairs in theoretical terms is based on many sciences. Experience, as the source of military theory, was described by him as rudimentary, primitive and limited in its achievements and very imperfect. "The road to understanding 'point blank'," he stated, "is the work of pure reason." He considered the underlying principles of military art to be permanent.

Prof A. Svechin advanced the notion that the theory of military art, in representing a cycle of practical military knowledge, cannot claim the title of a science due to the impossibility of its fully disclosing all aspects of military affairs; the latter also do not have their own specific principles, for they are common to any struggle, from a debate and boxing to the struggle between labor and capital, inclusively. Natural sciences exist in parallel and only in an external relation to the theory of military art.

A co-worker from the staff of the Kiev Military District S. Kvanin showed the existence of military science which studies war in common with sociology, but each of these has its own specific goal. War as a social phenomenon is the subject of sociology while war as military affairs is an area exclusively of military science. He voiced the opinion that Marxism is applicable only for solving particular problems in military science.

Prof A. Snesevich felt that military affairs in the preparatory process were almost a science and in the process of execution almost an art. He proposed the term "quasilearned art."

Prof A. Toporkov proposed that the nature of military affairs cannot be considered as an art, since by nature it is antiaesthetic and cannot be discovered by aesthetics. Prof F. Ogordnikov considered military policy the superior sector of military science and this policy, in his opinion, only could claim the title of a true science. Military science is the theory of military art and military politics.

V. Akhov spoke about the possibility and utility of applying Marxism to military affairs. He saw the particular value of the Marxist method in

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uniting theory and practice which, in his words, under other conditions clash. In the opinion of G. Isserson, the practical value of the question "military science or military art?" is that its resolution provides an opportunity to work out sound criteria for the training of the fighter and chiefly the commander.

Trotsky in a disrespectful tone said that it was possible to be a superior fighter and even a general without giving any answer to the question of whether military affairs are a science or an art, as it was possible to be a good communist fighter without ever being concerned with the questions of materialistic philosophy. Can Marxism teach you to make bast sandals? asked Trotsky and, extending his irony to military affairs, categorically denied the possibility of employing Marxism in this area. In his words, a danger threatens those comrades who wish to build a military system by the methods of Marxism. Further (in his subsequent speeches) he asserted that there is and was no military science. There is a whole series of sciences on which military affairs are based. War is not a science. War is a practical art or skill. War is a trade for those who correctly study military affairs. By its nature, it is impossible to turn war into a science just as architecture, commerce, veterinary science and so forth cannot become a science. What is called the theory of war or military science, in his opinion, is the aggregate of practical procedures, methods of adaptation and skills corresponding to a certain task, that is, to defeat the enemy. To form the procedures of the military trade using the Marxist method, he stated, is the same thing as constructing a theory of architecture or a veterinary textbook using Marxism. With the aid of Marxism, it is impossible to construct a field manual, and this was his main conclusion.(77)

M. V. Frunze also spoke at this session. Unfortunately, his speech here up to now has not been published in any collection of his works. It has been written down in different versions. An analysis of the minutes shows that M. V. Frunze in his speech first of all drew attention to the fact that a correct understanding of the discussed questions was of fundamentally important significance for elaborating the military theoretical problems and the practices of military organizational development. He criticized the idealistic approach of A. A. Svechin and certain other participants in the discussion of the debated questions and emphasized the inadmissibility of denying a relationship between the phenomena of social life and military affairs.

M. V. Frunze pointed out that only from the positions of Marxism-Leninism was it possible to fully analyze and provide a correct reply to the question of the place of military science among the other sciences and the essence of military science and military art. If a war is the continuation of politics, a part of social life, then consequently military affairs is a continuation of political affairs. These are carried out by people in a class society and under these conditions not only the military-social but also the purely technical questions require a theoretical and political assessment from the viewpoint of the interests of the proletarian state. For this reason, military affairs is completely "within the sway" of Marxism which provides a key to a correct understanding of all sociopolitical and military-technical questions.

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At the same time, M. V. Frunze pointed to the inadmissibility of a simplified, schematic approach to the use of Marxism. "If we correctly understand," he said, "the essence of the Marxist method, then we are confronted with a certain problem of the need to study military affairs with complete carefulness and seriousness. For solving the main military questions we must not employ fantastic research methods but approach them from the purely practical aspect."(78) By "fantastic methods" he meant the methods described in the course of the debate of the knowledge of "pure reason" and "eternal, unchanged principles."

M. V. Frunze convincingly showed all the falaciousness of the very positing of the question: either military science, or military art. He was the only one among the speakers who directly and definitely stated that "military affairs contain elements of both military science and military art."(79)

The above-described position of M. V. Frunze fully corresponded to the Marxist-Leninist scientific understanding of war, military science and military art. The founders of Marxism-Leninism, in giving enormous significance to elucidating the methodological questions of theory and practice, left a series of very important and valuable instructions which offer a key to a correct understanding of the questions concerning the relationship of military science and military art and the subject and content of military science. These instructions, undoubtedly, were taken into account by M. V. Frunze in giving the above-quoted definition of the designated concepts.

V. I. Lenin, in noting the complexity and difficulty of political leadership, wrote that "politics is a science and an art which does not drop from the skies or is given gratis...."(80) Since politics is a science it can be determined and carried out solely on a strictly scientific basis. If politics at the same time is an art, then it should be carried out in practice not only scientifically but also artfully and skillfully, considering the entire complexity of the specific historical situation. Consequently, if politics as a whole is a science and an art, then the continuation of politics by violent means, that is, the waging of war, as a part of politics can and should be a science and an art. If their essence is the same then the manifestation should also be the same.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism not only recognized the necessity and possibility of establishing a scientific theory about war, but in every possible way emphasized that only on a strictly scientific basis was it possible to correctly explain all the phenomena of a war and organize one's practical activities. At the First Congress of Labor Cossacks in 1920, Lenin directly stated that "without science it is impossible to organize a modern army...",(81) having in mind military science first of all.

K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, in profoundly and thoroughly analyzing the phenomena of war and highly regarding the importance of military science, at the same time pointed out that the preparations for and conduct of a war are an art. K. Marx and F. Engels wrote that "a revolt is an art, just as a war is as well as the other types of arts."(82) V. I. Lenin in his works "Marxism and Revolt," "Advice of an Outsider," and other articles in 1917, repeatedly

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and with his inherent certainty, emphasized that "revolt, like a war, is an art."(83)

M. V. Frunze understood these questions in the same light. He referred to the above-quoted statement of V. I. Lenin in his work "Lenin and the Red Army" and analyzed it in detail. In his works Mikhail Vasilyevich more than 20 times uses the concept "military science" and "military art" in the sense of the two aspects of military affairs. Just in the work "Military Doctrine and the Red Army" he does this several times: on bringing doctrine "into accord with the basic provisions of military science and the requirements of military art"; on coordinating the particular features of the organizational development of the Red Army with "the demands of military science and art" and according "to the basic demand of military art and science."(84)

M. V. Frunze understood military science as the area of theoretical research on the basis of generalizing the experience of the preparation for and conduct of wars. The main task of military theory was to disclose the general and the essentially uniform in the phenomena of war and on this basis work out the methods for preparing and conducting armed combat. He viewed military art as an area of applying military knowledge in practice in carrying out certain tasks under specific situational conditions.

These questions were understood in this manner in all the official documents and military literature during the prewar years, during the period of the Great Patriotic War and after it until 1947. On 11 April 1947, reporting to I. V. Stalin were N. A. Bulganin, A. M. Vasilevskiy, A. I. Antonov and S. M. Shtemenko. In the course of the conversation, I. V. Stalin gave the following instructions: certain military theorists feel that military science and military art are equivalent concepts. Such theorists are profoundly wrong. Military science must not be identified with military art. Military science is a broader and more all-encompassing concept and it, military science, includes also military art with the latter being one of the component parts of military science. Military art includes tactics, operational art and strategy, that is, it is concerned with studying questions relating to the methods of conducting military operations and a war as a whole. Military science, in addition to the questions comprising military art, investigates the questions of the national economy, its material and human resources. This definition was also incorporated in a report at a ceremony in honor of the 30th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces in February 1948 and has become widespread in our military literature.

In explaining this, K. Ye. Voroshilov wrote: "In being an ordered system of authentically scientific knowledge concerning the entire **complex of questions related to modern war**, Stalin's military science, along with the purely military elements such as strategy, operational art, tactics, the organization and training of troops, **encompasses the total of sociopolitical, economic and moral factors** in their aggregate, the interaction and determining influence on military affairs as a whole (emphasis mine.--M. G.)."(85)

Such a definition also had a rational aspect, contributing to a more profound investigation of economic and moral-political problems. But it still ran contrary to the generally accepted understanding of the essence of science and

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art and contained a number of unsound and vulnerable points. In the first place, it did not correspond to the methods of classifying sciences, since military science alone cannot investigate such a complex phenomenon as war and the questions of strengthening national defense, including the economic and moral factors. Secondly, from the philosophical viewpoint, military science, like any other science, is a spiritual phenomenon and cannot include military art as a whole, but namely its practical aspect. From the above-given definition, the very essence of military science has been lost related to an understanding of the objective laws of armed combat. Thirdly, with such an approach military science and military art begin to differ mechanically from one another only in terms of the quantity and scope of questions encompassed by them, assuming that some questions relating to the preparation for a war and its conduct are resolved only by science (for example, an understanding of the moral and economic capabilities) while others, in addition, are an art (tactics, operational art and strategy).

In actuality, as V. I. Lenin taught and M. V. Frunze wrote, the preparation for a war and the waging of war as a whole are not only a science but also an art. This applies also to modern conditions.

The preparation for and conduct of armed combat are related to military science and military art. Here military art has its practical and theoretical aspects and the latter is a component of military science. The main thing in military affairs is the unity of military science and the practice of military art, and for this reason it is a question not of putting these concepts into opposition but rather a more profound elucidation of their specific features and those essential, unbroken ties which ensure their actual unity.

Military science and the practice of military art--two aspects of military affairs. For better understanding this problem, it is obviously necessary to examine from present-day positions what in actuality distinguishes these two concepts from one another. Why did the founders of Marxism-Leninism, in giving enormous significance to knowledge and to military science, at the same time consider it essential to emphasize that war is an art?

Science, as is known, is the result or aggregate of knowledge concerning nature, society and thought and concerning the objective patterns of their development acquired in the course of social historical life. Science arises on the basis of human production and practical activities and develops along with the development of social phenomena, in more and more accurately and profoundly reflecting reality, disclosing the essential relationships of phenomena and arming humans with a knowledge of the objective laws of the real world in the aim of their practical utilization.

By art one understands usually any matter or practical activity of humans which in addition to knowledge requires skill and mastery (military art, the art of leadership, the art of teaching and indoctrination and so forth). In the dictionary of V. Dahl, the word "art" is defined as "a science, knowledge applied to a matter; mastery requiring great ability." The meaning of this word is explained approximately in the same manner under present-day conditions.

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If military affairs are approached from such positions and their essence is carefully analyzed, it can be concluded that military art is an ability or mastery based upon profound theoretical knowledge and the ability to creatively apply them in practice. Just as literature and art (understood in the given instance as a depiction of reality in artistic images) have their own theory or science (art and literary criticism), military science, being the theory of military affairs, has arisen on the basis of investigating and generalizing the practical experience of armed forces in wartime and peacetime.

Historical experience shows that with all the diversity and complexity in the phenomena of war, inherent to them are internal, profound and essential relationships and they have something common, permanent and repeating with the force of necessity, and for this reason the forms and methods of armed struggle arise not out of the "free" will of the generals but are subordinate, like human activity itself, to objective laws which are independent of their will and awareness. This also explains the possibility and necessity of military science which is basically a system of knowledge dealing with the objective laws of a war and the methods of preparing for and conducting armed combat in a certain historical period. Arising as a reflection of the experience of military creativity, military science, like any other science, possesses a relative independence and has, in turn, an enormous impact on the practical activities of man, showing their way, opening up new prospects and suggesting methods for resolving the set tasks.

Another particular feature of the phenomena of war is that the patterns inherent to them, in being independent of the will and awareness of people, operate not with that irreversible inevitability of the laws of nature, but are manifested, as in all other social phenomena, through human activity. A knowledge of the laws of armed combat facilitates practical activity and provides an opportunity to foresee the development of events, to act consciously and more fully utilize the objective laws in one's own interests. But an understanding of the objective laws and the principles, methods and forms elaborated on their basis for armed combat cannot provide an answer to the question of how one should act in one or another situation let alone be capable of by themselves ensuring the achieving of victory in a war. For this reason the provisions of military science cannot be applied in all instances, regardless of the situational conditions, with the same constancy and uniform outcome as the laws of natural sciences.

The difficulty of the given question also is that in the course of a war, different objective laws are operating simultaneously and these often intertwine and contradict one another, creating the most contradictory situation which, in turn, are not permanent and change constantly in the course of armed combat. It is essentially important to consider that war is a bilateral phenomenon and that each of the belligerents consciously or accidentally endeavor to understand and utilize in their own interests the action of one or another objective law and impose their will on the enemy, discover its intentions, deceive the opponent and stun it with surprise and unexpected actions.

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In the course of armed combat all of this creates an exceptionally complicated, intense and constantly changing situation. For this reason, in order to be victorious it is not enough to have merely a knowledge of the patterns of war and military science. Military art is also required. If victory and defeat in a war were determined by the automatic action of objective laws, if the concepts of military science could be employed in practice with the same constancy as the laws of mathematics or physics, then military art would lose any sense and cease to exist as a concept. In actuality, it plays an enormous role and the outcome of armed combat depends largely upon how correctly the military leaders and commanders of all levels have assessed the objectively developing conditions, take effective decisions and how skillfully they carry them out.

This is why M. V. Frunze viewed military art as the ability to correctly assess the situation and take the most effective decision considering the specific situational conditions, the ability to employ all conditions and opportunities to defeat the enemy, as the ability to employ the troops with maximum effectiveness and the least losses. He saw one of the main tasks of the military cadres in selecting the most suitable methods and means in each given situation out of the multiplicity of diverse ones. Military theory cannot provide any pat solution but can serve only as a guiding principle.

One of the participants in the 1922 discussion, Ye. Smyslovskiy, wrote: "...The study of any science in no way guarantees the mastery of the art guided by this science and life offers us repeated examples of so-called 'educated fools' who, in mastering perfectly broad scientific knowledge, are completely incapable in the area of the corresponding art. It is one thing to know and another to be able."(86)

In a combat situation, military leaders and commanders must frequently encounter phenomena which are not provided for by any theoretical concepts or contradict them, and for this reason the necessity arises of seeking out completely new methods of action. This undoubtedly is the entire "secret," the entire complexity of military affairs. As a rule, in a war commanders who have high theoretical training fight more successfully. But instances are known when military leaders, in possessing great theoretical knowledge, are little suitable for practical activity, as they have not mastered the art of troop command and control under difficult conditions.

M. V. Frunze had precisely this in mind when in his speech of 8 May 1922, in emphasizing in every possible way the importance of scientific knowledge, at the same time said that "of course, there cannot be any science capable of teaching one 'to command' as this is the area of art."(87) This was confirmed with particular clarity in the course of the Great Patriotic War. In the beginning of the war, certainly there was not a military chief or commander who theoretically did not understand or from previous experience did not know the need to concentrate the main forces on the crucial sector, to establish assault groupings or provide dependable fire damage to the enemy. Still it took significant time and a great deal of effort and sacrifice before it was possible to master the art of carrying out these and many other tasks. In mastering military art, our command cadres and troops subsequently showed

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remarkable examples of the successful conduct of offensive and defensive operations and won outstanding victories over the enemy.

As is shown by military experience, including the generalship activities of M. V. Frunze, for manifesting a high level of military art, in addition to profound knowledge and high political awareness, it is essential to have developed operational-tactical thinking, a creative approach to the matter, the ability to quickly assess the situation and analyze it profoundly, as well as high organizational and combat-morale qualities such as courage, boldness and decisiveness, initiative and independence, firmness and tenacity in achieving the goal.

From the specific qualities needed by a leader both in the political area and in military strategy, M. V. Frunze particularly pointed to intuition, the ability for profoundly scientific prediction, the ability in the complex intertwining of contradictory events and phenomena to grasp the inner logic, the patterns of their development and in the common chain of political, organizational and other decisions and measures to find at each specific moment that specific link in the chain which one must seize with all one's strength in order to hold the entire chain.(88) V. I. Lenin was gifted to the highest degree with this genial capacity. M. V. Frunze urged our military cadres to learn this greatest art from him.

Mikhail Vasilyevich gave great importance to experience and practical skills in troop command and in performing other duties related to leadership of subordinates.

All these qualities are not innate or inherent only to "genial" persons, as certain bourgeois military theorists have asserted; they do not appear as a result of merely studying theoretical concepts; they must be systematically and constantly developed in the process of all military service. A close study of the history of operational and combat training indicates that, unfortunately, this circumstance is not always fully considered. There have been frequent instances when at exercises and drills, in essence, the possibility was excluded of manifesting any art, for the situation far from fully reproduced combat conditions and in playing through combat operations the decisions of the trainees and their actual actions were not always taken into account. Instruction in such exercises and drills came down to a formal applying of various theoretical concepts in practice. Such an approach to military training contradicts the nature of combat and an operation, it limits the creativity of the trainees and deprives them of an opportunity to show military art.

In the aim of eliminating this shortcoming, there have been repeated attempts to increase the time in practical exercises with officers in the troops and schools. Certain schools and academies introduced testing in state exams not only for theoretical knowledge but also practical skills. But all of these basically correct ideas and measures, as a result of their formal realization, did not make it possible to take a substantial step ahead in the mastery of military art. For instead of testing the ability to quickly size up a new situation and take an original decision stemming from its specific conditions, the student using a map or sandbox had to list the general theoretical tasks

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and questions which did not derive from the specific conditions of the enemy's position and actions, those of his own troops and the terrain, thus skimming over the surface of this objective reality.

M. V. Frunze considered the most dangerous in military affairs and in the training of military personnel when the very involved process of decision taking was replaced by the superficial, abstract application of theory to practice, when decisions did not stem from an analysis of the specific conditions but were drawn from theory. B. M. Shaposhnikov, in speaking at an analysis of the RKKA maneuvers in 1929, emphasized: "That degree of general tactical training which we now have can be described as the mastery of the general, purely external scheme for a decision, a general scheme for giving orders and controlling the troops. But true creativity and real art begin where this general scheme (undoubtedly an essential one) does not overshadow or obscure the particular features of each special case but helps to understand these particular features more quickly and certainly, and for each particular instance to provide a new decision which is original and determined solely by the particular features of the given situation. This is that superior school which borders on real art and which we still lack."(89)

Thus, it is the issue that military art is primarily the ability to apply a general concept in a specific situation. "It is absurd," wrote V. I. Lenin, "to make up a formula or general rule...which would be suitable for all cases. One must have one's head on one's shoulders in order to be able to make one's way in each individual case."(90)

From this it follows that military art begins where, on the one hand, profound theoretical knowledge and its creative application help the commander to better see the common link of occurring phenomena and more confidently orient himself in the situation and, on the other, the commander, without tying himself down to a general theoretical scheme, endeavors to go more deeply into the essence of the actually existing situation, establish its advantageous and negative features and, proceeding from an analysis of these, find original decisions and methods of action which conform best to the specific given conditions and the set combat mission. The maximum degree of conformity of the decisions and actions of the commanders and the troops to the specific situational conditions is a major law of military art, as precisely this expresses its main essence and defines the most essential and permanent links, the relationship of objective and subjective factors, the internal driving forces and the main reasons for victories and defeats in war.

Even in the postwar years there were periods when the importance of theoretical knowledge was emphasized correctly but sometimes one-sidedly and the necessity was underestimated of indoctrinating a whole series of qualities in the command personnel and without which military art was inconceivable. Here one could feel negatively an incorrect understanding of the essence of military art which is based upon creativity linked with the carrying out of specific combat tasks. For this reason a correct understanding of the nature and relationship of military science and military art is not only of methodological but also great practical significance, particularly from the viewpoint of the focus, forms and methods of troop instruction and the indoctrination of military cadres.

According to Lenin, the conduct of a war as a whole, on any scale and in all its political and military aspects is a science and an art simultaneously and all historical experience in the development of military affairs, the experience of the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces in our times and the nature of carrying out missions in modern combat and operations clearly show that military science and the practice of military art are two interrelated and interdependent aspects of military affairs but which at the same time also have substantial differences.

One of the supporters of M. V. Frunze on military-political and military theoretical questions, S. I. Gusev, in speaking out against incorrect notions of the relationship of military science and military art wrote "that between science and art there is no metaphysical boundary which Trotsky has endeavored to establish. Science develops at the expense of art, art is based upon the victories of science and this process is infinite.

"...Science is the 'continuation' of art; in turn art becomes the 'continuation' of science. Any art is more or less 'scientific,' and any science is not so 'scientific' to be able to dispense with art. What in the 'examination' is a law in actuality becomes a rule. What is a law in science is a rule in art.

"The gap between science and art is the gap between past and present, between theory and practice. Such a gap is contradictory to the spirit of Marxism."(91)

Such an understanding of the relationship of military science and the practice of military art does not contradict the demand of studying the economic and moral capabilities both of one's own nation as well as that of the enemy. In this context let us examine how the content and relationship of military science and military art are influenced by the necessity of considering the economic and moral capabilities and whether the given circumstance can alter the stated understanding of these questions.

V. I. Lenin, as is known, thoroughly disclosed the significance of the economic and moral factors for waging war, having pointed out that wars are now waged by peoples and that "the link between a nation's military organization and all its economic and cultural system has never been as close as at present."(92) "In a modern war, as everyone knows, the economic organization is of crucial significance."(93) As was already pointed out above, M. V. Frunze also gave great importance to the economic and moral-political factors.

The importance of the economic and moral factors has immeasurably risen under present-day conditions. The economy of the belligerents now not only supports the waging of war but itself has become an object of military operations. The boundary line between the rear and the front more and more has been obliterated. Regardless of this, we do not have grounds to presently feel that the economic and moral-political questions exist solely in the scientific area and do not involve military art.

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In actuality, can one exclude from strategy and military art as a whole the questions of considering the economic and moral-political capabilities of both one's own country and that of the enemy? If one excludes such major and decisive questions under today's conditions, then this would lead to the emasculation of strategy, for without considering these questions there cannot be good strategic and operational plans. In keeping with the increased scope of armed combat and its encompassing of ever-new phenomena, strategy, like military art as a whole, cannot remain on the former level and it should undergo further development and encompass a broader range of questions corresponding to the nature of modern wars. As for the moral-political factor, it has always been considered and should be considered not only on the strategic but also the operational and tactical scales.

Characteristically, the authors of the book "O sovetskoy voyennoy nauke" [On Soviet Military Science], on the one hand, assert that military science is broader than military art, since in addition to the methods of conducting armed combat, it should also include the areas of knowledge "related to considering the influence of the economic and moral capabilities of the belligerents on armed combat." (94) On the other hand, in defining the specific content of military science, these sectors of knowledge are not included by them in the structure of military science. On page 243, where the structure of military science is described, these are not even mentioned. For this reason, it remains incomprehensible why military science is broader than military art. The authors assert: "...Military science is not restricted to just a study of the laws of armed combat, its essence and the elaboration of the forms and methods of waging it, that is, to military art. It also studies the forces and means of armed combat...." (95) However, there is and cannot be any abstract forms and methods of military operations in isolation from the means of armed combat and these very forms and methods are related primarily to the employment of certain means of armed combat.

The authors of the generally informative book on military science might not have noticed all these contradictions in their reasoning merely because for some reason they had to artificially narrow the essence of military art and correspondingly broaden the limits of military science. One is struck by the fact that at many points in the book the authors employ the concepts "military science" and "military art" as equivalent, as two aspects of military affairs. On page 225 it states that "war is a great art" and in another (page 187): "Tukhachevskiy introduced much that was valuable in elaborating Soviet military science and military art." One might ask why they would write this if, in their opinion, military science already included military art? There can only be one answer: the very initial position in positing the question is wrong, and with any artificial stretching of the point in science it is very difficult to tie the ends together and this stretching of the point makes itself felt.

This book quotes many well known military theorists and generals of the past on the questions of military science and military art, but this is done in a very unique manner, in a number of instances only that portion is given which confirms the thesis of the authors that military science is broader than military art. In particular, in setting out the military theoretical views of M. V. Frunze and S. I. Gusev, mention is not even made of their ideas quoted

by us above on the nature of military science and military art. Or, for example, reference is made to the pamphlet published in 1962 by MSU R. Ya. Malinovskiy "Bditelno stoyat na strazhe mira" [Vigilantly Guard the Peace], where it is directly stated: "...Military science is the theory of military affairs.... But military art is the application of the knowledge of military science in armed combat, the practice of military affairs which in our age is inconceivable without a scientific basis." (96) However, the authors of the book "O sovetskoy voyennoy nauke" suddenly conclude that the pamphlet of R. Ya. Malinovskiy examines the fundamental questions of Soviet military science and its most important part, military art, although the pamphlet not only does not state that military science is broader than military art or that military art (including its practical part) is incorporated in military science, but conversely, this thesis is rejected.

Undoubtedly, military science cannot be identified with the theory of military art, since the former, in addition to the theory of tactics, operational art and strategy, includes the theory of troop training and indoctrination, the theory of the organizational development of the Armed Forces and a whole series of other sectors. Also unjustified is the fear that such an understanding of military science and military art will mean the negation of all these disciplines and the discarding of them from military science, that it would reduce military affairs to the level of a trade and be an attempt to retreat to some "pure military art."

Undoubtedly, there is and cannot be any "pure military art." For example, take the questions of military training and indoctrination. In the practical activities of the military personnel in wartime, it is impossible to isolate these from tactics and operational art, since combat and operational training of the commanders, staffs and troops is one of the most important measures related to preparing combat and an operation. Moreover, combat operations themselves are an irreplaceable school for improving combat skill; in peacetime the art of conducting combat and an operation can be developed only in the process of combat and operational training.

The same can be said about military geography, topography and other special technical and administrative subjects. Military art cannot be reduced to the forms and methods of conducting armed combat. In resolving the practical questions of strategy or operational art, one must be concerned not only with the patterns and principles of military art, but also employ certain statistical data, resolve a whole series of organizational and military-technical problems, specifically consider the conditions of the theater of military operations, while the ability to orient oneself in the field and to employ its advantageous conditions for troop operations is also inseparable from the art of conducting combat and an operation. Precisely the strategic and operational considerations determined the establishing of horse, tank or air armies, although in military science the theoretical questions of troop organizational structure are examined by the theory of the organizational development of the Armed Forces.

Not only military affairs but also any other area of human activity have their history but because of this the corresponding scientific sectors do not become broader than the phenomena investigated by them. Military art both as a whole

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and in carrying out individual military tasks is inconceivable without the use of the experience of previous wars, operations and battles. Precisely the history of military art with good reason is one of the most important areas of military history. Its main task is to investigate the practically tested forms and methods of armed combat in the course of which the science itself is improved and a basis is established for elaborating its new provisions and conclusions.

Thus, the different aspects of military art are manifested in practical activities not independently and not separately from one another but in an organic unity and a close relationship, finding their specific reflection at one or another stage of preparing for and conducting the battle, the operation and the war.

The examination by military science of each sector of military affairs individually as well as their classification, as in other sciences, is caused by the need to systematize and to reduce to a definite system the knowledge gained on the patterns, forms and methods of armed combat in the aim of their more profound understanding. For example, no one would deny that training and indoctrination are a single and unbroken process. However, pedagogics examines and investigates each sector individually (didactics and the theory of communist indoctrination). Because of this pedagogics as a science does not become wider than pedagogical art.

The system of combat training also includes as independent subjects tactical and technical training, marksmanship and other special disciplines. But when tactics, as the art of conducting combat, is carried out in practice (in a combat situation or in an exercise), the tactical forms and methods of actions, maneuver, fire and attack, the control of weapons and combat equipment gain a specific manifestation in an organic unity and it is impossible to separate one from the other.

From all that has been said it can be concluded that military science and military art, as an area of practical activity, are not any mechanically addable elements which differ from one another in the quantity and scope of the studied questions. These are concepts which encompass the conduct of armed combat as a whole and are in an organic unity, expressing various aspects of military affairs. These concepts are not something born out of abstract thought. They arose out of the practice of military affairs. All military history shows that for the successful conduct of a war, in addition to well developed military theory and the arming of the military cadres with this theory, it is also essential to show creativity and the art of organizing and conducting combat, an operation and a war as a whole, starting from the supreme commander-in-chief and ending with each soldier.

Military art, as an area of practical activity, encompasses all aspects of military activities on strategic, operational and tactical scales in the preparation for and conduct of operations and combat actions. In this context the question arises of the relationship of the practice of military art and military practice generally.

From the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninist methodology, the practical structure includes such aspects as the need, goal, motive and purposeful activity in the aim of its individual acts, the subject at which this activity is aimed, the means by which the goal is achieved and, finally, the result of the activity.(97) By military practice one understands the aggregate activities of the Armed Forces in their historical development. Military art, in peacetime and wartime, to a significant degree encompasses the practical activities of the Armed Forces but military art certainly does not include all the listed elements and does not completely coincide with the practice of military affairs.

In the process of practical activity, the personnel of the Armed Forces must carry out all sorts of tasks, including purely military as well as other such as: construction, routine, administrative, medical and financial. All of these are aimed at ensuring the main task of achieving a high level of military art, but in terms of their nature their fulfillment does not always require the manifestation of the elements of military art.

Since the word "art" has come to be applied to any form of practical activity, when this activity is performed ably, skillfully and artfully, the opinion is sometimes voiced that military art also must be understood precisely only "as the able conduct of military operations based upon the creative application of military knowledge"(98) or as the ability to employ troops and naval forces with the greatest effectiveness. Of course, the desire to achieve this should always permeate military art; such an understanding is also correct from the formal terminological viewpoint.

But in life and objective reality, this question is significantly more complex to resolve. If one formally adheres to such a definition of military art, it may turn out, for example, that the Soviet Army at the outset of the Great Patriotic War or the Nazi troops over virtually the entire war did not have their own military art. However, this was not the case. We can say with full justification that in the last war Soviet military art won a convincing victory over the military art of Nazi Germany.

War is a bilateral phenomenon and military art is manifested in the clash of the sides, where, as a rule, one side wins a victory and the other suffers a defeat. And both sides without fail have their own military art, only the level of these differs. The history of military art is formed from the aggregate of the positive as well as the negative experience of conducting armed combat.

In history there have been numerous wars where opponents with a high level of military art engaged in combat and at times up to the last moment it was difficult to say which side would gain the upper hand and consequently (with a formal approach), it was impossible to determine which of these armies had actually mastered military art. But failures in a war often are determined not only by the level of military art but also by many other factors. Sometimes armies which have suffered a defeat (or a portion of them) have shown a rather high level of military art. One has merely to recall Waterloo, the heroic defense of Sevastopol during the Crimean War or the defense of Port Arthur during the period of the Russo-Japanese War.

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M. V. Frunze, in saying that military art has always been the special preserve of the ruling classes and access to it was forbidden to the people, commented well that "military art out of necessity has always been a progressive art and has always been based upon recent achievements of science and technology and placed rather high demands on its specialists."(99)

Considering what has been said, true military art at which one should aim should be unconditionally planned for victory over a strong and skillful enemy. It actually requires great ability and strategic and operational-tactical mastery. But the enemy will also endeavor to achieve this in the aim of surpassing the military art opposing it. For this reason in practical terms--in a general form and in terms of armed combat as a whole--military art is usually viewed as the application of military knowledge and experience in preparing and conducting military operations considering the specific situational conditions as well as in the process of the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. Military science is the theory of military affairs with the mission of investigating and generalizing primarily the achievements of military art and all aspects of the practical activities of the Armed Forces in peacetime and wartime.

Since military science and the practice of military art are viewed as two interrelated aspects of military affairs, certain researchers have assumed that the concepts of "military science" and "the theory of military art" should coincide. They consider as illogical the assumption that the theory of military art is merely a part of military science. This judgment is founded on the fact that for the manifestation of military art, particularly on the strategic scale, it is not sufficient to have a knowledge of the theory of strategy, operational art and tactics, but rather it is essential to have a knowledge of all areas of military science and, in addition, employ a large amount of knowledge from the area of political, economic, technical and other sciences. Proceeding from this it has been proposed to introduce the term "theory of armed combat" or "theory of preparing and conducting military operations" in place of the term "theory of military art" as a component of military science. In place of the term "theory of operational art" it has been proposed that the term be used "theory of preparing and conducting operations" (in the 1930's the term "operatics" was proposed).

From the purely theoretical viewpoint, this would not be more accurate. Moreover, the term "theory of military art," as a component of military science, although being somewhat arbitrary, has permeated our military vocabulary and our military literature so profoundly and military personnel are completely used to it that it has been recognized as ill-advised to alter the existing terminology on these questions and we have continued to employ it. Here the point is that the theory of military art, as a component part of military science, must investigate the laws and methods of conducting armed combat on the strategic, operational and tactical scales, in close correlation with the other sectors of military science. The main point is not which of the designated concepts is broader or narrower but rather a correct understanding of the essence of military science and military art.

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Such an approach to military science and military art cannot be viewed as the setting of these into opposition with one another or the isolating of them. It also cannot to any degree reduce the importance of military science of "debase military art to the level of a trade," since true military art, as was already pointed out, is possible only on a basis of profound military-scientific knowledge.

In returning to what has been said, we must re-emphasize that this has always been the viewpoint of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and the prominent Soviet generals and military theorists. In our times in many of the party and other official documents and in the various speeches and articles of the USSR minister of defense, his deputies and other military chiefs concerning the present-day conditions of military science and the practice of military art, military science and the practice of military art are viewed as two aspects of military affairs. For example, the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" states that "the victory in the Great Patriotic War showed the superiority of Soviet military science and military art and the high level of strategic leadership and combat skill of our military cadres."(100)

Of course, it is not merely a question of these highly authoritative definitions and statements but primarily tested historical experience and the understanding confirmed by modern practice of the nature of military science and military art. Their essence consists in the fact that, as in politics and in political leadership there is an immediate unity of the scientific theory concerning the development of society and the practical activities of our party and people (it would never enter anyone's head to say that political science is broader than politics itself), so in the practical activities of the Armed Forces and primarily our military cadres, there is an organic combination of military science and military art.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 6, pp 362-363.
2. "Syezdy Sovetov SSSR v postanovleniyakh i rezolyutsiyakh" [Congresses of the USSR Soviets in Decrees and Resolutions], Moscow, 1939, p 38.
3. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 37, pp 122-123.
4. D. Ryazanov, "Marxism in Military Affairs," VOYENNIY VESTNIK, No 3, 1926, p 15.
5. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," 1927, Vol 3, p 28.
6. Ibid., Vol 2, pp 162-163.
7. K. Marx, F. Engels, "Soch.," 2d Edition, Vol 20, p 175.

8. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 38, pp 369-370.
9. Ibid., p 55.
10. Ibid., Vol 36, p 382.
11. Quoted in: M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 150.
12. Ibid., Vol 1, p 466.
13. W. D. Jacobs, op. cit., pp 91-92.
14. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 151.
15. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 39, p 57.
16. K. Marx, F. Engels, "Soch.," 2d Edition, Vol 7, p 509.
17. Ibid., p 513.
18. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 44, p 205.
19. Ibid., Vol 26, p 224.
20. Ibid., Vol 31, p 159.
21. Ibid., Vol 32, p 82.
22. M. N. Tukhachevskiy, "Izbr. proizv.," Moscow, 1964, Vol 1, pp 32-33.
23. See: "Materialy soveshchaniya komandnogo i komissarskogo sostava voysk Ukrainy i Kryma i flotov Chernogo i Azovskogo Morey" [Materials of a Conference for Command and Commissar Personnel of the Ukrainian and Crimean Troops and the Fleets of the Black and Azov Seas], Kharkov, 1922, pp 80-81.
24. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 15.
25. Ibid., Vol 2, p 253.
26. Ibid., pp 37-38.
27. Ibid., Vol 3, p 16.
28. P. N. Fedoseyev, "Dialektika sovremennoy epokhi" [Dialectics of the Modern Age], Moscow, 1978, p 171.
29. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 216.
30. Ibid., p 208.
31. VOYENNOYE DELO, No 2(65), 1920, pp 38-40.

32. Ibid., No 6(70), [1920], pp 162-166.
33. Ibid., No 8(72), 1920, p 231.
34. I. Vatsetis, "O voyennoy doktrine budushchego" [On the Military Doctrine of the Future], Moscow, 1923, p 8.
35. VOYENNOYE DELO, No 23, 24, 1918, p 3.
36. See: VOYENNOYE DELO, No 4(65), 1920, pp 98-99.
37. Ibid., No 12(76), 1920, p 354.
38. See: S. S. Kamenev, "Zapiski o grazhdanskoy voyne i voyennom stroitelstve" [Notes on the Civil War and Military Organizational Development], Moscow, 1963, p 62.
39. VOYENNOYE DELO, No 11(75), 1920, p 322.
40. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 207.
41. Ibid.
42. D. V. Ryazanov, "Marksizm i voyennoye delo" [Marxism and Military Affairs], Moscow, 1926, p 15.
43. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 210.
44. Ibid., p 211.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p 214.
47. Ibid., pp 411-412.
48. Ibid., p 211.
49. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," 1957, Vol 2, p 22.
50. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 219.
51. Ibid., Vol 3, p 74.
52. Ibid., p 218.
53. Ibid., Vol 1, p 209.
54. See: Ibid., Vol 3, pp 250-251.
55. VOYENNOYE ZNANIYE, No 14, 15, 1921, p 12.

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56. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 35, p 408.
57. Ibid., p 395.
58. Ibid., Vol 41, p 117.
59. Ibid., Vol 39, p 236.
60. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, pp 132-133.
61. See: Ibid., Vol 2, p 102.
62. Ibid., p 104.
63. Ibid., p 103.
64. "Syezdy Sovetov vserossiyskiye i Soyuza SSR v postanovleniyakh i rezolyutsiyakh" [Congresses of All-Russian and USSR Soviets in Decrees and Resolutions], Moscow, 1935, p 351.
65. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 254.
66. Ibid., Vol 1, p 254.
67. Ibid., pp 264-265.
68. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, No 59, 1929.
69. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 255.
70. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 121.
71. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, pp 361-362.
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74. "Voyennaya entsiklopediya" [Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, 1910, Vol 6, p 478.
75. S. Gusev, "Nashi raznoglasiya v voyennom dele" [Differences in Military Affairs], Moscow, 1925, p 5.
76. See: VOYENNAYA MYSL I REVOLYUTSIYA, No 3, 1922, pp 3-10; TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 33987, inv. 1, file 521, sheets 525, 538.

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77. See: S. Gusev, "Nashi raznoglasiya v voyennom dele," p 6.
78. KRASNAYA ARMIYA (Vestnik VNO Voennoy akademii) [The Red Army (Herald of the Military Academy Military Scientific Society)], No 14 and 15 (May-June 1922), p 157.
79. VOYENNAYA MYSL I REVOLYUTSIYA, No 3, 1922, p 8.
80. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 65.
81. Ibid., Vol 40, p 183.
82. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Revolyutsiya i kontrrevolyutsiya v Germanii" [Revolution and Counterrevolution in Germany], Moscow, 1940, p 99.
83. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 34, p 383.
84. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, pp 209, 217, 218.
85. K. Ye. Voroshilov, "Stalin i Vooruzhennyye Sily SSSR" [Stalin and the USSR Armed Forces], Moscow, 1950, p 68.
86. VOYENNAYA MYSL I REVOLYUTSIYA, No 3, 1922, p 19.
87. Ibid., p 8.
88. See: V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 36, p 205.
89. TsGASA, folio 9, inv. 28, file 597, sheets 89-90.
90. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 52.
91. S. I. Gusev, "Grazhdanskaya voyna i Krasnaya Armiya" [The Civil War and the Red Army], Moscow, 1958, p 196.
92. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 9, p 156.
93. Ibid., Vol 34, p 194.
94. "O sovetskoy voyennoy nauke" [On Soviet Military Science], Moscow, 1964, p 62.
95. Ibid., p 212.
96. R. Ya. Malinovskiy, "Bditelno stoyat na strazhe mira" [Vigilantly Guard the Peace], Moscow, 1962, p 50.
97. See: "Filosofskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary], Moscow, 1983, p 522.

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98. S. I. Krupnov, op. cit., p 63.
99. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 2, p 160.
100. PRAVDA, 17 June 1984.

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CHAPTER 3: CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF MILITARY ART

Strategic Views

Preceding Ideas

The strategic views of M. V. Frunze were shaped considering the previous experience during the transitional period in the development of strategy during the age of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Military strategy from its very genesis was viewed as a higher area of military art and the theory of strategy incorporated the most general ideas concerning war and the methods of waging it. As a sphere of practical activity for the superior military leadership, this arose deep in antiquity simultaneously with the rise of armed forces and wars. According to the Leninist theory of cognition, man in all areas of activity has moved from experience to theory. In accord with this, the theoretical principles of strategy have been systematized and elaborated gradually, on the basis of generalizing the experience of wars.

For this reason only arbitrarily, from the standpoint of a more or less ordered theoretical formulation can one speak about the genesis of scientific knowledge concerning war in the middle of the 18th Century. In actuality, military theory, including also the theory of military strategy, had appeared and existed in a rudimentary form with the rise of wars and developed in the process of the evolution of military affairs as a whole.

In the 19th Century, an effort was made to incorporate in the theory of strategy all knowledge related to war, identifying it [strategy] with military science as a whole. Leer viewed strategy as "the synthesis, integration of all military affairs, their generalization, their philosophy."⁽¹⁾ But independently of this, even at that time there existed as relatively independent areas of knowledge such subjects as tactics and fortification and later other sectors of military science also appeared.

Due to the major sociopolitical and economic changes related to the development of capitalism, military strategy also underwent further development. With the growth of capitalism into imperialism, the uneven economic and political development of the capitalist states increased and political reaction and a desire for military aggression grew stronger. The introduction of universal military obligations in a majority of the nations led to an enormous increase in the size of armies. Million-strong armies

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appeared in the theaters of military operations. As a result of increased production and the development of science and technology, just in three decades (the 1850's-1880's) the armies received more new types of weapons and ammunition than over the three preceding centuries. Strategic practices and theory were particularly strongly influenced by the construction of railroads and their use for transporting troops, the introduction of the telegraph and telephone in the practices of troop command and control, the replacing of the sail fleet by steam, the appearance of rifled weapons and in the course of World War I also tanks, aviation, chemical and other types of weapons.

With the introduction of machine combat equipment, motors and automatic weapons, troop mobility was increased, the times for the strategic deployment of the armed forces were shortened, the scope of military operations, their intensity and duration and the depth of fire effect were increased and, consequently, the depth of the strategic configuration of the troops rose. Armies, corps and divisions began to be deployed along a wider front and at a greater distance from the enemy. Solid fronts of great length appeared. The operation arose as an aggregate of military operations and engagements that were separated in time and space but united by a common overall plan. A war could no longer be won even by several engagements. A whole series of operations and campaigns had to be carried out for achieving the strategic aims of the war.

Many of these new phenomena made themselves felt even during the period of the Russo-Japanese War. But they were most fully apparent in World War I of 1914-1918 which required a substantial revision of the strategic views on the conduct of a war. First of all, the plan of the belligerents to achieve victory in a short maneuvering war did not come about. The losses and material requirements of the operational armies increased sharply and because of this the role of the economy, the moral-political factor in the war, the importance of reserves and the coordinated employment of all the armed forces also grew. Even during this period, there was an objective need for a unified military strategy, including for the ground forces and the fleet. But all these new factors were underestimated in the strategic plans and strategic leadership while theoretically they remained completely unelaborated.

Proceeding from the fact that an offensive is more advantageous than the defensive, but not realizing that both sides could not advance for a protracted time, at the outset of World War I all armies set decisive goals for themselves and endeavored to carry out strategic missions solely by the offensive while the possibility of a strategic defensive was completely ruled out. However, this war, like previous wars, refuted the subjective one-sided plans and by the end of the first year of the war both sides were forced to go over to the strategic defensive along a solid front and conduct a positional war. The problem of breaking through the defenses was solved in practical terms only on a tactical scale by the massed employment of manpower, artillery, tanks and partially aviation on narrow sectors of the front. The strategic aims were achieved in the course of the war by carrying out successive attritional operations and combat operations with extended operational pauses between them.

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In a number of instances strategy began and ended with tactics. Ludendorff and certain other military leaders were even to say that tactics must be put higher than strategy. For this reason there were frequent instances when breakthrough sectors were chosen where it was tactically advantageous but not proceeding from operational-strategic considerations.

During World War I, new elements of strategic leadership (fronts, army groups) appeared. However, as a whole, command and control of the armed forces were far from conforming to the new conditions of waging war. The preparation and conduct of strategic operations demanded that the superior military leadership take into account a significantly greater number of the most diverse conditions and factors, but they endeavored in a majority of instances to approach the new phenomena of war using the old concepts of strategy. In commenting on this aspect of strategic leadership during the years of World War I, A. Ye. Snegarev has written: "Under such conditions could a modern strategist be satisfied with the old strategic formula for achieving a decisive battle? There could be no question of this. For him, there now must be such condensed brains, such vast knowledge and such exceptional scope and foresight. He must be a military man, a politician, an economist, a financial expert, an all-round technician and a true agitator." (2) And he concluded that the military leaders of those times were unprepared to carry out such strategic tasks.

However, certain essential changes which had appeared in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries in the nature and methods of carrying out strategic tasks had been reflected in the works of Clausewitz, Jomini, Moltke the Elder, Schliffen, Leer, Mikhnevich, Foch and other military theorists and M. V. Frunze was well acquainted with their works.

On the principles of Soviet military strategy. The theoretical principles of proletarian military strategy, as was already pointed out in the previous chapters, were worked out by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. The practical aspect of Soviet military theory arose and developed along with the rise of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces in the course of a fierce struggle against foreign interventionists and domestic counterrevolution. Its major provisions (scientific principles and the art of strategic leadership) were elaborated by the party Central Committee headed by V. I. Lenin, considering the new historical conditions, the nature of the world's first state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its Armed Forces and the interests of defending the socialist fatherland. At the Seventh RKP(b) Congress, V. I. Lenin said that "at each Central Committee session on each major question of strategy--there was not a single time when the sessions of the Central Committee or the Central Committee Bureau did not resolve the basic questions of strategy." (3)

During the years of the Civil War and the foreign intervention in Russia, the irreconcilability of political goals and the acuteness of the military-political situation predetermined the decisive strategic aims and the active offensive nature of Soviet military strategy. In contrast to World War I, military operations during this period had a maneuvering nature. The strategic offensive was the main type of strategic actions and this, as a rule, was carried out by making successive offensive operations using the

forces of one or two fronts. At the same time, Soviet military strategy, in proceeding from the fact that the methods of fighting the enemy had to be changed when the circumstances changed, flexibly employed various forms of strategic operations, including the defensive as well, and in certain instances, also the retreat, resorting to them as enforced types of military operations. For this reason the strategic offensive often commenced with the going over to a counteroffensive, as was the case, for example, on the Eastern and Southern Fronts in the defeat of the Kolchak and Denikin Armies. Offensive operations were carried out with decisive goals and were conducted on a broad front, to a great depth and in a number of instances without operational pauses.

During the period of the Civil War, the Soviet Republic was surrounded by a ring of fronts. The strategic tasks had to be carried out, as a rule, under conditions where the enemy had superiority in men and equipment, particularly in combat equipment, and the limited resources of the young proletarian state did not provide an opportunity to carry out decisive operations simultaneously on all the fronts. For this reason, of particular importance for strategy was the determining of the crucial sectors from whence the greatest threat arose and the concentrating of the main efforts on them. In the summer and autumn of 1918 this was the Eastern Front; at the end of 1918, the Southern Front; in the spring of 1919, again the Eastern Front; in the summer of 1919, again the main efforts were directed to the Southern Front.

The axes of the main thrusts in each of these theaters of military operations were selected in such a manner as to defeat the most important enemy groupings, and achieve a fundamental change in the military-political situation and liberate the politically and economically most important areas for raw materials, grain and fuel, without which the existence of the Republic and the continuation of the war would have been impossible.

In working out the strategic plans, enormous attention was given to moral-political considerations. Both sides endeavored to act decisively on those sectors where there was the strongest support from the population. The partisan movement in the rear of the White Guard troops and interventionists was a substantial support for the Red Army. Over the entire war, great attention was given to the establishing of strategic reserves and their replenishment; this was one of the most important conditions for the victories won by the Red Army.

During the entire Civil War, M. V. Frunze was closely involved with this enormous experience of strategic leadership. Of particularly great importance for shaping the strategic views of Frunze, like the other Soviet military leaders, was the direct leadership over the Red Army's strategic operations by V. I. Lenin. In urging the military cadres to carefully and earnestly study the military activities of V. I. Lenin during the years of the Civil War and military intervention, M. V. Frunze said: "For us and the future generation of revolutionaries, Comrade Lenin provides brilliant models of strategic and tactical art. His leadership is an outstandingly brilliant example of leading the masses into combat."(4)

In commanding the troops of a number of fronts on major sectors, M. V. Frunze gained great experience in the practical carrying out of strategic tasks. After the Civil War, he took a direct part (and in 1924-1925, headed) the practical elaboration of the major provisions of Soviet military strategy. Subsequently, these questions were taken up in such works of his as "Lenin and the Red Army," "A Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army," "The Military-Political Indoctrination of the Red Army," "The Results and Prospects of Military Organizational Development," "Basic Military Tasks of the Moment," "The Front and Rear in a Future War," and others.

M. V. Frunze worked out the questions of military strategy in strict accord with the demands and provisions of the party's political strategy, the tasks of defending the socialist fatherland and the real capabilities of the Soviet state and the Armed Forces.

The first decree of the Soviet government was, as is known, the Peace Decree which expressed the fundamental interests of the socialist state. Since that time the main aim of the policy of our party and state has always been and remains to ensure peaceful conditions for the building of socialism and communism. For this reason a war in the defense of the socialist fatherland has always been viewed as the most just of all wars in the history of mankind. This has also predetermined the focus of Soviet military strategy which is devoid of any inner sources of aggressiveness and is totally aimed at protecting the interests of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

V. I. Lenin emphasized that "politics is reason, a war is only an implement and not vice versa. Consequently, it remains solely to subordinate the military viewpoint to the political." (5) "...The nature of the political goal is of crucial impact on the conduct of a war..." (6) is a Leninist tenet which now appears perfectly obvious but at that time was not recognized by everyone. Many military theorists from among the specialists of the old army proceeded from objectivist, non-class positions and endeavored to view the questions of strategy outside of any relationship to politics. A. A. Svechin directly stated: "We view modern war with all its possibilities and do not endeavor to narrow our theory down to a sketch of a Red Soviet strategic doctrine." (7)

M. V. Frunze acted decisively against such views, proceeding from the Leninist thesis that scientific objectivity without fail also includes party loyalty.

The unbroken organic link of politics and strategy and the tenet that war is politics through and through on all its levels and that military strategy is subordinate to and derives from political strategy underlie all the military-theoretical views of M. V. Frunze. In the article "Lenin and the Red Army" he emphasized that our political strategy is based upon a study of the basic aspects of the movement of the masses and on a consideration of the conflicting class forces. It analyzes the relationship between these forces, it studies their specific weight and nature and, finally, considering the moments of time and space, sets out the appropriate strategic plan for the political struggle. The Communist Party directs the politics of our state and the political strategy of the Soviet nation is the party's strategy. "When we look at the situation of our Soviet Union and the situation of other states," wrote M. V. Frunze, "we see how with each passing day the area of politics is

more closely intertwined with the area of military activity. One changes into the other. Strategy in the narrow military sense of this word is a part of political strategy."(8) In the work "The Questions of Higher Military Education" he commented: "...In the present age of proletarian revolution...politics and strategy are so closely intertwined that they can be separated only by complex theoretical analysis."(9)

M. V. Frunze considered the strategy and tactics of the proletarian struggle to be a major question of Leninism and emphasized that their study is of the most colossal interest for elaborating the questions of military strategy. "Strategy," he wrote, "in being the higher generalization of military art, should take into account not only the purely military elements such as the size of the armies and so forth but should also consider aspects of a political nature. Only the person who possesses all this knowledge can lay claim to the role of a Red Army leader under the conditions of future military clashes. Thus, seminars on Leninism and the study of the principles of Leninism are brought about not merely by a desire to broaden the overall viewpoint but are a natural obligatory supplement in studying our purely military course of strategy and the course of general tactics."(10)

Further, M. V. Frunze went on to explain that in line with the closer intertwining of politics and military strategy in defining the aims of a war as well as in working out the strategic plans and assessing the theaters of military operations, the importance of political, economic and moral factors had risen sharply and a realistic accounting of these comprised one of the strong points of Soviet military strategy. He emphasized that "all our strategy and all our tactics are most closely linked with the economic state of the nation and our aim is to so organize the study of this element of our military operations that future army leaders would be thoroughly familiar with the state of the nation from the viewpoint of employing all economic opportunities for the war."(11) M. V. Frunze, in commanding fronts (Eastern, Turkestan and Southern), showed the highest ability to consider all these factors in working out and carrying out the operational-strategic plans.

The nature of the military-political tasks confronting the Soviet state and its Armed Forces and the focus of military strategy were defined by him proceeding from the constant military threat of hostile capitalist encirclement about which V. I. Lenin had repeatedly warned.

M. V. Frunze decisively argued against underestimating the military threat after the Civil War, when a partial stabilization of capitalism and the recognition of the Soviet state by a number of capitalist nations caused certain workers of the party and state bodies and even the military personnel to underestimate the strengthening of national defense and the increased combat readiness of the Red Army and Navy. In 1924, he said that in the context of our diplomatic successes which have now occurred, many are beginning to develop an incorrect notion of our general political situation. They may feel that the very fact of recognition puts our military work in the background. Such a way of thinking, if it assumed any broad acceptance, would be the greatest danger for our Union. "...The working masses of the Soviet Union," he cautioned, "should fear the contagion of pacifist illusions more than a bullet."(12)

As was already pointed out, M. V. Frunze, in speaking about the nature of a future war, considered the question of its class essence to be the main and determining one and derived this from the class nature of both the Soviet state as well as the hostile capitalist countries surrounding it. "From the viewpoint...of the socioclass content of a future war," he wrote, "the question for us is determined by the nature of our state. We are a state of workers and peasants. In our country labor is predominant. This means that we also will not wage a war with any state where labor also rules. We will not wage wars against peoples or national wars. We can only wage a class war against the enemies of the working masses."(13)

Frunze emphasized that such a war would be a revolutionary, class war, for between our economic and political system and the organization of the bourgeois states there lies a profound, irreconcilable contradiction, and if it is resolved by military means, this would lead to an acute and, in all probability, extended clash. When things reach the point of a major, serious war between the Union of Soviet Republics and the union of major bourgeois states, then there will not be any limited goals in a war. In truth, Frunze did not exclude such a version where class contradictions within the capitalist states could mature to such a point and the capitalist system itself become so rotten that it would take merely one crushing blow from outside for this system to collapse under the effect of internal forces.

At the same time M. V. Frunze was persuaded that in preparing the nation and the Armed Forces for war, one must proceed not from a possible favorable confluence of circumstances but rather place the main bet on the extended, fierce and protracted nature of future military clashes and make all one's strategic plans precisely proceeding from this. He assumed that a future war would be a world one and hence we would be opposed not by individual hostile countries but rather a coalition of capitalist states. In practical terms as long as we were opposed by the entire capitalist world which, however, was far from united, it was also essential to skillfully play upon the contradictions between the bourgeois countries and their internal contradictions. Mikhail Vasilyevich taught that we should carefully follow and correctly assess the military-political situation and be able to see primarily our specific probable enemies. He saw in this one of the major tasks of strategy.

If the political strategy determines the general line in terms of the age as a whole, the content of military strategy is determined by the specific balance of military-political forces under the given historical conditions and primarily in a forthcoming war.

In bringing out the influence of military strategy on politics, Frunze commented that the composition of the opposing coalition will depend largely upon our successes and how the strategic situation will develop. In the event of our decisive successes, certain countries can pull out of this coalition but with our strategic failures, the number of states acting against the Soviet Union could increase.

M. V. Frunze sharply criticized Trotsky's assertions that the experience, political aims and class nature of the Civil War did not leave their imprint on military strategy, and convincingly showed that the revolution and ideology

of the proletariat, as a politically active class, determined essential features in the military art of the Red Army. He considered the main factor to be the appearance of a new fighter and command who were defending the victories of the revolution. In his opinion this should and did tell on the methods of the Red Army's military operations. "This class feature is manifested in the greatest activity, initiative, in the capacity for organization, for unity and for actions by large organized masses both of its individual representatives as well as the entire proletarian mass taken as a whole."(14)

Frunze's statements concerning the class nature of a war and Soviet military strategy were intentionally distorted by the foreign press which quoted him out of context. They endeavored to depict M. V. Frunze as a supporter of exporting revolution to other countries and overthrowing the capitalist system there. Trotsky was depicted as a "peace lover" who supposedly was in favor of a defensive political and military strategy, since he had said that until revolution occurred in Europe, "the basic decisive slogan which conformed to the entire situation and all our policy was a defensive."(15)

M. V. Frunze showed the erroneousness and falaciousness of the positions assumed by Trotsky and his supporters, for they confused two completely different concepts: the fundamentally defensive nature of the wars of the proletarian state understood in the political sense and the defensive nature of proletarian military strategy as the methods of conducting armed combat. He always emphasized that our military doctrine and strategy on the political level have a defensive nature, we do not intend to attack anyone or be engaged in exporting revolution. But if a war is imposed on us, our military strategy will be decisive and offensive. In speaking about a class war, he had in mind that a war in the defense of the socialist fatherland and its just political aims on the part of the Soviet state would encounter sympathy among the workers of the capitalist nations, but he was never a supporter of the export of revolution. The slogan "revolution from without" was considered by him to be harmful and not corresponding to the policy of the proletarian state.

Our policy was a policy of maintaining peace, said Mikhail Vasilyevich. And not because we were Trotskyites and not because we feared the uncovering of our weapons in the defense of the interests of labor. But because the very conditions of our struggle and work were such that a position of peace was objectively the best for us. Frunze convincingly showed that if the capitalist world did not take up weapons against us, then we could allow the resolution of the dispute between us and the capitalist world to follow a peaceful development of events and we could peacefully direct all our energy and all our forces into economic and cultural development. We could channel all our efforts to peaceful purposes and completely abandon expenditures on defense needs. If such a prospect was possible, then undoubtedly victory would be on our side.

This idea which expressed the essence of the policy of our party and the Soviet state was repeated by Frunze repeatedly and consistently carried out in all his practical work. However, the bourgeois falsifiers of the ideas of Frunze intentionally play this down.

At the same time M. V. Frunze cautioned that the possibility of peaceful development depends not only upon our desires. Imperialism would not accept the existence of a socialist state and with the slightest opportunity intended to stifle it. To proceed solely from the prospects of peaceful development "would be, of course, an expression of the greatest naivete on our part, for such questions which pose the question of the life and death of an entire way of life or system of state organization are not resolved peacefully. They are resolved by iron and blood."(16) Certainly the history of the 1930's and 1940's confirmed the correctness of these words?!

Running through the works of M. V. Frunze as a constant idea is the notion that our defensive measures are forced upon us and that due to the presence of hostile encirclement and the constant threat of military attack, we should, in constantly carrying out a policy of peace and resisting the provocations to involve us in a war, constantly strengthen the nation's defense capability and the combat might of the Armed Forces. Frunze assigned an important role to the theory of military strategy in carrying out these tasks.

On the major problems of the theory of military strategy. In defining the tasks and content of military strategy, M. V. Frunze proceeded from the view that modern wars have an all-encompassing and all-round nature. They are waged on the armed, economic and ideological fronts. The crucial role is played by armed combat, for the aim of a war can be achieved only by the physical extermination of the enemy. The remaining forms of combat during a war should ensure the success of armed combat as the main means of continuing politics. For this reason, Frunze explained, in our calculations for future operations and in analyzing the nature of future clashes, within our own organization we should pay chief attention not to hopes of any political disintegration of the enemy but rather the mobilizing of all the state's forces to defeat the enemy.

The experience of World War I showed the impossibility of achieving the aims of a war by a single annihilating attack and this required, in Frunze's opinion, a revising of the principles of military strategy. A war tests all the economic and political foundations of the belligerents. "In being expressed in the language of strategy, this means a transition from a strategy of quick, decisive strikes to a strategy of attrition."(17) Into this basically correct conclusion Frunze subsequently injected a correction stemming from the class nature of future wars. For such wars there need not be an absolute abandonment of a strategy of lightning strikes by our opponents. On the contrary, the stronger the exacerbation of class contradictions in the enemy camp the greater the probability that they would bet precisely on such a strategy. Completely possible is the use of this strategy by world capitalism toward us in order to achieve victory in the shortest time by a decisive blow and by the massing of enormous resources. We, continued M. V. Frunze, should be ready to oppose such a strategy by carrying out first of all our own "strategy of lightning attacks." Regardless of the fact that the Soviet Republic has many enemies, they would not be able to crush it in this manner. For this reason, the struggle under any conditions would be protracted.

In this context one cannot help but recall that Nazi Germany, having initiated World War II, wagered precisely on a "lightning" war and even was successful in defeating Poland and France and capturing a number of other European states. But in the war with the Soviet Union, as had been predicted remarkably by M. V. Frunze, this strategy failed. The war assumed an unprecedentedly fierce and protracted nature and ended with the complete defeat of the Hitler coalition.

M. V. Frunze considered that, in contrast to World War I which had a predominantly a positional nature, a future war would assume completely different forms. In analyzing the reasons for the positional nature of World War I, he concluded that "the positional stalemate was established on the basis of the impotence of the conflicting sides to find a solution by a direct mass strike.

"On the other hand, the objective conditions in the form of limited territory and very rich equipment, made it possible for each side, having abandoned a quick solution, to go over to the defensive on immobile positions."(18)

Armed conflict between two sociopolitical systems with the mass employment of modern combat equipment will establish conditions to escape from the positional blind alley. A future war will basically be of a highly fluid nature. But this does not exclude that active, highly fluid operations will be combined in individual periods with positional forms of armed combat, for successful operational-strategic maneuvering is inconceivable without the broad use of positional forms of fighting on certain, particularly important lines. Frunze criticized the assertions of those who assumed that a positional war is in contradiction with the main principles of proletarian strategy. He proceeded from the fact that our strategy should skillfully and flexibly employ various forms of conducting armed combat, depending upon the specific situational conditions.

In the mid-1920's, the most acute disputes arose over the question of what strategy was more suitable for the Red Army: a "strategy of destruction" or a "strategy of starvation" or would a combination of these be possible in a single war? Here by a "strategy of destruction" they understood a desire for decisive victories by the destructive annihilation of enemy personnel and the achieving of the war's aims in a single push. Even the successively conducted operations were viewed as a single whole; a general engagement was not considered one of the acts of a war but rather assumed independent significance. The main features of the "strategy of destruction" were the rectilinearity of actions, speed and massing of the attack.

The "strategy of starvation" consisted in gradually wearing down and weakening the enemy in political, economic and military terms; here the destruction of its personnel was viewed only as a part of the task of the armed front. It was assumed that the "strategy of starvation" should combine the successive carrying out of limited missions with flexible maneuvering tactics for creating conditions and the necessary superiority to make the final attack. As a whole the "strategy of starvation" was designed to avoid decisive clashes with the enemy and achieve limited strategic goals.

Such a division of strategy into two types depending upon the methods employed in armed combat was unscientific and contradicted the dialectical approach to the question of the multiplicity of forms of combat. A. A. Svechin, for example, in laying out the essence of these types of strategy in his works, defended the "strategy of starvation" and denied the possibility of employing the "strategy of starvation" and the "strategy of destruction" in a single war. "It would be wrong," he wrote, "to understand destruction and attrition as aspects which can exist simultaneously in combat."(19)

Certain military writers and military workers felt that M. V. Frunze was a supporter of the "strategy of starvation." However, A. Golubev in the book "M. V. Frunze o kharaktere budushchey voyny"(20) correctly shows that such a view does not correspond to the essence of the strategic views of Frunze who never was the supporter of any one type of strategic actions. The view of M. V. Frunze was as follows: it is essential to ready the nation and the Armed Forces for a protracted and intense war with the mobilizing of all forces and capabilities, considering when necessary the employment of "methods of attrition," but the strategic tasks in the course of the war would be carried out relying chiefly on a destructive defeat of the enemy.

Proceeding from the "strategy of starvation" or the "strategy of destruction," the principles of maneuverability or positional warfare, different views also evolved on the employment of the basic types of strategic actions in a war, that is, offensive or defensive. To what should preference be given, in relying on either concept, in working out strategic plans and organizing the Armed Forces and in what spirit should the personnel be trained and indoctrinated, in an offensive or defensive one?

A. I. Verkhovskiy was one of the supporters of the defensive method of action and he, in confusing different concepts--a defensive war in the political sense and the defensive as a type of military operation--showed that the defensive provides the greatest advantages, making it possible to accumulate force. He even asserted that in the aims of winning it was politically "more advantageous for us in the first battles to yield Minsk and Kiev than take Belostok and Brest."(21) In his opinion, the strong would choose Cannae and the weak Poltava.

Certain military theorists supported the other extreme viewpoint. Thus, N. Kakurin totally denied the possibility of employing defensive forms of armed combat, asserting that "the entire experience of a positional war can only be of historical significance for us."(22)

A majority of the leading military personnel who had gone through the experience of the Civil War repudiated a purely defensive strategy. They supported the instructions of V. I. Lenin who said that we would be not only stupid but also criminals if we gave our pledge to wage only a defensive war.(23) At the same time, proceeding from the need for a skillful combination of different forms of combat, V. I. Lenin pointed out that "in world history there have not been any wars which began or ended with a complete victorious offensive or they existed only as an exception."(24)

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M. V. Frunze posed this question in the following manner: "Should we rest on the idea of a passive defense for the nation, without posing and without pursuing any active missions, or should we also bear these latter in mind? Depending upon one or another solution to this question of military policy, the entire nature of the organizational development of our armed forces is determined as well as the nature and system of training the individual fighters and large troop formations...."(25) And he answered this question quite definitely: the Soviet Union is not thinking about any predatory wars and politically all our desires come down to ensuring the peace. But this does not mean that in the event of aggression against us the Red Army should fight only defensively. "I personally belong," he said, "among those who do not agree with...attitudes and views giving preference to the defensive.... Even Marx in his pamphlet on the Civil War in France said that an offensive is the best type of defensive."(26) He was firmly convinced that only an offensive could provide a final defeat of the enemy. The side would be victorious which found in itself the determination to advance; the side which merely defended itself was inevitably doomed to defeat. With other conditions being equal, an offensive is always better than the defensive; the defensive is aimed at readying conditions for going over to the offensive.

At a meeting of military delegates of the 11th Party Congress, K. Ye. Voroshilov strongly supported Frunze on this question. He condemned passive defensive views as harmful and inadmissible attitudes for our army must not be indoctrinated in fear of the enemy. He urged us to instill in all the personnel confidence in their forces and the capacity to advance.

M. V. Frunze in many of his works emphasized that the Red Army operations should be permeated with active, offensive zeal, have a decisive nature and not be limited to repelling enemy attacks. At the same time he explained that in the given instance it is a question of the general focus of military doctrine and military strategy and not one of recognizing the offensive as the only possible type of strategic operations. In asserting that the offensive should be the main type of combat operations of the Red Army, he not only recognized the validity of the defensive and retreat, but also emphasized that success in a war could be achieved only by the skillful and rational combination of various forms and methods of operations depending upon the specific situational conditions. Here there should be no routine or dogmatism.

Activity and offensiveness provide greater advantages but they must not be turned into an end in themselves. In referring to the experience of the Civil War, Frunze cautioned: "...At times this activity of ours, in exceeding its bounds, bordered on the inability to consider the data of the specific situation of the present and not recognize the danger of extreme risk."(27) In the report "Military-Political Indoctrination of the Red Army" he developed this idea: "In our midst," he said, "there are persons who feel that in accepting the principle of maneuverability, we can completely dismiss everything involved with so-called positional warfare.... Such a conclusion, of course, is the greatest confusion and fraught with great danger for the Red Army. Such a brazen and abrupt opposing of these principles is completely incorrect. No war even the most fluid has been able to dispense with elements of positional warfare. The very support of a maneuver in a certain situation

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and under certain conditions requires the employment of positional procedures."(28)

"...A situation can always arise," explained M. V. Frunze further, "whereby a retreat is inevitable or is even necessary and useful. For this reason our Red Commanders should instill in themselves and their subordinates the view of a retreat as one of the aspects in the general course of offensive operations. A retreat can be essential to create a better situation for preparing a new and decisive offensive. Here one must take into account the essence of the matter and not external forms. One must consider the main goal of the operation."(29)

Many supporters of defensive actions based their judgments on the fact that the increased technical equipping of the armies, as was the case in World War I, inevitably would lead to extended positional forms of armed combat. The fluid nature of combat operations in the Civil War were explained by them by the comparatively poor equipping of the troops with combat equipment.

M. V. Frunze convincingly showed that with a more profound analysis of the essence of the question, the situation is quite the reverse. The going over to more active and fluid methods of operations was linked by him primarily to the increased technical equipping of modern armies. In his mind in a future major war there would not be that fixed line of the front which had occurred in World War I. Even by the end of the imperialist war, technology had made colossal headway and after the end of the war this process had been noticeably accelerated.

The rapid development of aviation, machinery, chemical and other special weapons had led to a situation where a solid, fixed line of a front would be impossible over any significant length and over any extended time. Conditions would appear for breaking through into the enemy rear and attacking its bases. Frunze was persuaded that the equipping of the troops with modern technology would play the crucial role in the outcome of the operations. Precisely this circumstance also determined the quality of the soldier, as only economically developed countries could produce a soldier who was up to the level of modern requirements, as well as the weapons and military equipment determining the possibility of maneuvering warfare. In an economically backward country with poorly developed means of communications the maneuvering ability of an army would be extremely low.

For the success of strategic operations in the Civil War of important significance were not only the correct determining of the chief danger and the shifting of the entire Republic's efforts to another theater of military operations and which assumed crucial significance at a certain stage in the war, but also the decisive concentration of men and weapons on the axis of the main thrust in accord with the plan for each specific operation. V. I. Lenin pointed out that it was essential "at the crucial moment and at the crucial point to have a predominant superiority of forces as this was the 'law' of military successes...."(30)

This Leninist thesis was always considered by M. V. Frunze in his activities as a military leader as well as in his theoretical works. While commander of

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the Southern Group of the Eastern Front, in an area of a little more than 200 km he concentrated 49,000 bayonets and sabers, 152 guns, leaving 22,500 bayonets and sabers and 70 guns on the remaining front of around 700 km in length. He also carried out the same decisive concentration of basic efforts on the main axis in defeating major enemy groupings in routing the Orsk White Guard Grouping in the area of the Turkestan Front and during the operations of the Southern Front to defeat Wrangel. In these operations the main thrusts were made, as a rule, on sectors comprising not more than 20-25 percent of the total length of the front. The remaining sectors were covered by insignificant forces.

In analyzing the experience of the war, M. V. Frunze, using examples of successful and unsuccessful operations, showed how with an overall shortage of men and weapons it was difficult to concentrate efforts on the main sector, what great art this required, what enormous risk one must take and how much courage and firmness one must show to carry out the idea in determining and making the main thrust. Precisely as a consequence of the fact that the principle of the decisive massing of men and weapons on the main sector was not fully carried out, we did not achieve our goals in the offensive of the Southern Front in August 1919 and the breakthrough of the Western Front in May 1920.

Other important principles of military art which were constantly defended and carried out by M. V. Frunze were the continuity and rapidity of the offensive, the constant holding of initiative and the activity of combat operations, without permitting an indiscriminate offensive here. For this reason in the course of an offensive he demanded that new assault groups be created so as to constantly increase the effort and continue to launch attacks against the enemy until it was completely defeated. He gave important significance to the continuous pursuit of the enemy in order not to allow it to dig in on intermediary lines. Frunze considered as the most effective method of countering enemy counterstrikes the use of preemptive active operations to thwart the concentration of enemy counterstrike groupings and the destruction of these piecemeal.

In studying the experience of World War I and the Civil War, M. V. Frunze concluded that for achieving the goals of a war, several campaigns would have to be carried out while a series of successive operations would have to be carried out to fulfill the missions of a strategic operation and to fully defeat the enemy grouping in the theater of military operations. As is known, in the course of the strategic offensive from the Volga to the Urals during the period from April through July 1919, the Buguruslan, Belebey, Ufa, Zlatoust and Chelyabinsk Operations were carried out to a total depth of up to 1,000 km. Here the fronts advanced in zones from 500-600 to 1,000-1,500 km; armies from 200 to 300-400 km. The offensive operations were carried out over a period of several months. M. V. Frunze assumed that operations in a future war would be marked by as much scope. But in a clash of armies equipped with a large amount of technology, for successfully conducting operations it would be necessary to significantly increase the density of men and weapons. This, in turn, would lead to an increased number of fronts and armies for carrying out strategic missions on the major theaters of military operations.

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M. V. Frunze viewed the defensive not only as a requisite type of strategic actions but also as one of the methods for saving forces to concentrate them on the crucial sectors. Without employing the defensive on other areas of a strategic front, it was impossible to ensure success of the offensive operations on the main sectors. A defensive could also be employed in the course of a strategic offensive operation as was the case on the Eastern Front in the spring of 1919, when the troops in the center of the front conducted a counteroffensive while the troops positioned on the flanks supported it by conducting defensive combat operations. Defensive operations should also have an active, decisive nature and be carried out with the wide employment of the maneuvering of men and weapons and the launching of counterstrikes.

M. V. Frunze considered the guarantee for success of both offensive and defensive operations to be the broad employment of different forms of operational-strategic maneuver to attack one or both enemy flanks coming out in the rear of its main grouping. In the offensive by the Turkestan Front, he skillfully combined a deep divisive attack on a strategic scale with flank attacks in carrying out individual operational missions and this led to the encirclement and destruction of superior enemy forces, for example, in the region of Orsk and Aktyubinsk.

Frunze gave great importance to breaking through the enemy defenses and to developing a tactical success into an operational one by the massed employment of infantry, artillery and cavalry on the main sectors. This was most visibly expressed in the operations to defeat the Wrangel troops in 1920.

With the coming of M. V. Frunze to the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, a start was made to a thorough examination of the initial period of a possible future war and to elaborating theoretical and practical questions concerning the planning of the war and operations as well as mobilizational work.

In the 1920's, in defining the content of the initial period of a future war, they proceeded from the experience of World War I, in understanding by this the period from the moment of the declaration of war and general mobilization to the start of the border engagements of the main forces. The main missions of this period were considered to be mobilization and strategic deployment of the troop groupings in the theaters of military operations in accord with the war plan.

Prior to World War I, mobilization had been understood only as the converting of the armed forces to a war establishment. In the documents prepared by the RKKA Staff in 1925 under the leadership of M. V. Frunze, mobilization was viewed more widely as the converting of not only the army and navy to a wartime status but also the entire state apparatus and national economy. The concept of a premobilization period was introduced when, in the event of a threat of war, a number of preparatory measures would be carried out increasing mobilizational readiness.

For covering the mobilization and strategic deployment, plans were made to establish screen troops which would basically consist of cavalry formations and units reinforced by rifle and engineer units, armored forces, artillery

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and aviation. It was assumed that the cover troops would conduct combat operations relying on a system of fortresses and fortifications. Also considered was the possibility of the aborting of mobilization and the increased length of the initial period of a war as a result of massed enemy air strikes against the lines of communications and operations by enemy armored forces. For this reason in the cover system an important role was assigned to the air forces and air defense units. Considering these views, a number of new regulations and official documents were worked out and introduced.

For the commanders and field headquarters of the armies and fronts, in 1924, M. V. Frunze approved the official manual "Vyssheye komandovaniye" [Higher Command]; in 1925, the Provisional Field Manual (Parts 1 and 2); in 1926, there was published the Regulation on Techniques for Working Out the Operational Part of a War Plan prepared with his participation and which defined the content and methods of strategic planning. Upon the initiative of M. V. Frunze work was also initiated to work out Part 3 of the RKKA Field Manual which was to set out the principles of the operational activities of a front and the fleet, but this work remained incomplete.

Certainly, these regulation documents express not only the personal views of M. V. Frunze; they were a reflection of the collective reason of the leading military personnel in the Red Army. In particular, M. N. Tukhachevskiy was the chairman of the commission for working out the Provisional Field Manual and its membership included B. M. Shaposhnikov with S. S. Kamaneyev, A. I. Yegorov, R. P. Eydemov and other military figures taking an active part. But one must also consider the circumstance that M. V. Frunze not merely approved the official documents but took an active personal part in working them out, he went deeply into all the wordings and himself directly dictated or worked out certain fundamental concepts.

M. V. Frunze assumed that, in being guided by a political goal, strategic planning should split a war into periods and campaigns, designating by these concepts a sequence of strategic actions. Strategy should determine what enemies must be defeated in what sequence, what strategic operations must be carried out for this, what men and weapons should be employed, it should set the missions for the fronts and branches of troops and determine the procedure of their cooperation and all-round support of the operations.

The Regulation on Techniques for Working Out the Operational Part of a War Plan stated that this part of the plan should be aimed at studying and working out all questions related to carrying out the operational concepts of the RKKA High Command for achieving the strategic aims of the war in the event of a clash with our probable enemies. The operational part of the plan should include particular plans for: strategic deployment of the Armed Forces envisaging the establishing of fronts and individual armies on the appropriate strategic and operational sectors; strategic movements to concentrate the armed forces in the theater of military operations; initial operations of the operational army; operational deployment of the troops within each front and individual army; support for the army in terms of communications, engineer, chemical and air defense, military lines of communications, supply for the operational army both during the mobilization and concentration period as well

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as for the immediate operation; medical and veterinary services and supply of military topographic maps.

The staffs of the border military districts were instructed to work out plans for the operational deployment of the front, for covering the mobilization and concentration and for supporting the operation.

M. V. Frunze took into account different variations for the initiating of a war by the enemy. He foresaw that "such cities as Odessa, Kiev, Minsk and Leningrad will be the first objects of attack for an air enemy..."(31) At the same time, the enemy ground forces and naval forces could begin an invasion. Enemy aggression should first be met by the army on active service and the size of this was set by him at approximately 1.7 million men. Such an army, according to his calculations, could cover the mobilizing and deployment of all the Red Army forces. The actions of the cover army should have a decisive and fluid nature. In line with this particularly responsible and active missions were entrusted to the cavalry for this period. Frunze drew attention to the circumstance that "our disposition, our vastness, the weakness of transport and a whole series of other factors force us to conclude that we will have to gain a rather large interval of time in order to prepare for a war. The nature of our operations during this period can be varied. It can be both defensive...and offensive. But this is a question of the future, a question of the situation, and depends upon how we determine to employ the cover army."(32) From this followed an important conclusion: the actions of the Red Army at the outset of the war should be planned for ahead of time and worked out both in an offensive and defensive version. However, on the eve of World War II this was not fully taken into account in the practices of strategic planning.

The elaboration of the questions of strategic reconnaissance, the covering and strategic deployment of the Armed Forces, the establishing of reserves and material supplies and the preparation of the theaters of military operations were also considered by M. V. Frunze to be major tasks in the theory of military strategy. He devoted a great deal of attention to the coordinated employment of the Armed Services and to the organizing of cooperation between them. In examining all problems of strategy, he demanded a close study of the probable enemies, including their strategic goals, the particular features of organizational development and the possible composition of the armed forces, economic and moral potentials, the possible methods of conducting armed combat and the equipping of the theaters of military operations.

Questions of control and support of strategic operations. M. V. Frunze was closely concerned with the questions of organizing strategic leadership over the Armed Forces and the questions of troop command and control. He rightly felt that leadership in a modern war as a whole is the prerogative of the military-political leadership and the government. Successful leadership of the Armed Forces is possible considering not only the military but also the economic and political conditions for waging war.

In investigating this problem, Frunze relied on the experience gained in the course of World War I and the Civil War. Even World War I had clearly shown a tendency toward centralization of state and military leadership in wartime.

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In the Soviet Republic, by the Decree of 15 (28) January 1918 on the Founding of the RKKA, the SNK headed by V. I. Lenin was stated to be its superior leading body. Direct leadership and control over the army was provided by the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs (later for Military and Naval Affairs) and the All-Russian Military Collegium for the Forming of the Red Army which was established under the Commissariat. In March 1918, for leadership over all military operations a Superior Military Council was established consisting of three persons (a leader and two political commissars); in March the council included the people's commissars for military and naval affairs. In May 1918, in the place of the All-Russian Military Collegium for the Formation of the Red Army the All-Russian Main Staff was established and this was subordinate to the People's Commissariat for Military affairs. For leadership of the troops in the theaters of military operations, commencing in June 1918, headquarters of the fronts were organized headed by the RVS of the fronts; RVS also existed in the armies.

The Higher Military Council as the body of higher military control, under conditions when military operations had to be directed simultaneously on several fronts, clearly could not carry out its tasks. The parallel existence of the Operations Section of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs and the Operations Headquarters of the All-Russian Main Staff had a negative impact as these often issued contradictory orders to the troops.

Many party and military workers both in the center and on the fronts acutely felt the lack of centralized military command and voiced various proposals to improve leadership of combat on the fronts. In August 1918, N. I. Podvoyskiy and A. I. Yegorov submitted proposals on this question to the Higher Military Council and the SNK. In particular, A. I. Yegorov presented to V. I. Lenin a report with the proposal to establish a Supreme High Command. He wrote: "The experience of the millenia has shown the necessity and possibility of controlling the affairs of a war, in a word, that the general should be provided with complete aid. Only a single will can control the operations and under the influence of different albeit useful advice, this always loses its clarity and certainty and the bodies led by it will act uncertainly. The consistent implementation of the same idea corresponding to a given situation sooner leads to the aim than the constant compiling of new plans; the contradictory orders which are inevitable in the latter instance influence the confidence and force of the troops....

"On the Higher Military Council the 'pros' and 'contras' are backed up with such strong irrefutable data that one opinion is destroyed by the other and as a result the question is stymied. With such a system any independence, any rapid decision and any bold risk would be destroyed and without these no war can be conducted."(33)

Considering this and other opinions, changes were incorporated in the organization of the higher military leadership bodies. In September 1918, the Republic Revolutionary Military Council was established by a decree of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] as the higher command body of the Red Army (the Higher Military Council was abolished). It was also given the functions and rights of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. At the same time, the position of commander-in-chief of all

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the Armed Forces was introduced and he was to lead the ground and naval forces comprising the operational army. The Field Headquarters of the Republic RVS was established for ensuring leadership of the troops and forces. At the same time, the All-Russian High Staff was kept and it was basically to be concerned with the questions of manning the troops, establishing new formations and combat training.

All these bodies were to work under the leadership of the RKP(b) Central Committee. In the Decree of the Party Central Committee "On the Policy of the Military Department" (December 1918) it was stated that "the policy of the military department, like all the other departments and institutions, is carried out on the precise basis of the general directives issued by the party in the form of its Central Committee and under its direct control." (34)

In the aims of uniting the activities of all the bodies of the Soviet state to defend the victories of the revolution, in November 1918, under the chairmanship of V. I. Lenin, the Council of Worker and Peasant Defense was established as the superior body for directing national defense. Such a system of strategic leadership, in undergoing minor changes, existed until the end of the Civil War. With the broadening of economic functions and the involvement of the armies liberated from military operations in rebuilding the national economy, the Council of Worker and Peasant Defense in April 1920 was transformed into the Labor and Defense Council (STO).

After the Civil War, in November 1923, the tasks and functions of the military department was adjusted. The Republic RVS was merged with the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. At the same time, the position of commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces was kept as the head of all the land and naval forces. He possessed independence in resolving operational-strategic questions within the limits of the directives and instructions of the higher authorities.

M. V. Frunze, in analyzing this experience of organizing and providing strategic leadership, concluded that as a whole it had proven effective and approximately the same structure should be kept for a future war. "In this area," he said, "we, undoubtedly, must continue working further." (35) He gave particular significance to the party's leading role over the entire system of military organizational development, to the unity of political and military leadership and to coordinating the carrying out of defense and national economic tasks under the leadership of the STO. Only under this condition, Frunze felt, could one ensure a close interaction of the front and rear, the military and civilian organizations, and with maximum effectiveness utilize all the economic, moral and military capabilities of the state. M. V. Frunze assumed that after the Civil War, it would be advisable to turn the STO into a body of economic leadership. Defense questions should be examined in a new body, a new council, which, like the STO, would possess the appropriate rights and be directly under the Union SNK.

As for the structure of the military department, Frunze felt that it required a substantial adjustment both for peacetime and for wartime. This was reflected in the measures of the 1924-1925 military reform carried out upon the decision and under the leadership of the party Central Committee. The

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position of commander-in-chief for peacetime was eliminated. There was no doubt that this position was required for wartime and its introduction was envisaged, however it was not determined who specifically would assume this in the event of war.

The RKKA Staff underwent a thorough reorganization and this, in the opinion of M. V. Frunze, was to concentrate its main efforts on carrying out state defense tasks as well as operational-strategic and mobilizational questions. The staff was to encompass the activities of all the Armed Services and because of this all the bodies which performed the above-listed functions in other directorates (air force, navy) were turned over to the RKKA Staff. The RKKA Staff was freed from the duties of directing the daily life and combat training of the troops, their manning and supply. The carrying out of these tasks was assigned to the RKKA Main Directorate, the supply of the Armed Forces with all types of supplies to the RKKA Supply Directorate. The directorates of the navy and air forces were to be concerned with the particular question of their own Armed Services (special training for the personnel, combat training and special supply).

In resolving organizational questions related to the military department, differences of opinion arose primarily over the purpose and functions of the RKKA Staff (in actual terms, the general staff). The words "general staff" evoked mistrust and were often employed in a disrespectful sense; the necessity of such a body was generally disputed. Even those who assumed the possibility of the existence of a general staff represented it not in the form of a creative and organizing body but as a technical executive body of the RVS or as a "field office of the High Command" which would not possess directive rights. It was said that directive functions were inherent only to a bourgeois general staff.

The dissemination of these views was brought about by the influence of leftist elements who denied the succession of proletarian culture and its link with the previous experience and culture. As is known, V. I. Lenin belittled the unsound denying of the names of old institutions in establishing new Soviet organizations and sharply criticized those who sought "that there was not a single bit of the old in it (the new institution.--M. G.)."(36)

A broad discussion was held on the question of whether a general staff was needed.(37) A. A. Svechin and certain other military specialists, in excessively exaggerating the role of the general staff in providing unity of actions for the entire military organism, endeavored to entrust to it those tasks which comprised the functions of the military-political leadership. A. Sedyakin, in correctly criticizing this twist, at the same time raised a further question by stating: "For the Red Army such an organization for 'ensuring' a unity of goal and action is clearly inapplicable and useless. A. A. Svechin has 'looked through' our military organization of the VKP(b), and has overlooked the ordered and dependable system of party political leadership over the army.... For this reason, we cannot pose the question of strategic leadership through the General Staff in the same way as Svechin does."(38) In principle this was correct and in actuality the problem of strategic leadership could not be approached in isolation from the tasks of political leadership, as certain old military specialists had endeavored to

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do. But this did not mean that it was possible to dispense with a general staff or that a general staff, in working under the leadership of the Party Central Committee, should not take up military-political questions. The issue was that the questions of political leadership of armed combat could not be entrusted to the general staff.

P. P. Lebedev in the book "Gosudarstvennaya oborona" [State Defense] (certain ideas in this have not lost their pertinence under present-day conditions) as a whole correctly posed the questions of the need to establish under the superior state bodies a special apparatus for preparing national defense (the Secretariat under the STO as a working apparatus on defense questions and the Mobilization Committee under the Gosplan, or independently).(39) But without sufficient grounds he proposed turning over many important functions of the general staff to these civilian bodies, not considering that they could not correctly be resolved in isolation from the strategic plans.

The most sound line on this question was expressed by M. V. Frunze in the theses "The Reorganization of the Red Army" prepared for the Tenth RKP(b) Congress. He felt it necessary to have the general staff participate in the elaborating of military doctrine and propose: with the forthcoming realization of the Red Army, this question should be particularly taken into account and an actual opportunity should be established of turning the army's 'brain,' its general staff, into a military-theoretical staff of the proletarian state. One of the ways to do this should be: a) the immediate incorporation of the most prominent military-political workers as members of the general staff; b) a revival of the activities of the institution of the general staff and c) a change in the methods for training future military leaders by combining elements of a broad general scientific education with purely military training...."(40)

M. V. Frunze emphasized that the elaboration of operational-strategic and mobilizational plans should be carried out considering the real political, economic and military capabilities of the Soviet state. An increase in the operational-strategic role of the RKKA Staff was also essential because it should be, in his opinion, "not only the brain of the Red Army, it should become the military brain of all our Soviet state and should provide that material which lies at the basis of the work done by the Defense Council."(41)

Thus, according to the views of M. V. Frunze, the general staff was primarily the "brain of the army," the military-theoretical staff of the state, and it should focus its main efforts at carrying out precisely these tasks. M. V. Frunze constantly carried out a line of the greatest possible increase in the role of the general staff in military scientific work and in directly elaborating the most important military-theoretical problems. For this purpose, in 1925, within the RKKA Staff a Directorate for Studying and Utilizing the Experience of the War was established (subsequently the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff); this carried out major work in this area, creating a good amount of material for the further development of military-theoretical thought.

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These ideas concerning the general staff subsequently underwent further development and profound and thorough elaboration in the remarkable and scientifically unique work by B. M. Shaposhnikov "Mozg armii" [The Brain of the Army]. In analyzing the work of the general staffs of a number of armies on the eve of World War I and during the war, B. M. Shaposhnikov viewed the general staff as the main body involved in the command of the armed forces and providing unity to the entire military organism and linking it with the remaining elements of the state machine.

The effective work of the general staff depended largely upon the position held by the chief of the general staff in the overall system of military command and control. In wartime he, as a rule, shifted to the position of the chief of staff of headquarters and was the main figure through whom the most important military questions were resolved. Because of this in peacetime precisely the chief of the general staff carried out all the work related to the preparations for a war, including for the future supreme commander-in-chief. For successfully carrying out these tasks it was considered necessary to observe two basic conditions: in the first place, the chief of the general staff should have the right of resolving the appropriate operational-strategic and organizational questions; secondly, in being subordinate in peacetime to the defense minister, he at the same time should be able to turn directly to the person assigned for wartime to the position of supreme commander-in-chief on the most important questions related to the planning and preparation for the war. In analyzing the activities of the military departments of a number of states, B. M. Shaposhnikov convincingly showed that it was impossible to properly prepare for a war and ensure effective command of the armed forces with the outset of a war, if the general staff and its chief were restricted in their actions in peacetime and not granted the appropriate rights.

With a slight exaggeration he wrote that "the change of a chief of the general staff actually is a new age in a state's military preparation, since while individuals do not create history, they still leave a trace in the latter by their activities and it would be a bad thing if each of them endeavored to find new ways to prepare for a war, forgetting the paths trod by his predecessor."(42)

The proposals of B. M. Shaposhnikov raised the question of increasing the role, authority and training level of not only the general staff but also the other command bodies and primarily the staffs of all levels. He wrote: "A staff worker is that line commander who according to our regulations remains the deputy commander in the event of his loss.... He is not some special breed of man who with a pen behind his ear, as he was previously shown in pictures, smartly writes out decisions on good paper. Under present-day conditions without a smooth-working staff, it is impossible to think of good troop command."(43) He placed high demands on the staff officers, paying particular attention to a profound knowledge of the job, constant contact with the troops, efficiency, professionalism, initiative, activity in work and humility (in his apt expression, one must "be more than one seems").

However, the scientifically sound proposals of B. M. Shaposhnikov concerning the role of the general staff in the system of the Armed Forces and staff service as a whole in practical work were not always fully taken into account

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and this caused definite difficulties in the activities of not only the RKKA Staff (General Staff) itself, but also in the entire People's Commissariat of Defense and the command bodies in the troops. M. N. Tukhachevskiy (1925-1928) and B. M. Shaposhnikov (1928-1931) both encountered this in heading the RKKA Staff. They worked constantly to turn the RKKA Staff into a viable command body of the Armed Forces.

But it was impossible to achieve this for all the questions. Moreover, during the prewar years the frequent replacement of the chiefs of the RKKA Staff (General Staff) had a negative effect on the work of the main command body of the Armed Forces.

As a whole, during the prewar years the RKKA Staff (General Staff) carried out great fruitful work in the area of strategic planning and the preparation of the theaters of military operations and took an active part in carrying out other tasks involved in the command and control of the Armed Forces. At the same time, the RKKA Staff (General Staff) and the staffs of the military districts did not pay sufficient attention to the questions of the combat and mobilizational readiness of the troops and to the operational training of the command bodies and there were also individual instances of a biased attitude toward the staffs.

The concern of certain military leaders about the danger of an "excessive exaggeration" of the role and importance of the RKKA Staff in the system of higher military command was unjustified, for in the Soviet state all the military command bodies always worked under the leadership of the party Central Committee, the Soviet government, under the direct leadership of the people's commissar of defense and on the basis of their directives and instructions.

The questions of organizing troop command were of fundamental significance not only for the General Staff. In essence it was a question of the role and place of the staffs in the system of command and control of the troops and naval forces. Were the staffs to be the basic bodies of command through which troop leadership was essentially provided or were they to be office-type executive bodies without directive and valid control functions? These two fundamentally different approaches long made themselves felt. But the severe test of the war showed that the first of these was the only correct approach and was enacted in legislation not only in our Armed Forces but in all the basic armies of the world.

This derives objectively from the nature of modern warfare. Troop command and control in the preparation and conduct of operations and combat actions have become an exceptionally complicated matter. The number and scope of questions which must be encompassed simultaneously have risen and the time for resolving them has become less and less. The very process and conditions of activities for troop command and control have become more difficult, particularly with the abrupt and unexpected changes in the situation.

Under such conditions the importance of one-man command and the role of commanders in the process of troop command and control not only are not reduced but increased further. But precisely because of the increased

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personal responsibility of the commanders and the importance of the prompt and effective taking of decisions and their organizational activity to carry out the set tasks, staffs are needed which are creative, viable command bodies and capable of ensuring precise, close control of the troops and, consequently, the fullest and most effective manifestation of one-man command.

During the Great Patriotic War the harsh reality of combat forced a sharp rise in the role of the staffs in the overall system of the command and control of the Armed Forces. Military practice cruelly punished those who ignored this objective pattern manifested in the processes of troop command. With good reason, by the end of the Great Patriotic War the chiefs of staffs on all levels had become the first deputy commanders; only they were given the right to issue orders to the troops and persons directly subordinate to the commanders in the name of the commanders. Such a position in the system of troop command and control had not only been earned by the staffs and chiefs of staffs but also, it can be said, during the war they had endured with their commanders. Precisely this also explains the circumstance that our best generals and commanders, following the example of M. V. Frunze, were always concerned for the development and training of their staffs.

As a whole, the structure worked out in 1924-1925 for the central apparatus of the military department was subsequently to prove effective. Particularly farsighted were the theoretical views and practical activity of M. V. Frunze in providing unified leadership over all the Armed Forces by the people's commissariat, in increasing the role of the RKKA Staff as the main command body of the Armed Forces and in concentrating its main efforts on the questions of strategic and operational planning, mobilizational deployment and the establishing of mobilization reserves, determining the scope of the needs of the army and navy, equipping the theaters of military operations, in organizing command and carrying out other measures related to preparing the Armed Forces for war.

Such a direction in the work of the RKKA Staff was also basically considered in transforming it into the General Staff in September 1935. However, as subsequent practice was to show, the removing of the questions of the organizational structure and the manning of the Armed Forces from the RKKA Staff (General Staff) in a number of instances led to insufficient coordination of measures on these questions and to a resolving of them in isolation from the operational-strategic tasks.

M. V. Frunze did a great deal to explain, concretize and carry out the ideas of V. I. Lenin and our party concerning the importance and role of the rear in a modern war. V. I. Lenin, in pointing to the importance of a strong and organized rear for the conduct of a war, by the rear in the broad sense of the word understood the entire state, its social and economic system, the policy of the ruling parties and governments, the relationships between classes within the state, production capabilities, the state of transport, the dominant ideology and the moral state of the people. "The link between our nation's military organization and all its economic and cultural system," wrote Lenin in 1905, "has never been as close as at present."(44)

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V. I. Lenin not only theoretically elaborated the questions of the economic support for a war but also directly led the replenishing of personnel and the supply of weapons and materiel for all the major operations of the Red Army during the period of the Civil War. These questions gained concrete expression in many party documents written by him (for example, the "Theses of the RKP(b) Central Committee in Line With the Situation of the Eastern Front" and "Everyone Into the Struggle Against Denikin") which not only defined the main threat and the main direction where the basic efforts of the party and the Soviet state had to be concentrated but also provided specific instructions on the economic and political-moral support for the major strategic operations.

M. V. Frunze in the works "The Front and Rear in a War of the Future," "The Red Army and the Communications Workers" and others consistently carried out the notion that the state of the rear is the crucial factor in a modern war; a strong rear is one of the most important conditions for the successful waging of war. Considering the prospects for the development of weapons, particularly pertinent were the ideas concerning the unity of the front and rear and the obliteration of the distinctions between them. Frunze emphasized that "the link of the front with the rear in our days should become much closer, immediate and crucial. The life and work of the front at each given moment are determined by the work and the condition of the rear. In this sense the center of gravity for waging war shifts from the front back to the rear."(45)

Precisely the rear provides viability to modern armies. With the presence of an economically and morally strong rear, even with temporary setbacks it is possible to mobilize all the existing human and material resources, to restore the battleworthiness of the army and continue the armed struggle. The material requirements and economic demands of a war have increased significantly.

The experience of World War I showed that no supplies of weapons and shells established in peacetime sufficed to conduct military operations. Under the conditions of the rapid development of technology, the obsolescence of weapons was inevitable. For this reason M. V. Frunze considered it ill-advised to excessively increase the supplies being established, since this entailed enormous outlays. It was better to invest these funds into establishing additional production capacity which at the necessary time could be employed for sharply increasing the production of weapons and military equipment.

Proceeding from this, Frunze concluded that in a modern war the victorious side would be the one which was able to surpass the enemy in organizing the economy, in developing science and technology, the side which could produce more metal, oil and other types of raw materials, the side which would have the more developed transport system which was of crucial significance to meet the needs of a war. He did not conceal that this work is unbelievably complex but it is also essential and feasible. Its carrying out is greatly facilitated by the state nature of the main sectors of our industry; this is an enormous advantage of the socialist state over the bourgeois states.(46)

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"It is essential," M. V. Frunze pointed out, "to firmly realize that precisely in peacetime lasting foundations should be put down for that organization which will operate in wartime and the work should be done to indoctrinate the working masses in the appropriate direction. It is essential to realize that the questions of mobilizing the troops, mobilizing the workers and mobilizing the national economy are equal in their importance. If we do not have a previously elaborated and prepared organizational plan for mobilizing the entire nation, then we will inevitably be confronted with the need to improvise the moment the nation shifts to a wartime footing."(47) He recognized that this was a task for the superior state bodies but the military department and, in particular, the General Staff should be the initiators and pacesetters in resolving defense questions. *

Proceeding from these concepts, Soviet military strategy gave great importance to the questions of economic support for the war and logistic support for operations. The experience of previous wars showed the growing importance of the rear for the successful conduct of strategic operations. The questions of organizing the rear had to be resolved considering the particular features of the nature of a future war. M. V. Frunze said that interruptions in the supply of materiel for the Russian Army arose not only as a consequence of the backwardness of industry in Tsarist Russia, but they also occurred in the most developed industrial countries. One of the reasons was that the military-political leadership and the general staffs were unable to correctly foresee the increased scale and length of the war. *

The questions of the rear arose with particular urgency in line with the elaboration of a system of successive operations which had to be carried out without extended operational pauses and halts. M. V. Frunze drew attention to the fact that neither the academy course of instruction nor the practical holding of exercises and military games in the troops paid proper attention to these questions. In a majority of instances they were worked through in an extremely superficial manner. And in theoretical terms the problems of the organizing of the rear had been little examined and elaborated considering the new nature of a war.

In examining the role of the rear in a modern war, M. V. Frunze commented that "the experience of the imperialist war provided rich material in this regard. Our Civil War, in turn, introduced a number of very valuable data stemming from the particular features of our state's structure. It is to be regretted that this experience of our has been very little taken up in the appropriate postwar literature. The work of our supply bodies...in addition to great historical experience has enormous practical interest.... The works devoted to the elaboration of this very important question are almost completely lacking in our country. But this should not continue further. It must be hoped that the elaboration of these questions had come to hold a suitable place in our military and civilian press."(48)

In the aims of improving the military-economic and rear training of the military personnel, M. V. Frunze, in 1924, issued instructions to include the questions of organizing the rear and supply in the course on strategy. A supply faculty was established in the same year in the RKKA Military Academy for a profound scientific elaboration of these questions and for a more

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detailed study of them. It was to train highly skilled personnel not only for the Armed Forces but also for work in the state bodies on the questions of the military preparation and mobilization of the national economy in the interests of national defense.

In relying on party documents and Lenin's concepts, M. V. Frunze examined the questions of the rear from the viewpoint of not only the economic but also the moral capabilities of the state. In part his views on this question were set out in the section concerning military doctrine. Here we would merely point out those aspects of the moral factor which Frunze linked closely with carrying out the tasks of combat. He first of all considered the Leninist notion that in the age of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, the masses of people have the determining impact on the course and outcome of a war. Their creative activity is most fully apparent and acquires a conscious and organized nature when they are close to and understand the aims of a war, particularly a revolutionary, just war. "To so fully sympathize with the war," said V. I. Lenin, "and understand it on the part of the party and non-party workers and the non-party peasantry (and the peasantry in their mass are non-party), no political regime has done this to even a small fraction of Soviet power. This was the reason why we ultimately conquered a strong enemy." (49)

M. V. Frunze, in seeing a source of high morale of the masses in the political and economic system of a nation, pointed out that a war would be waged not for victories, not for enslaving other peoples, but for defending the victories of the revolution and the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. He saw our strength in the fact that in our nation the working class is in power and that the millions of the peasant masses marched together with the working class. The October Revolution profoundly stirred the masses of people, raised them up and sparked awareness and this was the guarantee that the revolution would be invincible. In the work "The Red Army at the Start of Its Eighth Year of Existence," he viewed the increased morale and readiness to defend the victories of the revolution in close relation to the economic successes of the country and the improved prosperity of the people and the army and navy personnel.

The moral factor includes the morale of the people and the personnel of the Armed Forces. Military strategy, in the opinion of M. V. Frunze, should take into account the moral capabilities of both its own country as well as that of the enemy precisely in such a complete understanding, relying upon the conclusions and ideas of political strategy. In reflecting on the influence of the moral factor on the success of operations, Frunze at the same time warned that the task of strategy was not only to correctly take into account moral capabilities but also to help in seeing that the morale of the people and the men of the Armed Forces was constantly maintained on the proper level and increased. For this, in addition to well organized party political work, of exceptionally great importance was the organized preparation and conduct of the operations and the ensuring of their success. The high organization of the command and political personnel, the clear command of the troops, without nervousness and hesitation, and prompt logistic support instilled confidence and enthusiasm in the troops and helped to increase their combat capabilities.

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In accord with such an understanding of the importance of the rear for the course and outcome of a war, military strategy should also make provision both in economic and moral-political terms for measures to disrupt the enemy rear by launching attacks against it and capturing its most important economic and political centers as well as ground defense from the land, sea and air for the main facilities of one's own rear in order to ensure its organized and uninterrupted work.

M. V. Frunze considered as a major condition in shaping high army and navy morale to be the maintaining of vigilance and a constant readiness to come to the defense of the Soviet Republic and a profound understanding on the part of all workers of the tasks related to strengthening the nation's defense capability. "This task can be carried out successfully only when," he said, "the helmsman of the ship, the communist party, and all the worker-peasant masses led by it will be imbued with an awareness of the presence of a constant threat to their situation and will be capable physically and morally to commence combat at any moment and against any enemy."(50)

Thus, M. V. Frunze had a clear understanding that a war goes beyond armed combat and encompasses all aspects of politics and all aspects of the life of the state and the people. Along with armed combat during a war there will also be a fierce economic, ideological and diplomatic struggle employing the means and methods which are not employed in peacetime. For this reason a future war requires from each Soviet citizen unstintingness and a feat not only on the battlefield but also on the labor front.

Under the leadership of M. V. Frunze, the principles were elaborated for planning and carrying out a strategic service and in 1924 these were set out in a special manual.(51) The strategic service included the main types of support for operations: reconnaissance, security, signals, military transport, supply, manning, medical service, veterinary service, engineering and the organizing of the civilian rear administration in the theaters of military operations and in the front area. ||| *

This document pointed out that in a war the methods of organizing and controlling operations are of special significance. At the same time that the operational aspect of plans can never be uniform and routine, support for the operation by the means of command, communications, transport, evacuation and so forth should have definite standards. |||

The modern development of technology makes completely feasible the constant and uninterrupted control of operations and the support of them with everything necessary. For this reason just as the command and staffs of the divisions and corps must have a firm knowledge of the equipment of troop marching, the superior staffs must have a knowledge of the equipment for moving by rail, water and motor transport, as well as communications, for all of this is the basis of the strategic maneuver.

A major role was assigned to strategic reconnaissance which should promptly provide the superior command with information concerning the enemy army and navy grouping; the theater of war (natural conditions and materiel) and its preparation in military terms; the various military-technical achievements of

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the enemy; the political situation and the economic condition both of the theater of war as well as the entire territory of the enemy state. The information gained by strategic reconnaissance should be unconditionally reliable, since a discrepancy between it and reality can involve the failure of major operations. For this reason here it is essential to have a particularly sharp delimitation between absolute reliability and supposition or probability.

M. V. Frunze demanded that along with the traditional types of reconnaissance, air reconnaissance be more widely employed as this was capable of quickly reaching the enemy positions, quickly covering vast areas and rapidly delivering the reconnaissance information. He felt that strategic reconnaissance would provide the desired results only when a full coordination of all its means was ensured. All the types of reconnaissance should complement one another; moreover, it was recommended that the secured information be constantly reverified.

The organization of security on an operational-strategic scale included mainly such new types of support for an operation as air and chemical defense of a theater of military operations. Combating enemy aviation was considered to be a major task.

In all the official documents approved by M. V. Frunze, air combat was viewed as a single process; unified command and control were envisaged over all the forces and means allocated for carrying out these tasks. The commander of an air fleet of a front or army organized the air defense for the rear area and was responsible for this. Directly under him was the assistant for air defense who was the immediate chief of all the air defense elements comprising the front and army; under him there was the air defense section.

Great attention was given to the organizing of communications in an operation. M. V. Frunze emphasized that any commander having combat experience realizes what an important role communications plays in troop command and in achieving the operational success. "How often it has happened," he recalled, "that one gives some order and waits with the greatest excitement until it reaches its destination, when it is received for execution, and how often it happened that the communications conditions left the superior command in complete ignorance of what was being done down there."(56)

Interruptions in communications and transport which sometimes forced the abandoning of the fulfillment of previously planned tasks and often led to defeats, as a rule, were a consequence of insufficient attention and poor knowledge of the techniques for supporting the operations by the commanders and staffs. It was emphasized that the area of a front, army or group should be equipped with a permanent and field communications network including telegraph and telephone trunks, pole and cable lines, a radio telegraph network, courier routes, aircraft routes, pigeon mail combined into a single network, well protected and camouflaged with head signals points, signals centers, transceiving and relay stations. Thus, provision was made to organize centralized communications with the broad making up of all types and means of communications and their duplication. However, communications of the

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strategic leadership bodies with the fronts and armies was planned to be based solely on stationary communications lines.

Proceeding from the experience of previous wars, M. V. Frunze concluded that the military transport bodies are responsible not only for rail movements but also are given the task of preparing and utilizing all types of communications routes (rail, water and road) and the means of transport for war purposes. The military transport bodies were viewed as the sole responsible bodies of the war department from which derived all assignments for transport and which provided supervision over their fulfillment. Their competence also included the questions of the organization of the rear and security for all types of lines of communications as well as the rebuilding of bridges. This was explained by the fact that the rear facilities of the operational-strategic level, as a rule, were based on routes of communications. In accord with this understanding of the tasks of the military transport bodies, they consisted of the following basic elements: a) the routes of communications including rail, water, dirt, highway and air; b) transport including rail, water, cart, motor vehicle and air; c) stationary facilities including rail military food stations, stages, magazines and so forth.(53)

Such centralization of command over all types of transport and lines of communications at that time was justified. The excessively great breaking up of command over the various means of transport in subsequent years was not always sufficiently sound and reduced the efficiency of their use. As for entrusting certain functions of the rear bodies to the military transport bodies, this outlived itself as the rear support tasks became more complex.

M. V. Frunze constantly reminded that without well organized supply the troops could not be battleworthy. Along with the centralized delivery of everything necessary for the troops, attention was also paid to employing all means existing on the spot in order thereby to facilitate as much as possible the task of transport of delivering materiel from the deep rear. For this purpose, it was recommended that the supply bodies have not only a distribution but also a strong procurement system.

In the abovementioned documents worked out under the leadership of M. V. Frunze, the questions of the manning of the troops and the making up of human losses were also viewed as one of the types of support for the operations. It was demanded that any operational plan provide a procedure to replenish the expected loss of personnel. The replenishing of personnel for the troops was viewed in the regulation documents as a most important duty of strategic and operational leadership. In subsequent years, the questions of manning were no longer included in the regulation documents; recommendations on these questions were set out in special manuals and documents. This provided an opportunity to work them out and regulate them in more detail. But in a number of instances this was done in isolation from the operational-strategic tasks. Experience showed the advisability of at least briefly stating in the regulation documents the general purpose and fundamental questions of troop manning and replenishing losses in a combat situation.

Approximately the same understanding of the questions of supporting combat operations on the operational-tactical scale was reflected, in particular, in the 1925 Provisional Field Manual

Operational-Tactical Views

The role and place of the theory of operational art in the overall system of the theory of military art.

During the period when there were no conditions for establishing mass armies, when the economy was unable to support the extended conduct of a war even by comparatively small armies and when the outcome of the war was determined by one or two engagements, it was quite natural to divide military art just into strategy and tactics. The tasks of strategy were restricted to the preparation and conduct of a general engagement and the fullest utilization of the achieved success in this engagement. Since the aims of the war were achieved chiefly on the battlefield, tactics played the crucial role. Proceeding from this, Delbrück, for example, subordinated strategy to tactics while Jomini wrote that "strategy leads the army to the crucial points of the operational zone, prepares for the success of the engagement and predetermines its results. But the victory should be achieved precisely by tactics combined with bravery, genius and good luck." (54)

With the rise of an operation as an aggregate of battles and engagements unified by a single overall plan but broken in space and time, operational art also arose. Individual elements of an operation had appeared even in the wars of the first half of the 19th Century but gained their final form during the years of World War I and the Civil War and military intervention in Russia. However, for a long time bourgeois military-theoretical thought did not spot this new phenomenon.

Regardless of this, the preparation and conduct of operations objectively existed in practice. With the increased scope of combat and the appearance of different operational and operational-tactical field forces (front, army, corps), a strategic operation was broken up into a number of simultaneously and successively conducted front and army operations. Experience showed that the methods of preparing and conducting such operations had substantial differences both from strategic operations and from combat operations. They did not fit within the confines of combat but also did not encompass the war as a whole. An operation, as a part of strategic operations and an aggregate of battles, became a relatively independent phenomenon of armed combat. This was to gain appropriate reflection also in theory.

The term "operational art" began to be employed in our literature approximately from 1922 onwards. It was finally adopted and established in the Red Army official documents in 1925-1926.

Operational art which arose as a result of the development of military art first gained its theoretical generalization and expression precisely in Soviet military science. The dividing of military art into two parts--strategy and tactics--which had existed for a long time was now revised and military art now came to include three components--strategy, operational art and tactics.

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M. V. Frunze in the work "Lenin and the Red Army," in examining the questions of the relationship between strategy and tactics, commented that for a long time we had not any generally recognized, indisputable definition of strategy and tactics. He considered these areas of military art to be closely interlinked. "It seems to me personally," he wrote, "that anyone who endeavors to delimit or divide these two areas of military art by an impassable line is making a mistake. I feel that tactics and strategy in no instance can be put into opposition to one another. Tactics and strategy are phenomena of a single order and there is no qualitative distinction between them, rather there is only a quantitative distinction"(55) (considering, of course, a transition to a new quality.--M. G.).

Frunze proceeded from the view that in the area of strategy we are involved with phenomena and data of a more general and more complex order. Its tasks are to provide an overall assessment of the situation, to determine the specific dependence of the main factors involved in the question and on this basis to outline the basic lines of conduct (an operation). The basic elements by which strategy operates are mass, space and time. By mass he understood both the troops with their weapons and the material supplies and generally people. Tactics, in Frunze's opinion, "being, in essence, involved with the same elements or a majority of them, takes them in a more concrete and hence a narrower and more limited form, being aimed at carrying out tasks of a partial order. Tactics is a part of strategy, it is subordinate to it, serves it and is determined by it."(56)

In the given instance, M. V. Frunze did not set as his aim the giving of an exhaustive definition for strategy and tactics; he felt it necessary to draw attention to their relationship and most essential distinguishing features in the context of the review of our party's political strategy and tactics. In this article he did not employ the term "operational art," but as we will see below, in many other works he quite definitely spoke about the theory of conducting operations and approved the regulatory documents where the term "operational art" was introduced.

The separating of the theory of operational art from the area of the theory of strategy and its development as an independent part of the theory of military art were a major victory for our scientific thought and contributed to the subsequent more profound and thorough elaboration of the methods for preparing and conducting operations. A start was made to a thorough study of operational art in the RKKA Military Academy and in the system of operational training for the leadership personnel. In 1924, in the academy, upon the instructions of M. V. Frunze, along with the strategy chair, a chair was founded for the conduct of operations. In the 1924-1925 study program, we encountered the term "operational art" and consequently military art was divided into strategy, operational art and tactics.

The dividing of military art into three parts considering the separation of operational art also contributed to the more purposeful development of the theories of strategy and tactics, encouraging a thorough elaboration of the questions comprising the subject and specific features of these areas of the theory of military art. Soviet military science examined all the component parts of the theory of military art in their relationship, proceeding from the

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fact that strategy holds the predominant position in relation to operational art and the latter in relation to tactics. Here consideration was given to their reciprocal influence on one another.

In bourgeois military science, even at present, military art continues to be divided only into strategy and tactics. The problems of preparing and conducting an operation are partially examined in tactics and to a significant degree in strategy. The separation of the same subject of research between two different theories of military art cannot be considered scientifically sound, as it does not reflect the objective nature of modern armed combat.

In skipping ahead, we would find out, finally, that at present this is begun to be understood by bourgeois military theorists, too. In 1982, the journal NATIONAL DEFENSE published an article where it was pointed out that the doctrine of a "air-land operation" has led to the appearance of a new concept in American military art--operational art. This term is beginning to appear also in certain official documents of the NATO Armed Forces. One cannot help but notice that the bourgeois armies reached the conclusion of the existence of operational art after refusing to recognize the division of military art into three parts for several decades, criticizing at every opportunity Soviet military theoretical thought for this and declaring the separation of operational art to be artificial.

The elaboration of the most important provisions of the theory of operational art and tactics. Soviet operational art and tactics developed during the period of the Civil War and foreign intervention and within the limits of their subjects incorporated all the major requirements of Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army and Soviet military strategy. M. V. Frunze in many of his works pointed out that the operations and battles of the Soviet troops during the Civil War period were marked by a decisiveness of aims, by great scope and highly maneuverable actions. An analysis of the documents indicate that in all his directives and combat orders he focused his subordinates not on capturing a certain territory but demanded "dealing a decisive defeat to the enemy" and "destroying the enemy's main forces."

In the theory and practice of conducting operations, M. V. Frunze gave decisive importance to the correct choice to the axis of the main thrust and to concentrating the main forces on the decisive sectors. For this sake he recommended a bold weakening of the secondary sectors and constantly cautioned against a fatal desire to be strong on all sectors. But for the success of an operation, he did not consider a general correct allocation of the forces over the sectors to be sufficient. The skillful determining of the axis of the main thrust and the concentrating of the main efforts on this sector should be reinforced by the establishing of strong attack groupings.

M. V. Frunze felt that the strongest attack groupings could produce the desired effect only in the instance that diverse forms and a deep operational configuration of the troops were employed considering the specific situational conditions. He taught that even under the most difficult conditions, with any shortage of men and weapons, it was essential to endeavor to establish and replenish the reserves. Without this the commander would be left without resources to influence the course of development of the operation and combat.

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the reserve had to be positioned on the sector of the main thrust ready to exploit the success of the first echelon troops or repel unexpected enemy actions. At the outset of the Aktyubinsk Operation, where the 3d Cavalry Division had extended its forces and was actually dissolved in the infantry battle formations, M. V. Frunze demanded that the division be assembled into a single fist and used for a rapid raid against the enemy rears and for taking Orsk.

From the experience of his own generalship activities, Frunze considered the basis of the operational and tactical maneuver to be attacks against the weakest points, the enemy flanks and rear, the envelopment and outflanking of the enemy groupings combined with attacks from the front. Thus, in the defeat of Kolchak he made the main thrust with the main forces of the Southern Group in the gap between the White III and VI Corps. By bold flank attacks he achieved success in other operations, too. Characteristically, in the actions of the White Guard troops, the employment of the operational and tactical maneuver was observed significantly more rarely. They endeavored more to launch frontal thrusts along a broad front and for this reason their actions on the offensive were marked by linearity.

The decisive forms of the operational and tactical maneuver were reflected in the Red Army manuals worked out after the Civil War. In them great attention was also given to breaking through the enemy defenses. An offensive from the position of immediate contact with the enemy was comprised of neutralizing the enemy by all types of fire on the sector where the main thrust was to be launched and destroying the enemy by decisive infantry and cavalry actions with support from artillery, aviation and the other branches of troops. Attention was drawn to the necessity of promptly reinforcing the taken positions and lines and the non-stop pursuit of the retreating enemy.

Considering the experience of World War I and the Civil War, Frunze felt that in future operations the width of the zone of advance of a front would reach 400-600 km, for an army 100-150 km; the depth of an offensive operation would be 200-300 km for a front and 100-150 km for an army; the rate of advance would be 10-15 km a day. However, it must be pointed out that the operational-tactical norms set in the 1925 Field Manual largely reflected the experience of World War I and did not sufficiently consider the fluid nature of modern combat operations. Thus, the width of the zone of advance on the main sector for a division was set at 1-4 km and 0.7-2 km for a regiment; in breaking through fortified defenses it would be 1.5 km for a division and 4-5 km for a corps. In breaching the defenses it was considered necessary to establish a triple superiority in men and weapons on the breakthrough sector. At the same time, it was emphasized that this demand did not mean the abandoning of active operations with an equality of forces, particularly in conducting combat operations deep in the defensive and in meeting encounters, where a bold and rapid maneuver and attack could ensure the enemy's defeat.

Artillery should support the offensive, in successively shifting its fire against the enemy positions and thereby blazing the trail for the infantry, isolating the breakthrough (attack) sector from the remaining areas of the enemy's defensive zone and rear. Active counterbattery bombardment was envisaged and the hitting of the reserves in depth. However, there still was

no question of a simultaneous fire effect against the enemy to the entire depth of the tactical defensive zone and uninterrupted fire support for the infantry.

Aviation was entrusted with the conduct of reconnaissance, the correcting of artillery fire, bombing and strafing the enemy and all of this was to complement the artillery fire. Tanks were used together with armored vehicles for direct infantry support. The cavalry was perceived, as in the Civil War, basically as a means for exploiting the success in conducting combat operations deep in the defenses.

A major place was assigned to meeting encounters and engagements characteristic of the fluid combat operations, and to their organizing and conduct.

Operations to surround and destroy the enemy were one of the forms for manifesting the decisive nature of Soviet military art. Having assumed command of the 4th Army, M. V. Frunze in the very first operation endeavored by an active offensive to carry out the tasks of surrounding and destroying the main White Cossack forces in the area of Kruglozernyy, Lbishchensk. In the Aktyubinsk Operation and in the defeat of Wrangel, M. V. Frunze carried out these missions by establishing strong groupings in the aim of coming out in the flank and rear of the main enemy forces and then splitting and quickly destroying them piecemeal. In defeating the army of Gen Belov, upon instructions of M. V. Frunze, the 1st Army encircled and destroyed a large enemy grouping, having virtually equal men and weapons with it. However, a larger portion of the men and weapons was assigned to the flanking groupings which carried out the envelopment maneuver. Since the combat operations were conducted on individual sectors and there was no solid front, in addition to the general operational encirclement, a whole series of centers of tactical encirclement were created. In this operation such a decisive form of action was crowned with complete success.

The operation of the Southern Front conducted in October 1920 ended with the rout of the enemy and the liberation of Northern Tauria. However, the absence of a strong attack grouping on the left flank of the front, the unsuccessful employment of the 2d Horse Army and the indecisive actions of certain army commanders (4th and 13th) did not provide an opportunity to carry out the plan of the complete encirclement and destruction of the enemy. Cooperation between the flank groupings was little worked out, and particularly the questions of setting up the inner and outer perimeters of encirclement. These oversights made it possible for Wrangel to pull back a portion of his troops into the Crimea and organize a strong defense. In November 1920, the troops of the Southern Front had to prepare and carry out a new, Perekop-Chongar Operation in the aim of completing the defeat of the enemy.

M. V. Frunze, in analyzing the experience of the Civil War and noting the generally positive results of the operation of the Southern Front in October 1920, at the same time criticized certain aspects of this. For this reason, in working out the theory of operational art and tactics, he drew attention to the advantage and simultaneously to the exceptional complexity of operations

and battle involving the encirclement and destruction of the enemy and urged the complete elaboration of methods for conducting such operations.

In the course of World War I, the problem of breaking through the defenses and exploiting the tactical success into an operational one remained virtually unsolved, with the exception of the Brusilov breakthrough of 1916 which also produced comparatively limited results. In the Civil War, as a rule, there was not a long existing positional front. However, in a number of instances, the fortified enemy positions had to be breached, as was the case, for example, in the operation of defeating the Wrangel troops. Under the conditions of the Civil War the horse armies, cavalry corps and divisions were an effective means for exploiting the tactical success into an operational one. They largely contributed to giving high maneuverability and great scope to combat operations, to increasing the depth of the thrusts and to raising the rate of advance.

M. V. Frunze pointed out that the most characteristic features of the Civil War which distinguished it from an imperialist war were the high maneuverability and dynamism of all the operations; the desire to carry out the missions by energetic, offensive operations. He felt that the employment of new weapons would make future combat operations even more fluid and decisive, with the predominance of the offensive not only within the strategic limits and the war as a whole but also on the operational-tactical scale.

This notion, M. V. Frunze explained, stemmed from the objective nature of modern armed combat. A future war requires the decisive defeat of the enemy on the part of the Red Army and the offensive will be the sole method for fully defeating the enemy. An offensive is also important because it provides the advancing side with an additional factor for combat success, that is, initiative, and imposes the will of the attacker on the defending side. Surprise of actions can be most fully employed precisely on the offensive and this stuns and paralyzes the enemy.

"The attack itself, the push strengthen the attacking side and give it more chances of success. I affirm," said M. V. Frunze, "that the attack and offensive, with other conditions being equal, are always more advantageous than the defensive." (57) For this reason, maneuverability should become the flesh and blood of our Red Army and maneuvering qualities should be inculcated in every possible way by the entire system of training the army, and particularly for its command personnel.

The inevitability and necessity of maneuvering actions in the future were established by M. V. Frunze on the basis of the class nature of the Red Army as well as by the enormous scope of the theaters of military operations, the ever-increasing mobility of the troops due to their mechanization and motorization and by the need to shift efforts in the course of the operation from some sectors to others and regroup the resources to these sectors. Decisive operations in the war would be impossible without a bold maneuver in the aim of placing one's troops in an advantageous position for attacking the destroying the enemy. Our temporary technical backwardness, commented M. V. Frunze, does not contradict these considerations but, conversely, only

maneuverability will make it possible for us to compensate for the shortage of our equipment.

However, maneuverability is not an end in itself. It should be aimed at achieving the main goal of defeating the enemy. The basic feature of fluid combat operations is not formal aggressiveness but initiative and activity which ensure the successful outcome of the offensive operation in its basic essence."(58)

For increasing maneuverability and speed of actions on the offensive it was recommended to widely draw on the experience of the Civil War in employing forward detachments. For example, in the course of the offensive operations of the Eastern Front in 1919 to liberate the Urals, forward detachments were employed to ensure continuous operations at night and during the day, for coming out in the enemy rear and disrupting its lines of communications. A forward detachment included three-five rifle companies, several machine guns and one or two artillery pieces; on the most important sectors as forward detachments they also employed reinforced cavalry units. All of this made it possible to maintain a high rate of advance and ensure the continuous pursuit of the enemy.

When M. V. Frunze spoke about the high maneuverability of operations and combat in a future war, he also took into account the processes which could lead to the development of a positional front. For this reason he gave great importance to the questions of breaking through a fortified defensive and exploiting the success under the new conditions of conducting armed combat.

M. V. Frunze felt that for achieving decisive goals of defeating the enemy and maintaining the maneuverability of combat operations in the course of the war, it would be necessary to carry out a whole series of successive operations linked by a common plan. In elaborating these recommendations he relied on great combat experience. In the operations of the Southern Group of the Eastern Front one could already spot the genesis of successive operations conducted to a great depth. In the course of the Buguruslan Operation, a new troop groupings was established and it was given missions which were to be carried out in the forthcoming Belebey Operation. This made it possible without an operational pause to commence a new operation and conduct the offensive as a whole at a rapid pace until the complete defeat of the opposing enemy grouping. Actually, the Buguruslan, Belebey and Ufa Operations were parts of the overall operation of the Southern Group which later merged into a strategic counteroffensive by the entire Eastern Front.

The conducting of such operations was also envisaged in the future. In the course of a strategic operation they planned to conduct several front-level operations and in the course of the front-level one, several army-level operations. Here they pointed to the necessity in the course of carrying out one operation to prepare for the subsequent one so that they would be carried out without operational pauses and not provide an opportunity for the enemy to get its bearings, bring up reserves and organize the defensive on intermediate lines. In comparison with previous experience, this was a completely new phenomenon in operational art. For this reason it was considered advisable to

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prepare ahead of time new troop groupings, to plan the maneuvering of resources and increase the effort by committing reserves to battle.

In conducting operations particularly important significance was assumed by continuous troop command and uninterrupted troop supply with all essential materiel. Here completely new conditions arose as well as new demands on troop command and cooperation between the field forces and formations, primarily between the armies.

The problem was that even in the 19th Century, it was the custom to view armies as completely autonomous operational field forces fighting on independent operational axes. Regardless of the establishing of fronts (groups of armies) in World War I, this practice of conducting independent army-level operations had changed little. Thus, the lack of cooperation between the first and second Russian armies and the coordinating of their actions by the command of the Northwestern Front was one of the reasons for the loss of the 2d Army of Gen Samsonov. These same factors led to the failure of the German Army in the Battle of the Marne.

G. Isserson correctly commented: "The entire conduct of the operation in 1914 came down to determining and aiming the groupings. The armies from the very outset were given their own distant targets and moved toward them along determined axes. This had been proposed even before World War I by Bernhardt, saying that modern armies should be like released arrows. But, as is known, a released arrow is no more given to control than was the case with the German armies in 1914."(59)

Poor cooperation between the armies also occurred in conducting individual operations by the Red Army, for example, in the course of the liberation operation of the Eastern Front in the autumn of 1918 and the winter of 1919 and the May offensive of the Western Front in 1920.

Thus, as a whole the experience of World War I and the Civil War showed that successful operations can be conducted only with close cooperation between the armies. The armies could no longer conduct independent operational-strategic missions with their own men and weapons and for defeating the large enemy groupings it was essential to have constant coordination of their efforts by the front command, the replenishing of reserves and an adjustment of the missions and axes of operations. Without this it was impossible to have the massing of men and weapons on the scale of a front.

Relying on the acquired experience, M. V. Frunze viewed a front-level operation as a single system of operations and as an aggregate of closely interrelated army-level operations unified by a single goal. The most vivid expression of this was in the operation of the Southern Front to defeat the Wrangel troops. In truth, in this operation, as was already said, full coordination was not achieved between the actions of the armies. But this not completely successful attempt merely confirms the above-given conclusion of M. V. Frunze.

One of the most important forms of operational troop leadership during an operation was the issuing of operational directives, combat orders and combat

instructions. The practice of autonomous army operations in the past gave rise to directives and orders that were too general in content. The party Central Committee and the Republic RVS after the setbacks of the 3d Army at Perm drew attention to the inadmissibility of such a practice and demanded that concrete and feasible missions be set for the troops.

A majority of the directives and orders issued by M. V. Frunze was marked by concreteness in setting the missions and clarity of wording. And they varied in form and content. For one army commander (a more experienced one) he set only the missions and the execution dates and for another he gave the methods of execution. In addition to the directives and orders destined for the command, he issued orders directed to all the personnel with an explanation of the military-political situation and the combat missions. These orders were drawn up in a very accessible form and carried a great emotional charge. Thus, the first step of M. V. Frunze after assuming the position of commander of the 4th Army was to issue an order urging all the troops to be aware of the political and operational importance of the missions assigned to the army and the personal responsibility of each Red Armyman for defending the victories of the revolution. This order, in particular, stated: "...The eyes of the workers and peasants of all Russia are focused on you. The nation is following your successes with baited breath.... Here on the front the very fate of worker-peasant Russia is being decided..."(60) He issued similar orders on other fronts, particularly in crucial moments of the development of the operations.

In seeking clarity and concreteness in setting operational tasks and firm command of the field forces and formations, M. V. Frunze was a supporter of granting broad initiative and independence to subordinate commanders in carrying out the set missions.

He had high regard for a will to victory and decisiveness of actions. In all the regulation documents worked out under his leadership, decisiveness of action was recognized as the basic quality for all levels of commanders and chiefs; it was emphasized that a readiness to bear responsibility for old decisions is the basis of command. Precisely at that time, the Field Manual (1925) included the words which have been carried forward into modern manuals: "A rebuke is merited not by the one who in a desire to destroy the enemy suffers a defeat but rather the one who, fearing responsibility, has not committed all his resources to achieve victory."(61) Then the manual emphasizes that the only one who does not make a mistake is the one who does nothing.

For this reason, a senior commander (chief) should show particular restraint for those subordinates who have suffered a setback. A punishment should occur only in instances of negligence and flagrant violation of orders. If the setback is a consequence of the vicissitudes inevitable in a war, a senior chief is obliged by all means to support his subordinate. Without confidence in the support of the chief and his benevolent attitude (even in the event of a setback), it is impossible to develop independence among subordinate commanders. The military testing of subsequent years fully confirmed the correctness of this demand. As experience was to show, rapid and excessively strong punishment for the slightest failure and the lack of understanding and

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support from senior chiefs led, as a rule, to a situation where subordinate commanders began to fear responsibility. This fettered their initiative and will power with all the fatal consequences for troop command.

A major contribution of M. V. Frunze was that in working out the theory of successive operations and highly fluid combat operations, he proceeded from the considerations of operational-tactical advisability and endeavored to make them completely sound and supported in organizational and material terms. For this reason he constantly introduced not only operational-tactical but also material-technical norms into the theory and practice of preparing and conducting operations and demanded their scrupulous study and precise fulfillment by command personnel. He showed that without the most careful organization of the rear based upon precise mathematical calculations, without organizing correct support for the troops with everything needed by them for conducting the operations, without precise calculation of transport ensuring rear supply and without the organizing of evacuation work any correct and reasonable conduct of major operations was inconceivable.

In exercises and military games, he was impatient with any sort of schematic operational-tactical ideas divorced from the question of logistic support. "...Now," he said, "the successful outcome of military operations and the outcome of a war to a much smaller degree depend upon correct operational leadership than upon the correct organization of the rear and all that prepares for the conduct of military operations." (62) Here he stipulated that without correct operational decisions any logistical support can be useless. And the best operational decision is doomed to fail if the operation is not thoroughly prepared and supported. For this reason, he gave crucial significance to the organizational work of the command and the staffs in preparing for the operations and combat actions and their all-round support.

In analyzing the practice of conducting exercises and military games, M. V. Frunze pointed out that "usually the overall plan of an operation is correctly set out and the particular missions stemming from the plan too, but in terms of the organization of the operations, the coordinating of its individual elements and support--from the viewpoint of the organization of the rear, supply and communications--and the coordination of the individual branches of weapons, here major flaws are observed." (63) He constantly demanded that in preparing for the operations more attention be given to the logistic aspect of the matter, to the details of the combat employment of the branches of troops and as a whole to the organization of combat operations.

In the aim of the sounder theoretical elaboration of this aspect of operational art and improving the training of personnel, upon the instructions of M. V. Frunze the RKKA Military Academy worked out the collective work "Vedeniye operatsiy. Rabota komandovaniya i Polevogo upravleniya" [The Conduct of Operations. The Work of the Command and Field Headquarters]. It for the first time set out in detail the methods and procedures for the work of the commanders and staffs in preparing and conducting operations. The commander's decision was viewed as a unity of the overall concept for the operation and the methods of carrying it out. The commander should, proceeding from the set goals of the operation, determine the axes of the main and auxiliary thrusts on the offensive, the breakthrough areas of the enemy

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fortified position, allocate the forces, organize the maneuver and in a defensive operation, in addition, determine the defensive lines.

The decision of the all-arms commander was viewed as the basis of troop command as a whole and obligatory for working out the plans for the actions of artillery and aviation and the employment of the engineer troops and other branches of troops. The basic indicators were set for the scope of the operation of a front and army (the width of the zones, the depth of the tasks, the duration of the operation, and the approximate combat strength of the front and army). Thus, a start was made to the theoretical analysis and elaboration of the principles of troop command and control in preparing for and conducting operations as the most important part of operational art.

M. V. Frunze considered it essential to skillfully combine the offensive and defensive as the main forms of combat not only on the strategic scale but also the operational-tactical one. In giving preference to the offensive as the basic type of combat operations, he demanded the careful elaboration of the questions of modern defense, considering that this should be employed when an offensive was disadvantageous or impossible. "...The basic, predominant nature of our future operations," he wrote, "will be a maneuvering one. But at the same time, this very maneuverability demands extensive and complete familiarity with the positional forms of waging war." (64) He cautioned both against underestimating and overestimating the role of positional warfare in a future war. The need for it will arise when it is necessary to support maneuvering actions with immobile positions. The defensive was always combined with an offensive not only in World War I, but also in the Civil War. In practical terms the Red Army troops had to conduct defensive actions on all the fronts.

The war convincingly showed that the choice of the type of combat operations depends not only upon the desire and plans of one or another side but stems objectively from the situational conditions. Thus, in 1918 and in the first half of 1919, the Red Army due to the lack of forces conducted predominantly defensive operations. Offensive operations made up a comparatively small proportional amount. The defensive system was based upon small arms, machine gun and artillery fire combined with the maneuvering of men and weapons to the threatened sectors and the conducting of counterstrikes and counterattacks. At the start of the Civil War, the questions of field fortifications were clearly underestimated. Characteristically, precisely in the second half of the Civil War, when basically offensive operations were conducted, defensive actions began to be conducted more effectively. This was most fully apparent in the actions of the Southern and Western Fronts in the autumn of 1920. For example, in the defense of the Kakhov bridgehead, a developed defensive system was established; precisely there for the first time extensive use was made of elements of antitank defense. A large amount of engineer work was carried out employing antitank trenches, improvised mines and other obstacles.

Thus, a sort of pattern became apparent: the more skillfully the defensive was employed, the better the conditions created for successfully conducting offensive operations. For this reason all the manuals and other official documents worked out subsequent to the Civil War gave great attention to the questions of the defensive. This was correspondingly reflected in the

curriculum of the RKKA Military Academy and in the subject of the exercises and military games in the troops. Some 213 paragraphs were devoted to the questions of the defensive in the 1925 Field Manual. Detailed recommendations were given on the defensive along a broad front, on combat in an encirclement and breaking out of it.

According to the manual, the defensive was to be employed in the aim of forcing the enemy to give up the offensive, to gain time for concentrating men and weapons and creating conditions for going over to the offensive. The manual "Boevaya sluzhba pekhoty" [Infantry Combat Service] approved by M. V. Frunze in 1924 pointed out that the defensive was to be employed as a means for repelling the offensive of superior enemy forces in the aim of then going over to the offensive. It was assumed that the defensive would have an active, mobile and maneuvering nature; the strong holding of the occupied positions would be combined with the launching of strong counterattacks and counterstrikes. M. V. Frunze taught that the main thing on the defensive was not the plugging of holes, not the bolstering of retreating units or even the recovery of a lost position but rather the launching of an attack against the enemy and the winning of initiative in order to fundamentally alter the situation.

The defensive system included several defensive lines, the engineer organization of the terrain, organized fire, counterattacks by reserves and elements of air and antilanding defense. A division took up the defensive in a zone of up to 10 km and the width of a regimental sector was 2-4 km. The weak point in such a defensive configuration was its focal nature. After the war more attention began to be given to antitank defenses and in the 1930's this was viewed as one of the most important types of combat support.

M. V. Frunze was decisively against any sort of routine and pattern and against making a fetish of the selected forms and methods of conducting operations and combat actions. An infatuation with any form involved a serious threat and ran counter to Marxism. In accord with the Marxist-Leninist teachings, there should be nothing absolute or ossified for the Red commander. Any means, any method could be employed in a certain situation.

"...We should endeavor," he explained, "to provide maximum elasticity and flexibility for our methods and apparatus, making it possible to employ all available means and forms of combat. Everything can be good at one time and in its place and the art of a military leader should be manifested in the ability to choose the most suitable of the numerous diverse methods and means in each given instance."(65)

On the tactics of all-arms combat. The tactics of the Red Army in the Civil War was marked by great flexibility and diversity. Combat was organized as all-arms in which the different branches of troops carried out their missions jointly. Cooperation was also developed between the formations and units of the Ground Forces and the ships of the Navy and river flotillas. Under the Civil War conditions, extensive use was made of combat operations in population points, along railroads, in forests and mountains.

In all the operations conducted by M. V. Frunze he sought a flexible configuration of the battle formations depending upon the specific situational conditions. He demanded the abandoning of the routine configuration of battle orders, when they under all circumstances were an unbroken extended line of a regiment without any reserves and the cavalry was concentrated on the flanks, fulfilling the role of a security escort. He recommended employing battle formations which ensured maneuvering and the countering of different unfavorable eventualities. In accord with his instructions a company's battle formation was to consist of platoons formed into an extended line and the platoons left in the reserve also for protecting the flanks; the battle formation of a battalion (regiment) respectively consisted of company (battalion) sections and a reserve and security for the flanks. The purpose of the extended line was to conduct firing; the purpose of the reserve was, in the event of necessity, to reinforce the fire of the extended line, to parry an envelopment and assist in launching the attack.(66)

M. V. Frunze constantly introduced the tactics of active fighting not only during the day but also at night. After the Civil War, the demand to conduct nighttime battles, upon his instructions, was incorporated in all combat regulations. He pointed out that "nighttime operations have always been considered an important aspect in the general course of combat operations; with the new victories of technology the role of nighttime actions should increase further."(67)

In preparing and conducting combat operations, M. V. Frunze gave exceptionally great attention to the organization and constant conduct of reconnaissance as well as countering enemy troop reconnaissance. In generalizing the experience of combat operations on the Turkestan Front he demanded the employment of divisional cavalry only for long-range reconnaissance ahead of the front and on the flanks of the division and not to employ it for liaison service. Regimental commanders of the cavalry scouts were to be employed exclusively according to their immediate purpose of conducting reconnaissance. Since reconnaissance was aimed at promptly detecting the enemy and observing it, it was essential that the once established contact with the enemy not be broken, that is, reconnaissance should be conducted continuously.

In conducting combat operations more attention should be paid to the security and reconnaissance of one's flanks and rear in order not to permit the appearance of the enemy there. On the Southern Front, Frunze recommended the wider use of armored cars and airplanes for conducting reconnaissance and gave detailed instructions on the questions of reconnaissance.

After the Civil War, Frunze continued to be vitally interested in the questions of the development of tactics following the experience of local wars and exercises conducted in the troops. Mikhail Vasilyevich, in proceeding from this experience, in his works confirmed the well known idea that applied tactics had changed with the change in weapons and equipment. Any tactics corresponds to a certain historical age; if the means of armed combat change and new technical advancements are introduced, then the forms of military organization and the methods of leading the troops also change with this.

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In his work "The European Civilizers and Morocco," M. V. Frunze using numerous examples showed that the French Army in Morocco, regardless of the completely new conditions of war, in essence fought with the same methods as in World War I. He critically examined the theoretical works by the French general Cognacq who, in generalizing the experience of the war in Morocco, noted with satisfaction that the methods of conducting military operations confirmed the correctness of the 1918 regulations worked out from the experience of the world war. "But her," commented M. V. Frunze, "obviously did not even imagine the question of the conformity of this tactics to the conditions of the specific combat situation in Morocco. For him, once the troops fought according to the principles of the war of 1918, then certainly everything was well and certain success was ensured."(68)

In actuality, Frunze continued, the war of 1914-1918 was predominantly a positional war, a war of materials, a war of technology. The types and quantity of equipment participating in the war, the ammunition and other weapons ran into enormous figures. Naturally the military thought of the postwar age had to take these factors into account and had to be considered by anyone who wished to have an objective approach to the problems of a future war. But to take into account does not mean to be the prisoner of. The French troops in Morocco were not confronted with a fixed front line and there was no defensive with an enemy dug into the ground and relying on strong equipment. But the French Army continued to fight with the same methods as in World War I. Even for overcoming the resistance of a small enemy rear guard detachment, thousands of bombs were dropped and extended artillery softening up was carried out. Combat operations were carried out according to the principle: artillery and aviation conquer the space and the infantry occupies it. There were no attempts to switch to fluid operations with the coming out in the enemy flank and rear. Here French military theoretical thought proceeded from the view that military operations in a future war would be approximately the same.

M. V. Frunze in this context voiced the notion that not all the tactical, organizational and administrative ideas worked out on the basis of the imperialist war would maintain their importance for the future. Everything would depend upon the "circumstances of place and time." For this reason, to count on a "strictly positional" set-up was dangerous. Considering the experience of the war in Morocco, Frunze reaffirmed his conclusion: "The troops in peacetime should be organized and indoctrinated in such a manner as to be able to carry out the tasks of both the defensive and offensive. First of all they should be prepared for tasks of an active offensive nature for this is the most crucial, important and psychologically most difficult part of combat missions generally."(69)

On the question of the statement by Gen Cognacq that the French commanders did not commit a single battalion to the attack without a preliminary thorough artillery softening up, M. V. Frunze pointed out that troops indoctrinated in the idea that any attack is impossible without a preliminary strong artillery softening up cannot be good troops. Of course, it is a bad commander who does not fully utilize all of the tactical means at his disposal for ensuring success and reducing losses. But even worse are the commander and soldier capable of advancing only after strong artillery softening up.

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From all of this M. V. Frunze concluded that the identifying of the tactical procedures of the French troops in Morocco with the methods of fighting in 1914-1918 was not an indicator of well being but, on the contrary, proof of weakness and tactical decline in the French Army which had become fettered by the idea of positional warfare. Considering themselves the victors in World War I, the command of the French Army did not accept any other ideas. In all of this, in Frunze's words, you could trace an extraordinary share of scholasticism and lifeless doctrinarism.(70) He also then warned that any military doctrine divorced from true reality can in a future war lead to the most lamentable consequences and this was confirmed, in particular, by the same French Army at the very outset of World War II.

In line with this allow us to point out that the complacency of such victors and the inability to critically assess the lessons of a previous war considering the development prospects of military art have always been one of the most dangerous phenomena in military affairs giving rise to stagnation in all spheres of the military organism, dulling military thought and giving it an extremely limited and shortsighted nature.

Considering this, M. V. Frunze constantly advised the Red Army commanders to critically assess the experience of not only World War I but also the Civil War, particularly in working out the questions of tactics, as of all the component parts of military art precisely tactics responded most quickly to the appearance of new weapons and new human material. The 1925 Field Manual gave great attention to disclosing the nature of all-arms combat.

In speaking about the changed organization of the infantry, M. V. Frunze drew attention to the fact that "at present a regimental commander is not simply the chief of the infantry in the old sense of this word. He is the commander of a whole series of troop units with different weapons."(71)

Along with a detailed exposition of the principles of offensive and defensive combat, for the first time the manuals gave great attention to the methods of conducting a meeting engagement. It was emphasized that combat under the conditions of a meeting engagement, as a consequence of their rapidity and mobility, requires the most decisive and rapid actions.

In working out the theory of tactics and the regulatory documents, M. V. Frunze demanded a decisive abandonment of the traditional linear tactics the failure of which had been shown even in World War I. He urged the employment of a new deep tactics and also as an experiment the elaboration of group combat tactics. These ideas were embodied and underwent further development in the theory of deep combat and a deep operation.

However, as the experience of the Great Patriotic War was to show, the advantages of group combat tactics were exaggerated. In employing this, the battle formation of a unit was broken up into many small and poorly controlled groups up to a reinforced platoon in strength (a tank, machine gun and infantry group). Moreover, it was difficult to mass the tanks and support the infantry with artillery fire. It turned out that infantry actions in the extended line of riflemen, with their skillful employment and the diverse

configuration of the battle formations, conformed fully to the tactics of deep combat.

The 1925 Field Manual demanded the concentration of the predominant grouping of men and weapons from the different branches of troops, chiefly the artillery, on the crucial sector at the crucial moment; it demanded that all the branches of troops be provided with an opportunity in accord with their combat capabilities to conduct their operations in a coordinated manner to defeat the enemy.(72)

In such combat, great importance was assumed by the initiative of the commanders and fighters and command and cooperation among the troops became significantly more complex. This raised new demands on the training of the commanders and the staffs.

The basic requirement was that the commanders should work out common tactical plans and subordinate the actions of the branches of troops to the overall concept of all-arms combat, and should organize and constantly support cooperation between them, directing their efforts at achieving a common goal. This, in turn, necessitated not only an adaptation in the operational-tactical thinking of the all-arms commanders but also a definite break in the psychology of the commanders of the branches of troops, since not all of them completely understood the demand of subordinating their actions to the interests of all-arms combat.

The main role in carrying out combat missions was assigned to the formations and units of the Ground Forces which consisted of infantry, cavalry, artillery, armored forces, engineer, chemical and signals troops. The infantry and cavalry reinforced by the artillery played the leading role among them. The infantry remained the basic branch of troops and the cavalry was to fight not only mounted but also on foot.

Particular attention was given to dependable fire damage to the enemy. The Field Manual pointed out that the main condition for success in offensive combat was the complete defeat of the enemy's defensive area by the artillery.

In a future war an important role was assigned to aviation which was characterized as a new powerful means of conducting combat operations. It was assumed that aviation in fighting against a ground enemy would be employed for reconnaissance, observation and liaison as well as attacks from the air. It was viewed as the main means for combating the air enemy. It was emphasized that the successful operations of the air forces against a ground enemy were assured by air supremacy. At the same time, it was felt that aviation was capable of carrying out combat missions even if air supremacy was not achieved.

The overall trend in elaborating the methods of conducting combat operations was set proceeding from the prospects for greater technical equipping of the Red Army. M. V. Frunze did not approve of the attempts to adapt Soviet military art, including tactics, to the technical level of our army which existed in the mid-1920's. In an explanatory note to Part 2 of the Temporary

Field Manual a special section was made entitled "The Importance of Equipment." It, in particular, stated: "Under the impact of our economic chaos which developed during the imperialist and civil wars, the notion has grown in the Red Army that in a future war we must fight not so much with equipment as with the superiority of our revolutionary activeness and class self-awareness. If during the period of chaos such an opinion had some grounds, now when our industry is reaching the prewar level it is a most harmful and dangerous evil.... We already have major achievements in the area of strengthening the technical might of the Red Army and have every reason to assume that this technical might will grow more and more with each passing year. This respect for material force in combat and for material resources in a war sharply distinguishes the new Field Manual from the old one."(73)

The manual provided recommendations not only on the combat employment of the infantry, cavalry and artillery but also on the use in combat of aviation, armored forces, chemical and other new branches of troops.

M. V. Frunze was clearly aware that the success of combat in a future war could be achieved only as a result of coordinated actions and skillful interaction among the formations, units and subunits of all the Armed Services and branches of troops. For this reason all the new manuals emphasized that the organization and constant maintaining of cooperation are the prime obligation of all levels of commanders and staffs.

On political work in a combat situation. In being guided by the ideas and experience of the Communist Party, M. V. Frunze gave enormous significance to the questions of political work during combat and an operation. "...It must not be forgotten," he wrote, "what an exceptional role is played by political work in wartime, what importance political work had in ensuring our victory in the past and what it undoubtedly will play in achieving future victories."(74)

He saw in party political work the chief means of communist indoctrination making it possible for the masses to understand the just aims of a war, to assimilate the revolutionary traditions and essence of the Communist Party policy which conforms to the interests of the people, to instill in them confidence in the victory of the ideas of socialism and inculcate in them intrepidity and steadfastness. Precisely as a result of well organized party political work the activities of all commanders, political bodies, staffs, party, Komsomol organizations and the nonparty masses assume an aware, purposeful and active nature. All of this helps to form high morale, high political awareness and personal responsibility for the defense of the motherland and mobilize all the personnel to successfully carry out the combat missions.

Since political work encompasses not secondary but rather the most profound class interests of the masses of people, M. V. Frunze viewed this as the strongest weapon of the Communist Party which to great measure strengthened and increased the combat might of the Red Army. It has always remained a new, supplementary branch of arms terrifying for any of our enemies.(75)

In pointing to the enormous role played by the political bodies in this work, M. V. Frunze said: "Who has introduced elements of order and discipline into

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the ranks of our young Red regiments which have been established to the roar of cannon rounds? Who during the hours of setbacks and defeats supported the courage and boldness of the men and invested new energy to their shaken ranks? Who organized the rear of the army, established Soviet power there and created Soviet order, thereby ensuring the rapid and successful advance of our armies? Who by his constant and stubborn work split the enemy ranks, disrupted its rear and thereby prepared for the coming successes?

"This was done by the political bodies of the army and it was done, it must be said, brilliantly. Their accomplishments in the past are immeasurable."(76)

In paying proper due to the role of the political bodies, M. V. Frunze at the same time emphasized and by his personal example always confirmed that political work is a duty of all commanders who are party members and all communists without exception. He viewed political work as an inseparable and most important part of all work related to command and control of the troops in conducting operations and combat actions.

In commanding troops on three fronts, Frunze gave great attention to working out and implementing specific measures of party political work, employing different forms and methods of ideological influence on the personnel and mobilizing them to carry out the set tasks considering the situational conditions.

The "victory campaign" was an interesting form of political work in the troops of the Southern Front in the operation to defeat Wrangel and in the course of this both general as well as differentiated work was actively and purposefully carried out with different categories of commanders and soldiers as well as special propaganda aimed at the enemy troops.

The attention of M. V. Frunze to the questions of party political work was reflected in many works and in the regulations worked out under his leadership. Upon his instructions the 1925 field manual incorporated a special section on political work in a combat situation. This set out the tasks of political work and the specific duties of the political bodies (Article 41): a) the organization of the collection and processing of information concerning the moral-political state of one's units, the enemy units and the local population; b) organizing military-political work in one's troops, propaganda in enemy troops and among the local population; c) upon the instructions of the command the elaboration of a plan of action for political affairs, the transmitting of this to the troops and supervision of the precise and correct execution of instructions on the spot.

M. V. Frunze considered the indoctrination of high political awareness in all the personnel to be a most important condition for the inner cohesiveness of the army and strong military discipline. The state of discipline was viewed as a result and consequence of all political work both in the command area and the political area. Mikhail Vasilyevich vividly and persuasively explained that political work in the Armed Forces can be carried out only under the leadership of the party Central Committee. For this reason he, like many other prominent leaders in our party, in 1922, came out against the publishing by the Trotskyites of the so-called Political Regulation which falsified the

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history of our party and extolled the "accomplishments" of Trotsky. This "regulation" played down the party's role in the leadership of the Armed Forces. It was correctly viewed as an attempt to divorce the Army and Navy from the Communist Party and the Soviet state.(77)

In light of this, the incorporation of regulations concerning the organization of political work in the army has elaborated from party positions in the 1925 Field Manual was of great importance and provided a correct orientation for the command and political personnel.

In speaking at the RKKA Military Academy in December 1924 on the results of the plenum of the USSR RVS, M. V. Frunze unambiguously stated: "Political work has been and always will be for us the basis for our military organizational development. The party has played and will play the leading role in all our military policy. Without such party work we cannot conceive of the strengthening of our country's military might or the strengthening of the might, inner cohesiveness, solidarity and discipline of our Red Army."(78)

The Further Development of the Theory of Military Art

The influence of the ideas of M. V. Frunze on the development of Soviet military-theoretical thought. The strategic and operational-tactical views of M. V. Frunze had a great impact upon the development of the theory of military art in the 1920's and 1930's. Many of them have not lost their importance for present-day conditions, too.

The development of Soviet military art up to World War II occurred under the impact of the successful construction of socialism in our nation and the ever-increasing threat of war in line with the preparation for aggression against the Soviet Union by the imperialist states. On the basis of the nation's industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture and the cultural revolution, the social and technical level of our Armed Forces was fundamentally changed. Under the leadership of the Communist Party enormous work was done to increase the defense capability of the Soviet state and the combat might of the Army and Navy. The party gave great importance to the development of Soviet military science as one of the most important factors for increasing the defense capability of the state and the combat might of the Armed Forces. The views of M. V. Frunze which were based on Lenin's ideas concerning the nature of a future war were fully confirmed. The theory of military art also continued to develop.

Over the years of joint work with M. V. Frunze and subsequently, M. N. Tukhachevskiy also did a great deal to work out the problems of the theory of military art and the new regulatory documents. He carefully followed the military preparations of Germany and warned that Germany was the number-one enemy, since it was arming most intensely, creating an enormous army and preparing for war primarily against the Soviet Union. Of the military-theoretical works of those years the most profound trace was left by the works of M. N. Tukhachevskiy on the questions of strategy such as "Voprosy sovremennoy strategii" [Questions of Modern Strategy], "Voyna kak problema vooruzhennoy borby" [War as a Problem of Armed Combat], "Voprosy vysshego komandovaniya" [Questions of the Superior Command], "Novyye voprosy voyny"

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[New Questions of Warfare] and "Kharakter pogranichnykh operatsiy" [The Nature of Border Operations]; the major work by B. M. Shaposhnikov "Mozg armii" [The Army's Brain] which examined not only the questions of the organization and work of the general staff but also many questions of preparing for war and the problems of a coalition strategy; the book by V. K. Triandafillov "Kharakter operatsii sovremennykh armiy" [The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies] which was full of profound analysis and bold thoughts and which worked out the questions of preparing and conducting operations in a future war and the most important ideas of the theory of a deep operation.

Soviet military strategy, in taking into account the balance of forces on the international scene, proceeded from the fact that war would have to be waged against a strong military coalition of imperialist states. Also taken into account was the possibility of simultaneously waging war in several theaters of military operations, including in the East. It was shown that under the impact of new weapons the World War II would not have a lightning nature but rather would assume an extended one and necessitate the mobilizing of all the state's forces and capabilities.

The theory of military art as a whole was permeated with a spirit of decisive, offensive and fluid actions. In the event of aggression there were plans to launch powerful retaliatory strikes with the shifting of military operations to enemy territory in the aim of its crushing defeat. The strategic offensive was considered to be the main type of strategic actions and this was planned in the form of simultaneous and successive front operations conducted by the field forces and formations of the various Armed Services. The fleets were to be employed for conducting joint operations with the Ground Forces as well as in independent naval operations. In recognizing the fluid nature of the operations and battles in a future war, Soviet military-theoretical thought also did not deny the possibility of the development of solid fronts. In this context great attention was given to the problem of breaking through the defenses and to exploiting a tactical success into an operational one. The development of the Armed Forces was carried out considering this and primarily the tank and mechanized troops, aviation and airborne troops.

The theory of Soviet military art, in contrast to bourgeois, did not put the fluid forms of warfare in opposition to positional ones or one type of weapons in contrast to others. It proceeded from the view that success in a war could be achieved only by the joint efforts of all the Armed Services and branches of troops. In highly regarding, for example, the importance of tank troops and aviation, it did not wager solely on them.

An outstanding achievement of Soviet military science and military art was the elaboration of the theory of a deep operation. Its essence was as follows.

In the first place, if in World War I after each engagement to breach the defenses, in essence, a completely new situation arose which no one could predict and for this reason subsequent operations were not planned, a deep operation presupposed primarily the conducting of a whole series of operations following a general plan and to a great depth until the complete defeat of the main enemy grouping.

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Secondly, proceeding from the fact that in the course of modern warfare solid fronts might arise, this new form of operation opened the way to carrying out one of the most difficult tasks, that is, breaching a deliberate defense by simultaneous fire damage to it to the entire tactical depth and the massed employment of infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation on the chosen sectors.

Thirdly, the theory of a deep operation was to lead military art out of that positional blind alley into which it had strayed in World War I and carry out the main task of exploiting a tactical success into an operational or strategic one by committing to battle the echelon for developing the success (tanks, motorized infantry, cavalry), by landing airborne troops as well as by quickly broadening the breakthrough sector toward the flanks and rapidly developing the offensive to the entire depth of the operation.

Thus, instead of a series of interrupted engagements and operations limited in depth, a theory was elaborated for an actually deep operation which most fully took into account fundamental changes in the nature of armed combat. In accord with these ideas, the principles of deep all-arms combat were worked out.

Front-level operations were planned to a depth of 200-300 km. Prior to the start of the Great Patriotic War, the conclusion was drawn of the possibility of conducting a deep operation by the joint efforts of several fronts within a strategic offensive.

The most important conditions for the successful conduct of deep offensive operations were considered to be the winning of air supremacy, reliable air defense for the troops, naval forces and rear facilities.

It must be said that certain provisions of the theory of a deep operation were not immediately adopted. M. N. Tukhachevskiy, I. P. Uborevich, A. I. Yegorov and other military chiefs of ours had to make a great effort to incorporate its principles in the regulations and introduce this into the training practices of the headquarters bodies and troops. In particular, when V. K. Triandafillov showed the necessity of concentrating five-six divisions on the breakthrough sector of a front, certain comrades, including K. Ye. Voroshilov, were perplexed could not one division of our handle an enemy division? Triandafillov was accused of an "engineer" approach and underestimating the morale of our troops.(79) However, the Great Patriotic War demanded the establishing of densities of men and weapons of 1.5-2-fold greater than V. K. Triandafillov had proposed at one time and for the artillery this would be 5-6-fold more. This reaffirms that a serious scientific discussion should not be replaced by loud phraseology which is, however, divorced from the essence of the question.

Regardless of a certain temporary misunderstanding, a majority of our military personnel properly judged the advantages of the theory of a deep operation as the most progressive form for conducting armed combat. The ideas of a deep operation rather quickly took root in the Red Army and were practically assimilated by the commanders, staffs and troops in commander exercises, training and maneuvers. Here, undoubtedly, the decisive role was played by the mastery of Marxist-Leninist methodology by the military personnel and the

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development of revolutionary creativity which blazed the trail for everything advanced and progressive.

All of these major achievements in military-theoretical thought showed the rise of a qualitatively new stage in the development of military art and this became possible as a result of the technical reconstruction of the nation's industry and the equipping of the Red Army with new technology. All of this made it possible to effectively prepare the Army and Navy to repel aggression. In paying great importance to the economic and moral-political factors, the theory of Soviet military strategy also played an important role in scientifically establishing party and government measures aimed at increasing the nation's defense capability. As a whole, on the eve of World War II, the theory and practice of Soviet military art had basically correctly solved the most important questions of conducting armed combat.

The Great Patriotic War tested all the provisions of our military science and military art. It can be said with confidence that the most important provisions of Soviet military-theoretical thought were affirmed. In any event, in the entire history of wars no one has as yet succeeded in predicting with such reliability the nature of armed combat in the future. Proof of this is the victory of Soviet military art over the military art of Germany which had always been considered the apex of bourgeois military theory and practice and which was venerated and used as a source of ideas by military figures in the entire capitalist world. No falsifiers of the history of World War II can refute this.

At the same time it would be wrong to assert that all the provisions of our military theory were irreproachable and had been completely worked out prior to the war. Such an approach not only impoverishes what was achieved at a price of enormous effort during the war but also does not help to objectively investigate the patterns of military-theoretical preparation at present and prevents us from correctly establishing why certain phenomena can be foreseen before each war and some not.

In actuality, not all questions could be foreseen with sufficient scientific reliability. The lessons of history show that one of the most important and difficult tasks is to foresee the possible nature of the aggressor's actions at the very outset of the war and work out the corresponding methods for increasing combat readiness and the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces. These complex questions must be resolved each time anew considering the fundamental changes in the methods of conducting armed combat on the eve of the war. In the 1930's certain mistakes were made in resolving these questions.

Clearly overestimated were the instability of the rear of the capitalist countries and the possibility of an immediate and organized action by the proletariat against their exploiters. All of this turned out to be significantly more complex. In particular, as a consequence of a series of well known historical factors, the rulers of Nazi Germany succeeded in forcing the basic mass of the German population to fight against the Soviet Union.

In many works devoted to the history of the Great Patriotic War, it is stated that on the eve of the war Soviet military theory did not take into account the possibility of a surprise invasion by large enemy forces and had not sufficiently worked out the forms and methods of conducting a strategic defensive while the questions of the defensive on an operational-strategic scale had in practical terms been worked out extremely little. However, one of the most complex tasks which the Soviet Supreme High Command had to solve during the very first days of the war was the organization and conduct of the strategic defensive.

The underestimation of the defensive and the not quite correct assessment of the changing nature of the beginning period of a war had severer consequences than is sometimes depicted in military literature. It was not a question of the formal recognition or nonrecognition of the defensive but primarily of those practical conclusions and measures which stemmed from this.

In the first place, as experience was to show, it was essential to consider the possibility of a surprise attack by an enemy which had been previously mobilized and was ready for aggression. But this required a corresponding system of combat and mobilizational readiness of the Armed Forces which would ensure their constant high readiness to repel such an attack and a more decisive covert increase in the combat readiness of the troops.

Secondly, a recognition of the possibility of an enemy surprise attack meant that the border military districts should have carefully elaborated plans for repelling the enemy invasion, that is, plans for defensive operations since the repelling of an offensive by superior enemy troops would be impossible incidentally, merely as an intermediate task. For this it would be essential to carry out a whole series of protracted fierce defensive engagements and operations. But if such plans had existed, then in accord with them the groupings of troops and weapons of these districts would have been positioned completely differently, namely considering the defensive tasks, command and control would have been organized differently and the materiel and other mobilizational resources would have been echeloned.

Readiness to repel aggression also required that not only plans of defensive operations be worked out but that these operations be readied fully, including in logistical and engineer terms in order that the plans be mastered by the commanders and staffs. It was perfectly apparent that in the event of a surprise enemy attack, there would be no time for the additional preparation of such operations. But this was not done in the border military districts. And even in the theory and practice of operational training on the staffs and in the academies, the defensive was studied in a far different manner than it had to be conducted in 1941-1942 but rather as a type of combat actions to which one resorted to for a short period of time on secondary sectors in order to repel an enemy attack in a short period of time and thereby go over to the offensive.

MSU G. K. Zhukov on this question wrote: "In reworking operational plans in the spring of 1941, the particular features of conducting a modern war in its initial period had actually not been fully considered. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff felt that a war between such

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major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should commence according to the previously existing scheme: the main forces would enter the engagement several days after the border engagements. Nazi Germany in terms of the dates for concentration and deployment was put under the same conditions as we. But in actuality the forces and conditions were far from equal."(80)

The idea of the continuous shifting of war at its very outset to enemy territory (and the idea was unsound both scientifically and backed up neither by an analysis of the actual situation or by operational calculations) had so beguiled certain leading military workers that the possibility of conducting military operations on our own territory was virtually excluded. Of course, this had a negative impact upon the preparation of not only the defensive but also the entire theater of military operations deep in our territory.

The experience of the war demonstrated that a combination of the offensive as the main type of military action and the defensive is an objective pattern of warfare and, like any pattern, it operates with the strength of necessity and it is very dangerous to disregard it.

It cannot be said that the questions of the initial period of a war had not been elaborated theoretically. On the basis of an analysis of World War II which had commenced, a number of theoretical works had drawn important conclusions on the fundamental change in the content and nature of the initial period of a war. It was shown that during this period not only would the conversion of the nation and the Armed Forces to a wartime status be completed but also strategic operations could be carried out involving the basic groupings of the Armed Forces. The start of World War II disclosed a new, more dangerous method of initiating war by a surprise attack, without a declaration of war, hoping that the peace-loving states would be unprepared to repel aggression.

However, certain scientific conclusions and recommendations on these questions were not noted and correctly judged by those who had to carry them out. The initial period of the war as before was perceived as the period from the start of military operations until the entry of the main forces into the engagement. The basic error was that military operations during this period were conceived of on limited scale.

It must be emphasized again that Soviet military art, in contrast to the military art of Nazi Germany, as a rule, profoundly and thoroughly considered the objective and subjective factors which determined the development of military affairs, including the enemy's economic, moral-political and military capabilities. But on the eve of the war at a certain moment a major circumstance was forgotten that in the event of the outbreak of military operations both in political and military terms it was impossible to proceed solely from our desires and convictions, without considering that the enemy would endeavor to do everything when and where this would be convenient and advantageous for it.

Everyone realized that at that time for the Soviet Union it was very important to gain time and win at least a year or two to prepare the state for the defensive. But the Nazi rulers undoubtedly realized that in a year or two,

even according to their adventuristic calculations, they would have significantly fewer chances for success. For this reason the main wager was made on a surprise attack and on utilizing those temporary advantages which they possessed.

Historical experience has shown that an aggressor, under certain circumstances, is halted by nothing. In this context it is essential to have a flexible and well organized system of permanent high combat and mobilizational readiness in the Armed Forces. V. I. Lenin emphasized: "...It is essential to have military discipline and military vigilance brought to the highest limits. To overlook or lose one's head means to lose everything."(81)

The war convincingly showed the exceptional importance of all-round theoretical elaboration in peacetime of all the strategic and operational-tactical questions. It is sometimes said that not everything is conceived of in theory and in the event of a war the most rational methods of action will be found. But in actuality the case is not so simple. For example, prior to the war the insufficiently established notion was promoted that the artillery had to be deployed on likely tank approaches and with the start of the war many commanders did this, although the situation required something quite different. Many such examples could be given.

This is why, from the very outset of the war, a major effort was made to bring all the military-theoretical views into conformity with the demands of combat operations. The Communist Party and the Soviet government gave great attention to further developing Soviet military art, to promptly bringing combat experience to the troops and to their skillful employment of advanced military theory. Under the difficult wartime conditions, the theory of military art developed in an unbroken link with combat practices. The actions of the Supreme High Command and the Soviet Armed Forces showed an organic unity of military science and military art, military theory and practice.

A major reason for the defeat of Nazi Germany's military art was its adventuristic nature. Over the entire war inherent to it were an underestimation of the enemy's forces and capabilities, a divorce of military plans from economic and moral-political capabilities, schematicism and routine and the inability to respond flexibly and promptly to changed conditions.

The Nazi Military Command often endeavored to fit reality to its own theoretical views and military plans and continued to stubbornly employ them even when reality had showed all their erroneousness. It endeavored to wage a war against the Soviet Union, in essence, employing the same methods as in the West.

In conducting strategic operations, the Nazi Headquarters adhered to obsolete leadership methods. The operational tasks for the troops were set for several months; over this period the army groups fought, in essence, autonomously; proper attention was not paid to the questions of maintaining cooperation between them.

The Soviet Army in the course of the war conducted scores of different operations and all of them, as a rule, were marked by a newness of employed

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methods of action and were unexpected for the enemy. The elaboration of flexible forms for preparing and conducting defensive operations with the subsequent going over to a counteroffensive, the theory of a strategic offensive operation, the solution to the problem of the operational and strategic breakthrough of enemy defenses with the subsequent surrounding and destruction of large groupings, the seeking out of new methods for the combat employment and cooperation of the various Armed Services and branches of troops, such an effective form of fire damage to the enemy as an artillery and air offensive, new forms and methods for battle formations, all-round support for the operations and firm troop command--these and many other questions newly resolved in the course of the war to a definite degree have maintained their importance under present-day conditions.

MSU G. K. Zhukov at a military-theoretical conference in 1945 characterized the particular features of our military art in the following manner.

In the first place, an excellent knowledge of the enemy, a correct assessment of its plans, forces and means; the ability to consider what the enemy is capable of and incapable of and how it can be caught. This is achieved by continuous and thorough intelligence.

The second is a knowledge of one's own troops, their careful preparation for battle. It is essential to have the complete preparation of the command and staffs and the early elaboration of all variations for forthcoming troop actions.

Thirdly, operational and tactical surprise. This is achieved by the fact that the enemy is confused on our true intentions. It is essential to act so quickly that the enemy is always behind and thus falls in a difficult position.

Fourthly, precise calculation of the men and weapons depending upon the set task. The troops cannot be given tasks beyond them. This does not produce anything except losses and an undermining of combat morale. It is better to conduct offensive operations more rarely but accumulate the men and weapons for decisive attacks.

Fifthly, logistic support of the operations. Under no circumstances should an operation be carried out which has been poorly prepared in logistic terms. The general situation can force the High Command to quickly carry out an operation. But it can be commenced only after careful preparation and complete support.

G. K. Zhukov considered the skillful employment of artillery and a bold maneuver in the aim of the encirclement and destruction of the enemy to be an important condition for the successful development of an offensive operation. He viewed a frontal thrust only as an important stage to achieving the goal. A breakthrough not for the sake of a breakthrough but for obtaining freedom of maneuver as this provides an opportunity to hit the enemy from the worst sector for the enemy.(82)

The Soviet command during the period of the Great Patriotic War gave great importance to the prompt generalization of combat experience and providing it to the troops. Headquarters Supreme High Command, the General Staff, the Main Political Directorate, the People's Commissariat of the Navy, the command and staffs of the Armed Services and branches of troops as well as the field forces and formations were not only bodies of practical troop leadership but also the main centers of military-theoretical thought. Leadership of the war would have been inconceivable without creative work to prepare scientifically sound decisions and to work out regulations, instructions and orders which generalized all the advanced in the experience of conducting the war. In this regard, the finest traditions of military-scientific work bequeathed us by M. V. Frunze were continued and raised to a new height. During the Civil War after each operation and sometimes in the course of an operation he issued orders which generalized combat experience.

During the war the General Staff organized the Directorate for the Utilization of the War's Experience while the staffs of the fronts established the appropriate sections and departments. In 1944, the military-scientific organs of the front staffs employed 57 officers and the army staffs had around 200. Sections for the use of the war's experience were also found in the central directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the Navy Main Staff and the staffs of the branches of troops. Their tasks were crucial ones. In studying the combat experience of the war, they were to draw the necessary conclusions for the troops and make them available to a broad range of officers. In addition, they were also involved in working out instructions, regulations and manuals.

The rich combat experience of the Soviet Army was also reflected in the manuals, regulations and instructions worked out and updated during the war. For example, in 1944, they worked out and revised the Infantry Field and Combat Manuals, the Manual for the Crossing of Rivers, the Manual for Troop Operations in Mountains, the Regulation on Breaking Through Fortified Areas, the Regulation on Breaking Through a Positional Defensive and others. As a total in 1943-1944, 30 manuals, regulations and instructions involving combat operations and troop training were revised and worked out for the first time.

One should also note the concreteness and specificity of our military-scientific research and its strict subordination to the interests of the successful conduct of combat on the fronts. The generalization and theoretical analysis of combat experience were organically incorporated in the practical activities of the military leaders, staffs and political workers. The war required a responsible attitude toward military theory. The attempts not to consider the acquired experience or the theoretical recommendations elaborated on its basis were very soon felt by failures on the front. The war quickly eliminated everything unviable that had been present in prewar theory and practice and demanded the elaboration of a whole series of new provisions concerning military science and military art.

At the same time it must be pointed out that the army of Nazi Germany, regardless of the significant discrepancy of the prewar manuals to the experience of World War II, particularly after the attack on the Soviet Union, did not revise virtually a single regulation in the course of military

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operations, although it fought for 6 years. From captured documents and from the evidence of officer prisoners it was established that the analysis and generalization of combat experience in the Nazi Army were carried out solely by the issuing of individual instructions and directives. Many Nazi generals in their memoirs mention as one of the reasons for defeat that in the East they fought using the same regulation documents as in the West.

Thus, the high level of military-scientific work in the Soviet Armed Forces was one of the important conditions for achieving superiority by Soviet military science over the military science of Nazi Germany. The experience of its organization and conduct has largely not lost its importance and we employ it directly under present-day conditions.

As was correctly emphasized by MSU D. F. Ustinov, "the experience gained by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War is truly invaluable. This...is one of the sources for the further development of military art."(83)

Certain directions in the development of the theory of military art in the postwar years. The theory of military art in the postwar years developed considering the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the new balance of military-political forces, the appearance of nuclear missile weapons, the extensive introduction of radio electronics in the troops and naval forces and the complete mechanization and motorization of the troops which have brought about fundamental qualitative changes in all areas of military affairs.

In accord with the policy set out by the CPSU and the Soviet government, our military doctrine, including military strategy, has a strictly defensive nature and pursues one goal of defending the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the other peoples in the socialist commonwealth.

A possible world war, if the imperialists succeed in initiating it, is viewed by our theory of military art as a decisive clash between two opposite socioeconomic systems, socialist and capitalist. The virtually unlimited range of the nuclear weapon delivery systems making it possible in a short period of time to defeat any groupings of enemy armed forces has altered the notions of the nature of a war. For this reason, in strategic terms a war can develop into a global clash which is unprecedented in history in terms of spatial scope, fierceness and destructiveness between the two major coalitions of armed forces.

A world war can start by the employment of just conventional weapons but a broadening of military operations can lead to its growth into a nuclear war. The Soviet Union is against the use of weapons of mass destruction and it will never be the first to employ them. But any possible aggressor should be clearly aware that in the event of a nuclear missile attack on the Soviet Union or the other countries of the socialist commonwealth it will receive a destructive retaliatory strike.(84)

The role of the initial period of the war will increase further and this may be the main and decisive period which largely predetermines the outcome of the entire war.

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The strategic content of a war is viewed as a complex system of interrelated simultaneous and successive strategic operations. Modern operations are characterized by increased scope, by the involvement in them of different Armed Services equipped with diverse, complex combat equipment, by great dynamicness and maneuverability of combat operations, by the conduct of them under conditions of the absence of a solid front, by sharp and rapid changes in the situation and by a fierce struggle to capture and retain the initiative. All of this significantly complicates troop command and control which should be carried out under the conditions of the massed employment of radio electronic equipment.

In the course of a war, decisive significance will be assumed by the prompt launching of nuclear and fire strikes against the enemy and the skillful use of their results by the troops; by the combining of massed strikes with the dispersed location of the troops (forces) and by the organization of dependable defense against enemy weapons of mass destruction.

Speaking as a whole, in the theory and practice of armed combat, on the one hand, very substantial, fundamental changes have occurred and, on the other, many important provisions elaborated in the period of World War II have maintained their importance and undergone further development.

Thus, the trends in the development of military art under present-day conditions confirm how right were V. I. Lenin and one of his talented students M. V. Frunze when they in the process of revolutionary creativity in establishing the fundamentals of Soviet military theory boldly broke with everything old that impeded advance and at the same time passionately and decisively were against a nihilistic attitude toward past experience and carefully watched so that a natural succession was maintained in the development of military science and military art.

Each new war is not like the previous one. But one can clearly see the repeating pattern: at each of the turning points in the development of military affairs remaining viable and affirmed by practice are only those newly elaborated theoretical ideas which, along with considering the new prospective phenomena, also include the germs of previous experience which have still not lost their ability for further development and for this reason act as particles of insipient new methods of conducting armed combat. The ignoring of this pattern and particularly the underestimating of new trends leads, as a rule, to major mistakes.

Thus, while in World War I most experience was gained on defensive questions, in the configuration of the defensive and its engineer organization more elements of this experience were employed in the period of World War II, including the positional and trench system, which they had endeavored to unjustifiably abandon after the Civil War.

While during the Civil War the operations of the Red Army had predominantly a decisive, offensive nature and up to the start of World War II the questions of the offensive had been worked out most thoroughly, this along with other objective conditions told largely on the nature of operations by our Armed Forces during the period of the Great Patriotic War. Suffice it to say that

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of the 210 front operations, 160 were offensive ones and only 50 were defensive ones. Here a major role was played by the circumstance that our theory of military art, along with the skillful use of past experience, was able to step over obsolete ways of positional warfare which fettered military thought and spot in their very rudiment those new factors which predetermined the possibility of escaping from the positional blind alley and conducting armed combat in highly maneuverable forms.

All of this undoubtedly was a reflection and manifestation in life of the dialectic, the law of negating the negation which requires the viewing of each phenomenon as one of the links in the general chain of the ongoing development of military art. The most important and difficult thing in this process is the specific elucidation of what of previous experience has a future, what must be preserved from this and what must be abandoned. On the one hand, it is inadmissible to hold too long onto the old for this is tantamount to preparing for the past war; on the other hand, in working out new concepts of military theory it is equally dangerous to have the unjustified surrender to fantasy or a divorcing from true reality. For this reason, as M. V. Frunze warned, "major innovations in military affairs which play a decisive role in the fate of a state should be carried out with extreme caution."(85)

With the appearance of nuclear weapons, major changes occurred in the methods of conducting armed combat and in the literature these have been termed a revolution in military affairs. But this has also given rise to certain extremes when attempts have been made to depict things as if virtually nothing remained from the previous theory of military art. A profound and generally correct analysis of the development prospects of the theory of military strategy considering the appearance of nuclear missile weapons has been provided in the book "Voyennaya strategiya" [Military Strategy] edited by MSU V. D. Sokolovskiy. However, over the more than 20 years not all the provisions of this book have been confirmed.

Thus, the book stated that a whole series of known principles, norms and rules which were previously considered as guidelines for military strategy at present are being subjected to a fundamental revision or have completely lost their importance. Among these the authors put the principles of concentrating men and weapons on the decisive sector, the economy of forces and partial victory. They proposed that strategic deployment, strategic offensive, strategic defensive, strategic maneuver and other underlying concepts of strategy theory have largely lost their importance.(86)

In the 1960's and 1970's, the authors of this and many other books proceeded primarily from the view that a war, under all circumstances, would be waged employing nuclear weapons and military operations employing solely conventional weapons were viewed as a brief episode at the start of a war. However, the improvement and stockpiling of nuclear missile weapons have reached such limits where the massed employment of these weapons in a war can entail catastrophic consequences for both sides. At the same time in the armies of the NATO countries there has been a rapid process of modernizing conventional types of weapons. The main emphasis has been put on the development of highly accurate, guided weapons which in terms of effectiveness are close to low-power nuclear weapons. Under these conditions, as is assumed

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in the West, there will be a greater opportunity for conducting a comparatively long war employing conventional weapons and primarily new types of high-precision weapons. The possibility of the initiating of a nuclear war by the imperialists is also not excluded.

The designated book rightly pointed out that the principle which has existed since antiquity of concentrating men and weapons on the crucial sector requires clarification and adjustment under the new conditions. It should be carried out not by the method of moving up a large number of troops to the selected sector but chiefly by massing the weapons. But as a whole this principle, primarily the correct choice of the axis of the main thrust and the massing of men and weapons on the crucial sectors, has maintained its importance.

This also applies to the strategic maneuver of men and weapons in the course of a war. The appearance of new weapons not only does not obviate but further increases the importance of strategic reserves and the necessity of maneuvering them during a war. However, here the questions of dispersing the troops and naval forces and the measures of protecting them against enemy weapons of mass destruction cannot be resolved by previous methods and should be carried out considering the new demands.

Under present-day conditions, the outcome of a war depends significantly more than previously upon the quantity and effectiveness of the effort made at the very outset of the war, however the strategic principle of the economy of forces as a whole survives, since it is difficult to figure on a rapid war between major coalitions with their enormous potentials. For this reason it is essential to be ready for a protracted, stubborn and fierce armed struggle.

Regardless of the fact that the main, most powerful means of waging war are in the hands of the superior military command and their employment can have a decisive influence both on the course of the war as a whole and on the conduct of military operations, the principle of a partial victory has still not lost its importance, since the utilization of the results of attacks by strategic weapons and the concluding of the defeat of enemy groupings will depend upon the success of combat operations on an operational and tactical scale.

Soviet military art proceeds from the view that success in a war can be achieved only by the joint efforts of all the types of weapons and by the coordinated actions of the field forces, formations and units of the Soviet Armed Forces. The defeat of large enemy groupings can require protracted effort, the conducting of a series of successive operations and the employment and combination of different methods of armed combat. In this context such forms of strategic actions as a strategic offensive and strategic defensive have not lost their importance, considering, of course, the new methods of their preparation and conduct.

A different approach is also needed to the questions of strategic deployment. The book "Voyennaya strategiya" on this question states: "The notion which existed right until World War II concerning the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces as a range of successively implemented and planned measures to cover, mobilize, concentrate and deploy the armed forces in the theater of

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military operations and which are carried out in a threatening period or with the start of a war at present is clearly obsolete. **Under present-day conditions, a majority of these measures can be carried out ahead of time and merely completed in the threatening period** (emphasis mine.--M. G.)."(87)

Such a recommendation in principle does not arouse dispute. When there is an opportunity, of course one must work for this. But, in being correct theoretically, this recommendation in practical terms does not take into account the entire complexity of carrying out the task, in being reminiscent of the demand of a fire chief that his team arrive at the fire an hour before it starts.

In the first place, the given statement does not take into account that the imperialist states are waging in a war against the socialist states on a surprise attack, without the preliminary deployment of all the resources required for this. The slogan which was widespread in the 1930's of "Fight On Foreign Territory" was also designed for the early deployment of the troops for repelling aggression, but on the eve of the war we did not succeed in doing this for various reasons.

Secondly, early strategic deployment of the Armed Forces prior to the start of a war, regardless of all the benefits of this in purely military terms, is not always feasible out of military-political considerations. A mobilization, let alone the entire range of measures related to strategic deployment, has always been considered tantamount to a state of war and it is very difficult to achieve a return from it back to a peacetime status. If a war generally is politics through and through, on the eve and at the start of a war its political aspects are even more prevalent.

Considering all of this, the present system of strategic deployment cannot be oriented solely on one of the most advantageous variations for us, but should be more flexible and provide the organized deployment of the troops (forces) under any conditions when the imperialist aggressors initiate a war.

Thus, at the present stage in the development of the theory of military art, when the methods of fighting are being fundamentally transformed and the gap between the experience of a past war and the present-day demands is becoming ever-greater, the succession and the most permanent patterns of military affairs to a definite degree do survive. The more profoundly they are considered in working out new concepts and the farther theory looks ahead, the sounder the conclusions and notions directed toward the future will be.

In speaking about the prospects for the further development of the theory of military art, in line of what we have been discussing, the problem of maintaining high combat readiness to repel an enemy surprise attack assumes particularly important significance. The advance in the means of attack among our probable enemies, their commitment to launching a first strike and the growing role of the time factor at the outset of a war place new demands upon the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. For this reason one of the important tasks of military science is to seek out ways for further increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces and their ability to conduct decisive actions to defeat any aggressor under any conditions of the start of a war.

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The difficulty of this problem is determined by the fact that the rapid evolution of enemy means of attack and its attempts to ensure a surprise strike must be countered not only by the appropriate effective means and methods of defense but also by a more advanced and flexible system for the combat training of our Armed Forces. This should ensure the possibility of an immediate response to increased danger and the organized commitment of the Armed Forces to action under the most complicated conditions.

One of the most important tasks in the theory of strategy is to continue the profound study of the military-strategic nature of a possible war and the main features and traits of modern operations. In turn, it is essential to have a further elaboration of the key questions of planning and employing troops (forces) in an operation. Here, as was pointed out by the Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, MSU S. F. Akhromeyev, "it must be remembered that changes in the nature of wars at present are occurring faster and, hence, our response to these changes and the demands of Soviet military art on the organizational development of the Armed Forces should be more timely."(88)

A large amount of research is related to the questions of improving troop command and control, particularly on the eve and with the start of military operations, considering the new, increased demands upon the work of the headquarters bodies. Many tasks remain to be resolved in working out the theoretical bases in the area of increased effective cooperation between the formations of the various Armed Services and branches of troops in preparing and conducting joint operations and combat actions.

The problem of replacing losses remains a complex and important one. The experience of wars in the Near East has shown that losses in modern combat, even in combat employing only conventional weapons, increase significantly, for the effectiveness of weapons has sharply risen. In this context, the need arises for further improving the methods of increasing the effort, replenishing troops, repairing and rebuilding weapons and military equipment as well as establishing and utilizing reserves.

In the area of operational art, one of the central group of problems remains the profound and thorough elaboration of questions related to the preparation and conduct of all-arms, combined and independent operations by all the Armed Services. It is essential to thoroughly study those methods of actions which would ensure high reliability in carrying out the basic operational tasks by the troops and fleets in a shorter time, with fewer expenditures of resources, with minimum losses and the fullest utilization of the capabilities of the new types of weapons and combat equipment.

In principle we have elaborated a clear system of views on the preparation and conduct of offensive operations. But they, like other concepts in our theory, are constantly developing. In particular, work must be continued on investigating the methods of ensuring continuous and rapid advance by our troops to a great depth. On this level many problems arise including: breaking through the defenses full of various antitank weapons, the organizing of dependable fire damage to the enemy, particularly its armored objects on the defensive, the coordinated employment of airborne troops, forward

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detachments and the rapid exploitation of success, the combating of enemy reconnaissance and attack weapons and so forth.

An analysis of the probable enemy's capabilities shows that our troops will have to fight against its groupings which possess great fire and attack power, high maneuverability and armed with a large amount of modern types of weapons and combat equipment, including: armored vehicles, antitank weapons, air defense weapons, helicopter gunships and so forth. In order to successfully defeat such a grouping, it is essential to resolve the questions of its fire damage to the entire depth of the configuration as well as splitting up the grouping and defeating it piecemeal.

A different approach is required to conducting encirclement operations. In the previous war an encirclement was basically carried out by the rapid emerging of mobile troops in the flanks and rear of relatively immobile infantry groupings. The surrounded troops now have greater opportunities for maneuvering, for establishing attack groupings and breaking out of the encirclement. At the same time, there has been a greater dependence of modern equipment upon the delivery of fuel and ammunition and upon roads. This to a certain degree will tie down the surrounded groupings. For this reason, methods must be sought for the more dependable and rapid carrying out of this difficult form of operation considering the new conditions.

In speaking about the problems of offensive and defensive operations, it must be considered that at present there is an ever-stronger tendency toward a further merging of the methods of troop operations on the offensive and defensive. A modern offensive is a combination of fire strikes, the rapid advance of tanks and armored infantry supported by aviation and helicopter gunships from the air and bold actions of airborne troops deep in the defenses and on the flanks of the opposing groupings. In contrast to an offensive in the period of the Great Patriotic War this will be not a successive advance of the troops from line to line but a more decisive simultaneous hitting of the enemy to the entire depth of its configuration.

In line with the increased range of the enemy's operational-tactical missile systems and artillery, the need arises for clarifying the methods of dispersing the troops along the front and in depth both on the offensive and on the defensive and increasing the distance of the assembly areas of the formations, the deployment lines of the troops, the second echelons and the reserves. Of enormous significance is the primary hitting of enemy nuclear missile weapons and high precision weapons even before the moving up of the main grouping of one's troops into the jump-off areas for the offensive and for launching counterstrikes.

The modern defensive is also based upon fire and maneuver combined with the strong holding of occupied positions. This is characterized by the employment of powerful weapons making it possible to hit superior enemy forces at the distant approaches as well as by high activity of the defending troops.

It is essential to improve the methods of employing the formations and units of the Armed Services and the methods of preparing and conducting independent and joint operations as well as more thoroughly study the specific actions of

troops (forces) under the conditions of the various theaters of military operations.

Tactics is the most dynamic area of military art. Each change in one generation of weapons by another is reflected first of all in tactics and brings to life new tactical procedures for conducting combat as well as an adjustment or reorganization of the structure of the formations and units and the methods of their training. For example, in the Ground Forces as before there is great importance for improving the forms of cooperation among the tanks, infantry, artillery and aviation, the methods of neutralizing enemy antitank defenses, the methods of combating enemy remote minelaying, aeromobile antitank weapons, troop aviation and so forth. In each Armed Service there are a number of problems in the area of preparing and conducting modern combat on land, in the air and at sea.

A characteristic trait of tactics is the growing importance of the distance of conducting a fire engagement. At present, the troops have gained the opportunity of causing significant damage to the enemy using firearms long before direct contact with the enemy. As the range of missile launches and artillery fire increases, the depth of the fire fight will also rise.

Modern weapons make it possible to achieve a continuous offensive, surprise and rapid attacks as well as great activeness and strength of defenses.

The interests of the matter demand that research on prospective questions be combined with a thorough study of the experience of previous wars, the local wars of our times and the history of the development of military-theoretical thought and the practices of operational and combat training, bringing out here, as M. V. Frunze taught, primarily the trends in the further development of military art. In relying on the experience of our predecessors and considering the development prospects of military affairs, we should do everything to more accurately and fully anticipate the nature of future operations and the methods of conducting them. The irrefutable advantages of Marxist-Leninist military science and what we have experienced and suffered through over many years provide us with reason to assume that our theory of military art will always be equal to its purpose.

FOOTNOTES

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4. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 17.
5. Quoted in: "Leninskiy sbornik," 12, p 437.
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16. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 110.
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22. VOYENNIYE VESTNIK, Nos 2, 3, 1922, p 5.
23. See: V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 42, p 173.
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27. Ibid., pp 222-223.
28. Ibid., pp 401-402.
29. Ibid., p 406
30. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 40, p 6.

31. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 2, p 63.
32. Ibid., Vol 3, p 167.
33. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 2, inv. 2, file 205, sheets 157-158.
34. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza" [The CPSU on the USSR Armed Forces], Moscow, 1969, p 35.
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CHAPTER 4: ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES

Leadership of the CPSU--The Fundamental Principle of Soviet Military Organizational Development

The sociopolitical principles in the organizational development of the Red Army. K. Marx and F. Engels, in working out the theory of revolutionary struggle, formulated most important concepts about the military organization of a victorious proletariat. They established the necessity of shattering the bourgeois state machine including such major attributes of it as the army and the police. At the same time, they pointed out the main areas of establishing a new military organization of the proletarian state. However, the conditions under which the Armed Forces of our country were established after the victory of the October Revolution differed significantly from those which they had conceived in the 19th Century. The main feature was that the socialist revolution, as V. I. Lenin had foreseen, was victorious just in one country which from the very first days of its existence was in a hostile capitalist encirclement.

In creatively applying Marxist teachings about war and the army in the new age, the age of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, the Communist Party, headed by V. I. Lenin, worked out the scientific principles and specific ways for the organizational development of the Armed Forces of the world's first socialist state. "...The ruling class, the proletariat," said V. I. Lenin, "only if it wishes to rule, should show this through its military organization."(1) V. I. Lenin was the true organizer and leader of the Red Army and Red Navy. He elaborated the most important ideas on the defense of the socialist fatherland, he disclosed the particular features of the socialist state's armed forces and their fundamental difference from bourgeois armies, he brought out the sources of the new army's strength and might and defined its social nature and purpose.

V. I. Lenin viewed the Armed Forces of the Soviet nation as a social, state organization established to defend the victories of the socialist revolution and as a most important weapon in the entire revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat under the conditions of capitalist encirclement. For this reason, he emphasized, the questions of military organizational development can be resolved only considering the general processes occurring in the society and the state. He pointed out that the organizational development of

our army "could only lead to successful results as it was established in the spirit of general Soviet construction...."(2)

V. I. Lenin considered the leadership of the Communist Party over the Armed Forces and the entire question of strengthening the nation's defense capability as the highest sociopolitical principle. He saw in this the decisive source of the Red Army's might and the basis of all its victories. "...Solely, due to the fact," wrote V. I. Lenin, "that the party was on guard, that the party was strictly disciplined and because the authority of the party unified all the departments and institutions and according to the slogan which was given by the Central Committee, tens, hundreds, thousands and ultimately millions marched like a single man and only because unprecedented sacrifices were made--only for this reason did the miracle which occurred could happen. Only for this reason, regardless of the two, three and four campaigns by the imperialists of the Entente and the imperialists of the entire world were we able to win."(3) The principle of the leading role of the party in the organizational development of the Armed Forces was carried out in a fierce struggle against the Trotskyites and other antiparty elements which wished to split the army and navy from the party.

From the very start of the founding of the Soviet Armed Forces the leading role of the party in their organizational development and training has been carried out in the following most important areas: assessing the conditions and the balance of forces in the revolutionary class struggle and establishing the necessity of the armed defense of the socialist fatherland; the elaboration of military policy; the elaboration in accord with this of the sociopolitical, economic, ideological-theoretical, organizational and scientific-technical bases of military organizational development; determining the purpose and tasks of the army and navy considering the specific military-political situation; the elaboration of the principles, specific forms and methods of organizing and manning the Armed Forces and their technical equipping; the training of military personnel; the organization and execution of party political work; concern for the material support of the army and navy personnel; the elaboration of the most important provisions of military theory and practice and determining the content and direction of military doctrine on this basis; the training and indoctrination of the personnel; the mobilizing of the efforts of the entire party, the people and the state for the armed defense of the victories of the revolution and the strengthening of national defense.

All these areas of military organizational development were reflected in the decisions of the 8th-11th and subsequent congresses, plenums of the party Central Committee and numerous speeches of V. I. Lenin and other party and state figures. The decision of the Eighth Party Congress in 1918 stated that the revolutionary nature of the Armed Forces is achieved by their class composition, "by the organization of commissars at the communist cells. And by the common party and soviet leadership over the life and activities of the army."(4)

Our party had to follow an untrod path in the organizational development of the Armed Forces. For this reason it relied particularly widely on the revolutionary creativity of the masses, it constantly tested out in practice

the correctness of the proposed ideas and constantly improved the forms and methods of military-organizational development. The "Circular Letter of the RKP(b) Central Committee to All Party Members on the Strengthening of the Red Army" of 14 July 1919 stated that the question of the building of the Armed Forces of a socialist state was a new and difficult matter. For this reason the party "should analyze as often as possible the previous experience of the organizational development of the Red Army, look back, measure the stages passed and weigh the new paths."(5)

One of the party figures who carefully studied previous experience and actually carried out Lenin's ideas of military-organizational development was M. V. Frunze. "All the changes," he said, "which we are now carrying out in the area of military-organizational development are so fundamental that we can rightly speak of the start of a new stage in military-organizational development."(6)

The party also gave great attention to the elaboration and practical implementation of the principle of the unity of army and people. "...The Soviet organization," wrote V. I. Lenin, "has made it possible to create an armed force of workers and peasants which is much more closely tied than before with the workers and exploited masses."(7) The link between the army and the people during the period of the Civil War was expressed primarily in the all-round support by the workers and peasants for their army, by sending their finest sons and daughters into its ranks, by unstinting labor in the rear to meet the needs of the Red Army and by active involvement in universal military training and in many other measures.

"We can say without exaggeration," commented M. V. Frunze, "that no nation will be found which compares with us in terms of the availability of a mass of population trained for military affairs, in terms of the strength and solidarity of the army with the broad masses of people and the inner cohesiveness of its command and rank...and file. All of this creates so favorable conditions for us that we could scarcely be beaten not only by any individual, even the most powerful state but even by an entire coalition of them."(8)

In the leadership of military-organizational development, our party has consistently carried out the principle of the friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism and this has been one of the most important sources for the inner cohesiveness and combat might of the Armed Forces which are the implement for defending the multinational state. In addressing the representatives of different peoples and internationalist fighters, V. I. Lenin said: "On you has fallen the great honor of defending the sacred ideas with weapons in hand and...actually realizing the international fraternity of peoples."(9)

In contrast to the bourgeois parties and states which hypocritically conceal the antipopular essence of the imperialist armies, our party and Soviet power from the very outset has openly proclaimed the principle of a class approach to the organizational development of the Armed Forces based upon a strengthening of the alliance of the working class and the peasantry and have firmly adhered to this in practice.

V. I. Lenin pointed out: "The army cannot and should not be neutral. Not to involve the army in politics is the slogan of the hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie...who in actuality have always involved the army in reactionary policies...."(10) And while the armed forces in all states have been an implement of military violence in the hands of the ruling classes, our party, Lenin stressed, has become an implement in the struggle for worker interests.

M. V. Frunze pointed out that a class approach to the manning of the army is a manifestation of the class nature of the proletarian elements leading it and the very nature of class warfare. We cannot, he said, entrust the right and duty to defend our worker-peasant fatherland with weapons in hand to those social groups the interests of which are inimical to the interests of labor. The right to defend the socialist fatherland with weapons in hand can be entrusted only to the workers.

M. V. Frunze was decisively against the supraclass principle proposed by the SRs, Mencheviks and certain military specialists from the old army of establishing a people's army which would include the representatives of both the workers as well as the former exploiting classes. On the basis of an analysis of the specific balance of forces, he showed the absurdity and harmfulness of this thesis under the conditions of a class society, under conditions where a fierce struggle was underway between these classes. He explained and showed that no time previously had any people's army existed or could it exist. The so-called peoples armies of any age, in essence were armies representing not the interests of the people but rather the ruling classes. The word "people's" was only a manifestation of the political hypocrisy of those classes who feared to say openly that, for example, the Tsarist Army was an army of tsars and landowners. "For this reason," emphasized Frunze, "we from the very outset have sharply and definitely raised the question of establishing any mythical 'people's' army but rather a proletarian army, an army of workers and peasants."(11)

The RKKA was established from the most aware and organized elements of the working masses, exclusively from the proletariat and the semiproletarian strata of the peasantry which were close to it. The class approach to its organizational development was embodied both in the manning method and in the recruitment and placement of military personnel so as to prevent the penetration of hostile elements into the ranks of the Red Army and Red Navy and ensure the moral and political unity of their personnel. Non-laboring elements were inducted only for the rear militia.

At the same time our party viewed the class approach to the manning of the army as a temporary phenomenon, envisaging that after the elimination of the exploiting classes and the victory of socialism, the army would be turned into an army of all the people.

All the sociopolitical and organizational principles in military organizational development were elaborated and implemented by our party from the viewpoint of solving the main task which defined the main purpose and goal of the Armed Forces, that is, ensuring their high constant combat readiness to repel imperialist aggression and securely defend the security of the Soviet state.

On the System of Military Organizational Development

What path should be followed? A permanent or militia army? The question of what the military organization of the proletariat should be and what army should be established for defending the victories of the revolution was the most difficult. At the Eighth RKP(b) Congress, V. I. Lenin said: "The question of the organization of the Red Army was completely new and it has not been posed at all even theoretically.... We have fought for a cause for which no one has fought so widely in the world.... We have gone from experiment to experiment...feeling our way and testing out in what manner the problem can be resolved in the given situation. And the task was clear. Without armed defense of the socialist republic we could not exist."(12) He taught that the ruling class would never voluntarily surrender its power to the suppressed class. But the latter should show in fact that it is capable not only of overthrowing the exploiters but also organizing itself for self-defense and stake one's all.

F. Engels, in examining the questions of the proletariat's military organization, in military history found the attempt to organize (form) two systems of armed forces: a regular army and a militia (armed people's militia). At one time Engels preferred the militia as the most convenient and most comprehensible form of involving the revolutionary masses in the defense of the revolution. At the same time he cautioned that "only a communistically organized and indoctrinated society can come very close to a militia system but may not fully achieve it."(13)

Initially V. I. Lenin also felt that after the victory of the revolution it was essential to crush the military organization of the bourgeoisie, to arm the working class, to establish a worker militia (detachments of the Red Guard) and win over the soldiers and sailors of the Tsarist army. The party's first program envisaged the replacement of a standing army by the universal arming of the people in the form of a worker-peasant militia. But circumstances developed in such a manner that the Red Army had to be established in an extremely short period of time in the course of a fierce struggle against the domestic counterrevolution and foreign interventionists in a country that was backward, illiterate and devastated by the imperialist war. Under these conditions small-sized, poorly trained and poorly armed volunteer units and militia formations were unable to check the superior and well organized forces of the numerous enemies of the revolution.

Trotsky and his supporters continued defending the obsolete principle of a militia military organization for the Armed Forces, insisting upon the immediate and complete conversion to a militia system or the manning of the Red Army. This position, unfortunately, was defended not only by the Trotskyites. Certain authoritative figures in our party, for example, N. I. Podvoyskiy, were also in favor of the militia system for organizing the army similar to the Swiss Army, where all males should undergo military training without being diverted for military service for an extended time.

There was a broad discussion in the press over the question of what path should be followed in military organizational development. On the pages of

the journals, newspapers and official announcements, the most diverse judgments were heard. One group of military leaders including I. I. Vatsetis, N. I. Podvoyskiy, I. S. Unshlikht, V. P. Georgadze and others proposed disbanding the standing army, the complete abandonment of it and the conversion to a militia system for the organizing of the army, considering this to be the most economic and effective for organizing combat training. Another group including M. N. Tukhachevskiy, D. A. Petrovskiy, V. Vilenskiy and I. T. Smilga was against the militia system, considering it a "hair-brained scheme," since a militia army under the new conditions could not provide dependable national defense. Individual military specialists such as A. A. Brusilov, V. P. Muratov and G. F. Girs considered it possible to organize the army on a combined basis.

V. I. Lenin, considering the altered conditions for the defense of the socialist fatherland, proved that the demand for the universal arming of the people and a militia of all the people did not conform to the interests of strengthening and defending the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under a situation of fierce resistance from the overthrown classes which together with international imperialism had unleashed a civil war demanded not "the arming of all the people" but rather the arming of the workers and the disarming of the exploiting classes, not a "militia of all the people" but rather a class military organization of the proletariat which also included the working peasants.

Proceeding from these Leninist concepts, our party has concluded that under the existing extreme situation for the defense of Soviet power there was only one way, the establishing of a regular, mass, well organized and trained army. Such an army could not be organized on a volunteer principle; it was essential to convert to obligatory military service for the male population and introduce universal military instruction for the workers and peasants. This was a fundamentally new resolution to the question of organizing the armed forces of a socialist state. The great achievement of V. I. Lenin was that he creatively developed the theses of Marxism concerning the breaking up of the bourgeois army and the establishing of a new military organization for the victorious proletariat.

The Eighth RKP(b) Congress approved the Leninist course of military organizational development and the establishing of a centrally controlled, class, regular and disciplined army. The congress rejected the attempts of the "military opposition" to thwart the establishing of such an army.

The entire course of the Civil War showed how timely were the measures to establish a mass regular army. The size of the Red Army at the outset of the war was 800,000 men and by the end of the war the situation demanded that it be brought up to 5.5 million men.

Thus, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, the proletariat "never could and cannot at present achieve...rule and strengthen it except, having completely broken up the old army...in going through a most difficult, tortuous period without any army...but gradually...in a difficult Civil War developing a new army, a new discipline, a new military organization of a new class."(14)

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The organizational development of the regular army. After the end of the Civil War, V. I. Lenin insisted upon introducing a military organization which would most fully consider both the danger of imperialist aggression as well as the internal capabilities of the Soviet state. His idea came down to the following: "Without relying upon the blows already dealt to imperialism, we should maintain our Red Army at whatever the cost in full combat readiness and strengthen its combat capability. This, of course, is not impeded by releasing a certain portion of the army and its rapid demobilization. We are counting that the enormous experience which was gained during the war by the Red Army and its leaders will help us now improve its qualities. And we will see to it that in cutting back the army we will keep a basic nucleus which will not impose an impossible burden on the public in the sense of upkeep and at the same time with a reduced size of the army we will better than before ensure the possibility in the event of need of getting back on our feet and mobilizing an even greater military force."(15)

The carrying out of such a complex as maintaining a high combat capability for the army without excessively overburdening the economy, under those very severe conditions as our nation was after the Civil War was possible solely on a strictly scientific basis. Proceeding from the Leninist notions of the importance of science in the organizational development of the Armed Forces, the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in its decision stated: "The Worker and Peasant Red Army should be so organized that with the least expenditure of men and weapons to provide the greatest result and this is possible only with the planned employment of all types of military science...."(16)

The program for reorganizing the Red Army after the Civil War was set out by the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921. Upon the instructions of the party Central Committee, M. V. Frunze and S. I. Gusev prepared and published the theses proposed by them to the Tenth RKP(b) Congress as a draft resolution on the military question. They defended the maintaining of a nucleus of a professional army and at the same time proposed a gradual conversion to militia formations. The congress rejected the ideas of Trotsky and his supporters on the immediate conversion of the Armed Forces to a militia system, having recognized these ideas as wrong and extremely dangerous under the conditions of the complex international situation and the unabating attempts by imperialism to stifle the young Soviet Republic.

The congress considered it possible to have only a partial conversion to the territorial-militia formations. The decisions of the Tenth Party Congress on this question stated: "The agitation of certain comrades for the actual elimination of the present Red Army and the immediate switch-over to a militia is incorrect and practically dangerous for the present moment."(17)

In 1921, in the article "A Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army," M. V. Frunze wrote: "In organizational terms the basis of our armed forces for the immediate period can only be a permanent Red Army. This stems from all that was said about the general nature of our combat tasks. This question at present can be considered resolved once and for all in line with the corresponding decree of the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party and the subsequent governmental decrees. The conversion to a militia system on the basis of Vsevobuch [Universal Military Training] will be permitted only to

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the degree that it makes it possible to achieve definite savings in the expenditure of state funds without undermining the ability of the Red Army to resolve active goals."(18)

Of great importance for further military organizational development was the congress decision concerning the uniting of the economic, political and military efforts of the Soviet Republics within the framework of a unified Soviet state. This was expressed most vividly in the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1922.

The organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces after the Civil War was carried out considering these party theses and the instructions of V. I. Lenin. The nation's economic situation did not make it possible to support a large army. In November 1920, the Soviet government issued instructions for reducing the army by 2 million men. But due to a number of international and domestic circumstances and the unsatisfactory leadership by the Republic RVS and primarily Trotsky, the demobilization of the army was carried out slowly. By the spring of 1921, it had been reduced by just 800,000 men.

In April 1921 the RKP(b) Central Committee examined the course of troop demobilization and in accordance with Lenin's proposal recommended a reduction of the Armed Forces to 1.6 million men by Fall 1921, and to subsequently reduce their numerical strength to less than 800,000 men. This was accomplished by October 1922. However the status of the country's economy made it extremely difficult to maintain even this number of troops and naval forces. In December 1922 the Party's Central Committee adopted a resolution to reduce the Armed Forces to 600,000 men.

The complexity of the international situation and the possibility of military complications for the Soviet Republic required the seeking out of the most effective ways for military organizational development in order, with a limited number, to achieve the necessary level of combat readiness for the Armed Forces. The interests of the matter dictated the necessity also of clear, well thought out leadership over the organizational development and training of the Red Army and Red Navy, a high level of organization in the work, unified understanding and specific ways for carrying out the military tasks confronting the nation.

But the practical implementation of these tasks was impeded not only by the intrigues of international imperialism and the severe economic state of the nation. The situation was aggravated also by the fact that the Trotskyites and other party enemies did not provide an opportunity for the planned and purposeful carrying out of the Leninist party general line both in the area of socialist construction as a whole and on the question of national defense. By their constant antiparty intrigues, they diverted the attention and strength of the army and the state from solving urgent political, economic and military questions. Particularly bad was the state of affairs in the military department which Trotsky continued to lead. The conversion of the Armed Forces to a peacetime status was carried out in a disorganized manner and delayed in every possible way. Having made their way to leadership positions, Trotskyite elements sabotaged the carrying out of the decisions of the congresses and plenums of the party Central Committee on military questions.

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The material condition of the Armed Forces personnel was extremely bad. The organizational structure of the army and the system of its manning did not correspond to the new tasks and demands. The RKP(b) Central Committee, in conducting a special investigation of the state of affairs in the Armed Forces, was forced to comment: "Having heard the report of the commission...the Central Committee plenum confirms the presence of serious flaws in the army (colossal turnover, complete dissatisfaction with the organization of supply and so forth) threatening the army with collapse."(19)

In describing the situation at that time, M. V. Frunze wrote: "If one of the old military workers who had lived through the heroic combat age with the army and had bid farewell to it after the elimination of the fronts would turn up in its ranks again, he would probably be extremely amazed by the picture which appeared before him. Not a trace remains of the former rushing, feverishly intense pulsing with life. Deprived of a significant share of its best and most active elements, put under heavy, technical conditions of work, and now escaped from the view of the direct attention and leadership of the party, today's military apparatus ekes out a rather dull existence, scarcely meeting the concerns and needs of today. The wheels of the military machine creak slowly and feebly; modern military thought also moves lazily and flabbily."(20) The middle-level military worker, he continued, caught up in a 2-year period of continuous reorganizations and reformatations, has finally lost any sense of balance and has fallen into a state close to mental prostration, dreaming only of one thing: when all of this will end and order will finally be imposed. The unprecedentedly difficult material conditions of army life added to all of this.

Furthermore, Frunze explained that with all the importance of the question of national military defense, the state and the army could allocate comparatively insignificant funds for this purpose. "But our task, regardless of the extremely limited possibilities, remains as before: to provide the republic with a strong, hale and at the same time cheap army."(21)

Immediate and decisive measures were required to rectify the state of affairs. Under such conditions, M. V. Frunze had to commence the work of reorganizing the Armed Forces. Upon the assignment of the party Central Committee and the Soviet government, he took over the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. By that time, as was pointed out previously, M. V. Frunze already had significant experience in the organizational development of the army in the post of military commissar of Yaroslavl Province and as the commander of an army and fronts and the troops of the Ukraine and Crimea. Moreover, he had a thorough knowledge of the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, military history and the experience of foreign armies on the questions of military organizational development.

In 1924-1925, upon a decision and under the leadership of the party Central Committee and the Soviet government, major changes were carried out in the Armed Forces in the aim of increasing their combat readiness. Under party assignment, M. V. Frunze directly led their implementation. K. Ye. Voroshilov has rightly commented on the gigantic work carried out under Frunze's leadership: "...The enormous tasks which were posed for resolution by this

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extraordinary opened up a new stage in military organizational development."(22)

As was already pointed out, in working out the concepts of a unified military doctrine, M. V. Frunze raised not only military-political and operational-strategic questions but also closely tied questions of the theory and practice of the organizational development of the Armed Forces. One of the most important conditions for successfully carrying out the tasks of military organizational development and for planned and effective work in this area was considered by him to be the elaboration of a unified understanding of both the tasks and methods for improving the organizational structure of the troops and the manning principles of the army and navy. This unity, in his opinion, should encompass and permeate all aspects of army life both in peacetime and wartime.

The mixed system for the organizational development of the armed forces. M. V. Frunze had an understanding of the advantages of a professional army over the militia one and considered the latter to be a temporary, enforced measure. However, under the developing historical situation, he assumed, a skillful, rational combination of the professional and militia army would be the most effective form for the organizational development of the Armed Forces. "Of course," he said, "if we had the choice between a professional army of 1.5-2 million men and the current militia system, from the military viewpoint all the givens would be in favor of the first solution. But we have no such choice. The militia system, combined with regular units, undoubtedly will provide the defense of the Union."(23)

The actual organizational development of the Red Army was carried out in two areas: in the first place, by improving the organizational structure and increasing the combat readiness of the professional formations and units; secondly, by working out and introducing a territorial-militia system. A particularly complex matter was the carrying out of the territorial-militia system. Both in theoretical and practical terms, M. V. Frunze prepared carefully and purposefully for carrying out this exceptionally important state task. In 1922, he wrote the article "The Regular Army and the Militia" which from Marxist-Leninist positions analyze the experience of military organizational development in other nations, including the experience of employing the militia system, and establish proposals for employing it in the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

M. V. Frunze went on to show that the territorial-militia system, like any other organizational forms, must not be viewed abstractly, in isolation from the existing historical conditions of military organizational development. Its advisability could be correctly assessed only considering the specific conditions in the existence of the state and the army as well as all the political, economic and military factors which influence the practical employment of this form of military organization.

In the opinion of M. V. Frunze, "Not any militia is always better or preferable over a standing army. This question should be posed and resolved specifically, in close relation to the social and political conditions of time and place. Where there are no basic conditions which would ensure the

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founding of strong militia formations, a changeover to them would be simply harmful."(24) For us, on the one hand, the political conditions should be of crucial importance and, on the other, the purely military requirements.

Did our nation have prerequisites for converting to such formations? asked Frunze. He replied: For us a changeover to a militia system is possible only gradually and only within strict limits. In any event, for a long time to come there can be no question of completely abandoning the professional units. He emphasized that one could only speak about a combination of these two basic organizational forms in our military organizational development and of one or another combination of professional units with territorial units.

M. V. Frunze using specific figures showed that without employing the territorial-militia system to a certain degree it would be impossible to ensure dependable defense capability for the nation. By 1925, the size of the Soviet Armed Forces was 562,000 men. The annual induction contingent for the nation was around 1.2 million men. With a 1-year period of service it would be necessary to have an army of 1.2 million men to pass all the youth through the army and train them in military terms and with 2-year service the army would be 2.4 million men. But in this instance around 900,000 men each year would remain outside the army. Even if one excluded the youth not fit for military service for various reasons, all the same approximately 400,000-500,000 men would not undergo military service. As a total the Red Army could pass through its ranks not more than 25-30 percent of the induction contingent while the French Army was able to pass through over 68 percent, the Romanian could handle 66 and the Polish could take 70 percent of the induction-age youth. This circumstance significantly reduced the mobilization capabilities of our army.

Only by maintaining territorial formations and units was it possible to cover this shortfall, to train reserves and in the event of war to field a multimillion army. M. V. Frunze felt that the Red Army under the existing circumstances was not a standing regular army in the full sense of the word, as was the case, for example, in the old army. It represented only the cadres, that is, the nucleus around which the millions of worker and peasant recruits should unite.

A small professional army, undoubtedly, would not be able to ensure dependable national defense. In the event of a war it had to be increased by several fold and for this militarily trained reserves were required. "...We cannot," said M. F. Frunze, "organize our defenses solely on the so-called cadre or professional units. If we wish to field a number of divisions which would probably be required by a future military situation, then we must wager not only on the professional divisions but also on divisions of a different sort.... This is why on the question of the structure of our armed forces we have assumed the viewpoint of a standing army plus militia formations. With the given conditions and the size of our peacetime cadres we have no other way out."(25)

Proceeding from all these considerations, under the leadership of M. V. Frunze a mixed system for the organizational development of the Armed Forces was

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worked out and introduced and this combined the professional and militia formations.

By that time relatively good conditions had developed for achieving such an organizational form of military development. The international situation of the USSR had been somewhat consolidated, the dictatorship of the proletariat and its alliance with the peasantry had grown stronger and the new economic policy had led to a certain revival in agriculture. However, the military threat continued to exist for the Soviet state.

In accord with the decisions of the party Central Committee and the Soviet government, preparations for establishing the territorial formations and units started in 1922. A special commission was set up under the leadership of M. V. Frunze and it worked out the primary measures to convert a portion of the infantry formations and units to a territorial status in a number of the military districts.

Military organizational development according to the territorial principle was possible only with the active involvement and support from the party and soviet bodies on the spot. Considering this, the 12th Party Congress held in April 1923 obliged the party organizations to conduct a broad campaign to explain the essence of this new system of military organizational development for the Soviet nation, in assisting in the greatest possible success of the question and at the same time widely utilizing the assemblies of militia units for an agitation impact on the countryside. After the study of the first experience at organizing territorial military organizational development in the troops, this system was approved in legislation by the Decree of the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee] and SNK [Council of People's Commissars] of 8 August 1923. This defined the bases for the organization, manning and standing of service in the territorial units.

The territorial-militia system began to be introduced most widely and actively when M. V. Frunze assumed leadership of the People's Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs. The proportional amount of territorial-militia units in 1925 was raised to 62.8 percent.

The military reform measures, including for the territorial system of a military organization, were also reflected in the Law Governing Compulsory Military Service adopted in September 1925 by the USSR TsIK and SNK following the report of M. V. Frunze. The drafting of this law and the military reform measures required not only extensive research involved with studying the past experience and the experience of modern armies in other countries but also the carrying out of experimental work in the troops. As a result for the first time in history the scientific bases were elaborated for the organizing of military service in a socialist state.

In accord with the Law Governing Compulsory Military Service, the times were clearly defined for regular induction and for the length of military service for all categories of Army and Navy servicemen and for all branches of troops and forces. A total length of active military service of 5 years was set both for the professional and territorial units. Of these the Red Armymen and junior commanders of the cadre directly in the troops served 2 years in the

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infantry, cavalry and artillery, 3 years in the Air Forces and 4 years in the Navy, after which they were given early discharge with subsequent registration in the reserves.

The Red Army men and junior commanders of the territorial units were periodically called up for assemblies over the entire 5 years, after which they were discharged into the reserve. But they were taken away from their daily occupation for undergoing military service for only 8-12 months (depending upon the branch of troops). Thus, one portion of the youth served 2-4 years out of the 5 years while another portion served 8-12 months.

As a whole rather high demands were placed on the territorial formations and units. M. V. Frunze considered them to be first-line troops which should be ready to enter battle simultaneously and on equal footing with the regular troops. He saw to it that the best trained commanders and political workers were sent to these formations. He also demanded the creation of the best conditions for them in terms of supply and service. The best inductees were also to be sent to these units. The manning of the territorial formations and units was to be carried out in such a manner that each formation constantly received the men assigned to it from the very same area.

In the aim of providing better contact with the local and party Soviet bodies, the territorial troops were stationed, as a rule, considering the administrative division of the nation. For example, a division was organized in a province, a regiment or battalion, in a district and a company in a county [volost]. In line with this the provincial and district military commissariats were abolished or more precisely they were changed into corps (divisional) territorial headquarters and were placed under the commanders of the territorial formations. District military commissariats were maintained as the primary training-mobilizational bodies. This was done in the aim of eliminating parallelism in the work and in order that the commanders and staffs of the divisional corps and divisions would be directly responsible for the training and mobilization of the subordinate formations and units. In those areas where there were no troop units, headquarters of the territorial districts were established under the local soviet executive committees.

For the rapid mobilization and for bringing the territorial formations and units to a state of readiness for carrying out combat missions, in peacetime they were to have the necessary supplies of weapons, equipment and materiel.

The training of the personnel of the territorial units was carried out in two directions: the training of the changing command and rank and file at periodic assemblies and the instruction of preinductees in the Vsevobuch system. During the period of active service, the men of the territorial units for a period of 5 years would annually be called up for assemblies. The first such assembly lasted 3 months. Subsequently, monthly assemblies were conducted annually. For the period of the assemblies, the personnel from the territorial units received all they were due according to the wartime establishment: weapons, equipment and materiel. The general assemblies of the registered personnel usually ended by the holding of exercises on the level of the formations and units. The most difficult question was the

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logistical support for the territorial formations, particularly supplying the temporary personnel with uniforms.

M. V. Frunze devoted special attention to the quality of preinduction training. He demanded that upon its completion a recruit should be trained who knows how to handle cold steel and firearms, who is acquainted with the main elements of field and interior service, with the equipment and combat properties of his branch of troops and who is a literate and politically indoctrinated citizen-soldier. He constantly reminded that in peacetime the center of gravity in military training to a significant degree should shift to all our party and soviet apparatus; the Red Army alone could not handle this task.

Mikhail Vasilyevich devoted a major place in this work to the civilian institutions of learning and to the volunteer defense societies. "For everyone it is clear," he said, "that the correct organizing of things to establish the militia units requires the obligatory and closest involvement of not only the militia personnel in this work but also the entire soviet, professional and party apparatus of the given area. Only by the combined close efforts of these bodies will we be able to satisfactorily handle the tasks of creating strong territorial units which in terms of their training and combat accomplishments are the equal of the first line regular units."(26) Generally it was a question of realizing that not the Red Army alone would be fighting but all the people and for this reason they should be prepared for this.(27)

It must be said that far from everyone both in the ranks of the Red Army and outside of it showed understanding for the territorial-militia system. Even now in memoirs one can encounter complaints over the imperfection of the territorial divisions. As with any new undertaking, this system made headway in a stubborn struggle. M. V. Frunze in virtually every speech had to return to this question and explain its essence. In line with this, even now one interesting comment by him has not lost its significance. He said that both an overtly negative as well as a passively indifferent attitude on the part of a certain portion of the command to the new experiment in a number of instances "is not the result of a well thought out, careful analysis of the comparative merits and drawbacks of either system in a concrete historical situation, but merely the result of a biased, sterile, muddled rationalistic attitude toward reality. Such an attitude and the moods created by it are lethal for the question and they must be quickly and decisively ended."(28) The main thing, he commented, is that the opponents of the new system have not offered anything else in its place, since they could not propose anything else without disregarding the actual situation.

As experience was to show, the chief merit of the territorial system was that it provided the training of trained reserves and significantly increased the army's mobilizational capabilities with comparatively small material outlays. It provided an opportunity to provide military instruction for the basic portion of the induction contingent and reservists without taking them away from production for an extended time. Moreover, the territorial system, particularly during the assemblies, established favorable conditions for

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carrying out political work among the population and primarily among the peasantry.

The territorial system, of course, also had weak aspects. It was difficult to organize systematic and well supported combat training in the territorial units. In this regard, they were largely inferior to the regular units. Subsequently, as the technical equipping of the army was improved, when the rifle and cavalry formations and units began to include an ever-larger number of subunits from the different branches of troops (artillery, engineer, signals and so forth), the training and combat cohesiveness of the territorial formations became even more complex. The combining by the corps and divisions headquarters of the functions of the command-staff and local military command bodies had definite positive aspects, but it was basically designed to train reserves and a single mobilization of the formations and units. With the departure of the headquarters and the organized troops for their operational purpose, leadership over the military training of the public and the mobilizing of the subsequent formations great weaker. In a protracted war, with the straining of all the nation's forces and capabilities, the Armed Forces required a constant replenishment with large reserves.

At the same time, we must re-emphasize that, regardless of certain difficulties and shortcomings, as a whole the territorial-militia system at this stage in the organizational development of the Armed Forces proved fully effective, having solved the military problems confronting the Soviet state. The main task was carried out of training military personnel and mobilization resources without which it would have been impossible in a short period of time to fully convert the Red Army to a professional system on the eve of World War II. One can also say with certainty that the attempts to restore the territorial system in our army in the 1960's were, of course, unjustified, for they were undertaken without considering the new demands on troop combat training and the fundamental qualitative changes which had occurred in the methods of conducting armed combat.

The Organizational Structure and Technical Equipping of the Armed Forces

The organizational structure--the strongest aspect of a regular army. So F. Engels taught. V. I. Lenin also gave enormous importance to organizational questions. In the opinion of V. I. Lenin, as M. V. Frunze pointed out, "the person who erred in the area of organizational problems has nullified even his most correct ideas, concepts and views in all other areas of political activity."(30)

For this reason, from the very outset exceptional importance was paid to correctly establishing the organizational structure of the Armed Forces. M. V. Frunze felt that an effective organizational structure could be produced only proceeding from a scientifically sound prediction of the nation of a future war and the methods of waging it. This should be permeated with an operational-strategic purposefulness and at the same time take into account the human and technical capabilities of the Armed Forces. The organizational forms of the Armed Forces depended upon the methods of armed combat and in turn, influenced them.

Soviet military science proceeded from the view that the operations of a future war would be conducted by the joint efforts of the various Armed Services and branches of troops. For this reason the plans for military organizational development were worked out and implemented considering a rational combination of the various armed services and branches of troops in the Armed Forces. This related also to the branches of troops which had arisen in the course of World War I. In accord with the Law Governing Universal Military Service adopted in 1925, it was established that the Armed Forces would be divided into the Ground Forces, the Air Forces and Navy, the troops of the United State Political Directorate and convoy escort.

Since the outcome of the war was determined by ground engagements, the Ground Forces were the basic Armed Service. These included rifle troops, cavalry, artillery, armored forces, engineer, railroad, chemical and signal troops. The division remained the main tactical formation. However, the operational structure of the divisions had been worked out in 1918 by old military specialists without sufficient consideration of the new nature of a war and the training level of the commanders and staffs and since that time had virtually remained unchanged.

According to the 1918 TOE, a rifle division should consist of three rifle brigades (with three regiments in each), three light battalions, one lightened, two howitzer and two heavy artillery battalions, an antiaircraft artillery battalion, a balloon detachment, an air battalion, a cavalry battalion, an armored vehicle detachment, an engineer battalion, a signals battalion and a large number of rear units. The total size of a division was 58,325 men; a division had over 24,000 horses, 382 machine guns, 170 guns and mortars.(31)

Since such divisions were not adapted to the conditions of the Civil War and the material and technical means did not exist for their organization and the commanders and staffs were not prepared to command such cumbersome formations, it was virtually impossible to adhere to these TOE. For this reason, the divisions were organized with the most diverse composition and left as such after the Civil War.

In viewing this situation as abnormal, M. V. Frunze raised the question of a fundamental reorganization of the rifle and cavalry divisions. First of all, regardless of the overall cutback in the size of the Red Army, he assumed that from the standpoint of the combat and mobilizational readiness of the troops and the maintaining off the cadre it was advisable not to reduce the number of divisions but even to somewhat increase this. "The number of troop formations had not been reduced but on the contrary, for a number of divisions we have increased the number of presently existing units, chiefly for the special branches of troops."(32) In actuality, while on 1 October 1923 the Red Army had 49 rifle divisions, by April 1925 there were 77 of them, including 46 territorial ones.(33)

M. V. Frunze worked to establish a more rational organization of the formations and units. In carrying out the reform under his leadership, uniform TOE were worked out for the field forces, formations and units of all branches of troops. Considering the maneuvering nature of the forthcoming

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operations, he considered it necessary to make the field forces, formations and units more mobile. For this reason their TOE size was reduced. The organizational structure of the corps, divisions and regiments was realized in such a manner as to give them an all-arms nature.

A rifle division after the reform consisted of three rifle regiments, a light artillery regiment, a separate cavalry squadron, a combat engineer company and engineer park, a signals company and rear subunits. As a total a division numbered 12,800 men, 54 guns, 189 medium machine guns, 81 light machine guns and 243 grenade launchers.(34) For the regular divisions of the border military districts, the peacetime size of a division was set at 6,516 men. Regardless of the reduced size, the combat might of a newly organized division had been significantly increased.

After the Civil War a so-called demonstration company was to be established in each rifle regiment and this company was to be armed with automatic weapons. The demonstration companies were trained in accord with the requirements of group tactics while the remaining companies were left with the usual organization and trained to fight in extended lines of riflemen. M. V. Frunze pointed out that under these conditions "we did not and could not have either a single organization or uniform tactics."(35) It was initially planned that all the companies of the rifle regiments would be converted to the sort of the demonstration ones, however due to the shortage of automatic weapons this could not be done. For this reason a decision was taken for all the companies to be converted to a uniform organization considering the positive experience of the demonstration companies and the weapons available in the troops. These companies were named real infantry, since they had new TOE considering certain prospects and real possibilities.

The cavalry was viewed as an independent branch of troops capable of carrying out important operational missions. At the same time the comment of M. V. Frunze was characteristic: "There is not the slightest doubt that in a future war, of course, **counting this 'single future' not as decades** (emphasis mine.-- M. G.)...the cavalry will play an honorable and prominent role."(36) Caveat was not accidental. He foresaw that the mechanization and motorization of the army and the cavalry could not develop in parallel for an any way extended time.

The cavalry corps was the superior formation of the cavalry and this consisted of two or three cavalry divisions, a horse-drawn howitzer artillery battalion and a signals squadron. A cavalry division had three cavalry regiments, a fire regiment, a horse-drawn artillery battalion, a combat engineer squadron, a signals squadron and rear formations (a total number of 7,000 men). The existing organizational structure of a cavalry regiment, M. V. Frunze pointed out, in consisting of three squadrons did not meet the demands made, since a regiment was very weak and with such a composition could not fight on foot. For this reason the regiment was to be reinforced. In the future Frunze considered it essential to include in the cavalry formations and units armored and mechanized subunits which would cover the cavalry and provide it with support.

As a result of the reorganizing of the rifle and cavalry divisions, regardless of the reduced number of personnel, their fire power, in comparison with the actually existing divisions had risen. However, in terms of fire power and technical equipping the Red Army divisions were inferior to the divisions of the major capitalist armies.

In the course of the reorganization the structure of the artillery was also changed. The dividing of the artillery into corps, divisional and regimental became established. The High Command was to have available special purpose artillery (two heavy artillery regiments and an artillery division). The armored forces, due to their small size, were not incorporated in the all-arms formations and in organizational terms were formed into separate heavy and light tank battalions.

A number of changes was also made in the organization of the other branches of troops. In particular, the engineer and railroad troops were put into larger formations. The signal troops were also significantly strengthened. We did this in order, explained M. V. Frunze, to create more convenient conditions for training the troops as a large organism facilitated instruction.

The Communist Party and V. I. Lenin, regardless of the limited resources, gave primary significance to the development of the Air Forces. Among the outstanding figures of our party, M. V. Frunze was one of the strongest proponents of establishing a powerful aviation. "...Even with the humblest assessment of the future role played by the air fleet, its significance...in actuality will be enormous,"(37) he said. According to a 3-year plan for the development of the Air Fleet approved in 1925, the number of aircraft was to be increased from 126 to 1,200, with the majority being fighters. The squadrons of fighter, light bomber and reconnaissance aviation became the main organizational unit and these were put directly under the chiefs of the military district air forces directorates.

Important missions in armed combat in the future were also to be entrusted to the Navy. V. I. Lenin always gave enormous attention to the navy. Since the outcome of a war was basically determined in ground engagements, the main mission for the fleet was to assist the fronts on the maritime sectors.

After the war V. I. Lenin demanded that the development of the navy be approached, as was the case incidentally for the other Armed Services, considering the specific military-political tasks and economic capabilities. He had high regard for the role of the navy in a future war, he was well aware of what strong naval enemies would oppose us but advised that the question be approached more soberly. Having weighed the situation existing in our country and abroad, he concluded that to have a significant fleet with a large number of capital surface ships for the Soviet state was an "excessive luxury.... It is not possible for us to maintain a fleet of any significant size due to economic and political considerations."(38) For this reason, the program worked out in 1932 for the overhaul and construction of naval vessels was to be cut back by approximately one-third and Lenin added to this: "...The specialist sailors, naturally, in being involved in their job, will inflate any figure, while with the enormous expenditure which we have assigned to

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aviation we should be doubly and triply cautious in terms of expenditures on the fleet...."(39)

M. V. Frunze commented that the fate of our navy was tragic: in the course of the revolution and the Civil War it had suffered particularly severe blows. In practical terms our state had been deprived of a fleet. As for an overall estimate of the role of a navy in the overall national defense system," stated Frunze, "I should say that we cannot conceive of the possibility of firm security for the frontiers of the Soviet land without the presence of a rather strong navy."(40) He felt that we needed a navy and we should develop it. He emphasized that while our nation did not possess the means to turn it into a size which would correspond to the length of our sea frontiers and to the interests of our naval defense, he expressed certainty that our economy in the future would provide such a possibility. Upon the decision of the 10th RKP(b) Congress, under the leadership of M. V. Frunze emergency measures were adopted to rebuild the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets and the naval forces on other seas. The tonnage of the fleet rose by 1.5-fold from 1923 through 1925.

In terms of the major direction in the organizational development of the Navy, M. V. Frunze supported Lenin's position in asserting that we "even with the best budgetary conditions would restrict ourselves to a program of building small vessels of a defensive nature."(41) He based this conclusion on three considerations: in the first place, "the navy is a very expensive weapon" and with an overall shortage of funds it is better to use them on more acute and primary needs which are of decisive significance for national defense; secondly, the fate of a future war will be determined on the continental theaters of military operations and the main mission of the Navy is to support the operations of land groupings on the maritime sectors; thirdly, our fleets do not have direct access to the major expanses of water.

Substantial changes had also occurred in the organization of the rear. For the fuller utilization of local resources and for reducing expenditures on procurement, storage and transporting, the main task of troop supply was entrusted to the military districts and troop units. Prior to this, as M. V. Frunze pointed out, all procurements, including troop supply articles, had to be made at the center and then delivered to the troops and this increased the load on transport and transport expenditures and generally created great inconveniences in supply. Troop supply after the reform began to be carried out according to the system of center--district--unit. The divisional and corps rears were excluded in the supply system. From 1924, the position was introduced of deputy regimental commander for supply.

For ensuring precise leadership over the troops and the military commissariats, the entire territory of the nation in military-administrative terms was broken up into seven military districts (in addition, the Turkestan Front still continued to exist). Here certain organizational ideas of Frunze were realized as voiced by him to the Republic RVS in 1918 in the establishing of the Yaroslavl Military District. He considered it advisable that the provinces comprising the district if possible be closely interlinked economically, culturally and politically; the district territory provided certain conveniences both in the sense of the disposition of the troops and in the sense of the possibility of shifting them with the least difficulties; as

a district center there was a city providing conveniences both in the sense of geographic position and in the sense of the placement of facilities. The sizes of the district should be as large as possible, for this was necessitated both by the need to reduce the size and cost of the military-administrative apparatus and also by the extreme shortage of workers.(42) Frunze was against including the districts of one province in different military districts as this could disorganize the military administration, the organizing of the units and the carrying out of mobilization. He saw to it that the provincial military commissariat within its functions was the master in all the districts of its province.

In accord with the Leninist nationality policy and the multinational nature of the Soviet Union, nationality [minority] formations were kept in the Red Army and their establishment was reinforced in the decisions of the 12th RKP(b) Congress. By the end of the Civil War, the Red Army had representatives of 50 nationalities with the Russians comprising 77.6 percent. In his work "Results and Prospects of Military Organizational Development" M. V. Frunze pointed out that our Red Army had never been viewed as a "Russian" army or the army of a single nationality. The Great Russian nationality has comprised and does comprise its core and the basis of all its might. But this did not and does not remove from all the other nationalities the rights and duties of defending the Soviet nation with weapons in hand. This duty should be extended evenly and on the principles of complete equality to ultimately those nationalities which previously were not liable for military service. In establishing the nationality formations M. V. Frunze saw not only a military but also a political, international purpose: we in this regard should set the example and show the future to all suppressed peoples.

M. F. Frunze felt that the highest demands of a political and military sort should be placed on the nationality formations, without making any concessions for them. He said directly that "the nationality formations for us are not an empty trifle and not a game for satisfying the national pride of the individual peoples of the Union. This is a serious task stemming from the entire nature of our state and determined by the basic principles of our domestic and international nationality policy.... For this reason, the republic is right to demand from us the establishing of those units which would wholly and fully satisfy all modern combat demands."(43)

At the same time M. V. Frunze was against turning the nationality formations into the core of national armies for they would not provide a unity of military thought and risked carrying out all our work in different directions and creating confusion in military affairs which absolutely could not be tolerated. For this reason, he said, "we do not permit the existence of nationality armies in each individual oblast or republic; we will incorporate the nationality unit in the general system of our Union's armed forces."(44)

Thus, upon the decision of the VKP(b) Central Committee and under the direct leadership of M. V. Frunze, in 1924-1925, major and important changes were carried out in the Armed Forces and these significantly improved the organizational structure of the Armed Forces and raised their combat readiness.

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Increased technical equipping of the Army and Navy. V. I. Lenin took a vital interest in the appearance of new weapons and recommended wider use of the most recent discoveries and advances for improving the technical equipping of the Army and Navy.(45)

During the first years after the Civil War under the conditions of the universal economic chaos, it was extremely difficult to solve the problems of increasing the technical equipping of the Armed Forces. But here was an accomplishment of the party as it looked far ahead and resolved these questions considering not only the immediate future but also the long run. In all the decisions of the Communist Party and the Soviet government the plans for the industrialization of the nation and for the development of the socialist economy were closely coordinated with the tasks of strengthening national defense. Even the decisions of the 10th RKP(b) Congress stated the demand: "...to pay exceptional attention to all the special technical units (artillery, machine gun, armored vehicle, aviation, engineer, armored train and so forth); to provide these units with all necessary articles of both combat and material-housekeeping supply...."(46)

Also of important significance was the circumstance that during the years of the 1924-1925 military reform, when proceeding from party notions the principles were established for the further development of the Armed Forces, M. V. Frunze held a very farsighted and correct position on the questions of the technical equipping of the Army and Navy. In a future war, he was convinced, the role of military equipment would rise significantly. In November 1925 he wrote an article in PRAVDA entitled "Let Us Have Equipment!" where he stated: we should have an army armed according to the last word of modern equipment. This was a slogan with which the Red Army during the 7th anniversary of its existence would direct to domestic industry, to the workers, engineers, technicians, chemists and scientists of the Soviet Union.(47)

"The experience of the imperialist war," M. V. Frunze pointed out, "has shown what an enormous role will be played by equipment on future battlefields. With the development of aviation, chemistry, radio and so forth, the broadest prospects are opened up in this area. At the given moment, it is hard for us to imagine with what the armies of the technically most advanced bourgeois countries will appear on the fields of future battles. Probably the weapons which they will possess will differ significantly from what we saw in the course of the imperialist war. A future war to a significant degree, if not as a whole, will be a war of machines."(48) He constantly emphasized that the Red Army would be engaged with a well equipped enemy army that was armed with all the most recent technical advances and if our army does not have these advances then prospects for us would be very, very bad. This must be considered when we settle the question of the general preparations of the nation for defense.

Considering this circumstance, M. V. Frunze insisted upon the adopting of emergency measures to increase the technical equipping of the Army and Navy. He saw two basic ways for carrying out this task: the first, a maximum acceleration in the development of the defense sectors of industry and the greatest possible development of science and technology in the aims of

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developing new models of weapons; the second was the modernizing of existing types of weapons and military equipment. The latter would make it possible, with comparatively small expenditures and without a fundamental revision of production methods, to improve the quality of the technical equipping of the troops. Thus, in 1925, the Soviet designer V. F. Tokarev improved the Maxim machine gun; the Mosin rifle was also improved; the firing range of artillery pieces increased from 1,500 to 5,000 m. By organizing repair and modernization, the amount of artillery in the troops was increased by 3-4-fold.

An increase in aircraft output was also quickly achieved. For example, in 1922, 90 percent of the aircraft was produced abroad and only 10 percent was produced in our nation. By 1925, aircraft purchases abroad had been halted and aircraft output had been significantly increased for the Red Army.

Tank production was started. Characteristically, M. V. Frunze even in 1921 had raised the question of the need to start tank building in our country, "although even to the detriment and at the expense of the other types of weapons."(49)

At the same time work was started on developing the designs of domestic tanks, aircraft, more advanced field and antiaircraft guns, means of communications and other types of equipment. Great attention was paid to developing antigas protective equipment. The greatest possible intensification of scientific-technical research and inventive activities during those years was of exceptionally great importance and created a good start for organizing the production of new types of weapons and military equipment in the 1930's, when the essential military base had arisen in our country.

Centralism and One-Man Command

Centralism--one of the most important principles of military organizational development. Centralism in the organization, set-up and command of the Armed Forces was understood by V. I. Lenin as the reflection in terms of the specific conditions of a military organization of the principle of democratic centralism which had been adopted in party and Soviet construction. He considered it one of the most important conditions for the combat capability of the Armed Forces, without which the army could not act as a united force. Lenin called the army one of the examples of strong organization and pointed out that it is good in its flexibility and at the same time its capability to give millions of people "a single will.... This is called an organization when for the sake of a single goal and inspired by a common will, millions of people change the form of their intercourse and their actions, they change the place and procedures of activity and change implements and weapons according to the altered circumstances and needs of combat."(50)

Lenin's ideas on centralism were reflected in the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress which pointed to the necessity of "the planned organizational development of a centralized army, a unity of organization and a unity of command over the army only can ensure the achieving of the greatest results with the least sacrifices."(51) V. I. Lenin emphasized that "unified command over all the Red Army detachments and strictest centralization in the

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disposition of all forces and resources of the socialist republics..."(52) had established the necessary prerequisites for defeating the White Guard armies and interventionists.

The unified will which was given to the Soviet Armed forces was viewed as a party, state will expressed and established in the corresponding decisions, laws and demands of the military regulations. In developing this notion, M. V. Frunze said that the Red Army "is an organism living and acting on the basis of firm, state-established statutes."(53)

The principle of centralism in terms of Soviet military organizational development was understood by Frunze as the organizing of unified command over the Armed Forces by the Republic RVS and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs working under the direct leadership of the party Central Committee and the Soviet government, as the unconditional subordination of all headquarters bodies, troop and naval formations from top to bottom to central authority and to the single High Command. This at the same time presupposed the subordination of all the field forces, formations, units and military facilities to the corresponding superior commands up a strictly established chain of command.

It should be pointed out that M. V. Frunze profoundly and precisely understood the necessity of establishing a single and clearly regulated procedure for all the major questions of military service. If the necessary instructions from above did not exist for any type of activity, he immediately established the corresponding regulations within his authority. We have already mentioned the regulations worked out by him for the combat militias in working underground, the regulations and instructions concerning the procedure for forming new troop formations and units in the Yaroslavl Military District, the first troop regulations in the Ukrainian and Crimean troops and so forth. Even now one is amazed how thoughtfully and intelligently he worked out instructions down to the last detail on covert troop command. These instructions were announced in an order to the armies of the Southern Group of Forces of the Eastern Front No 1/1 of 30 March 1919. While commander of the Turkestan Front, he issued instructions to partisan detachments operating in the area of the front and these set out their tasks, the most effective methods of action and the procedure for cooperation with regular troops.(54)

M. V. Frunze responded in a principled manner to all instances of violating established procedures for centralized troop command wherever these might arise. Thus, in October 1918, in a special order for the Yaroslavl Military District, he strictly warned all the provincial military commissars on the inadmissibility of turning directly to the fronts and central directorates on questions comprising the competence of the district command. M. V. Frunze repeatedly sent urgent requests to the All-Russian Chief Staff so that orders were not issued without notification of the district military commissar of the stationing of new formations and units on the district territory, for several units ended up being sent to the same points and this led to disorganization and a disrupting of troop order.(55) He argued back when the staff of the Eastern Front endeavored to command individual regiments over the head of the divisional and army commanders.

At the same time M. V. Frunze expressed his disagreement if the essence of centralism was distorted and understood in a formal bureaucratic manner. When the main staff issued instructions to all the military commissars of the military districts to utilize the orders of only the All-Russian Main Staff, Mikhail Vasilyevich turned to the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars with a request to adjust this order.(56) He rightly pointed out that such a formal approach merely impeded the work, for the military commissars, along with instructions from the main staff on the questions inherent to it, should carry out the instructions of the political directorate, the supply bodies and other central directorates which were not under the main staff.

The value of this idea of M. V. Frunze was that the centralization of command and control does not mean carrying out leadership and cooperation of the various levels only along the vertical line of command, but it should also be carried out along the horizontal. Such a form of subordination or reporting of the inferior levels to the superior bodies on the appropriate special questions, without disrupting the principle of direct subordination, creates a broad front of contact, professional cooperation, in increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of troop command and control. This idea was considered subsequently in the reorganization and setting of the functional duties for the directorates of the central apparatus of the military department, the military districts and fleets.

In carrying out the reform, along with the organizational changes in the military bodies, there was also a major revision of the principles and methods of their work. M. V. Frunze expressed his attitude to these questions most extensively in the report "On the Reorganization of the Military Apparatus" given at the RKKA Military Academy in April 1924.(57)

In the first place, M. V. Frunze proceeded from the view that authentic centralism is impossible without planning and a system in the work, recalling the words of V. I. Lenin that "it is impossible to work without having a plan calculated for an extended period and for a major success."(58) Upon the instructions of M. V. Frunze, the RKKA Staff and the other central directorates worked out a series of long-range plans for the organizational development of the Armed Forces as a whole and for the individual services (Air Forces, Navy), for improving mobilizational readiness, for working out regulations, for military scientific work and other major questions. He sharply criticized the directorates of the central apparatus for the fact that by justification of the limited nature of the resources allocated to the Red Army, they had been solving the questions of long-range planning slowly and without a proper eye to the future. In speaking about the shortcomings in the elaboration of the operational and mobilizational plans and their isolation from real capabilities in the nation, he commented that the questions of coordinating our operational goals with material capabilities and the questions of coordinating military mobilizational plans with the plans of industrial measures do not depend upon the shortage of resources and should be fully resolved by the central directorates of the military department jointly with the other bodies. Consequently, it was essential first of all to improve the style and methods of leadership.

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Secondly, M. V. Frunze considered as inadmissible a state where there was no uniform understanding of the tasks confronting the army and navy. For surmounting the differences of opinion it was essential to introduce the ideas of a uniform military doctrine into the minds of all the personnel and primarily the commanders and political workers. He in every possible way fostered creative initiative, he participated in debates on scientific questions and was sincerely pleased by the slightest manifestations of the new. At the same time, he assumed that a discussion of theoretical questions should be terminated by the elaboration of ideas and conclusions which would be obligatory for all and which would be followed unswervingly by all officials. This, actually, was the sense of a military doctrine and its main distinction from military science and military theory generally, since the formally approved conclusions and recommendations required not debate but fulfillment.

Thirdly, M. V. Frunze considered dangerous an isolation of the leadership apparatus from the army rank and file; he fought to eradicate the vestiges of bureaucracy, paper-shuffling and red tape. He considered these abnormal phenomena to be unnatural and contradictory to the entire essence of the military system of command which demanded simplicity and clarity, preciseness, definiteness, flexibility and efficiency in work. "When we come close to this question," he said, "it turns out that the work of our staffs was three-quarters and, for example, in the naval department nine-tenths burdened down with completely unnecessary and useless reporting. As a curiosity one might mention that fact that in the naval department there was a form of reporting which had been inherited from the times of Peter the Great and which had no bearing on modern needs and the requirements of our fleet.

"All of this shows that in the organization of our work we have still too many vestiges of the old routine which impede our work and prevent a vital approach to the job."(59)

Red tape had led, on the one hand, to the swelling of the administrative apparatus and, on the other, prevented the troops from being concerned with vital matters. Even Suvorov had said: "Large staffs mean small victories."

As the work of the commissions to investigate the activities of the central apparatus was to show, the excessive size of its staffs had led to a situation where it became hard to manage. The leaders of certain departments, in experiencing major difficulties in controlling the subordinate apparatus, gradually became fenced off from their main administrative bodies by personal office staffs. As a result the main apparatus began to stand idle while they endeavored to resolve major questions through insufficiently competent persons. This sharply reduced the effectiveness of both the leaders themselves and the command and control bodies as a whole. Frunze boldly moved to reduce the central apparatus by almost one-quarter (prior to the reform it numbered over 3,500 men).

It must be said that even after the Civil War at the center they had cut back on the administrative apparatus several times but after a certain period of time it had begun to grow. For this the bureaucrats employed the long-tested method of establishing a system of cumbersome reporting and a bureaucratic

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exchange of letters over any, even the most insignificant question and thought up all sorts of questions on each document which frequently already provided this information. Here they themselves thought up a form of reporting and then explained that this had been established by the appropriate orders and rulings of the superior levels. With good reason V. I. Lenin warned constantly about the threat of bureaucracy, for each bureaucrat and official is dangerous in the fact that he is formally right.

In considering the particular lethality of bureaucracy for troop leadership, M. V. Frunze worked decisively to eradicate this evil and introduce into the work practices of the military personnel new methods and a Leninist style of work. We are endeavoring, he said in a report, to minimize paper reporting and control and instead of this introduce vital control, direct leadership and supervision. In the place of the numerous reports comprising a flow of red tape, we want to more widely introduce the practice of the more frequent visiting of subordinate units by the appropriate superior chief. At the same time, he warned that the granting of great rights and opportunities for hands-on leadership and the reduction in paper reporting did not mean a lessening of demands for a knowledge of the state of affairs in one or another area, it did not mean a reduction of responsibility but presupposed a rise in this in all levels.

As a whole, all the measures of the 1924-1925 military reform, starting with the ordering of the command system at the center, establishing a uniform procedure for undergoing military service and ending with the establishing of uniform TOE for the field forces, formations and units and the introduction of military manuals, were aimed at realizing in practice the principle of centralism in military organizational development on a scale of the Republic's Armed Forces. Thus, in addition to the passage of a number of laws and provisions in 1924-1925, the following were also worked out and introduced: the RKKA Temporary Field Manual, Part 2 (Division and Corps) which was an all-arms manual and standard for all the branches of troops; combat regulations for the infantry, cavalry and artillery (in 6 parts) and armored forces; all-arms regulations including the Temporary Regulation for Garrison Service, Temporary Disciplinary Regulation, Temporary Internal Service Regulation and Temporary Firearms Regulation (the use of firearms and weapons training). A series of manuals and instructions were also issued on special questions. The all-arms regulations for the first time in the history of Soviet military organizational development clearly set out the rights, duties and relationships of the servicemen in a combat situation and in peacetime service. All of this provided an opportunity for the command and political cadres to lead the subordinate troops in a more confident and effective manner and at the same time helped to increase the responsibility of all the personnel for carrying out their military duty.

M. V. Frunze was clearly aware that there was a very great distance in practice between the establishing of the principles of centralization and their introduction. Enormous indoctrinational and organizational work was required. In formal terms, in a general setting, the necessity of centralization was recognized by a predominant majority of the command and political personnel. However, in practical activities at the outset there were numerous attempts to avoid or inaccurately carry out the demands stemming

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from the principle of centralism. M. V. Frunze, in the report "The Red Army at the Start of the Eighth Year of Its Existence" brought out the roots of these phenomena. Certain commanders even of the superior grades, he said, have granted themselves arbitrary rights, even to the point of the independent shifting of units. And not because of any conscious violation of orders. M. V. Frunze was inclined to explain this to a significant degree by the vestiges of the age of the Civil War and by the remnants of the administrative and organizational procedures in partisan units, when the troops too long lived without permanent organizational forms.... They too long lived by their own wits. Each person, in fighting in a difficult situation, endeavored to do what he was capable of, he was concerned with creativity and each thought in his own way, being guided, certainly, by the best intentions. Now not all comrades have realized that this period is now over and that the army should remain within definite, permanent organizational limits and at present we should not have any such actions. At present the army, as an organized whole, lives and should live according to orders and instructions.(60) M. V. Frunze urged the waging of a decisive struggle against any violations of the established laws and rules of military life.

At the same time, Frunze explained that centralism and strict regulation in military life not only do not contradict creativity, initiative and independence of subordinates, but, on the contrary, presuppose an obligatory manifestation of these qualities by them for seeking out the best methods of resolving the set tasks. Particularly inadmissible is the excessive "over-centralization" of initiatives coming from below. "I have in mind," he said, "a push for obligatory centralization of any initiatives even when things are just beginning to move."(61) Thus, he did not advise the excessive regulation of activities in the primary military-scientific societies, the volunteer defense and other societies until definite experience had been gained on the spot.

The basic notion of M. V. Frunze came down to the fact that the regular army could be successfully organized and operate only with centralized control. However, centralization is not an end in itself; it should be carried out within limits and in such a combination with initiative and broad creativity that as a whole all of this ensure the necessary effectiveness of troop command.

In order to be victorious, iron, military discipline is required. Centralism in the organizational development of the Armed Forces had been constantly tied to discipline which is one of the conditions for the organized activities and combat readiness of the Army and Navy. V. I. Lenin said: "If one thinks about what ultimately lies at the very basis of that historical miracle which has occurred, that a weak, impotent and backward nation has been victorious over the strongest nations of the world, we see that what this is is centralization, discipline and unprecedented self-sacrifice."(62) It is well known how profoundly Lenin thought out and weighed each word in his oral and printed comments. And if he was forced to say: "The person who does not help the Red Army totally and unstintingly and does not support order and discipline with all his strength is a traitor...and must be eliminated mercilessly,"(63) it is not difficult to understand what enormous significance he gave to discipline in the Army and Navy and how acutely and sharply he

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raised this question. Lenin's conclusion on this score was completely definite and constant: in order to be victorious there had to be the greatest struggle, there had to be iron, military discipline and this had to be instilled firmly and uncompromisingly.

In 1918, in line with the setbacks of the Southern Front, the party Central Committee demanded with an iron hand that the command, superior and inferior, be forced to carry out combat orders at the price of whatever means.

M. V. Frunze profoundly understood and with his entire soul shared such a severe and exacting approach to the questions of discipline. All his life and activities were the greatest example of party and military discipline. He considered the maintaining of official discipline in army ranks to be an obligatory and most essential condition for its might and warned that the demands of the Soviet state in this regard were the most decisive.

Being a supporter of rigid exactingness on the questions of military discipline, Frunze at the same time emphasized that its bases in the Red Army were fundamentally different from those in the Tsarist Army and for what exists in the bourgeois armies. In a speech on the results of a plenum of the USSR RVS in December 1924, he explained that we were against barracks drill as a method of the mechanical subordination of the rank-and-file to a superior will. This was the method of the capitalist armies, where discipline was based upon the class subordination of the private, almost exclusively a peasant or worker, to a bourgeois officer class. There discipline was a reflection of the class, social inequality and suppression by the exploiting classes. In the armies of the capitalist states discipline was based on naked coercion of the soldier and on a fear of punishment. In the Red Army and Red Navy there was not and could not be any opposed class interests among the command personnel and the Red Armymen, since both came basically from the workers and peasants and were called to defend the victories of the revolution and the interests of the workers. Red Army discipline was based not on class subordination but on the necessity of the correct division of labor, correct leadership and correct responsibility. It was founded upon a voluntary, conscious execution of one's military duty.

In demanding unconditional subordination to his orders, each commander should be fully aware that the revolutionary discipline of the Red Army cannot be mechanical. Our Red Armyman is not the former Tsarist soldier silenced and intimidated to the point of losing the feeling of one's own worth. We do not need such a soldier. Our Red Armyman is a full citizen of the Republic. He is fully aware that revolutionary discipline is a difficult burden only for the person who does not understand its aims and importance. The essence of military discipline is in subordination to the laws of the worker-peasant government, strict observance of the rules of military service and the unswerving fulfillment of the orders and instructions of the commanders and commissars. Hence it is clear that any nonfulfillment of an official order from a commander is a major crime before the law. "Each Red Armyman should be indoctrinated in an awareness of the need for the unswerving, rapid and precise execution of all official orders. In this regard there can be no concessions made by the command and political personnel." (64)

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M. V. Frunze considered particularly inadmissible instances of laxness by the commanders and a desire of some of them to "make up" to subordinates, to acquire cheap popularity or overlook infractions of discipline due to a lack of civil courage. Even more aggravating and intolerable were instances when commanders and political workers carried out conflicting lines and when the political workers did not support the official authority of the commanders. M. V. Frunze demanded that such phenomena be prosecuted unmercifully. He urged the most decisive struggle be waged against all instances of negligence, slovenliness and lack of discipline. No instance of nonfulfillment of an official order by whatever party should remain unpunished.

A most important condition for the strengthening of discipline was considered by Mikhail Vasilyevich to be the example set by the command and political personnel itself. "The slightest instances," he said, "of undisciplined behavior by the supervisory personnel have the worst effect on the discipline of the rank and file.... Any undisciplined action by any commander or political worker should be met by the strongest rebuff and in no instance be allowed to go unpunished. Only in such a case can one tighten discipline from top to bottom."(65)

On one-man command. The principle of one-man command is inseparably linked with centralism and the maintaining of high military discipline and organization in the Armed Forces. The party and V. I. Lenin thoroughly established and consistently carried out the principle of one-man leadership not only in military organizational development but also in the area of state and economic activities.

Any large-scale machine-based industry or transport, V. I. Lenin said, "cannot function correctly if there is no unity of will linking all the available workers into a single economic organ operating with the preciseness of a clock mechanism."(66) One-man command "most ensures the best utilization of human abilities and provides a real and not a verbal check on the work,"(67) and ensures the responsibility and organization of human activity.

One-man command in no measure contradicts socialist democracy. V. I. Lenin wrote: "...There is decisively no fundamental contradiction between soviet (that is, socialist) democracy and the employment of the dictatorial power of individuals."(68) Socialism, as the most highly organized society, requires the unswerving obedience of the masses to a single will of the leaders of the labor process. Just how consistent and unswerving Lenin was on this question was can be judged from his instructions that in instances when the demands of one-man command and the interests of the question did not coincide with the desire of individuals or groups, and when the conscious observance of discipline was lacking, one-man command "can assume the abrupt forms of dictatorship...."(69)

If the question of one-man leadership in the national economy was posed so acutely and certainly, in the Army and Navy it undoubtedly had and does have even greater significance, since the very nature of military service and particularly a frontline situation requires the highest organization, unity of action and firm troop command. Without unity of leadership and a unity of will, V. I. Lenin pointed out, "there can be no dictatorship on the front and

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there will be mere dawdling."(70) In conducting a merciless struggle against the Trotskyites and "leftist" opportunists, Lenin said outright: "Irresponsibility covered by references to collegiality is the most dangerous evil which threatens everyone who does not have very great experience in actual collegial work and which in military affairs quite often leads inevitably to catastrophe, chaos, panic, divided power and defeat."(71)

The introduction of the institution of military commissars during the period of the Civil War was viewed by him as a temporary, enforced measure under the existing extraordinary historical conditions when there was not a sufficient number of ideologically tempered commanders devoted to the revolution and it was essential to draw upon military specialists from the old army and when the Red Army could be penetrated by hostile elements. Clearly under the conditions of the fierce class struggle, Soviet power could not rely fully on such command personnel and was forced to have political supervision. Political work was needed to win the masses and draw them over to the side of the revolution. As M. V. Frunze said, "This was a completely essential stage in the process of establishing the armed force of our worker-peasant state."(72) The commissars carried out enormous work and played a decisive role in the course of the Civil War, particularly in indoctrinating the command personnel and the entire mass of Red Armymen. They worked to strengthen the moral and political unity of the personnel and thereby established conditions for introducing one-man command in the Armed Forces. In the following periods, when it was essential to return to the institution of military commissars, this was a forced measure.

The Leninist understanding of one-man command as the only correct organization of work and as the most effective method of troop command has remained immutable. But, as V. I. Lenin taught, every, even the most correct principle is applied in practice considering the specific situational conditions.

M. V. Frunze pointed out: "...We recognize and always have recognized the advisability of switching to one-man command in all the organizational stages of the Red Army and Navy. But, as in other questions of our life, in assessing any situation, here we, as Marxists, cannot approach the question in an abstract manner. Each principle, each idea must be assessed from the viewpoint of its conformity to the existing situation. Such an attitude must also be extended to the principle of one-man command."(73) He then went on to stipulate that in the period of the Civil War it was impossible to do this but since then the situation in the Red Army had significantly changed.

It must be pointed out that in the period of the Civil War where M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuybyshev, V. K. Blyukher, K. Ye. Voroshilov and other commanders and commissars who had undergone the school of revolutionary struggle were working together, there were no formal relationships between the commander and commissar. Mutual trust and the interests of successfully carrying out combat missions created a situation where the commanders, in essence, fully and without any limits restricting their power exercised operational command of the troops while the commissars, participating as necessary in command focused their efforts on political work, skillfully involving the commanders in it. All of this had a beneficial effect upon the effectiveness of troop leadership and was a reflection of the objective necessity of one-man command.

The changes carried out in 1924-1925 in the Red Army, the strengthening of the military command bodies with experienced party cadres and the purging of the Trotskyites from them created conditions for introducing one-man command into the Army and Navy. By this time, 40 percent of the commanders were communists and there was a higher proportional amount of commanders who had come from worker and peasant backgrounds (together these comprised around 85 percent). A recertification of the command, political and administrative personnel had been carried out. A single rank of RKKA commander had been introduced. In addition, the new complex tasks confronting the Red Army required further centralization of troop command.

In analyzing this problem and noting the great contributions by the commissars during the Civil War and the role of the military commissar in the postwar period, M. V. Frunze wrote: "His primary functions which came down to the role of the 'eye of the soviet state' soon under the influence of naturally developing events broadened and our military commissar has been turned into an organizer and administrator. This process was inevitably linked to a certain reduction in the rights and functions of the commander, particularly when the latter was a nonparty person. Then there emerged the reverse side of the coin when the commander gradually lost the most important property of any good commander, that is, will power and the capacity to take independent, quick decisions. This phenomenon for a number of reasons has become rather common for the Red Army." (74) All of this, he continued, shows the timeliness and necessity of quickly implementing a series of measures to actually realizing one-man command in the army.

In July 1924, the RKP(b) Orgburo [Organizational Bureau] adopted a decision on gradually converting to one-man command in the Armed Forces and entrusted the fulfillment of this task to the Republic RVS. On 2 March 1925, the RVS issued an order signed by M. V. Frunze on introducing one-man command in the Red Army and Navy.

Initially complete and incomplete one-man command was introduced. M. V. Frunze in preparing the decision on this question, proceeding from the above-given Leninist theses, was firmly convinced that the superior and most desirable type of one-man command would be the combining of the functions of both line and party leadership in one person. Over the long run this type of one-man command would be the apex of our achievements, he emphasized. But at that time, regardless of the first successes in the training of military cadres, such a principle could not immediately be carried out in practice. The combining of operational-line and political functions, Frunze felt, required from the commander the properties and qualities which could be found in far from all of even the party commanders, let alone the nonparty ones.

Considering all of this, M. V. Frunze considered it better to institute several forms or types of one-man command. In speaking in December 1924 in the RKKA Military Academy giving a report on the results of the plenum of the USSR RVS, first of all he drew attention to the fact that the question of one-man command related not to the institution of political workers but to the institution of commissars. At present all leadership in the area of line, administrative and housekeeping affairs could and should be concentrated in

the hands of the commander; the functions of political indoctrination remained fully in the hands of the political apparatus. He considered it wrong also to extend the principle of one-man command solely to the party command personnel, as had been proposed by certain comrades. One could not assume that all the command personnel would consist of party members and one-man command had to be introduced in the army.

For this reason, three types of one-man command were introduced a description of which was given by M. V. Frunze at the plenum of the RVS and in the above-mentioned speech after the plenum.(75)

The first type. The commander who is solely in command not only for line and administrative-housekeeping affairs, but also for the questions of political leadership and indoctrination. This type would not be widespread and would be introduced only where they had actually succeeded in selecting commanders who met the high demands of both a commander and political leader.

The second type. The solely-responsible commander in the area of line, housekeeping and administrative affairs. This type of solely-responsible commander was to be the predominant one; such solely-responsible commanders could be all of both the party and non-party commanders of the Red Army.

The third type of one-man command should be introduced on the staffs and other administrative headquarters. Here the functions of political work would be entrusted to the party cells under the control and leadership of the appropriate political bodies.

A slow rate of introducing one-man command was established for the Navy where old military specialists still predominated among the command personnel.

It was proposed that political commissars remain in the nationality formations until the completion of their organization.

Special attention was paid to close contact in the work of the solely-responsible commander of the second type with the party and political leadership in order not to allow a gap between these areas of work. M. V. Frunze was sharply critical of those who assumed that the introduction of one-man command would lead to a playing down of the role of political bodies. He firmly and persuasively explained that political work was and always would be the basis of our military organizational development.

In line with the introduction of one-man command the order of the USSR RVS of 2 March 1925 demanded "the concentration of line and administrative-housekeeping functions completely in the hands of the commander and chief, having commenced the carrying out of this measure primarily in the RKKA.... All commissar personnel was to be freed...from the duty of daily supervision over the line, administrative and housekeeping activities of the commanders and chiefs, fully maintaining for the military commissars the functions of party and political leadership and responsibility with the commanders for the moral-political state of the unit or formation.... At the same time the commanders and chiefs are obliged to keep the commissars informed of all the line and administrative-housekeeping life in the unit or formation."(76) A

commissar was granted the right to contest the orders of a commander or chief to superior levels, without halting their fulfillment.

Considering the importance and complexity of the transition to one-man command, the party Central Committee in March 1925 sent to all party committees a directive letter which proposed every assistance to the army political bodies in carrying out the principle of one-man command and strengthening party influence in the Armed Forces.

M. V. Frunze cautioned that the introduction of one-man command would require greater work in the training and indoctrination of command personnel so that they consistently carried out the policy of the party and the Soviet state, they did not permit administration by mere injunction or the abuse of power and were politically mature and competent commanders. In their work they were to rely on the support of the political bodies, the party organizations and all the communists. Once we have readied the army for a decisive struggle, he explained, against major and serious enemies, we should have at the head of our units persons who possess sufficient independence, firmness, initiative and responsibility. We must have a command personnel which does not become muddled in any situation whatsoever and which could quickly take the appropriate decision, bearing responsibility for all its consequences and firmly carry it out. The former system of divided command which had been caused by political considerations impeded the development of such command personnel. For this reason, M. V. Frunze considered the policy of instituting one-man command to be an important condition in strengthening the state's military might.

He then went on to point out that: "Our commander should be able to organize things so that the masses see in him not only a technical leader but also an indoctrinator. But this is possible only in the instance that our commander has a sufficiently broad political viewpoint so that he is able to analyze all that complicated and constantly changing tangle of class and national forces with which reality confronts us..."(77) This notion has not only maintained its importance but has become evermore pertinent for all officer personnel under present-day conditions.

Organizing the Training of Military Cadres

Military cadres--the basis of army and navy military might. F. Engels correctly foresaw that in creating a new army the main and most difficult question would be "creating a corps of officers and junior officers"(78) which would determine the strength of the entire organization of armed personnel. Our party has always given great attention to the training of military cadres who are dedicated to the cause of the revolution and are highly trained.

V. I. Lenin said: "The success of the Russian and world socialist revolution depends with what energy the workers take to administering the state and to commanding an army of workers and exploited persons who are fighting to overthrow the yoke of capital."(79) He felt that the problem of military cadres had to be solved in two ways: by using the officer and junior officer personnel of the old Russian Army and training our own revolutionary command personnel from the workers and peasants.

Generally known is the resistance evoked from the "leftist" communists, the "military opposition" and certain confused party, state and military workers to the idea of V. I. Lenin on widely drawing officer personnel from the old Tsarist Army into the Red Army. One of their arguments was that the Tsarist Army was made up of officers of noble origin who under no circumstances would fight on the side of the revolution. But this was merely a formal approach concealed behind a pseudorevolutionary phraseology and not considering the true state of affairs. On this question one can clearly see the inspired simplicity of the decision found by Lenin and based not on formal and abstract slogans but rather on a profound and specific analysis and consideration of a concrete historical situation.

He boldly took the step of using officers from the old army, taking into account those major changes which had occurred in the Russian Army during the years of World War I. On the eve of this war the Russian Army had around 45,000 generals and officers, and among the superior officers (the most numerous part of the officer personnel), noblemen comprised not more than one-half. But by the end of the war there were 240,000 officers. During the war in short courses some 220,000 persons had been trained as warrant officers alone and 80 percent of them came from the middle and petty bourgeoisie and from the intelligentsia; there were even individual representatives of the working class and peasantry among them.

Proceeding from this, V. I. Lenin reached the conclusion that: "Defeats...have hardened the army and have eliminated enormous amounts of its old command personnel of a hardened noble and particularly a rotten bureaucratic nature, and have replaced it with a young, fresh, predominantly bourgeois, mixed and petty bourgeois personnel." (80) Many democratically inclined officers from the very outset sided with the revolution.

As the experience of the Civil War was to show, Lenin's ploy proved completely right. By the end of the war former officers comprised more than one-third of the Red Army command personnel. In accord with the instructions of the party Central Committee, their actions were closely followed by the commissars appointed for this, since there were instances of treason by the old officers. For this reason at the Eighth Party Congress, Trotsky and his supporters in the military department were informed that they had excessively trusted the military specialists and poorly monitored their activities. But a majority of the officers from the old army basically served honestly. V. I. Lenin in November 1919, on this question commented: "You have heard about a series of brilliant victories by the Red Army. Working in it are tens of thousands of old officers and colonels. If we had not put them into service and forced them to serve us, we could not have created an army." (81)

Using out of necessity the military specialists of the old army, V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party still wagered chiefly on the training of officers from the workers. V. I. Lenin constantly demanded "in building the new army...to take commanders only from the people. Only the Red officers will have authority among the soldiers and be able to strengthen socialist in our army. Such an army will be invincible." (82)

The questions of organizing the training of military personnel were discussed at the 10th and 11th RKP(b) Congresses and at numerous plenums of the Party Central Committee. A number of party and government decrees were published on the reorganization and improved training at military schools. Measures were adopted to increase the party stratum among commanders. There was a significant rejuvenation of the command personnel. Thus, in 1921, put on permanent leave were all persons of command personnel, regardless of the position held, who had reached the age of 50, while for battalion and regimental commanders the age was 40 and for commanders of companies and below 35 years of age.(83)

Immediately after the Civil War (in 1921) V. I. Lenin signed the decree of the Labor and Defense Council on converting many short courses into military schools with a corresponding lengthening of the period of instruction. Three stages were planned for training command personnel in military schools: secondary military schools with a period of instruction of 3-4 years, higher schools and courses for the advanced training of personnel after work in the troops and military academies.

A most serious problem was the filling of the VUZes with officer candidates from workers and peasants. Even under the condition that the military schools admitted those with a three-grade education, it was extremely difficult to recruit the required number of literate students.

M. V. Frunze called the command personnel the backbone of the army, the basis of its might and during the period of conducting the military reform also gave great attention to the question of improving the training of military personnel and their military service.

Here it was essential to overcome also the consequences of the incorrect personnel policy carried out by the Trotskyites, particularly in relation to commanders from the workers and peasants. In the process of reducing the army, the Trotskyites had endeavored to get rid of them. Thus, of the 87,000 persons who completed Soviet military schools, by the start of 1924, just 25,000 officers were in the army. A majority of the graduates from the first class of the General Staff Academy and who had experience in the Civil War had even been dismissed.

In carrying out the instructions of the party Central Committee, M. V. Frunze first of all posed the problem of stabilizing the command and political personnel of the Armed Forces and strictly regulating their military service. For this purpose a regulation on service in the military department was worked out and put into effect in October 1924. The terms of service and obligatory service after completing military schools were established. Of great importance for systematizing service was the establishing of maximum and minimum service times for each position. A procedure was instituted for certifying the command and political personnel.

The reduction in the army was also employed for improving the qualitative composition of the commanders and political workers. The worker group among them in 1925 had increased by 1.5-fold and the party group by 2-fold. At the same time, the number of old military specialists was reduced. By the end of

the Civil War they were 34 percent of the command personnel, including 13.1 percent in 1925.

Great attention was given to strengthening the party and Komsomol organizations in the troops, and particularly the party cells. In October 1924, the army had 46,000 party members and candidate members and 36,700 Komsomol members. A major event in the life of the Red Army was the holding of the first all-army conference of party cell secretaries held at the end of February and the beginning of March 1925. This conference defined the specific tasks and ways for further strengthening party influence in all elements of the troop organism. The army Komsomol had also gathered strength. A. S. Bubnov commented: "The military Komsomol since 1924 has grown gigantically. It now is the first assistant of the party in all its party and political indoctrination in the ranks of the Red Army. The Komsomol organization is the main instrument of party influence in the barracks, in the crew and on the ship."(84)

In line with the difficult material situation of the command and political personnel, in March-April 1924, upon the initiative of M. V. Frunze the USSR RVS submitted for review by the RKP(b) Central Committee the question of improving the material status and living conditions of the command personnel. The plenum adopted a number of measures aimed at solving this question. These problems were also raised in the report of M. V. Frunze at the Third Congress of USSR Soviets. The congress obliged the TsIK and SNK as well as the equivalent Union republic organizations to improve the material and living conditions of the RKKA and primarily its professional personnel.

Improving the system of military schools. In the aim of improving the training of military personnel, the USSR RVS, under the leadership of M. V. Frunze, carried out a number of measures to further develop and improve the system of military schools. In November 1924, it approved the Decree "On the Network of Military Schools." For training middle-level command personnel, instead of the short courses, a uniform normal military school was introduced for the branches of troops with standard TOE. The organizational structure of the schools was brought close to that of the troops with the schools consisting of battalions, companies (batteries and squadrons). In a number of republics nationality military schools were established.

Of great importance was the demand of M. V. Frunze set out in the decree of the USSR RVS: the RVS of the military districts should provide the military schools with everything necessary for studies and life, they should be manned by the best command personnel, the admission to the schools of Red Army men should be increased from the troop units, the schools should be helped in establishing training facilities and the necessary weapons and equipment supplied.

M. V. Frunze was a supporter of increasing the size of the military schools. As experience was to show, small military schools were not effective. Such schools spent too much training time on self-servicing. At them it was harder to create proper training facilities.

With the appearance of the new branches of troops, the appropriate technical schools were also established. As a total for the Ground Forces there were plans to have around 60 normal military and unified schools. In addition, 8 air force schools and 2 navy schools were established. As a total in 1924-1927, the military schools graduated around 24,000 middle-level command personnel.

In giving great importance to military professional training of the future commanders, M. V. Frunze raised the question of establishing military preparatory schools (similar to the cadet corps of the old Russian Army). These were to provide basic military training for the most capable and physically strong young persons from the workers and peasants, instill in them a love for military affairs and prepare them for lifelong military service in command positions. Upon the completion of the military preparatory school a young man had the right to enter a normal military school without an exam.

Arguing against this proposal by Frunze were the People's Commissar of Education and certain leading workers from the Directorate of Military Schools. However, Mikhail Vasilyevich succeeded in defending his viewpoint and the government permitted him as an experiment to establish two military preparatory schools (in Kharkov and Baku). The Kharkov school had seven graduating classes. In subsequently establishing the Suvorov military schools, the idea of M. V. Frunze was again realized and to a definite degree the experience of the first military preparatory schools was taken into account.

The system for training the middle-level political personnel was also reorganized. In line with the transition to one-man command on the level of the company, battery and squadron and in the aim of the sounder military training of the political workers it was considered advisable that a political worker without fail have a military education on the level of a normal military school. For this reason from 1926 it was planned to convert to combined training and combined service of the middle-level political personnel. Subsequently, the political instructors of the subunits were appointed from among the platoon commanders who had completed a military school. This was of great importance for increasing the military skill and authority of the political workers.

Junior command personnel was trained in units, in the regimental schools with a period of instruction of 7-10 months considering the specific features of the branches of troops.

Certain changes were also made in the organizing of training for the senior and higher supervisory personnel. In line with the significant reduction in the size of the army and the expenditures on its upkeep, the number of military academies was also somewhat reduced. In 1924, the Military Administrative Academy was closed. Training for the supervisory personnel assigned to operational-rear work was entrusted to the RKKA Military Academy while the training of supply workers for special services (food, clothing, veterinary and so forth) was entrusted to civilian VUZes.

In 1925, the Military Engineer and Military Artillery Academies were merged into one, the RKKA Military-Technical Academy. The Military-Political Institute imeni N. G. Tolmachev was turned into the RKKA Military-Political Academy (subsequently, the Academy imeni V. I. Lenin). Military academy courses for training the higher command personnel were reorganized into the higher advanced training courses where commanders who had completed the Higher Academy Courses and the RKKA Military Academy were to undergo retraining.

M. V. Frunze considered it advisable not only on the middle but also the senior and higher levels wherever possible to standardize the training of the command and political personnel and achieve a unity of their instruction and indoctrination. Proceeding from this, the Higher Advanced Training Courses were combined with the Military-Political Academy Courses and Courses for the Advanced Training of Higher Supervisory Personnel were established under the RKKA Military Academy with military and political departments. "The organization of advanced training courses..." said M. V. Frunze, "shows that from motley, improvised and hurriedly put together command personnel we have taken a step, and a major step, ahead along the path to establishing a unified properly trained command personnel which is up to the demands of modern warfare."(85)

As a result of the reform, six military academies remained in the RKKA: the RKKA Military Academy, the Military-Technical Academy, the Air Force Academy, the Naval Academy, the Military-Political Academy and the Military-Medical Academy. In addition, four higher schools existed.

M. V. Frunze took into account that it was essential to train personnel not only for the then small Red Army but also for the event of its development during a war into a multimillion-man army. For this reason he constantly raised the question of establishing military faculties in civilian VUZes. In the civilian institutes, five military faculties were opened and there were plans to subsequently increase their number. Provision was made to train reserve commanders in the civilian higher and middle-level institutions of learning. After completing a VUZ, the persons who had undergone higher preinduction training would be inducted into the Army for 9 months and 1 year for the Navy. After acquiring practical experience in the troops and after passing exams, they would be discharged from active service and put into the reserves with a rank of a middle-level commander.

The military academies were entrusted not only with the training of military personnel considering the new demands and the changeover to one-man command but also they were to become the main centers of military-scientific thought and were to work out books and aids both for the training process in the VUZes as well as for the command and political personnel in the troops and fleets.

Upon the instructions of the party Central Committee, constant concern was shown for improving the social composition of the officer candidates and students and for increasing the party contingent among them. In 1924-1925, among the students of the military academies some 80 percent were communists.

A major problem was the training of a faculty for the VUZes. The faculty from the old military specialists did not have experience in the Civil War or the

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necessary ideological maturity, they had not mastered Marxist-Leninist theory and could not fully carry out the education and indoctrination of the students and officer candidates. For this reason instructor work in the academies was assigned first to the most able young graduates of the academies from party members who had experience in the war and troop practice.

Regardless of the general reduction in the number of VUZes, measures were taken to increase the number of students and improve the training process in the Military Pedagogical School which trained instructors of tactics and special disciplines. Generally the specialized pedagogical training of future instructors for VUZes at this school was very beneficial.

For training highly skilled instructors and military scientific workers in 1924 the institution of graduate students was established. Admitted as graduate students, as a rule, were the most capable commanders and political workers who had practical experience and who had completed military academies and the military faculties of civilian VUZes.

Along with an organizational reform of the VUZes, M. V. Frunze devoted great attention to setting up scientific, educational and indoctrinational work in them. He took a vital interest in their activity and participated in numerous scientific and academic measures. The same thing was done by A. S. Bubnov and other associates of Frunze. M. N. Tukhachevskiy in holding the position of deputy chief of the RKKA Staff and deputy people's commissar, for many years gave a course on strategy in the RKKA Military Academy. B. M. Shaposhnikov as the chief of the RKKA Staff, regularly gave lectures at the advanced training courses for the superior personnel.

Previously mention has been made of the work done by M. V. Frunze in this area, when he held the post of chief of the RKKA Military Academy. But after he had been moved to a different position, he did not break his creative ties with the academy. Characteristically, after each plenum of the USSR RVS which discussed fundamental questions of the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces, he felt it necessary to speak on these questions at the RKKA Military Academy. And he did this regardless of his enormous involvement in political, state and military work.

Mikhail Vasilyevich realized well that if the Military Academy was not kept up on the major events of army life, then it would not truly know the operational-strategic and organizational problems, it would not be able to function fully and could not be the center of everything advanced and new. None of this could be replaced by any strict demands or any noble appeals. Just as dry, unirrigated and unfertilized soil cannot produce a good crop, so the Military Academy without vital direct contact with the leadership of the Armed Forces and command personnel from the troops would be unable, in turn, to supply the army and navy with new ideas and scientific recommendations and develop major scientific authorities. This, certainly, applied to all the military institutions of learning.

Thus, in preparing and conducting the military reform, M. V. Frunze, in accord with our party's instructions, carried out great work to scientifically establish a system for organizing the training of military personnel and

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practically realize the ideas stemming from this. For example, he carefully studied the history of the organization and development of military schools in Russia and a number of other countries. He was particularly interested in the system of training military specialists in the American civilian institutions of learning. He re-read the literature existing on this question without altering his rule: a practical resolution of any major question should be preceded by a thorough theoretical elaboration.

As a result of all this well thought out work, an ordered system was established for the service of military personnel and their training in the military schools and the bases of this have kept their importance at present. Much was also done to work out and introduce forms and methods of instruction and political and military indoctrination of the military personnel corresponding to the new conditions.

As a whole, as a result of the military reform carried out in 1924-1925, the Soviet Armed Forces acquired a more ordered organizational structure. Their combat and mobilizational readiness was significantly increased. However, while in organizational terms the Red Army was already the equal of the armies of the major capitalist countries, it still remained extremely small and particularly weak in technical terms.

The Organizational Development of the Armed Forces in the Subsequent Stages

Constant work of improving the organizational development of the Armed Forces was continued in subsequent years. The growing threat of war required immediate measures to further increase the combat capability and readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces and primarily their technical equipping. M. V. Frunze understood this well and in a short period of time he had done extraordinarily much. Moreover, he had outlined an extensive program for the further development of the military organization. Fate granted him too little time for carrying it out. But the work commenced by him was continued by his associates and students.

The ideas of M. V. Frunze, the theoretical concepts elaborated by him and the measures implemented in the area of the organizational development of the Armed Forces were completely sound and were a basis for their development during subsequent years. The Decree of the VKP(b) Central Committee of 15 July 1929 gave high tribute to all the work done in the area of military organizational development. It stated: "The basic result of the previous five-year plan (1924-1929) in the planned organizational development of the armed forces has been the establishing of a strong, battleworthy army which in political terms is completely dependable and in technical terms stands on the level of development of the nation's productive forces."(86)

In speaking about the ideas of M. V. Frunze in the area of military organizational development, it is essential to bear in mind that many of his statements were directly not only at the distant future but also the immediate one, since a real threat of imperialist aggression existed constantly and it was essential to be ready to carry out defense tasks with those forces and means which existed at that time. It was for this reason that he was involved in carefully calculating the number of carts in the nation in order to adapt

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them to meet the needs of war. For example, no one would have understood him if in the middle of the 1920's he began to talk about the lack of future of the cavalry. At that time, there was nothing to replace it in the territorial formations. But there could be no doubt that at the beginning of the 1930's he would have held a different position on the question of the number of cavalry or territorial divisions in the Red Army.

Not all that M. V. Frunze correctly foresaw was carried out with complete consistency. Contrary to the warnings of V. I. Lenin and the recommendations of M. V. Frunze, large amounts of money were spent in building large ships although subsequently it was recognized that we would have been better off to place the main emphasis on the development of a submarine fleet and naval aviation.(87)

Regardless of individual flaws, as was subsequently shown in the Great Patriotic War, in a majority of the main, most fundamental questions the basic trend in the organizational development of our armed forces from the very outset was correctly established and carried out with a profound and thorough consideration of the nature of a future war. Of decisive significance was the farsighted, scientifically-sound approach to such problems as the development of military organizational development along the path of mobilizing all the state's forces for strengthening national defense, the creation of a mass regular army, the rational combination and proportional development of all the Armed Services and branches of troops, the relationship of man and equipment in a war and so forth.

Under the leadership of the party Central Committee at the end of the 1920's and in the 1930's, extraordinary measures were taken to increase the level of the technical equipping of the Armed Forces and to strengthen the nation's defense capability as a whole. A modern defense industry was established virtually from scratch, including tank, aviation, automotive-tractor, chemical and so forth. The literacy and culture of the people increased sharply. By the start of the Great Patriotic War all of this had fundamentally transformed the social, organizational and technical level of the Red Army and Navy. It is sufficient to give such figures. In 1928, the Red Army had a total of 7,000 light guns, 200 tanks and armored vehicles, 100 aircraft of obsolete design, 350 trucks; there was no antitank and antiaircraft artillery at all. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army was now armed with thousands of tanks, aircraft and other types of weapons. Over the war our industry produced over 830,000 guns and mortars, 102,000 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount] and 112,000 combat aircraft.(88) While in 1924-1927, the military schools graduated 24,000 commanders and political workers, in 1941, more than 300,000 persons were studying in the VUZes and courses.

M. V. Frunze dreamed about the time when the Soviet Armed Forces would surpass the armies of the major capitalist states not only in social and moral-political terms but also in terms of the highest level of organization, training and technical arming. During the period of the Great Patriotic War, they actually demonstrated their superiority in all terms, although they had to fight against the strongest enemy over all our motherland's history.

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After the Great Patriotic War, due to the concern of the party, the government and all the Soviet people, the Soviet Armed Forces moved far ahead and presently have everything necessary for securely defending their homeland and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth. From the viewpoint of the internal conditions, the Soviet state, as a state of all the people and developed socialism, does not need armed forces. But since a military threat remains deriving from the imperialist countries, our party, as was pointed out in the CPSU Program, "considers it necessary to maintain the defense might of the Soviet state and the combat readiness of its Armed Forces on a level ensuring a decisive and complete defeat of any enemy which would dare encroach on the Soviet motherland." (89) The present state of the Soviet Armed Forces is the most vivid and visible embodiment of Lenin's ideas and the thoughts of M. V. Frunze on the military organizational development of the socialist state.

The very heart of Soviet military organizational development is the leadership by the Communist Party over the Armed Forces and the growing role and influence of the party organizations in the army and navy. Under present-day conditions, the role of the party in strengthening the defense capability of the nation and in the organizational development of the Armed Forces is growing even more. This is explained by the complexity of the international situation, by the importance and broadening of the military, economic and sociopolitical problems of military organizational development, by the fundamental changes in the nature and methods of waging war, by the increased role of the Armed Forces as a factor in restraining the aggressive aspirations of imperialism, by the broadening of their international tasks and by the necessity of strengthening the communist indoctrination of the personnel.

The organizational development of the Armed Forces and the ongoing increase in their combat might and readiness have been carried out under CPSU leadership and a number of measures has been carried out to strengthen the nation's defense capability, including in the area of training the induction and reservist groups. Being, in the expression of M. V. Frunze, a precise copy or image of our worker-peasant nation, the Soviet Armed Forces have developed not only in organizational and technical terms but also in sociopolitical ones. With the building of a developed socialist society in the USSR, they have been enriched with a new content and in terms of their social nature have been turned into an organ of the state of all the people, truly into a people's army in the new socialist understanding, reflecting the sociopolitical and ideological unity of Soviet society and the unshakable friendship of peoples. Here our Armed Forces have not lost their class nature in relation to the external enemies and in terms of the ideological and political focus of military doctrine.

A question of constant concern for the party has been the technical equipping of the Army and Navy, the development and introduction of new types of weapons, the development of military science and the improvement of combat training and party-political work in the Armed Forces. The Soviet Armed Forces at present are equipped with the most advanced combat equipment and weapons. In comparison with the last years of the Great Patriotic War, the capabilities of all the Armed Services have immeasurably risen.

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The strategic rocket troops have been established and turned into a major force and they are a sure means for restraining the imperialist aggressors; they are constantly ready for a devastating retaliatory strike.

The development of the Ground Forces is being carried out by increasing the fire power and strike force, mobility and maneuverability. The all-arms formations are armed with powerful tanks and armored vehicles, more advanced conventional and rocket artillery, antitank weapons and mortars. The motorized rifle subunits and units are equipped with guided and homing weapons and this makes it possible with great reliability to hit targets both during the day and at night. The signal troops, engineer and other special troops have also undergone further development.

The Air Defense troops are a mighty means for defending the state and Armed Forces against enemy air strikes. They are in constant combat readiness, they possess modern means for warning of an air attack, powerful airborne and antiaircraft missile equipment capable of destroying any airborne enemy targets under difficult situational conditions.

The Air Forces have made a major qualitative jump in their development and they are present based on supersonic aviation, missile-carrying aircraft capable of launching powerful strikes against the enemy using both nuclear and conventional weapons. The speed of modern aircraft and their bombload have risen by many times and advanced missile weapons make it possible for them to hit the enemy without entering the enemy air defense zone.

The Navy has become ocean-going. Nuclear submarines and missile-carrying naval aviation have become its main force.

Great work is being done to further improve the rear of the Armed Forces and the Civil Defense troops of the nation. In all the Armed Services they are continuing to carry out extensive automation of the troop control processes.

But with all the technical modernity and might of the weapons, the main force of the army is comprised of the personnel which skillfully operates these weapons and equipment. The dream of M. V. Frunze has come completely true of the high literacy of the personnel and technical skill of the command personnel. At present, 80 percent of the Army and Navy personnel have higher and secondary educations. As was pointed out by the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Personnel, Army Gen I. N. Shkadov, "almost 70 percent of the officer personnel has a higher military and military-specialized education.... It is also noteworthy that at present...all the command personnel is receiving the appropriate skill of engineer in the military schools."(90)

However, it must also be considered that under present-day conditions the complexity and responsibility of carry out the missions entrusted to the Armed Forces have immeasurably grown. This is determined, in the first place, by the completely new conditions for military service and by the new demands on the combat readiness of all the Armed Services and branches of troops.

Secondly, the Soviet Union considers it its international duty, along with the other allied states, to ensure the guaranteed security of all the socialist

commonwealth nations. In this context the scope of the international tasks for our Army and Navy has risen in the system of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states.

Thirdly, the probable enemies opposing us cannot be compared with anything in the past. Under present-day conditions, our Armed Forces must be ready to wage war against a strong, technically equipped and perfidious enemy.

The theory of the organizational development of the Armed Forces has developed in accord with these increased demands. Particular urgency has been assumed by further research on the ways for the coordinated development of the various weapons, improving the structure and increasing the fire power of the Armed Services, the branches of troops, field forces, formations, units and subunits.

The organization and establishment of the units, formations and field forces should ensure the most effective use of all the combat capabilities of the weapons and equipment, their fire and strike power as well as an improvement in the system of control. In line with the major social changes which have occurred in the nation, the need has arisen of improving the overall manning system of the Armed Forces, the standing of military service and the training of officer cadres in the military schools, the elaboration of scientific principles for strengthening military discipline and the organization of troop service considering modern demands.

Our military-scientific thought must help provide the Armed Forces with weapons and equipment which fully meet the conditions of modern warfare and which possess high readiness for action, rapid fire, range and accuracy of employment as well as reliability and portability.

As weapons and military equipment develop, many new problems arise and will constantly arise in the area of investigating the questions of their standardization and reducing the number of models, increasing resistance to jamming, the elaboration of new methods and means of electronic combat and other tasks related to increasing the combat might of the Armed Forces and the defense capability of the Soviet State.

At one time I. V. Stalin commented: "The aggressive nations, as attacking nations, ordinarily are more prepared for a new war than the peace-loving nations,"(91) considering this a historical pattern. However, times have changed and under present-day conditions this cannot be permitted and we have real economic and defense capabilities for not permitting it.

The Soviet Army and Navy, like all our nation, no longer alone opposes the entire surrounding capitalist world as was the case in the 1920's and 1930's. The armies of the fraternal socialist countries stand together with the USSR Armed Forces. Their combat alliance is a source of might and a dependable guarantee for the security of the socialist countries. The Chief of the General Staff and USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense, MSU S. F. Akhromyev emphasized: "The Soviet Union, in affirming its adherence to the Leninist peace policy, cautions that it will not permit any military superiority. No one should dispute this. Any attempt to undertake aggressive actions against

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our nation, its friends and allies will encounter the most decisive rebuff and will be fatal for its initiators. The aggressor will be overtaken by retribution inevitably and without delay.(92)

During the postwar years, imperialism has repeatedly brought mankind to the dangerous brink of a major military conflict, having encountered the might of the socialist forces was forced to retreat. The military capabilities of imperialism are growing but the ability to achieve its political aims by armed violence is declining. Prof D. A. Volkogonov is right when he points out that "in this is the dialectics of the new role of the army which over the entire history of antagonistic societies has been exclusively an instrument of war but under socialism has been turned into an instrument of preserving peace."(93)

The most important lesson of the past and the major task of today are not to allow the outbreak of a new war. Before it is too late, every measure must be taken to halt the aggressive aspirations of imperialism by the common peace-loving forces.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 38, p 139.
2. Ibid., Vol 40, pp 76-77.
3. Ibid., p 240.
4. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh....," Vol 2, 1970, p 67.
5. Ibid., Vol 2, p 110.
6. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 2, p 26.
7. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 38, p 92.
8. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 2, p 47.
9. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 37, p 26.
10. Ibid., Vol 12, p 113.
11. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 2, p 38.
12. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 38, pp 137-139.
13. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 32, p 18.
14. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 37, p 295.
15. Ibid., Vol 42, pp 130-131.

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16. "Syezdy Sovetov RSFSR v postanovleniyakh i rezolyutsiyakh" [Congresses of the RSFSR Soviets in Decrees and Resolutions], Moscow, 1939, p 89.
17. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh...", Vol 2, p 264.
18. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 225.
19. K. Ye. Voroshilov, "Lenin, Stalin i Krasnaya Armiya: Stati i Rechi", [Lenin, Stalin and the Red Army: Articles and Speeches], Moscow, 1934, p 81.
20. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, pp 425-426.
21. Ibid., p 426.
22. PRAVDA, 31 October 1926.
23. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 289.
24. Ibid., Vol 2, p 7.
25. Ibid., Vol 3, pp 114, 221.
26. Ibid., Vol 2, p 50.
27. See: M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 2, p 119.
28. Ibid., p 63.
29. See: K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 15, pp 413-414.
30. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 2, p 199.
31. See: "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" [The Soviet Armed Forces], Moscow, 1978, p 59.
32. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 2, p 147.
33. TsGASA, folio 9, inv. 1, file 58, sheet 30.
34. See: "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily," p 160.
35. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 2, p 148.
36. Ibid., p 144.
37. Ibid., p 328.
38. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 45, pp 311, 313.
39. Ibid., p 313.

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40. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 129.
41. Ibid., Vol 2, p 147.
42. TsGASA, folio 25906, inv. 1, stor. unit 15, sheet 5.
43. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 2, p 140.
44. Ibid., p 191.
45. See: V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 36, p 116; Vol 13, p 375; Vol 11, p 270.
46. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh...", Vol 2, p 263.
47. See: M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 91.
48. Ibid., pp 251-252.
49. Ibid., Vol 1, p 254.
50. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 26, pp 258-259.
51. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh...", p 40.
52. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 38, p 400.
53. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, pp 274-275.
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55. Ibid., pp 88-89.
56. See: Ibid., pp 100-101.
57. See: M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 2, pp 26-41.
58. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 42, pp 153-154.
59. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 2, p 33.
60. Ibid., Vol 3, p 121.
61. Ibid., Vol 2, p 19.
62. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 40, p 241.
63. Ibid., Vol 39, p 152.
64. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr soch.," Vol 2, p 188.
65. Ibid., p 187.

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67. Ibid., Vol 40, p 76.
68. Ibid., Vol 36, p 199.
69. Ibid., p 200.
70. Ibid., Vol 40, pp 222-223.
71. Ibid., Vol 39, p 46.
72. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 2, p 140.
73. Ibid., p 180.
74. Ibid., p 142.
75. See: Ibid., p 183.
76. Ibid., p 310.
77. Ibid., p 163.
78. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 12, p 220.
79. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 37, p 88.
80. Ibid., Vol 31, p 15.
81. Ibid., Vol 39, p 313.
82. Ibid., Vol 37, p 200.
83. See: "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily: Istoriya stroitelstva" [The Soviet Armed Forces: History of Organizational Development], Moscow, 1978, p 138.
84. A. S. Bubnov, "Boyevaya podgotovka i politicheskaya rabota" [Combat Training and Political Work] Moscow, 1927, p 74.
85. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 2, p 185.
86. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh....," p 264.
87. See: "Voyennaya strategiya," Edited by V. D. Sokolovskiy, Moscow, 1963, p 170; N. G. Kuznetsov, "Nakanune" [On the Eve], Moscow, 1966, pp 256-261; S. G. Gorshkov, "Morskaya moshch gosudarstva" [The Sea Power of a State], Moscow, 1976, pp 442-446.
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CHAPTER 5: MILITARY INSTRUCTION AND INDOCTRINATION

Military Pedagogical Views

Marxist-Leninist ideology--the philosophical basis of military training and indoctrination. The military-pedagogical views of M. V. Frunze evolved in the course of his revolutionary and military activities under the influence of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. K. Marx and F. Engels devoted particularly much attention to the questions of the military training of revolutionary troops. F. Engels in his article "The Lessons of the American War" pointed out that "no army newly organized from civilians could never exist in an effective state until it is trained...."(1) He gave crucial significance to the principle of teaching the troops what is needed in a war and in all his works was sharply against an excessive concern with parade drill instruction to the detriment of field training. At the same time in the article "Company Training" and certain other words, he convincingly showed that the revolutionary soldiers must also not avoid drilling. Although volunteers in this regard could not rival regular troops, they still should be trained up to a point where their movements and actions occur simultaneously and have reached the point of becoming automatic.

F. Engels realized well that military affairs are primarily of a practical nature and lose any sense if they come down to just giving oral commands. Systematic company and battalion exercises were considered by him to be the best form of military training.

V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party, in creatively applying the ideas of Marxism, worked out the questions of military training and indoctrination, proceeding from the need of establishing a regular, well trained army. The demand of V. I. Lenin "to study military affairs effectively" permeated and directed all aspects of the training of the Armed Forces. "The best army," he said, "the men most dedicated to the revolution will inevitably be exterminated by the enemy if they are not sufficiently armed, supplied with food and trained."(2)

Long before the revolution, he urgently recommended that they follow the advice of F. Engels on studying not only the theoretical but also the practical aspect of military affairs. During the period of the Civil War, Lenin demanded that the communists particularly zealously study "machine gun, artillery and armored affairs and so forth, for here our backwardness is most

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tangible, here the enemy's superiority with a large number of officers is more significant, here the causing of a major damage by an unreliable military specialist is possible and here the role of the communists is greatest."(3)

The Red Army from the very outset of its founding, in fighting on numerous fronts, carried out the instructions of its leader, in simultaneously working hard on combat training. "We know," said V. I. Lenin, "what a difficult matter it is when the working class for so long has been removed not only from command and control but also from literacy and we know how difficult it is to learn everything all at once. The working class in military affairs, the most difficult and dangerous, has nevertheless made this change."(4)

M. V. Frunze was one of the most zealous students (and then teachers) of military affairs. Like all outstanding military leaders, her at the same time was an outstanding military pedagogue, he had a good knowledge of the psychology of the men and was a great master of military training and indoctrination.

In analyzing the experience of major wars, he concluded that "the might of any army, including our own, is based upon two factors: in the first place, on the political mood and, secondly, on factors related to skill and combat training."(5) "Even with a good political mood and ready to enter battle and give up one's life, we may be unable to sustain a victory if we have poor skills. In addition to a good political mood, it is essential to have ability...combat skill."(6) M. V. Frunze pointed out that the Red Army should be indoctrinated and trained on the basis of uniform concepts and uniform views on all questions related to its activities and tasks.

Here Mikhail Vasilyevich proceeded from the view that the sociopolitical principles in military organizational development extend fully to the area of combat training and indoctrination. He pointed out that the basic provisions deriving from the nature of the worker state and from the entire essence of its ideology should gain an actually have gained expression in the principles governing the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. Those political ideas which should make out of the Red Army soldiers conscious fighters for the worker-peasant cause have been set completely by the ideology of the working class and by the Communist Party Program.

In contrast to bourgeois armies where apoliticalness and inaction are instilled and the class essence of the military organization is denied, we, said Mikhail Vasilyevich, base all the strength of our Red Army and all its might precisely on broadly and deeply developed political education. He viewed the entire process of troop training in an organic unity with political indoctrination with the determining, leading role played by political indoctrination. In many of his speeches and works he explained the Leninist thesis that strength, according to the bourgeois notion, is when the masses blindly go into battle, obeying the bidding of the imperialist governments. According to the communist system of indoctrination, a state is strong in the awareness of the masses, when the masses know everything, for they can judge everything and do everything consciously. "A conviction of the justness of a war and an awareness of the need to sacrifice one's life for the sake of one's brothers," wrote V. I. Lenin, "raise the spirit of the soldiers and cause them

to endure unprecedented hardships.... This awareness by the masses of the aims and causes of a war is of enormous significance and ensures victory."(7)

Throughout the entire system of political work in the Armed Forces, M. V. Frunze gave particular significance to the development of Marxist-Leninist ideology and to achieving a profound awareness by all the personnel of the policy of the party and the Soviet government and the importance of military duty in the defense of the socialist fatherland. He constantly explained that the just nature of a war which would be waged by the Red Army is reflected in all aspects of its life and activities, "it permeates the entire system of our organization and is reflected in the army training and indoctrination methods and in a whole series of other practical conclusions."(8)

In this context, in the process of combat and political training it is essential to train not only a narrow military specialist, as in bourgeois armies, where everything thinking and alive is eradicated from the creation of a soldier, but primarily a citizen-soldier who is politically developed and loyal to the ideals of the revolution.

In the old Russian Army, as in other armies of the capitalist states, there was a particularly noticeable distance of the officers from the soldiers and from the masses of people as a whole and the officers were viewed as a separate caste. M. V. Frunze emphasized that our officer corps should be trained and indoctrinated on the common principles of Soviet pedagogics. We are not a caste but rather a branch of Soviet society, he said. "The most characteristic trait for that edifice which we have now created is the closest, deepest tie of the leading military upper group with the entire body of the army and through it with all our Soviet social organism."(9)

M. V. Frunze considered one of the major evils in the training system of the old army to be the divorce of theory from practice, dogmatism, routine and a mechanical, witless coaching and learning by rote. He constantly fought against these vestiges in the training and indoctrination of the personnel and which had made themselves felt also in the Red Army particularly in the work practices of the old military specialists.

The difficulty of elaborating the principles of Soviet military pedagogics in those years was explained also by the fact that the very pedagogics of communist indoctrination were just being established. For this reason the paths of military training and indoctrination in the Soviet Armed Forces had to be laid in surmounting various reactionary and idealistic currents in the area of pedagogics and psychology.

On the principles of military training and indoctrination. Proceeding from the general party notions on the questions of the communist indoctrination of the workers, M. V. Frunze felt it necessary to found military instruction and indoctrination in the Armed Forces on new principles that were completely different from those in the bourgeois armies.

He assigned a leading role to the principle of communist ideological and party loyalty in training and indoctrination as this principle must ensure the political awareness of all the personnel and its wholehearted dedication to

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the cause of the party and the people. He considered the ideology of the Bolshevik Party to be the basis of all political and military indoctrination. Party and government policy was that vital basis on which state, cultural, military and training-indoctrinational work in the army was based. "A profound, unswerving dedication to it (the party.--M. G.) and the following of its ideals, its discipline and steadfastness serve as an indispensable condition for the strength of the Red Army and Navy and their combat capability."(10)

In accord with the instructions of the RKP(b) Central Committee, Frunze demanded that the barracks be brought as close as possible to a military school and that they be made a center of not only military training but also general education and political indoctrination. "In this regard," he said, "I should say with pride that no army of other states can compare with our Red Army. Our Red barracks, our Red Army are not only a school for combat indoctrination and combat training of the Red Armyman but also a school for his indoctrination as a citizen...."(11)

M. V. Frunze viewed military and political training as the most important means for carrying out party and state military policy and for achieving dependable defense of the socialist fatherland. In assigning an important role to the commanders and political workers, at the same time he emphasized that military and political training in the Army and Navy are not their personal concern but rather a major party and state question, their party and state duty.

As our party has demanded, on the question of the ideological indoctrination of the personnel and increasing party influence in the army and navy, M. V. Frunze gave exceptionally great significance to party political work, to increasing the activities of the party and Komsomol organizations and ensuring the vanguard role and example set by the communists and Komsomol members. The decision of the Eighth Party Congress stated that belonging to a communist cell did not give a soldier any special rights but merely placed on his the duty to be the most self-sacrificing and courageous fighter.(12) Frunze repeatedly recalled that the task of a party organization is by its party influence and by party work to support all the measures of the command aimed at increasing the level of combat and political training and, consequently, the combat readiness of the units and subunits. The quality of party political work should be determined by the degree of carrying out this major task. A party cell which does not ensure a high political-moral state of the personnel, the combat readiness of the unit and subunit and firm military discipline, is not carrying out its main task in the army--this was how firmly and definitely M. V. Frunze posed the question.

He emphasized that stemming from the principle of ideological and party loyalty was the principle of the unity of training and indoctrination and primarily a close link of training with political and military indoctrination. On the question of the military-political indoctrination of the Red Army, Frunze demanded that the commanders and political workers pay attention to the need to merge the purely military line and the political line. He considered "it absolutely necessary that any practical activity be carried out under the slogan of the greatest possible merging of these two areas."(13)

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M. V. Frunze also taught that military training and indoctrination can be separated only theoretically but in practice they should be inseparable and fused into one. In all exercises it is essential not only to inculcate knowledge and skills but also to continuously indoctrinate the personnel. Precisely a unity of training and indoctrination, particularly a unity of political and military indoctrination, helps most in developing intrepidity and a readiness in the men at any price to carry out the missions set in a combat situation. M. V. Frunze pointed out that the readiness of the personnel for self-sacrifice in the Red Army is immeasurably higher than in the army of any bourgeois country. "The Red Army is the army of the future, an army carrying new ideals. Hence its strength, hence that heroism, that ardent enthusiasm which made it possible for us in the past Civil War to emerge as the victors from the combat trials...."(14)

Considering this, Mikhail Vasilyevich constantly recommended that at exercises and in personal talks, orally and through the military press the commanders and political workers clearly and simply explained to the men our common military and political tasks, pose and facilitate the resolving of the questions of barracks internal life and widely popularize the requirements of our regulations.

Frunze gave great importance to the principle of the unity of theory and practice which should gain its fullest expression in the teaching of the Armed Forces personnel primarily what would be needed in a future war. Our military might, he emphasized, is based not on a separation of it from life but, on the contrary, on the deepening and broadening of ties with it. Precisely from the principle of teaching the troops what would be needed in a war stemmed the demand of M. V. Frunze of giving a practical focus to the entire process of military training and indoctrination. He demanded that no gap be permitted between the content of combat training in peacetime and the actions which would be required from the troops in a war, the shifting of the center of gravity to their training in the field, on diverse terrain and under conditions close to a combat situation, "so that in the event of necessity we will fight a new war with the least losses and sacrifices, 'with little blood,' as one of the greatest military Suvorov said."(15) Frunze felt that it was impossible to train a Red Armyman or commander in military affairs by words alone, even the best. Without active independent labor and practical drills, it was impossible to gain the skills needed in a combat situation. The drills should be systematic in order to gain confident actions in a formation, at the weapons and on the battlefield.

In being against drilling in the old understanding, M. V. Frunze explained that the word "drill" to many seemed awful due to the prejudice and the incorrect understanding of its essence. The main thing was not to disregard the necessary external elements of discipline and training but rather that these external elements are not made the basis of military training and indoctrination.

In speaking about the unity of theory and practice, M. V. Frunze also had in mind that political training should not be abstract but organized in close contact with the tasks of combat training and the daily life of the formations

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and units. "Our educational work," he demanded, "should be so organized that we produce both a Red Soviet citizen and a Red soldier. Here I would like to place particular emphasis on the second part of this formula. The question is that we are sometimes too involved with the tasks of a civil sort and forget that our duty is primarily to be concerned with producing a well trained and indoctrinated Red soldier from the peasant who has been inducted into the army."(16)

Of the general pedagogical principles, M. V. Frunze gave greatest importance to the following principles: awareness and activeness of the personnel in the training process; an individual approach to each serviceman with a simultaneous reliance on the collective; systematicness and planning; accessibility, stability and visibility of training.

M. V. Frunze drew attention to the fact that for realizing these pedagogical principles in an army of the socialist state, new training and indoctrination methods were required. Many training methods employed in the old army could not be applied in the Red Army. In the old army it was not so much that they trained and indoctrinated the soldiers as anesthetized them, they did not enlighten but rather dulled their conscience. Prevailing there were the methods of drilling and the mechanical memorizing of material and for this reason the officer played an active role in the training process while the mass of soldiers remained passive and inert.

In the Red Army, M. V. Frunze felt, one must proceed from the fact that not only innate abilities, as certain reactionary theories asserted, but primarily the social milieu and the troop collective shape the views, convictions, habits and skills of the servicemen. At the center of all military political work was a man with his conscience, feelings and individual features and for this reason the main place in training and instruction should be given to awareness, activeness and personal responsibility of the trainees themselves.

"...It is essential to organize everything," pointed out M. V. Frunze, "at achieving...maximum development of personal initiative and the independence of each Red Armyman. In this regard, the characteristic features of our state and our army open up the broadest prospects.... While each bourgeois state should fear the acquiring of knowledge and the development of spiritual activity by the slaves of capital, for us this development itself is the most dependable guarantee for victorious accomplishments. The entire apparatus of our training for the individual soldier should be adapted to this demand."(17) A soldier, in his opinion, was a good one when his own personality lived together with the social nature of awareness.

Due to the low literacy of the personnel, Frunze gave particular importance to the accessibility of knowledge and to the ability of the commanders and political workers to set out for the Red Armymen the most complex political and military questions in a popular and persuasive form. He himself by his speeches set a brilliant example of how to do this. Frunze explained: if the Red Armyman or a commander are immediately explained complicated things which are completely incomprehensible to him, this kills a desire to learn and the exercises do not achieve their goal. For this reason he advised gradually

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leading the trainees up to complex questions. Then this instills confidence in one's forces and activates the training process.

At the same time Frunze warned that the accessibility of instruction should not be understood as its simplification or artificial facileness. The instruction process should be about a straining of both thought and physical forces and should strengthen the will and character of the trainees. He constantly recommended at exercises both with Red Armymen as well as with command and political personnel that the interest of the trainees be aroused and instill a love for military affairs and a desire oneself to constantly improve one's knowledge and practical skills. In giving great significance to the form and method of presenting the material, he cautioned at the same time that forms and methods should not be turned into an end in themselves. The main thing should be the ideological content of the training and indoctrination. "...There must be," he said, "a thrusting forward of content."(18)

In the new army, as in a socialist society generally, the force of an example is the strongest indoctrinational means. If there is no personal example and authority of the indoctrinator, Mikhail Vasilyevich emphasized, "then by the mechanical subordination of the Red Armyman by drilling him we will not achieve anything.... This applies to any command level."(19) He constantly explained that the commander or political worker should be able to correctly approach each serviceman, to consider his individual features, to influence not only his awareness but also feelings and see to it that there is full mutual understanding between superiors and subordinates. For this each commander and political worker should be a good pedagogue and psychologist.

In demanding the giving up of old training and indoctrination methods and the introduction of new ones which met the particular features of the Red Army, M. F. Frunze cautioned the commanders and political workers against two mistakes in this area. In the first place, one should not completely abandon all the old in the training methods merely because it is old. All useful pedagogical experience must be taken up and skillfully and creatively employed. Secondly, neither old nor new training and indoctrination methods should be turned into a routine pattern. "Generally speaking here each Red commander should firmly realize that the most dangerous thing for us is routine and an overinvolvement with any definite scheme or any definite method.... For us there cannot be anything absolute and ossified; everything flows and changes and any means, any method can be employed in a certain situation."(20)

Training of the Command and Political Personnel

New demands upon the training methods for commanders and political workers. M. V. Frunze with great satisfaction pointed out that our party and state, regardless of the exceptionally difficult conditions under which the new army had been created had succeeded in indoctrinating its own military cadres. He emphasized that the class composition of the Red Army and the higher military school sufficiently eloquently showed whose interests were being served by our command personnel. The successes in the training of military cadres were explained by him not by any special talents or accomplishments of the military

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workers but by the fact that in the course of the revolution the objective situation had pushed military problems to the forefront and attracted the attention of the party, the attention of the working class and peasantry. M. V. Frunze constantly reminded that the postwar situation and the nature of a future war placed very high demands upon the command and political cadres and the level of their training was still far from meeting the new conditions. As a whole, the Red Army at that time was experiencing a great hunger for highly skilled, young Red commanders. In the work "The Questions of Higher Military Education" Mikhail Vasilyevich explained why such a situation had developed precisely in the area of training the military cadres.

In all states based on social inequality, the outcome of a class struggle has always been determined and is determined ultimately by armed force. For this reason the ruling classes have always given particular attention to this force and have always been very careful that leadership over it remained completely and fully in their hands. Access to this area of social activity and the road to military knowledge and to military art were closed off to the people. Military affairs themselves were clothed in unique talent and inaccessibility for the comprehension of simple minds. All of this was done of course to place a sort of taboo on military art and military science and thus prevent access to the exploited classes. Moreover, a mastery of military art was possible with a certain general literacy and for this reason placed rather demands upon its specialists. And since culture in a class society is the monopoly of the ruling class, the military specialists and commanders were recruited precisely from this class. World War I forced Tsarism to train officers also from other strata of the population. But in their predominant majority they did not have a higher military education and basically had experience only in the inferior troop levels.

Considering all of this, M. V. Frunze showed constant concern for improving the professional training of the military cadres, considering this an important condition for successfully carrying out all tasks in the area of the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. "One of the major shortcomings in our military work," he said, "I consider to be the absence of our own skilled workers who are trained, who have fully mastered their subject and at the same time are closely linked with the Soviet system. The present composition of workers with a higher military skill is a mechanical aggregate of persons with a higher military education in part from among those who completed our Red Academy and in part inherited from the old Tsarist Army. Understandably, being motley in its competition, views, skills and traditions, it cannot be an ideological leading center.... The designated fact is reflected in all the organizational development of the Red Army, being the reason for a whole series of flaws and shortcomings." (21) Frunze pointed out that old military art cannot satisfy us but as yet we have not created a new one. And this has been in no way a consequence of our reticence or oversight but simply is the result of inability and ignorance. The acuteness and complexity of this problem have increased due to the fact that military affairs after two major wars continued to develop rapidly.

Proceeding from the instructions of the party Central Committee on the questions of the training of cadres and the above-given considerations, M. V. Frunze proposed a number of new demands on the training and indoctrination of

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the Red Army commanders and political workers. Even in establishing the first command courses in the Yaroslavl Military District, M. V. Frunze demanded the training of an instructor commander who possessed the following qualities: 1. The instructor should have an ardent and revolutionary spirit and passion for carrying out the ideas of communism and should be able to inculcate this spirit...in the Chinese. 2. He should possess a store of mental forces and be...a well developed person. 3. He should quickly perceive external impressions and analyze the phenomena of life occurring around him.... He should possess a total of certain knowledge in his military specialty. He should be able to get across to the trainee what he has learned, that is, have pedagogical abilities.(6) He should have an understanding of the methods of instruction and procedurally train his students moving from the simple to the more complex. 7. He himself should be an example of a soldier, in looking at whom the trainee would see an example worthy of imitation. 8. The instructor should be irreproachable in moral terms.(22)

Considering the nature of a future war, the demands on the training of command and political cadres would increase even more. For this reason Frunze constantly reminded the commanders and political workers that one must follow what is happening in our Armed Forces and in the armies of other countries and there must be constant, systematic work on one's own education. "This is a duty for all commanders without exception," he emphasized. The person who does not do this will soon end up behind and in this instance can only blame himself."(23)

Frunze emphasized that in order to best serve the interests of the workers and peasants, it is not enough to merely belong to the proletariat or to the peasantry or even to possess the most unstinting dedication to the interests of the workers. Also insufficient here is a mere mastery of the techniques of military art as is required from a commander in bourgeois armies. A Red commander needs significantly more. In order that a Red Army commander is on the proper height, as a commander of an army of the socialist revolution, for this he must also master the method of Marxism-Leninism. This, in turn, can be ensured only in the instance that all the work of the higher school and all the training of the command and political personnel in the Army and Navy are permeated with a spirit of Marxism-Leninism and if all military disciplines are given a Marxist-Leninist approach.

In April 1924, the Directive of the USSR RVS "On Involving Command Personnel in Political Education" was issued. This pointed out that all levels of commanders should take a personal part in party political work. Subsequently this demand was reflected in the Temporary Internal Service Regulations which for the first time in the history of our Armed Forces defined the duties of the commanders and other officials in the area of the political and military indoctrination of the personnel.

Equally important Mikhail Vasilyevich taught, is the mastery of the principles of military science and military art. In his article "On the Academy and Academies" M. V. Frunze wrote that while in welcoming in every possible way creativity and a critical reevaluation of previous experience, at the same time one must act decisively against nihilism in military affairs and excessive complacency on the part of certain young commanders. He did not

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approve of the commanders, including the young academy students, who under the pretext of a revolutionary breaking with all the old, without having yet studied either the old or new experience and not yet knowing anything as they should, resorted to a "disrespectful scorning and spitting at the old specialists."(24) Confidence in one's own forces and in oneself, Mikhail Vasilyevich taught, is a fine thing, particularly when it is based upon a solid ground of knowledge and experience. But when there is no such base, it threatens to become conceit and presumption.

Mikhail Vasilyevich was not afraid to admit that the Red commanders were still very poor specialists in their job. In this he showed an example of a demanding, self-critical attitude not only toward others but also toward himself. "I can say honestly and openly about myself," he said, "that for a whole series of questions I have constantly felt my greatest backwardness. One feels how much work there is to be done to actually become worthy of those posts to which the Soviet government has assigned us."(25) It is essential to remember, he continued, that we still are students and in many regards students of a subpreparatory class. However, recognition of oneself as a student does not exclude the possibility of showing one's own initiative. One must merely not permit presumption and boasting. It is better to be humbler but stronger. Hence the conclusion: we, the Red commanders, must study, study and study.

Frunze constantly reminded us that the commander "who rests on his laurels, who counts only on his old accomplishments will, on this basis, not move forward in his own education and at advancement; this commander will not encounter support from us."(26)

In speaking in August 1924, at the graduating class of students from the RKKA Military Academy, M. V. Frunze reminded the new detachment of young commanders that our party, while still underground and during the first days after the October Revolution, was concerned for training its own military cadres which would be loyal to Soviet power. But at the moment of the greatest struggle and open clash with the enemy, it was impossible to think of raising the entire mass of the laboring lower classes and soldiers to the proper height but rather it was essential first of all to be concerned with who would lead these millions of the masses into battle. And there was no time to thoroughly and properly train those who would lead the masses into battle. Now, Frunze emphasized, when we for the first time have gained an opportunity to train truly educated and ideologically mature commanders, the academy graduates should have a particularly acute sense of their responsibility. For this reason, one must recall one's duty to be at any point the center organizing creative activities and to work in such a manner that each person, regardless of where he works or where he is, provided an impetus to all further work and becomes a source of new accomplishments and new progress. He saw to it that the graduates of the RKKA Military Academy were sent to work first on the staffs of the operational-strategic level. "We must not," he said, "be so wasteful as to keep our Red academy graduates for long periods of time in line positions, particularly when they already had definite line service in the past."(27)

One of the characteristic traits of M. V. Frunze was frankness and directness in talking with people and the ability not to skirt acute questions but rather to focus attention precisely on them. In his speech to the academy graduates, he did not conceal those difficulties which they would encounter in the troops. He told them directly that they would be returning to an atmosphere that was rather gray to an atmosphere of the everyday and Philistine, with its routine and with its ordinary interests. Undoubtedly this situation would cause the greatest obstacles along the way of solving the set problems. But it would be a bad thing if a person fell into depression or a state of apathy. A true organizer-commander would be tested precisely in this situation, in this daily routine work. The role of a true Red Army commander would be claimed only by the person who is able to handle this situation, who does not give into it and is able himself to work and to lead others. He cautioned the commanders that military science and military affairs were moving rapidly forward. Thought, if it is not strengthened and if it does not follow all the accomplishments of military affairs will become powerless and sterile. Hence the conclusion: "Only those of you who feel a constant dissatisfaction with yourself, a dissatisfaction and incompleteness of one's scientific knowledge carried out of the academy, only the person who endeavors to broaden his viewpoint and supplement his theoretical and practical knowledge--only this person will not fall behind in military affairs, will move forward and, possibly, bring with him scores and hundreds of others."(28)

In demanding a broad political viewpoint from the commanders, M. V. Frunze placed equally high demands upon the military training of the political workers. "I draw particular attention of the political workers to this circumstance," he said. "They should not only master their special type of weapons, political weapons. According to the glorious combat traditions of the Red Army, our political workers have always marched in the front ranks...our political workers should know well the equipment of their unit...so that the Red Armymen would show even greater respect for them and to an even greater degree recognize their authority.(29)

M. V. Frunze disdained the commanders who still have not had an opportunity to gain the necessary theoretical training. Mikhail Vasilyevich spared not time and effort to work closely with them and direct their self-education in the necessary direction. But he was extremely patient of dilatantism evidenced not in insufficient knowledge but rather in the fact that a person not only did not know but did not want to know, for a dilatant, without knowing the essence of the question and in being satisfied only with superficial knowledge, takes it upon himself to self-confidently and unquestionably judge various problems of theory or practice.

Frunze considered the constant study of major questions using primary sources to be one of the conditions for serious and sound preparation by the commanders and political workers. Mikhail Vasilyevich was convinced that it was impossible to learn something properly in a surrogate or spiritual delicacies. Only with a direct study and investigation of the facts, documents and works (as he had done in generalizing the experience of the war in Morocco; or B. M. Shaposhnikov in creating the work "Mozg armii") were convictions sharpened and profound thoughts born. Even more one could not

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expect anything useful from a military man if he never read anything. Proof of this was the example of the untalented military minister of the Tsarist government, Gen V. A. Sukhomlinov, who even boasted that he had not read a single book in 20 years.

As for Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze, he hated and disdained any manifestation of mental flabbiness and intellectual laziness. Working in 1921 on the article "On the Reorganization of the French Army," he advised one of the responsible staff workers to read a book devoted to the questions of military organizational development abroad. And when at the next meeting Mikhail Vasilyevich realized that this comrade himself had not read the book but had assigned his subordinate to do this, without concealing his disappointment, he simply broke off the conversation. Such an attitude toward books seemed unnatural to him as if a person assigned another person to perform the bodily functions of his organism. While physical emaciation from systemic malnutrition is felt rather quickly and immediately becomes noticeable, mental emaciation, unfortunately, occurs more covertly. For this reason it is particularly dangerous.

During those years such demandingness for self-education, for the development of a viewpoint, for competence, and for the ability to dig down to the details, to the depths of any question was sometimes seen as excessive and not corresponding to the then existing training level of the personnel. But Frunze was looking far ahead, for even then the grains were being sown the sprouts of which were to determine the intellectual level in the training of the command and political cadres in subsequent years. The main thing for him was not the very fact of knowledge or ignorance of one or another question on the part of a commander (this was always rectifiable) but rather his fundamental attitude toward his own self-education. The military-theoretical backwardness of a senior leader, when he due to his insufficient competence not only cannot effectively head the assigned job, see all its aspects and skillfully direct but is not even capable of even understanding what subordinates are reporting to him was considered by Frunze to be the greatest evil for military service.

Life subsequently was to show how profoundly right Frunze was, in placing such high demands upon the superiority and personal preparedness of the military cadres.

Simultaneously, M. V. Frunze recommended that the commanders and political workers not merely store up the acquired knowledge but more quickly put it into action in practical work and generously and skillfully pass this on to their subordinates. He urged them to take a greater and more active part in the work of the party organizations and to more boldly involve all the command personnel in political-indoctrinational and social work. All of this sounds close to modern demand. D. F. Ustinov at the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries in a concise and complete manner formulated the qualities which should be inherent to a modern military leader: "This is competence, a sharp sense for the new, the ability to assume responsibility for solving difficult problems, to promptly spot and support initiative, to mobilize the will and energy of the personnel...an ability to

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think and act under the conditions of an extremely rigid time limit and with enormous moral-psychological and physical stresses."(30)

On the organization and methods of commander training. M. V. Frunze is rightly considered the founder of commander training in the Soviet Armed Forces. Precisely with his appointment to the post of chairman of the USSR RVS were uniform principles established for organizing the training and indoctrination of command and political personnel in the military schools and in the commander training system in the troops and naval forces.

In order to properly appreciate the innovations of M. V. Frunze in this area, it is important to recall that in the Russian Army, for example, no system at all existed for compulsory commander exercises for officer personnel. The Instructions for Officer Exercises issued in 1882, in being a program for the tactical training of officers and remaining unchanged until 1904, stipulated that officer exercises for tactics should be held during "leisure" hours. Certain commanders of military districts conducted exercises upon their own initiative. But these exercises came down basically to lectures; sometimes military games were conducted on the senior level.

In the Red Army the official start to commander training was made in January 1919 by the Order of the All-Russian Chief Staff "On Exercises With Command Personnel." In February 1920, the people's commissar for military affairs approved the Regulation for Exercises With the RKKA Command Personnel. In 1922, a system was instituted for filling the training groups for command personnel according to the principle of the position held. Two hours twice a week were assigned for commander exercises during free time from training the Red Armymen.(31) However, there still was no systematic commander training which was obligatory for all the commanders and political workers.

Upon the instructions of M. V. Frunze, a unified and obligatory system of command training for all categories of supervisory personnel was instituted in the Red Army. Commander exercises were viewed not as a personal, voluntary question for the officers but as a most important part of service activity and were conducted during service time.

M. V. Frunze proceeded from the view that the commander training programs should provide successive mastery of all the main achievements of military science and military art. At the same time, he was decisively against overburdening the commander training programs in the troops and the curricula in the VUZes. "If we do not make any major changes here," he said, "then this threatens a major danger, primarily in the sense that all these enormous and good programs of ours will remain on paper, since they cannot be actually implemented by us. They will simply be a formality and in no way assimilated. On the other hand, such an overloading will lead to increased apathy and indifference among the command and political personnel. For this reason I consider it our greatest and most enormous task to now set to work on further studying this question so that we could now make our programs viable.... It is essential to approach the question in a practical manner. It would be much better if we shortened our programs than, in having extensive programs, they would be organized in such a manner that there was not even any hope of mastering them."(32)

The more time passes since these words were said, the more pertinent they sound. For as equipment has developed and military affairs have become more complex, the range of knowledge and skills which an officer needs has grown while the desire to incorporate a large amount of subjects in the programs has also grown and this has led to the overloading and overstraining of the training process and told negatively upon the effectiveness of instruction. For this reason, both in the past and at present the seeking out of an optimum volume for the programs which would consider, on the one hand, the development level of military affairs and on the other, the actual opportunities for their effective assimilation remains one of the major problems in organizing commander training and the training process in the military schools, in the troops and fleets.

The way out of this situation was seen by M. V. Frunze in the independent work of the commanders and political workers. For this reason, in giving great importance to improving the training process in the VUZes and commander training in the troops, he considered self-education to be the main form for increasing the training level of the commander and political worker. In analyzing the elaborated programs, he pointed out that it would be correct and timely to shift the center of gravity in training and studies to independent work.

M. V. Frunze saw perfectly clearly that this demand could be realized only in the instance that conditions would be established for the self-education for the command and political personnel by reforming and systematizing the entire system of military service. In this context he for the first time raised the question of the work day of the commander and political worker and spoke about this in detail at a conference for the command and supervisory personnel in Tiflis.

During the first years after the Civil War, the question of the commander's work day was not particularly raised by anyone. For in a war, where combat work goes on continuously, around-the-clock, the commanders could rest only in breaks and the presence of even any rest was a pleasure. Out of inertia work on the staffs and in the troops in peacetime was carried out according to a wartime pace. When several special commissions organized for studying this question established that the average length of the work day for a commander was 12-14 hours, M. V. Frunze drew attention of the army leadership to the abnormality of such a situation. On this question he proceeded not only from considerations of general concern for the commander and political worker. He was also disquieted by the circumstance that with such working conditions the problem of self-education for the command and political personnel could not make progress. In addition to adding to their political and military knowledge, a majority of the commanders also had to increase their general literacy and culture.

Mikhail Vasilyevich realized that this problem could not be solved by orders and appeals. In contrast to certain leaders, he took into account its complexity and did not issue any easy promises to the command personnel. He even warned that as equipment became more complex along with military affairs as a whole, the demands and the range of questions resolved by command

personnel would increase. He was convinced that for systematizing the commander's work day it was essential to fundamentally revise the entire system of work for the command and political personnel from top to bottom and the question had to start from the center.

Frunze saw the main ways for solving this question in the following. In the first place, clear, calendar, as he expressed it, planning of work of the central apparatus and then the districts, fleets, field formations and units. But this was not to be formal planning but well thought out and realistic and which should be strictly followed by all officials. Any deviation from the plan at the center would cause a chain reaction of violations in planning work on all levels. Secondly, a clear delimitation of the questions which should be resolved at the center, in the districts (fleets) and in the formations. They must abandon the practice of issuing instructions from above on questions which did not require a centralized solution. "We devote too much time to such things," pointed out Frunze, "which could be settled much sooner and simpler. We must make it our task that everything which could be done by the individual order of a commander be done by it."(33) Thirdly, the systematizing of the work day on all levels depends both upon the senior and subordinate commanders. If the subordinates work well, carrying out their duties fully, then there is more rarely the need of intervention into the affairs of subordinate units by the senior chiefs and fewer additional measures are carried out involving the providing of help and various investigations.

Since the problem of an officer's work day to one degree or another will always exist, at present it would be a good thing to reflect on the advice given by M. F. Frunze.

In examining the contents and methods of training the commanders, M. V. Frunze pointed out that the command personnel which had received good practical schooling in the Civil War mostly did not lack theoretical training and general culture. But he simultaneously pointed to the need of a close link of theoretical studies with practical work in the troops. He cautioned that a young commander who showed uncertainty in carrying out practical tasks would get into a difficult situation in the troops. For this reason Mikhail Vasilyevich drew attention to the main drawback of the training process at the RKKA Military Academy and the other military schools. This was a separation of the training process from practice, an abstractness and nonconcreteness of many lines of argument of the instructors and students and the inability to spot the main thing and creatively apply theoretical knowledge in carrying out practical tasks. "At present, the main thing," he said, "is not discussions or literary exercises on general questions but rather energetic assiduous and painstaking work both in training oneself and in mastering that work which each of us is assigned."(34)

At the same time Frunze considered it essential to overcome the conservatism of the old-school faculty and advised realizing that the new will grow and demands room and that it is essential to keep pace with this growing new, for ultimately this new, sometimes in truth, in an unclear and confused form, expresses and reflects what will be the truth of life tomorrow.

Frunze urged the faculty to avoid formalism in educational and in indoctrinational work. He urged that they judge the assimilation of the training material by the students not from their answers but how they were able to apply the knowledge in practice. He wanted them to develop the students' ability to clearly and precisely formulate their decisions, to give missions to subordinates and actually organize their fulfillment. In instilling in the students standard norms and rules of work which were obligatory for all, they should not permit excessive leveling of their work methods or suppress the individuality and uniqueness of a commander. They should be more concerned for shaping a firm commander character and other organizational and volitional qualities. In the process of training in the VUZes and commander training in the troops, he demanded that chief attention be given to the tactical training of the commanders. "The elimination of tactical impotence" was considered by Frunze to be the main task of the RKKA Military Academy.

Creativity in military affairs was linked by Mikhail Vasilyevich to a significant degree with military scientific work which had developed widely among the command and political personnel. Here he recommended that it be given a concrete nature. Questions for review and discussion should be set primarily in terms of one's own formation. If, for example, questions of the offensive or defensive were being worked on, then one should figure out how to better organize combat under the various situational conditions proceeding from the organization and combat capabilities of one's units.

Frunze was particularly demanding on the training process in the military schools, including on increasing the personal responsibility of the students and officer candidates. He said directly that it was the duty of each student to justify those large material outlays which the state was making on his instruction. "The time spent...in the walls of the RKKA Military Academy must be 100 percent used in order to shape oneself as well as possible for the coming responsible work. Studies and the assimilation of a subject should be in the forefront."(35)

Thus, M. V. Frunze saw three main areas for improving the training system for command and political personnel: in the first place, the elaboration of optimum and realistically planned training programs in accord with the development level of military science and military art; secondly, the development of the training forms and methods considering the new demands on the training of the Army and Navy; thirdly, the greatest possible rise in the personal responsibility of the trainees and the authority of the knowledgeable commander and political worker as well as increased activity in the training process.

Improving Combat Training

The planning and organizing of combat training. The Red Army has been concerned with combat training constantly, including in the course of the Civil War. But under peacetime conditions this became the main task of the Armed Forces and the entire training system had to be given greater planning, systemativeness and uniformity.

M. V. Frunze gave a great deal of attention to the questions of organizing combat training. While holding the position of the commander of the Ukraine and Crimea, on 30 May 1921, he issued an order with detailed organizational instructions "On the Holding of Summer Exercises Upon Completing Initial Drill Training and Improving the Combat Training of the Troops,"(36) and which demanded that the first summer assemblies after the Civil War be thoroughly prepared for. According to the results of combat training in 1923, an order was issued with an appended List of Instructions on **Field Training of the Troops** (emphasis mine--M. G.).(37) Thus, in the general system of combat training Frunze for the first time isolated the notion of the field skills of the troops.

On an even larger scale, Frunze continued work on improving the organization of troop (naval) training upon assuming the position of deputy chairman and then chairman of the USSR RVS. Actually only as a result of carrying out the military reform were conditions established for initiating planned and effective combat training for the troops and naval forces. As M. V. Frunze pointed out: "The general improvement in the conditions of army life and work has provided an opportunity to put the question of army indoctrination and training on a firm footing. In essence only now can we actually set to training. In previous years, with the turnover of the personnel, the difficult material conditions of existence, the lack of a firm procedure for service and so forth, we were actually deprived of any opportunity to organize the army as an effective combat force."(38) He considered a uniform system of troop combat training to be a most important part of military doctrine. One of the reasons for the defeat of the Russian Army in the Russo-Japanese War was seen by him in the fact that the troops were trained and indoctrinated differently in the various military districts and as a result in joint operations on the battlefield, chaos and a lack of coordination became apparent. M. V. Frunze constantly reminded the commanders that these lamentable lessons should be taken into account in the Red Army.

In accord with the instructions given by M. V. Frunze, starting in 1925, in our Armed Forces centralized planning was established for basic measures related to the training of the troops and naval forces. The questions of organizing and the direction of combat training were taken up at a plenum of the USSR RVS at the end of 1924. In accord with the plenum decisions, starting in 1925, a uniform plan of combat training was introduced for the entire Red Army; this was designed for the entire stay of the Red Armyman in the army ranks, both in the professional and territorial units. The practice was introduced of the annual setting of tasks for combat training of the troops (naval forces) and the summing up of the results in an order of the USSR RVS. Of great importance in this regard were also the elaboration and introduction of uniform combat training programs for the branches of troops.

In accord with the approved programs, specialty troop training was carried out basically in the winter training period. During this period, in the course of special assemblies with the subunits and units, one-sided exercises were organized with the simulating of the enemy and field firing. During the summer training period, the development of the subunits was continued and exercises were conducted with the units and formations as well as major

maneuvers. Tactical exercises and maneuvers began playing an important role in the training of headquarters bodies and the troops.

Already in September 1921, under the leadership of M. V. Frunze, two-sided maneuvers were conducted on the territory of the Southwestern Ukraine involving the troops of several military districts.

Combat training in the training year usually ended with maneuvers or two-sided exercises of the formations. Maneuvers were considered to be a higher form in the practical training of the command-political personnel, the staffs and the troops.

In contrast to the practice which existed in the Russian and other bourgeois armies, the commanders, staffs and troops prepared ahead of time and carefully for these concluding exercises and maneuvers. For the questions which were to be worked on in the coming exercises, additional drills were conducted with the command and political personnel, command-staff exercises were held with the staffs, while battle drill, special tactical and tactical exercises were held for the subunits and units of all branches of troops. In those instances when new questions were to be worked on, demonstration exercises were conducted for the most difficult of them for the commanders and political workers. Company, battalion and regimental exercises preceded the maneuvers and exercises with the formations.

The reorganization of the formations and units during the period of the reform gave the exercises an all-arms nature. The artillery, engineer subunits and other reinforcements were involved in the battalion, regimental and divisional exercises. Aviation more and more often began to be involved in major exercises. The questions of cooperation between the branches of troops were more fully worked out in the exercises.

M. V. Frunze pointed out to the commanders that it must be constantly remembered that without such joint actions an exercise cannot even to the slightest degree be considered satisfactory from the viewpoint of conducting modern combat. In line with the appearance of the new branches of troops, along with all-arms exercises, they began conducting special exercises with the formations and units of aviation, field and antiaircraft artillery and other branches of troops.

The number of largest exercises, the times of their holding and their subject were planned for the year by the RKKA Directorate and sent out ahead of time to the military districts.

M. V. Frunze considered that under peacetime conditions the army would always be confronted by two main problems. The first was on the basis of a correct anticipation of the nature of a future war, to determine the content of combat training, that is, what must be taught to the troops. This problem was basically solved by the elaborating of new regulations. The second was how to instruct the troops, that is, to develop the forms and methods of military training and indoctrination which would ensure the mastery by army and navy personnel of the new demands and concepts of military science and military art.

In the report "The International Status of the USSR and Our Military Tasks" M. V. Frunze drew the attention of the command and political personnel to the fact that the elaboration of combat training procedures considering the new demands on troop training was assuming particularly great importance. He pointed out that precisely this aspect of the question most often lags behind and cautioned against the danger of a gap in the future between the growth of the political and cultural level of the Red Armymen and the educational skill of the command and political personnel. In our training methods, Frunze said, we still have many vestiges of the past; quite often training was provided by mechanical cramming and by coaching the Red Armyman. He demanded that such training methods be eliminated and eradicated from the Red Army. "We must learn in a short period of time to be able in a comprehensible form to get across that information which is vitally essential for combat, leaving the particulars on the sideline."(39)

In working for strict systematicness and successiveness of instruction, M. V. Frunze demanded that this principle be most fully considered not only in exercises but primarily in the combat training plans and the programs of the military schools in the aims of ensuring a gradual growth and firm retention of the knowledge and skills of the trainees. He saw a great evil in numerous subjects being studied in the military schools and demanded that the excessive number of subjects be eliminated. Very important was his notion that in working out the programs and plans, the studied disciplines and problems should be united by the common goal of combat and political training of the army and navy considering the nature of future operations and combat actions.

M. V. Frunze considered the excessive restriction to barracks areas to be a major shortcoming in the organization of training in the cadre units. Exercises conducted largely in the quarters or on the drilling field contributed little to the training of the Red Armyman for actions in a combat situation. Frunze demanded that the chief attention of the trainees be focused on practical exercises in the field, on the most diverse terrain and under different conditions. Here, while the best conditions for such exercises for the cadre units were created during the camp assemblies and maneuvers, for the territorial units where training time was extremely limited, field exercises should be the general rule.

M. V. Frunze always adhered to this demand. Even in one of the first orders of the Yaroslavl District Commissariat for Military Affairs, he pointed out: "...Everything required by the programs is to be conducted if possible in practice, in the field, by demonstration exercises and field exercises with tactical problems, in order to provide an opportunity for the trainees to gain the necessary knowledge under conditions precisely coinciding with reality.... Theoretically, by talks, one should conduct only what cannot be taught practically for one or another reason...."(40)

Frunze gave great attention to organizing combat training in the territorial units. He considered it wrong that the directorates of the central apparatus and the military districts were concerned chiefly with directing the combat training of the regular formations and units. Mikhail Vasilyevich demanded,

without forgetting the regular troops, that basic attention be given to the territorial troops which most needed supervision and help.

In the work "The Regular Army and the Militia," M. V. Frunze, along with the organizational bases for the development of the territorial formations, also set out the particular features of organizing their combat training. The cadres of the territorial divisions were given two tasks: in the first place, the training of the rotating command and Red Armyman personnel of these divisions; secondly, training the group of senior preinduction ages. Initially during the assemblies of the territorial units, a portion of the training time was spent on holding exercises in literacy elimination courses. M. V. Frunze considered this wrong. Such exercises in his opinion, should be held only during non-training time. He assumed that the problem of eliminating illiteracy should be solved without fail during the period of preinduction training with the aid of civilian organizations, primarily the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Education.

For the rotating personnel of the territorial units the following sequence of instruction was established: the junior induction age would undergo training during a period of 3-month assemblies; the following age in terms of seniority would be called up by the end of the first month of assemblies for the junior induction age and trained during the period of 2-month assemblies; the last two senior ages would be called up by the end of the second month of the assemblies of the first ages and undergo training for a month. For training during the assembly periods persons from the command, political and administrative-housekeeping personnel of the mobilizational reserve would also be called up. And it was envisaged that they would be called up first so that by the moment the assemblies for the rotating Red Armyman personnel were to be held, they would be able to receive preliminary training.

Questions of troop training methods. M. V. Frunze worked constantly to seek out more effective forms and methods of troop instruction. For this purpose, upon his instructions, a number of procedural instructions and aids were worked out on the questions of troop training methods. The most important recommendations on troop training were also incorporated in the field manuals.

The methods for preparing and conducting the exercises also underwent further improvement. An effort was made to bring them as close as possible to the conditions of combat reality and they were held in a more instructive manner than in the Tsarist Army and other capitalist armies. More attention was given to the content of the exercises and less to the props. Various simulating devices were widely employed. Small arms fire was designated by the firing of blanks; the enemy's use of gases by colored smoke, dyes and strong smelling liquids. Markers were also employed for designating the fire of various types of weapons. Skillfully conducted political work in the troops and among the population contributed largely to the instructiveness of the exercises.

M. V. Frunze demanded that in all exercises and military games, the commanders and staffs being trained be given more initiative and independence. In 1924-1925, a start was made to working out an ordered system for organizing an umpire staff and in subsequent years this continued to be improved.

For comparison let us point out that in the Russian Army, as in other armies, only a system of troop umpires existed until World War I. The lack of section umpires did not make it possible in an instructive and effective manner to play through combat actions in the colliding of sides. The sorting out of the troops took a great deal of time. In the French Army, in certain exercises they used a system of only section umpires without the designating of troop umpires for the sides.

In 1924, the Red Army issued the Manual for Maneuvers and Instructions to Umpires. According to the requirements of this manual, the area of the exercise was to be divided into sections and section umpires were to be assigned to each of these with a staff and personnel of junior umpires. The junior umpires, in working out the most important episodes, were to be sent to the subunits being trained on both sides.

Thus, for the first time in the methods of conducting an exercise, an attempt was made to combine the activities of section and troop umpires, however this good idea at that time was still not carried out to its logical conclusion. The absence of troop umpires at the commanders and staffs being trained from the formations and units did not make it possible for the leadership and the section umpires to promptly take into account the decisions of the sides and the measures of the trainees to support combat operations.

In accord with this manual, the depth and duration of the exercises were still too short; it was recommended that in the course of the exercises nighttime breaks be provided. All these shortcomings were taken into account and eliminated in working out the subsequent manuals on conducting exercises and maneuvers.

M. V. Frunze taught that the issuing of orders and the working out of programs were just the start of the work in directing combat training. The main thing for the leadership was organizational work in the troops, supervision over the carrying out of the plans and personal participation in the training of subordinates.

In 1924-1925, he visited many units of the Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, Voronezh, Rostov, Baku, Tiflis and other military garrisons. In the summer of 1925, he participated in a major overseas cruise by ships of the Baltic Fleet. The cruise which lasted from 20 through 27 June 1925 was full of various exercises and training drills. During the cruise, along with Frunze on the flagship were the Chief of the Naval Forces V. I. Zof, the Commander of the Baltic Fleet A. K. Vekman and the Deputy Commander of the Leningrad Military District B. M. Shaposhnikov. With them he worked out the most important questions of cooperation between the district troops and fleet forces. At the same time during the entire cruise Frunze most carefully studied fleet service. Here he was not inhibited by his ignorance of various questions and carefully listened to the explanations of specialists and asked detailed questions on various points of ship design, weapons and the methods of conducting combat operations at sea. Here also he set an example of how one must not only teach but also constantly learn and learn.

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In the course of work in the troops and on the fleet, he noted with satisfaction, regardless of numerous material and everyday difficulties, everywhere there reigned a political upswing and a fighting mood among the personnel. He was pleased by the increased gravitation of the commanders and Red Armymen to political and military studies. But he also noted the lag of the troops and particularly the command personnel, in technical and weapons training. In both he noted certain positive shifts but at the same time pointed out that in technical and firing training, our troops still lagged behind the armies of foreign countries and in weapons training even behind the old Russian Army. Frunze demanded that the command personnel set the pace in carrying out these tasks for in the ranks of the Red Army there should not be a single commander and political worker who could not serve as an example for firing for the Red Armymen. Then weapons training would also be improved in the troops.

M. V. Frunze considered movement and fire to be the most important elements in combat. For this reason, he gave great attention to indoctrinating troop endurance, their march training, to the rapid deployment of infantry, cavalry and artillery for fighting in the most unexpected situations, and in this regard always set the Suvorov troops as an example.

In analyzing the results of the reorganization in the French Army from the experience of World War I, Mikhail Vasilyevich concluded that "in modern combat fire is the decisive factor and main force. Only with the aid of fire is it possible to gain supremacy over the enemy.... For this reason, any group of troops, any branch of arms should appear before the enemy, that is, on the battlefield having guaranteed itself fire supremacy. This is the first directive, the first task and the first goal which we should achieve, in carrying out the question of organizing our forces and our headquarters in terms of all the branches of arms without distinction." (41) He applied this same demand to the combat training of all the branches of troops, and above all to weapons training.

M. V. Frunze pointed out that a thorough study and skillful mastery of the weapons and equipment, on the one hand, ensure the more complete utilization of their combat capabilities for hitting the enemy; on the other, they develop confidence of actions. The psychological effect, particularly in the employment of new weapons, can be significantly greater than the material damage. This is why Frunze demanded that in exercises conditions be set for the troops so that they be acquainted with all the new means of extermination. The entire army should know them and should be indoctrinated in its attitudes and feelings so that the use of new weapons be not unexpected for the personnel and not cause panic.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War and local wars in the postwar years has completely confirmed this idea of M. V. Frunze. For example, for us, the participants of the previous war, it is not somewhat awkward to recall how much trouble and difficulty were caused during the first days of the war even by the Nazi submachine gunners who penetrated in small groups into the flanks and rear of our troops. But when our troops analyze the methods of their actions, the Nazis themselves abandoned this method of their employment. This shows that in a war the most terrible and dangerous thing is what the troops

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are not familiar with and what is unexpected for them. For this reason, as M. V. Frunze taught it is essential even in peacetime to put the troops in exercises under conditions where they would employ and work out all the possible means and methods of actions, including surprise ones, which they might encounter in a combat situation.

In considering tactical exercises and maneuvers to be the main form of combat skills for the troops and for the combat coordination of the formations and units, M. V. Frunze was exceptionally demanding on their preparation and the instructiveness of their holding. He was most demanding upon the command and political personnel, seeking the creative employment of the provisions of the manuals, considering the specific situational conditions, bold maneuvering on the battlefield and decisiveness of actions in accord with the demands of Soviet military doctrine. He was most critical of the thoughtless, routine application of the provisions of the manuals and theoretical concepts generally in isolation from the actual reality.

In analyzing various unsuccessful actions of the commanders, staffs and troops, Frunze convincingly showed that for manifesting a high level of military art it is not enough to merely apply military theory in practice. Each specific combat situation is in its own way original and unrepeatable. The decisions of the commanders and the troop actions should be the same, otherwise they would not correspond to the developing situational conditions and, consequently, could not be successful. "The summer and autumn exercises have shown," commented Frunze, "that a knowledge of the appropriate parts of the manuals does exist among the command personnel but quite often there is no ability to apply this knowledge in practice. As a result, in the course of the mobile assemblies and maneuvers, there was a whole series of facts and phenomena which, had they occurred in a combat situation, would have had the most fatal impact on the operations. There were particularly many failings in this regard among the junior and middle command personnel. This is a most serious and most dangerous shortcoming for us which in the event of military testings could threaten to become a source of our failures."(42)

M. V. Frunze strongly recommended that the commanders carefully and thoroughly study the probable enemies, the organization and capabilities of their formations and units and their methods of fighting. He himself set a magnificent example in this regard, in closely following the organizational development and training of the capitalist armies. He never showed a disdainful attitude toward the enemy and demanded an objective evaluation of it. Thus, in analyzing the experience of the operations and combat actions against the Kolchak and Wrangel troops, he not only pointed to the weak aspects of the White Guard armies but on a number of occasions also commented on the skillful and active operations of the Wrangel troops. With such an approach our victory over the enemies became more significant. In all exercises and training Frunze demanded the detailed working out of the questions of conducting reconnaissance, security and all other types of combat support. Here he sought the real designating of a strong and active "enemy."

In troop training Frunze constantly drew the attention of the commanders to the bold employment of the terrain, concealment and surprise of actions. He recommended that all the personnel be instructed in effective camouflage and

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rapid digging in. In summing up the results of the combat training of the Ukrainian and Crimean troops, he pointed to essential shortcomings in their training and in particular made the following comment: "I consider it a very dangerous phenomenon...that in the course of the maneuvers by the infantry units almost nowhere was digging in practiced. In training the troops under such conditions, without the use of a shovel, we risk instilling in them completely pacific notions of the nature of future battles." (43) Mikhail Vasilyevich demanded an improvement in field fortifications, the bringing of these closer to the troops and their skillful complementing of the main elements of combat, movement and fire. A particularly important place was given to fortifications on the defensive, where they should increase the strength of the troops.

M. V. Frunze gave important significance to the developing of coordination and to the training of the staffs. In analyzing the experience of the maneuvers conducted, he pointed out that quite often proper coordination and interaction were lacking in the work of the commanders of the troop formations and their staffs. Up to the present, he pointed out, there have been instances of a misunderstanding of the role of the chiefs of staff as responsible assistants in working out operational assignments and the ensuing attitude toward them as messengers assigned for the simple mechanical transmitting of the commander's orders. As a result, the capabilities of the staffs are not employed and the chief of staff is an unnecessary appendage while the interests of the matter suffer terribly from this. He saw in this the vestiges of a partisan warfare mentality and demanded that this be decisively ended.

After exercises, tactical drills or firing M. V. Frunze made it a practice to hold an analysis directly in the field where the combat actions had been played out. He also employed such an analysis method where the commanders of the operational sides themselves analyzed and justified their actions. Frunze recommended that the leaders of exercises not be in any rush to make conclusions on the various decisions and actions of the commanders and troops but rather skillfully bring out their strong and weak points and in every possible way encourage bold decisions and the showing of initiative. In his opinion, only instances of inertia, passivity and indecisiveness of the trainees merited sharp condemnation.

M. V. Frunze reorganized the methods of inspecting and checking the troops on the questions of combat and political training. He demanded that the inspecting personnel combine objectivity and exactingness with a vital interest in improving the state of affairs in the formations and units being inspected. In work in the troops he advised not only the bringing out of shortcomings but above all find positive examples in order to indoctrinate subordinates with them. He recommended on the spot instructing the commanders in the organization of service and the procedures for training and indoctrinating the personnel; the results of the inspections should be announced in orders and specific instructions given on eliminating the disclosed shortcomings.

He saw to it that as a result of an inspection and checks the viability and effectiveness of the programs, plans and orders worked out at the center be established so that considering this the style and methods of work for the

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superior levels could be improved in troop leadership. For encouraging and intensifying combat training, he considered it very useful to employ a competition between the formations and units and commendation of the best units by various means.

Even in those years M. V. Frunze raised the questions of the psychological and professional recruitment of personnel for the military schools and for service in the units of the branches of troops. He said: "With a 2-year period of service for regular personnel and with our territorial system, where periods of service are even shorter, the question of a correct approach to the allocation of the induction group among the various branches of arms in many instances is almost crucial for us." (44) Frunze advised studying the experience of widely employing "psychological testing" in the armies of the capitalist nations, in particular in the U.S. Army. He felt that the basic work in the area of a thorough investigation of the personality of future Red Armymen and officer candidates employing the scientific methods of psychological testing research should be carried out in the period of preinduction training. The result of this work should be a conclusion on the assigning of draftees to the corresponding branches of troops.

M. V. Frunze viewed the level of combat training as a most important component in the combat readiness of the troops as a whole. Leadership over combat and political training was considered by him to be the main duty of the command and political personnel and in terms of combat training, the basic indicator for the maturity of any leader. He examined and resolved the questions of troop combat training starting from planning and the individual instruction of the Red Armymen and ending with the elaboration of the methods for conducting the exercises and troop leadership in a close relationship with one another, directing all efforts at the single goal of increasing the combat skills of the troops and their readiness at any moment to carry out combat missions.

On Military Indoctrination

Demands on the military indoctrination of the Red Army. Military indoctrination has always been viewed as a process of systematic and purposeful effect on the spiritual, volitional and physical development of the servicemen in the aim of shaping their moral and combat qualities needed for military service and for carrying out missions in a combat situation. The military organization, said M. V. Frunze, is a specific organization requiring from its members particular clarity, accuracy, efficiency, endurance, speed in carrying out all orders and so forth. In his speeches he repeatedly emphasized that the command personnel must above all have the ability to rapidly size up the situation and take sound decisions, firmness and tenacity in carrying them out, decisiveness, initiative and independence of actions, courage, the ability to take a reasonable risk and assume responsibility for one's decisions and actions under difficult situational conditions as well as other organizational and volitional qualities. He had a high regard also for accuracy, preciseness and neatness of the commander, emphasizing that the commander's accuracy most vividly shows his respect for the military collective. For this reason in a good commander accuracy and neatness should be an inner need.

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Frunze considered as the main tasks in military indoctrination of all personnel to be the development of discipline, boldness, self-sacrifice, physical endurance, the ability to steadily endure the hardships of a combat situation and a readiness to carry out the combat mission regardless of any difficulties.

The necessity of these qualities stems objectively from the nature of a combat situation and for this reason at all times great importance has been given to developing them in the men, particularly military discipline and organization.

The French military writer A. Blondel has aptly written: "Bring together 100,000 men, give them weapons, uniforms and ammunition and you still will not have an army. Teach them to employ all means of self-preservation and extermination of the enemy, assume that they are courageous and strong and then you will have 100,000 soldiers but not yet an army. If they are inspired by one feeling, lead them against the enemy and possibly they will win an instantaneous victory but on the next day will fall apart; they still do not form an army." (45) What is still lacking in order for them to become a battleworthy army? he asked and answered: they lack discipline which is the only thing that turns a mob into a terrible war machine.

Regardless of the obviousness of such statements, in the revolutionary troops and generally among revolutionaries there was not always a uniform approach to certain elements of troop indoctrination. During the French Revolution and the Civil War in America, the Paris Commune and the Civil War in Russia, there were many outstanding military leaders who excelled in talent, bravery and other military virtues. However, many of them, in recognizing in principle the great importance of troop indoctrination, in their practical activities sometimes suffered from elements of false democracy and at times underestimated the necessity for rigid and severe organizing of troop indoctrination, particularly on the questions of discipline and organization.

At the Eighth RKP(b) Congress in 1919, such prominent party figures as A. S. Bubnov and K. Ye. Voroshilov ended up on the side of the "military opposition." The supporters of the "military opposition," in defending the electing of command personnel and the methods of partisan warfare, in essence were against the party line of establishing a regular, centrally controlled and disciplined army. They argued sharply, for example, against the demands of the Red Army Internal Service Regulations on the saluting of commanders by Red Armymen, seeing in this "the vestiges of an autocratic-serf-holding order." K. Ye. Voroshilov in subsequent years revised his views and as a whole held a correct position on these questions. He did a great deal to carry out party policy in the area of the organizational development and training of the Red Army. However, subsequently, in the 1930's, the demands on military indoctrination of the personnel were somewhat loosened. In 1940, after the Soviet-Finnish conflict, an abrupt about-face had to be made on this question upon instructions of the VKP(b) Central Committee.

As is known, the founders of Marxism-Leninism were always disapproving of any sort of manifestations of underestimating military discipline and organization in the troops. F. Engels in the article "Company Exercises" belittled the

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volunteers who in a lax and sloppy manner performed the drilling exercises and were "proud" of the fact that they performed them out of time and differently.

M. V. Frunze was a military figure and theorist who profoundly understood the questions of military indoctrination and gave them exceptionally great importance. His revolutionariness, simplicity and democracy in conduct did not prevent him from being severe and rigidly demanding when it was a question of military discipline and military indoctrination generally.

In light of this it is not hard to realize of what great importance for our military organization was the circumstance that during this difficult, crucial period in the development of the Red Army, when equally dangerous phenomena as both false democracy and eruptions of the old regime orders were making themselves felt, the party put at the head of the Soviet Armed Forces a person who profoundly understood the essence of military organization and discipline and as a professional revolutionary, party figure and most experienced front commander had unassailable authority throughout our Army and Navy, among the commissars, the commanders and all the personnel. His principled position on the questions of military indoctrination, in being supported by our party's Central Committee, made it possible to overcome the negative phenomena in this area and for many years to come predetermined the only correct approach to this major question in the training of the Armed Forces.

M. V. Frunze considered the very basis of discipline to be unswerving obedience and execution. A good commander, in his opinion, should be not only able to give orders but also to carry out orders and to obey unquestionably.

History has kept for us an example which could be used in the entire primer on military indoctrination. Upon arriving in 1919 at the Eastern Front in the position of commander of the 4th Army, Frunze, in the course of preparing the operation, visited the troops, held drill inspections, viewing the smartness and organization of the personnel as one of the most important elements of troop discipline and their readiness to carry out combat missions and their military duty to defend the republic.

During the troop inspection in Uralsk, Mikhail Vasilyevich was forced to make sharp comments to certain commanders on the low discipline in their units. After this one of the brigade commanders requested that the army commander be present at an assembly of the commanders to explain his comments at the drill inspection. In the units rumors had spread that Frunze was a general from the Tsarist Army and for this reason was implanting old regime procedures. Frunze left the first note unanswered but, having received a second "summons," decided to visit the brigade. Here he very delicately took into account military psychological aspects. They tried to persuade him not to go or to go later when the brigade command personnel had quieted down. But Frunze felt that a psychological about-face was essential among the army commanders and political workers, since after the murder of Commissar Lindov some of them were even afraid to show up in the units. It would be possible to take a strengthened security but this could merely lead to complications and not produce results. Having weighed all the pluses and minuses, Frunze took the decision to visit the brigade accompanied only by one aide.

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As witnesses were later to describe, when Frunze appeared at the commander assembly, everyone fell silent, no one stood up, the mood was dark and threats were heard. Those who spoke complained most that here they were fighting, shedding their blood but then others arrive, hand down sentences, teach you to march and organize general parades.

M. V. Frunze let everyone have his say and then, weighing every word, turned to those assembled, saying:

"First of all, I assure you that I am not an army commander here. An army commander cannot and should not be present at such a meeting. I am here as a member of the Communist Party. And on behalf of the party which sent me to work in the army, I reaffirm all my comments on the question of the shortcomings noticed by me in the units the commanders and commissars of which you are and the responsibility for which you, consequently, bear to the republic.... Your threats have not frightened me. I am a Bolshevik. The Tsarist court twice condemned me to death but was unable to force me to abandon my convictions. Here it has been said that I am a general. Yes, I am a general but not from the Tsarist punitive forces but from the revolution. I am unarmed and am here only with my aide. I am in your hands. You can do with me what you like. But I firmly assure you on the question of today's summoning of me here as a commander that in the event of repeating such phenomena I will punish most unmercifully even up to execution. In violating discipline, you disrupt the army. Soviet power will not permit this."

Mikhail Vasilyevich fell silent. Stunned by the truth stated so boldly, the commanders also fell silent. And when he, in saying farewell, went toward the exist, the commanders stood up and formed a line, with some of them coming out to bid him farewell.(46)

V. L. Arkhangelskiy in the book "Frunze," in referring to the memoirs of I. Kutyakov, has doubted the reliability of this episode. He has based his assertion on the fact that Mikhail Vasilyevich was a surprisingly humble person and that the sharp tone of the discussion described by S. A. Sirotinskiy was unlike Frunze. But I. Kutyakov was not a participant of the described event and writes about it secondhand. Moreover, the unflinching firmness of Frunze on questions of instituting military order and the plausibility of his comments to the brigade command personnel are confirmed by the content and tone of the order issued after this to the troops of the 4th Army No 92/39 of 3 March 1919, where the above-described instance is recalled and it is directly stated: "...Any violation of service duty and discipline in the future, after the publishing of the present order, will be viewed by me as nothing more than a malevolent and conscious crime and as such will be punished unmercifully by me."(47) For this reason, any doubt on this score is devoid of foundation.

M. V. Frunze was forced to act more than once in similar extraordinary circumstances. Any professional military leader could envy the profound understanding of the foundations of military discipline and as a whole military indoctrination, the firmness and unswervingness in maintaining

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military order which were shown by M. V. Frunze from the first days of commanding the army.

And after the Civil War, in resolving all the questions of the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces, Mikhail Vasilyevich constantly carried out this line, in giving particular significance to the maintaining of high military discipline in the Army and Navy. In condemning the methods of instilling discipline which existed in the Tsarist Army where the prime place was held by mechanical obedience and coercion by the extensive employment of repression, intimidation and insulting the personal dignity of the soldiers, he explained that in the Red Army discipline should be maintained on a different basis.

In military service, where all the life and activities of the servicemen are strictly regulated, methods of coercion can and should be employed, including in our army. But discipline cannot be created on coercion alone. Military discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces must be based primarily on the high revolutionary awareness of the personnel. M. V. Frunze was in favor of combining the methods of persuasion and coercion but considered the method of persuasion to be the main, determining one. Undoubtedly, there could be instances when persuasive methods alone were not sufficient and then it was necessary to resort to compulsion carried out firmly and consistently. But, he emphasized, the better commander will be the one who succeeds in carrying out his mission without any use of punishments.

M. V. Frunze repeatedly explained to the commanders and political workers that it is impossible to achieve much in the strengthening of discipline by punishment alone. It is essential first of all to endeavor to more profoundly understand the psychology of the subordinate, to influence him with the commander's authority and by persuasion and to be able to influence his feelings. "Of course," he commented, "such an approach demands from the command and political personnel much greater sensitivity, restraint, political awareness and service qualities than employing the methods of simple orders and penalties. But for a commander of our army there cannot be any other approach as it is our worker-peasant Red Army."(48)

In the report "The Next Questions of Military Affairs," in examining the questions of military discipline, Mikhail Vasilyevich said that recently he had repeatedly heard from certain commanders and Red Armymen that excessively high demands were beginning to be placed on discipline and that we were "exaggerating" excessively on this question. "Certain comrades are inclined to see in this a manifestation of unnecessary drilling, nitpicking, pettiness and so forth. Such an assessment," Frunze stated firmly, "is absolutely wrong. We have nothing reminiscent of the old Tsarist drill in our army and we will not.... We demand firm revolutionary order and want each commander and each political instructor and each Red Armyman...in all his life, in all his work and even in terms of appearance to bear the impression of this profound, firm and internally felt revolutionary discipline...we also draw attention to external appearance, for the latter is a reflection of internal content."(49)

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During the drill inspections at the Tiflis Garrison, Frunze was particularly indignant over instances of lax conduct in formation, whispering and talking, including from the command and political personnel. In the analysis he pointed out with all severity that discipline in formation is a reflection of everything that is done in the troop unit. He persuasively explained that all of this is needed not for a parade but for the military indoctrination of the personnel. For modern military affairs which are characterized by the broad employment of equipment are extremely complex. "In addition to ability and awareness, it requires from each man agility, skill, efficiency and clarity in actions. The carrying out of the prescribed demands 'taking one's time' and 'any old way' is a dependable path to defeat. This is why any person who equates these demands of combat indoctrination to a desire to implant lifeless drill of the old Tsarist Army or does not try to understand anything in military affairs is either an enemy or a traitor who consciously works to weaken the combat might of the Red Army. Order and discipline in the Red Army should exist and we are obliged to work for this. All the requirements of our regulations...should be carried out unconditionally...in order by its external appearance and inner state, the Red Army says to each worker and peasant of the Union that it at any moment is ready to set to battle against the enemy and that it hopes to win this battle with honor. Both our enemies and friends should feel this in merely looking at our Red Armyman and commander, that here there is a well formed, organized and tight force which by its every deed, every word and step bespeaks the presence of firm revolutionary will power and deep inner tempering."(50)

Ways of military indoctrination of the personnel. As was already pointed out, M. V. Frunze viewed the problems of military indoctrination inseparably linked with the political indoctrination of the servicemen, since all the moral-combat qualities needed for military service can be indoctrinated only on the basis of high political awareness, dedication to the cause of the revolution, where every fighter profoundly understands the importance of military duty. Since 1925 a uniform 2-year program of political training was introduced. The basic form of political indoctrination has been and remains political exercises. They should shape a communist ideology which, in defining a person's position in life, is also of crucial significance for military indoctrination. M. V. Frunze emphasized that political studies contribute most to military indoctrination when these are skillfully related to the tasks of combat training and the strengthening of military discipline, and when it persuasively brings out the purpose of military service and the demands of the military oath and regulations. He considered a major task of military indoctrination to be a profound understanding by each serviceman of the importance of his military duty and personal responsibility to defend the motherland in order, as he said, all of this would be infinitely dear and without which, seemingly, "life itself has no meaning."

"The task of indoctrination can...be considered resolved only when," M. V. Frunze pointed out, "each...Red Armyman is inculcated with a feeling of love for his unit and via it for all the Red Army, when he will be proud of belonging to it, joyous over its successes and disappointed over its failures."(51)

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He saw the link between political exercises and combat training and military indoctrination not only in the coordinating of their subjects with the tasks being carried out by the troops. The main thing, Frunze was convinced, was that indoctrination which is established in political exercises should be continued in other forms at other exercises and in daily life. He saw the main shortcoming in the indoctrination of the personnel in the gap between what is said at exercises on discipline and military order and what is practically done; the entire question of indoctrination suffers most from this. If political and other exercises are concerned with proper military order but in daily life the commanders and political workers overlook the violations of the regulations or even violate them themselves, then this corrupts people and leads them to think that what is said at political exercises is not so important to carry out.

For precisely this reason Frunze so constantly emphasized the importance of the personal example set by the command and political personnel. The strength of a personal example is that it possesses the greatest visibility and serves as the most important means for developing in the servicemen awareness, will power, character, traditions and military habits.

At the same time, M. V. Frunze explained that no matter how well and how many political exercises, conversations and other general indoctrinational measures were carried out, no stories about heroism, courage and discipline could instill these qualities just as it is impossible to learn to swim without going into the water, merely listening to a lecture. He realized very well that for the indoctrination of high moral-combat qualities there is only one way: to put the men in all exercises, drills and in daily life under those conditions where they would be forced systematically and constantly to manifest these qualities. Later the essence of this pedagogical formula was clearly and very aptly defined by A. S. Makarenko: "It is impossible to indoctrinate a courageous man if he is not put under conditions where he could show courage...."(52)

Proceeding from these considerations, M. V. Frunze demanded that at the exercises and drills a combat training situation be established which would reproduce as completely as possible actual combat so that the commanders, political workers, the junior commanders and Red Armymen could show the moral and combat qualities needed in combat.

In urging that the Red Armymen be indoctrinated in the heroism of the Civil War, M. V. Frunze pointed to the necessity of conducting a decisive struggle against cowardice. V. I. Lenin copied out of Napoleon's book "Thoughts" the following words: "...In each engagement there is a moment when the bravest soldiers, after the greatest effort, feel a desire to flee, this panic is engendered by the absence of confidence in their own courage; the most insignificant occasion and any pretext is sufficient to return this confidence to them; the high art is to create them."(53)

Under these conditions the personal example of the commander, his bravery and his presence where a psychological break has formed can play a crucial role. This is precisely how M. V. Frunze himself proceeded, for example, in crossing the Belaya River at Ufa. He gave equal significance to the personal example

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and to the personal effect on subordinates in peacetime. It is interesting to point out that Mikhail Vasilyevich recommended in exercises that suitable episodes be created in order to teach the commanders and political workers to find the procedures and methods for controlling the combat mood of the personnel.

One of the factors which gave rise to the indecisiveness of commanders and cowardice of the Red Armymen, M. V. Frunze felt, was the extended remaining of troops in a passive state. For this reason, during a war and in going over to the defensive, even if the enemy was not advancing, he demanded that the troops conduct active reconnaissance, make raids against the enemy flanks and rear and conduct frequent combat actions. A good commander should always seek out battle, remembering Suvorov's admonishment: It is better to meet danger head on than to wait for it in place. And in peacetime he saw to it that the troops were never idle but were constantly engaged in intense combat training. Precisely active and decisive combat operations in wartime and in exercises in peacetime helped most to indoctrinate volitional qualities both in the commanders and among all the personnel. He taught that the will of a commander or a Red Armyman can be indoctrinated only in the overcoming of difficulties, emphasizing that great hardships as well as physical and psychological stress will rest on the shoulders of the personnel in a combat situation. In order that all these difficulties are not unexpected for the men with the outbreak of a war, they must be accustomed to all of this in peacetime.

In giving great importance to the drill instruction of the troops, M. V. Frunze drew attention primarily to its role in the military indoctrination of the personnel. As is known, the bases of drill instruction for an army were established since antiquity, in the first attempts to introduce elements of organization into troop operations in combat. Even then it was clear that only a man who had undergone special drill training could successfully employ weapons not only on an individual basis but also together in a team, together with others.

In being against drill and senseless parading, Frunze demanded that a military purpose be given to drill instruction and that the drill elements needed by a soldier be mastered to the point of perfection, since there was no better means than drill instruction to teach the personnel attentiveness and the quick and precise execution of commands. F. Engels wrote: "This introduces into the conscience of the soldier the fact that they actually comprise a single body; that they as a whole are in the hands of the commander who can employ their force in the shortest time and with the greatest result." (54) And the more battle formations developed and were split up and the more complex and fluid battle actions became, the greater importance assumed by drill instruction as the most important means for the military indoctrination of the personnel.

M. V. Frunze in many of his speeches and articles emphasized that such qualities as organization and discipline can be developed in the personnel only by the entire way of military life based upon the precise and unswerving fulfillment of the order of the day and the requirements of the military regulations. Exemplary internal order in the unit and barracks, if it is

instilled not in a rush or randomly but is maintained day after day and systematically, is of great indoctrinational significance. Frunze considered guard duty and detail for regimental duties to be good schooling in military indoctrination and demanded the scrupulous observance of all the rules for standing this.

Noteworthy is the idea of M. V. Frunze that in the Red barracks troop order must be maintained not by commander pressure but rather as a result of skillful military indoctrination this becomes a personal need for each serviceman. He was constantly concerned that the Red Army barracks did not pick up from the old army the heavy atmosphere of oppressiveness, harassment and alienation of the soldiers.

Since there was no experience in organizing troop life in the Red barracks, in some places, under the influence of the old military specialists, elements of the old barracks began to actually be resurrected. M. V. Frunze, in speaking in Tiflis in April 1925, said to the commanders and political workers that in the institution of the Red barracks we want to have a facility which is not only the site of military instruction for the Red Armyman but also a place for his political and cultural indoctrination so that the Red Armyman does not feel homesick. "As for the internal life of the Red Army," he commented, "it should be organized toward coming as close as possible to the ideals of a communist community...the internal order and regimen in the army of a worker-peasant Soviet state should be free of any privileges not based upon the needs of service and not stemming from its nature. Only on this grounds can we conceive of establishing that comradely unity and mutual understanding among the army superiors and inferiors and which are the main guarantee for the physical and spiritual might of the Red Army." (55) Mikhail Vasilyevich emphasized both great exactingness on subordinates as well as great concern for them, particularly in satisfying their material needs. Indifference and a bureaucratic attitude toward the needs of the men were viewed by him as a completely intolerable phenomenon for the Red Army. With the converting of the army to a peacetime status, even under the conditions of chaos and universal disorder, he was concerned for the amenities of the barracks, he thought a great deal and sought advice from the commanders and political workers on how to establish in them at least elementary comfort for the Red Armymen.

M. V. Frunze felt that on the question of establishing firm military order, the commanders and political workers should act as an united front. He sharply condemned individual instances when the commanders demanded order but the political workers, on the contrary, endeavored to play the role of the "protectors of the Red Armymen against suppression by the commanders." He pointed out that this was not characteristic for a majority of the political workers, but even individual instances were unacceptable, since there was nothing more harmful and more inadmissible for the Red Army than such relationships. In speaking always with great respect about the political workers, he emphasized that our political worker, as a representative of the Communist Party, should always be the carrier of the idea of order and discipline and which has always been most inherent precisely to our party. For this reason the political worker should be that element which better, more dependably and more strongly than any other helps to strengthen discipline and

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military order. Frunze drew attention to the fact that among certain commanders as well as among the political workers, "in many instances instead of the firm and categorical demand for performing service duties there is an unprincipled 'playing up' to the Red Army masses and a desire to show one's exceptional 'democracy.'"

"This 'democracy' is the most flagrant distortion of all and any bases of discipline in our Red Army. An order is an order. Persuasion and admonishment to carry out orders by their very nature are flagrant violations of discipline."(56) But strictness and exactingness, M. V. Frunze was convinced, should not lead to the alienation and separation of the command and political personnel from the Red Army masses. He put among the most valuable qualities of the Red commanders their ability to live in the midst of the Red Army masses, to be linked daily with their subordinates, to know their needs, requests and be concerned with satisfying them.

M. V. Frunze assigned a leading role in the area of military indoctrination to the junior command personnel comprising that "basis on which is founded the entire question of discipline, combat unity and combat training of the unit. In being constantly in the midst of the Red Army men, the junior command personnel is the sole conductor of all the influences and effects from above indoctrinating the unit."(57)

For this reason, Mikhail Vasilyevich emphasized, the careful selection of personnel for the junior commander positions, their training conforming to modern requirements and the quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the reserve of junior commanders in the event of war--all of this is assuming primary significance in the tasks of military organizational development. He demanded that the regimental schools should recruit the most literate, bold, energetic and at the same time the socially and politically most reliable men. He drew attention to the fact that the regimental schools should become a model of military indoctrination and order. And during the war he viewed all the Red Army men of regular service as future junior commanders. "Our task in the area of the skills of the present Red Army personnel," he wrote, "comes down to making each fighter coming into its ranks capable of subsequently becoming a squad commander."(58)

M. V. Frunze taught the commanders and political workers to make skillful use of all the levers for influencing their subordinates. An important role, in his opinion, could be played by arousing a spirit of competition within the formations and units, as well as between individual subunits, including the militia units with regular ones. It was extremely important to organize all sorts of sports contests and prize shooting involving the local civilian population. In this regard, good service could be stood by the establishing of special divisional, regimental, battalion and company holidays to which the sports competitions should be timed if possible. It is interesting to point out that M. V. Frunze was the initiator of establishing the Red Army clubs and personally opened the first such club in Kharkov. He felt that the Red Army club should become one of the important centers for the political and military indoctrination of the men. He constantly recommended that questions of a military-technical sort be raised and propagandized in the Red Army clubs.

As a whole, M. V. Frunze viewed troop indoctrination as a complex, many-sided process which is carried out by the commanders and political workers in the course of political indoctrination, combat training and military service as well as by the entire way of daily military life in accord with the requirements of the military oath and military regulations. In the military indoctrination system not only are the commander and political worker an active character but also the Red Armyman who should adopt all the elements of discipline and military order not out of compulsion, not out of enforced obedience but as a profoundly aware necessity making it possible for him along with the entire troop collective to successfully carry out the sacred duty of defending the socialist fatherland.

Present-Day Questions of Military Training and Indoctrination

The trends in the development of military training and indoctrination. As in the start of organizational development and training of the Soviet Armed Forces, the further development of military training and indoctrination has been carried out in accord with the demands of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the party decisions on the questions of the communist indoctrination of the workers and the strengthening of army and navy combat might. The practical measures and military-theoretical works of M. V. Frunze had a substantial impact upon shaping the principles, the concrete forms and methods of military indoctrination and training. The provisions worked out by him on these questions were basically reflected in all the subsequent regulations and manuals of the Red Army. The RKKA Temporary Internal Service Regulations put into effect in 1924 existed until 1937.

The forms and methods of military training and indoctrination were continuously improved in accord with the changed sociopolitical composition, technical equipping and organizational structure of the Armed Forces and with the development of military art. In the 1930's and 1940's the forms and methods of operational and combat training underwent the greatest development.

Prior to the start of the Great Patriotic War, the headquarters bodies and the troops were engaged largely and intensely in operational and combat training. Exercises and maneuvers were carried out widely. They assumed a new content considering the development of the methods of conducting operations and combat actions. It was generally recognized that in those years, in the Red Army, the most advanced system for organizing the umpire personnel was established and this significantly improved the methods of playing out combat. The marksmanship of the personnel was rather high. As a whole, the combat training of the troops undoubtedly was higher than in the mid-1920's, when M. V. Frunze established the bases of Red Army Combat Training.

But the development of military affairs with each passing year placed evermore important demands on military training and indoctrination of the army. At the same time, the exactingness of the leadership for these questions and the training and indoctrination procedures were not always up to these new tasks. On certain questions related to training and particularly combat indoctrination, the advice of M. V. Frunze was not completely carried out. No one denied its importance and significance. But as experience was to show, in order to maintain the necessary intensity in combat training and to constantly

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bring combat training and indoctrination closer to the conditions of an evermore complex combat situation, there also had to be great exactingness corresponding to the new conditions and constant pressure. Under various pretexts these had caused overt and concealed resistance, diverting the question of combat training from what was needed in a war. In peacetime such exactingness is irreplaceable.

In the 1930's, field skills were primarily underestimated. The intensity of combat training was low in wintertime and at night. Not enough attention was given to exercises involving field firing and bombing. The demands on military indoctrination were somewhat reduced, particularly drilling skills and smartness. The People's Commissar of Defense, MSU S. K. Timoshenko in 1940 was forced to admit: "We have spent a very long time in the classrooms, we have become accustomed to learning by verbal explanations, without bothering ourselves with the difficult conditions of a combat situation or difficult terrain conditions, in a word, everything that rests on the shoulders of a fighter, commander and political worker during a war and in combat...."(59)

There were also objective difficulties. In 1935, in the Ground Forces 74 percent of the divisions were territorial and only 2 years before the start of the war were they fully converted to a regular system. A large number of new formations and units was fielded and the command and political personnel replaced. All these troops only on the eve of the war had actually begun regular combat training.

On the basis of the experience of the Soviet-Finnish War and the commenced World War II, the party Central Committee and the Red Army Command took decisive measures to improve the entire combat training system and particularly for strengthening discipline, military order and generally improving military indoctrination. Over a short period of time, enormous work was done to bring troop training closer to wartime needs. But there was not enough time prior to the start of the war. The decisive measures undertaken in those years in the area of military training and indoctrination seemed unjustifiably rigid to certain commanders and political workers. But the Great Patriotic War was to place even more severe demands in this area.

During the entire war the Red Army was constantly and intensely engaged in combat training considering the specific experience of the war and the forthcoming combat missions. Combat actions themselves served as irreplaceable schooling in the improving of military mastery and the combat-moral qualities of the personnel.

The main conclusion from the war's experience in this area was that combat training maintained its purpose and met its sense only when in peacetime under no circumstances was it diverted from the guidelines which would determine the nature of a future war. The lessons of the war with exceptional strength confirmed the wisdom and vitality of Lenin's words: "Intensified military training for a major war requires not a rush, not shouting, not a battle slogan, but rather protracted, intense, most stubborn and disciplined work on a mass scale."(60)

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During the postwar years the system of military instruction and indoctrination has continued to be improved considering the experience of the Great Patriotic War and the appearance of nuclear and other new types of weapons and military equipment. Fundamental qualitative changes in military affairs have immeasurably increased the demands made on combat skills, on moral-political qualities and on the ideological and psychological tempering of the personnel. Proceeding from these demands in the postwar period, particularly in recent years, the questions of military training and indoctrination have been raised to a new, higher level corresponding to the nature of modern combat actions.

The tactical and special tactical exercises and maneuvers play a particularly important role in increasing field, air and sea skills. The methods of their preparation and execution reflect all the finest that was gained in our Armed Forces and in the socialist nation armies.

The characteristic features of modern military training and indoctrination are: the bringing of these as close as possible to the conditions of a possible war; complicating the tasks and broadening the range of questions studied considering the development level of military art; the thorough consideration of the particular features of the theaters of war; increasing the scope of the conducted exercises and their full saturation with field firings, missile launches and other practical actions involving the use of the weapons and combat equipment. The ability of the leaders is becoming evermore apparent of putting the commanders, staffs and troops being trained under the difficult conditions of an acute and dynamic situation as these most fully reproduce combat actions which are characteristic for a modern war.

The joint exercises of the socialist country armies play an enormous role in strengthening combat cooperation, being a true school of fraternal friendship and combat comradeship for the men of the Warsaw Pact states.

The complicating of the international situation, the new round of the arms race unleashed by the reactionary imperialist forces, the outright wagering of the leadership of the United States and the other NATO countries on military force and achieving military-technical superiority over the Soviet Union do not give the Soviet military personnel the right to be content with the level achieved. As was pointed out by MSU S. L. Sokolov, the logic of development of military affairs is such that at each new stage of it more complicated and responsible tasks are carried out. In the present international situation, in the age of scientific-technical progress, "it is a law in the life of the Soviet military to follow the party demand not to be complacent with the successes, not to be content with the level achieved but rather to constantly move forward and achieve more." (61)

Considering all of this, modern military training and indoctrination are based on the demand of teaching the troops to carry out missions under the most difficult conditions which could exist in a future war, if it is impossible to prevent it.

In carrying out these missions even greater significance than before is assumed by the Marxist-Leninist training of the officers and the political studies of all the personnel and by observing the principle of party loyalty

in the entire system of troop training and indoctrination. Only on the basis of a profound study of Marxist-Leninist theory, by ideological conviction, a communist attitude toward labor and a correct understanding of military duty can all the other tasks of training the Armed Forces be successfully carried out.

In accord with the decisions of the 25th and 26th Party Congresses concerning a comprehensive approach to the entire question of the indoctrination of Soviet people, the system of troop training must be carried out in close relation to the ideological-political, moral and military indoctrination of the personnel, considering the specific tasks which are carried out by the troops and naval forces. Observing the principle of party loyalty in preparing and carrying out training and indoctrination measures gives the entire process of training and military indoctrination a highly ideological nature and creates the basis for a thorough mastery of military affairs.

These questions have assumed particular urgency under present-day conditions, when the importance of ideological struggle has increased sharply and the moral-political factor is a most important element in the combat capability of the Armed Forces.

Historical experience convinces us that the greater the successes of the socialist countries demonstrating the triumph of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the more activity shown by the reactionary imperialist circles on the ideological front. This is no accident. In being expressed in a military language, the enemy is constantly throwing its main forces where the chief danger threatens it.

Considering all of this, the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations must further intensify work in the area of carrying out the decisions of the June (1963) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on ideological questions, know the procedures of psychological warfare employed by the imperialist circles, they must aggressively fight against the ideological subversion of our class enemies and instill hate for the enemies of the socialist fatherland as well as high political vigilance among the Army and Navy personnel.

Ways of improving military training and military indoctrination. An analysis of the new factors and conditions in the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces indicates that a further rise in the quality and effectiveness of military instruction and indoctrination can be carried out in the following basic directions.

In the first place, in the area of improving the planning of combat training and all training and indoctrinational measures. This provides the prompt mastery by the personnel and primarily by the military cadres of the modern achievements of military science and military art which comprise the content of military training and indoctrination. As is known, planning is the central core of any leadership. The effectiveness of troop training and the organized execution of all planned measures depend largely upon its viability and careful elaboration.

Even M. V. Frunze pointed out that one of the most important and complex questions in planning is to set the proper amount of drills, exercises and

other measures to be carried out in the area of troop indoctrination and training. On the one hand, there is an objective need to constantly increase the training and indoctrination measures and, on the other, an excessive increase in their number can lead to a decline in their quality and effectiveness. It is perfectly obvious that this question requires an objective approach which more fully takes into account present-day demands on troop training.

The issue is that the preparation and conduct of modern combat encompass a large range of diverse military-technical, tactical and special questions. Among these first of all are: converting the troops and staffs to a wartime status under the various conditions of a military threat or the unleashing of a war by an aggressor; carrying out long-distance transport and marches; conducting offensive and defensive battles. Within each type of battle, one must work out the methods for performing various tactical missions such as: conducting a meeting encounter, launching or repelling a counterattack, crossing a water obstacle, combat, rear and technical support and so forth.

It is impossible to work out this in all details at one or two drills or exercises and even as a result of carrying out all measures related to combat training during the year. For this reason, the need arises for the staffs to draw up a list of the most important questions stemming from the content of military art and which should be worked through with the headquarters bodies and the troops and then determine the sequence of their study in various combat training measures. The planning must be carried out in such a manner that over a certain period of time the main questions of preparing and conducting various types of combat are worked through. Only under this condition is it possible to ensure the proper combat readiness of the formations and units.

In other words, the main measures in the training of the staffs and the combat training of the troops (drills, military games and exercises) as much as possible should be intercoordinated by a single tactical and procedural plan so that at each drill or exercise a minimum necessary number of questions is raised, the most important of them are worked through in succession and as a result of carrying out a range of intercoordinated measures complete and thorough preparation of the headquarters bodies and the troops (naval forces) to carry out any combat missions which might occur during a war is achieved.

In planning combat training it is advisable to plan for the full utilization of the entire arsenal of its forms and methods, including: training procedural assemblies and monthly commander exercises; staff drills and exercises, military games; command-staff and special tactical exercises with the troops. The command-staff exercises and tactical exercises with the troops are the most effective forms of combat training. But they achieve their goal only in the instance that they are preceded by appropriate staff drills, staff exercises, military games and troop command drills as this ensures the successive transition to carrying out more complex tasks.

One must also avoid the other extreme, when all the exercises at the training and procedural assemblies, staff drills, military games and other measures are devoted solely to the questions of the forthcoming tactical exercise. This

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can lead to the working through of the same tactical problems while other equally important ones remain unassimilated. In order to avoid such one-sidedness in troop training, it is desirable, in paying chief attention to the main subject, at the same time to plan for the working through of other subjects. In the course of the assemblies, drills and other measures, as was already pointed out above, all types of combat and methods of carrying out combat missions should be mastered.

This also applies to the planning and organizing of the training process in VUZes and commander exercises in the troops.

In the training of officers, it is particularly important to determine the content of instruction on the basis of correctly anticipating the development prospects of military affairs stemming from the nature of a future war. The remarkable pedagogue V. A. Sukhomlinskiy has written that without "scientific prediction, without the ability to instill in a person today those kernels which will sprout in decades, indoctrination would be turned into a primitive supervision, the indoctrinator would become an illiterate nanny and pedagogics into sorcery. It is essential to scientifically predict and this is the essence of skill in the pedagogical process and the more accurate and thoughtful the prediction the fewer the unexpected misfortunes."(62) In terms of military affairs, this idea should be taken into account with particular consideration in working out long-term training programs.

Secondly, an important area in increasing the effectiveness of military training and indoctrination is the developing in the officer personnel of the qualities needed for showing a high level of military art for which M. V. Frunze was so concerned. We are the opponents of an arms race and are not endeavoring to achieve military and technical superiority but we are inferior to no one on the level of military mastery.

Improving the military art of the military cadres and the combat skill of all the personnel is one of the most important and inexhaustible sources for increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces virtually without any material outlays. For this reason, the task of the military cadres at the present stage is to effectively utilize this source. Here it is essential to bear in mind that as military affairs develop the necessity for military valor and high moral-combat qualities increases while the conditions for manifesting them become evermore complex. Even for manifesting ordinary self-possession on the battlefield a level of straining of the spiritual and physical forces must be completely different than the one in previous wars.

For this reason, along with profound theoretical knowledge, in the training of generals, admirals and officers, decisive significance is being assumed by an improvement in the practical skills of troop command, the combat cohesiveness of the staffs and the formations as a whole as well as the shaping of the necessary organizational and volitional qualities. V. I. Lenin said: "...No school, no university is worth anything if there is no practical ability."(63) This is particularly important in military art. Of course, the manifesting of military art is impossible without profound theoretical knowledge. But the circumstance must also be considered that the most progressive theoretical views become a material force and a component part of military art if they are

actually mastered not only by the individual military leaders and commanders but also by the basic mass of the officer personnel. In the course of the Great Patriotic War, the command personnel of all levels constantly studied the art of the practical preparation for and conduct of combat.

Particular carefulness and a detailed working through of all questions was required in organizing cooperation and combat as a whole. When at present one looks through the documents related to operational planning worked out during the period of the Soviet-Finnish military conflict or in preparing certain offensive operations of 1941-1942, externally everything appears quite in order and in formal terms they were worked out correctly. From the theoretical viewpoint the tasks were set intelligently and the sequence of their execution was set, the allocating of the necessary men and weapons was envisaged and many other missions were correctly carried out. But why did these operations not end up successfully? The main reason for the failures was: there was not a good knowledge of the enemy and because of this its dependable neutralization; far from all that had been planned and conceived of could not be promptly and precisely carried out; in preparing the operation and as a whole in the work of the commanders and staffs there was a lack of concreteness, detailing and carefulness in organizing and supporting combat actions and a lack of skillful organizational work directly in the troops and in the field. If this does not exist, then the best plans and a brilliant exposition of their content lose any sense. The planning of an operation and combat and the setting of missions are very important but only the initial part of the enormous practical work of preparing the operation and combat.

It is essential that in the exercises all the questions of the practical organization of cooperation and as a whole the organization of combat and its combat, technical and rear support be worked out fully and in all detail. For carrying out these tasks in exercises as much time should be assigned as would be needed in a combat situation.

Even in command-staff exercises, where only simulated subunits are employed, in these subunits it is essential to carry out the entire range of the planned measures related to preparing combat, including: to actually organize and conduct reconnaissance, to carry out the engineer organization of the terrain, to establish the required material stocks, to carry out the stipulated technical servicing of the combat equipment and so forth.

Special attention must be paid to organizing the cooperation of the subunits and units of all branches of troops. Here this work should not come down to solving formal theoretical questions, as is sometimes the case still in exercises, but should have a professional character and involve primarily the fundamental questions a correct solution of which would determine the coordinated actions of the troops; this should ensure a uniform understanding by all the personnel of the set combat missions and the methods of carrying them out. The exercise leader must carefully verify whether everyone correctly understands the directions of the forthcoming actions, where the "enemy" weapons (target coordinates) are specifically located, what artillery or aviation is to hit them and when, the procedure and signals for calling in and halting fire in the course of combat, the location of passages through "enemy" obstacles and other questions. When necessary it is essential to

request an additional or a repeat working through of these questions but under any circumstances not allow the commanders and staffs being trained to commence an insufficiently prepared combat.

Consequently, the shaping of the qualities needed for showing a high level of military art is achieved primarily by the unswerving carrying out of the main demands of instruction and troop indoctrination, that is, to teach what is needed in a future war if this is forced on us.

The third area for increasing the effectiveness of troop training is improving and further developing the forms and methods of military training and indoctrination. A most important form for increasing the training level of officer cadres remains their independent work. As V. I. Lenin pointed out, "without certain independent work the truth cannot be found in any serious question and the person who fears labor deprives himself of the opportunity to find the truth." (64) From these words of Lenin's it follows that the main thing in self-education is an analysis of the studied material and the search for the truth. With no other form of instruction can this be fully achieved? In this context we should recall the thought of V. G. Belinskiy: "An idea read or heard and probably understood as it should but not carried out through its intrinsic nature and which has not received the imprint of your personality is dead capital...." (65)

In the aims of developing independent, developed operational thinking in the command and supervisory personnel, M. V. Frunze gave particularly great importance to the profound study of the history of military art both in military schools and in the troops. And he sought not an abstract study of military history but rather the ability to extract the necessary conclusions from it for today and the future. All the associates and students of Frunze excelled in the ability in their scientific and practical work to inseparably link a careful study of previous experience with a bold look forward. B. M. Shaposhnikov wrote: "The Academy gave me a love for military history and taught me to draw conclusions from it for the future. I have always generally gravitated toward history and it has been a bright light on my path. It was essential to further continue the study of this fount of wisdom." (66) And further: "That history is the best mentor in practical affairs and which certainly includes military affairs is beyond any dispute...." (67)

The experience of the older generations has also shown the exceptional value of the assignments which were given to generals, admirals and officers in the area of the independent study of the experience of the most important engagements, operations and campaigns with the subsequent hearing of their reports. The question is that the preparation of reports by officers on theoretical subjects, without an analysis of specific combat experience or the experience of the conducted exercises, does little to encourage the thought process and does not sufficiently develop creative habits.

For today's officer, constant work in the area of acquiring military knowledge and the creative analysis of it are particularly important. In any sector, the insufficient preparedness of the leader harms the question and for an officer poor preparation is completely inadmissible, as his activities, particularly in a combat situation, determine the life of other persons whom he must reasonably use and at the same time, under any circumstances, carry

out the set combat mission. It has long been known that war for a military person is a testing the date of which is not known but for which one must prepare all one's life.

However, independent study cannot be the concern of just the officers. Certain organizational measures and moral incentives are also needed, namely: indoctrination in the officers of a strict critical attitude toward one's preparation, the creation of a situation of great exactingness and intolerance for any manifestations of indifference and compacency in this matter. The independent work of the officers should be skillfully directed by the senior chiefs by individual assignments, colloquiums and other methods. In a number of military districts, for example, each year the entire officer personnel is given a list of books which the officer should read without fail. On the other hand, there must be a further rise in the responsibility and interest of the officers themselves in the results of their preparation as well as greater importance for this in the certification system and in service.

The preparation of military cadres to carry out functional duties in wartime, undoubtedly, remains the main area in their military training and indoctrination. However, the demand to teach the troops what is needed in a war can be carried out only with the skillful organization of the work by the commanders, the political workers and the officers of the staffs in peacetime. In the VUZes and in the system of commander training in the troops, in addition to the questions of military art, it would be advisable to more thoroughly study the principles of management science, the forms and methods of combat and political training, military indoctrination, the organization of troop service, the strengthening of military discipline and other questions related to the leadership of the troops' daily life.

All these questions in the organization of military service and troop leadership in peacetime represent a complex range of sociopolitical, legal, military, pedagogical, special and technical knowledge which the military cadres must thoroughly master, improving organizational and volitional qualities simultaneously in the course of practical work. Without this there cannot be a truly scientific level in troop leadership.

Under present-day conditions, when the range of military knowledge and the practical skills needed by the officers is growing and it is virtually impossible to increase the training time, the necessity arises of intensifying the training process, of widely and constantly introducing progressive teaching methods as well as more fully utilizing the achievements of psychology, pedagogics and cybernetics.

A major task remains the improving of the troop training methods and the combat teamwork of the subunits and units, starting with the planning of the exercise, the creating of an instructive initial situation and ending with the playing through of combat actions. First of all, it is very important that the initial situation correctly reflect the possible conditions for carrying out the combat missions. The initial situation and all the additional inputs related to intensifying it and playing through combat actions should as fully as possible reproduce the nature of modern combat, correspond to the goals of the exercises, put the trainees under difficult conditions of a ground, sea

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and air situation, abound in acute situations requiring profound reflection, difficult creative searches and original decisions stemming from this, a quick response to a changed situation and the ability to find a way out of the most difficult situations.

Only in such a manner is it possible to instill in each officer strong will power, high organizational abilities, tenacity and inflexibility in achieving the goals. As was pointed out by the USSR Minister of Defense MSU S. L. Sokolov, a Soviet officer "should find alien to him feintheartedness, indecisiveness and inefficiency. He must act according to the rule: if an order has been given, then it must be carried out no matter what. No difficulties or obstacles should shake the commander's will."(68) All the methods of preparing and conducting exercises and drills should be subordinate to the interests of developing all these qualities.

The fourth area of improving the quality of military training and indoctrination is the further development of the training facilities. Of particularly great importance in this area is improving the field training facilities and trainers.

Thus, the forms and methods of military training and indoctrination should be continuously improved in accord with the overall process of the development of military affairs.

Certain questions in the specific features of military indoctrination. A number of new problems has also arisen in the area of military indoctrination. On the one hand, objectively in line with the fundamental qualitative changes in military affairs, the importance of military indoctrination has been constantly growing. On the other hand, under conditions where there is a higher level of equipping the army and navy with complex weapons and the proportional amount of technical specialists has increased in the Armed Forces, individual manifestations have appeared of underestimating troop drill, internal order and certain military rituals. There have always been shortcomings in this area. This is natural under conditions where there has been an ongoing process of military indoctrination for constantly new generations of young soldiers. And if everything proceeded from the fact that this was the result of unfinished work and better work must be done in this area, the problem could be more easily solved. But the question is that sometimes individual young officers pose the question differently: have not certain military rituals become an anachronism?

In actuality, military affairs are becoming more and more complicated while there is less and less time to cover all the questions of military life. In the 1920's and 1930's, a Red Armyman from the rifle forces had to basically know his rifle. Now a soldier must master the most complicated combat vehicles and be able to conduct combat under conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy. Even the circumstance that people have become more educated, in addition to advantages, also creates certain new problems in the process of military training and indoctrination. People do not accept absurdity in anything or any unjustified actions. In a word, it has become more difficult to resolve the questions of military indoctrination. A new approach is required and somewhat different methods of the work done by

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the indoctrinators themselves. The essence of them, to put it briefly, consists in having significantly more persuasiveness, awareness and analysis of the military indoctrination procedures and a closer linking of them with the interests of carrying out combat missions.

At the same time, it must be said with all certainty that with the fundamental changes which have occurred in military affairs there have been no changes which would provide grounds to play down the importance of military indoctrination. Conversely, everything shows that modern military service has placed increased demands in this area and we must be even more seriously concerned with military indoctrination. An immeasurably more complex and important problem is the rapid restoring of control, the subordinating of the troops to a single will, the maintaining of their organization and battleworthiness in a modern combat situation, when the personnel must endure enormous psychological stresses and in short periods of time entire subunits and command posts can be knocked out. For example, the trail of a radioactive cloud has been discovered during the march of the troops. In this situation what speed is required in taking decisions and what clarity in transmitting commands and signals is needed in order that all the subunits and units receive them promptly and immediately begin to carry them out in order to bypass the dangerous zone of radioactive contamination and employ protective equipment!

The aim of military indoctrination under present-day conditions is to develop in the personnel an entire series of special qualities needed in combat so that under any circumstances, in difficult situations there are high organization, discipline, clarity and promptness in carrying out orders and combat instructions so that all the subunits and units be well controlled and any given command is quickly received and carried out with a show of initiative and independence in the actions, so that the troops advance decisively and boldly, defend themselves stubbornly and steadfastly and so that the personnel be physically tenacious and courageously endure the hardships and deprivations of a combat situation.

As M. V. Frunze taught, this can be indoctrinated only by the entire system of combat and political training and by the entire set-up of a strict prescribed military life, when the personnel is constantly and systematically trained in showing high moral-combat qualities which define the content of military indoctrination considering the nature of a possible war.

MSU G. K. Zhukov, in recalling his service, has written: "I have been accused of excessive exactingness which I considered an indispensable quality of a Bolshevik commander. Looking back, I feel that at times I actually was excessively demanding and was not always restrained and patient with mistakes by my subordinates. My equilibrium was upset by any lack of conscientiousness in work or in the conduct of a serviceman. Some did not understand this but I, in turn, clearly was not sufficiently compassionate for human weaknesses."(69) In actuality a combination of profound respect for a person with great exactingness is the main principle of military indoctrination. A lack of exactingness in peacetime costs too much in a war. A leader who in peacetime does not show proper demandingness although this may impress some, in essence, least of all shows true respect for his subordinates. The

experience of the ages teaches that the more severe, like combat reality itself, the exactingness in peacetime, the less losses and the more victories there will be in a combat situation. This old truth recognized by all, in being clearly and flagrantly apparent in war, unfortunately, has begun to be obscured in peacetime.

The high art of military indoctrination of Suvorov, Frunze, Zhukov and other outstanding military leaders was that they were able to dispell this fog in peacetime, too, they themselves clearly saw and were able to indicate to subordinates the only true goal of military indoctrination, that is, to carry out one's duty honorably in wartime. When on the question of military training and indoctrination they showed stiff exactingness for subordinate troops, in this one could feel both the higher concern for the interests of the fatherland as well as the humaneness and true respect for man in their highest and most noble understanding.

A specific knowledge of the psychology of each man also is of exceptionally great importance in the question of military indoctrination. "...Indoctrination in the broad sense," wrote V. A. Sukhomlinskiy, "is a many-faceted process of constant spiritual enrichment and renewal--both of those who are being indoctrinated and those who are indoctrinating; here this process is characterized by the profound individuality of the phenomena: the same pedagogical truth which is true in one case becomes neutral in a second and absurd in a third. Such is the nature of our pedagogical job."(70)

With the present educational level and development of the military personality, without well organized, well conceived and purposeful individual work, it is impossible to count on any serious success in indoctrinational work. Consequently, at present, particularly on the question of strengthening military discipline, decisive significance is being assumed by work with each man, let alone each sergeant and officer. The issue is that all measures of a general sort in the general mass of the personnel, to put it figuratively, is reminiscent of area artillery firing, that is, the probability of the shell hitting the target is low. Individual work in psychological terms is direct laying at a well reconnoitered and ranged target. Its effectiveness is incomparably higher.

But if this is the case, then we cannot consider as sound the practice where in certain units the indoctrinational work plans include only measures of a general sort while individual work is let slide and, in essence, is not planned at all. In such instances it usually comes down to working with those who have already committed one or another service violation and for this reason has not fully achieved its aim.

The interests of the matter require that individual work be carried out purposefully and according to carefully worked out and conceived plans, bringing under their influence all the personnel and anticipating possible deviations from the rules of standing military service. All of this does not mean any underestimation of the general indoctrinational measures involving all the personnel. These are indefensible. But they should be combined with more effective individual work with each serviceman.

Consequently, the advanced weaponry, the growing role of the time factor and the establishing of mass professional armies in the leading capitalist countries have placed increased demands upon the readiness of the troops to immediately carry out the combat task assigned to them. In previous wars, shortcomings in troop training and indoctrination, albeit with difficulty, could still be eliminated in the course of combat. But this was often achieved at too great a price. The necessity of continuing troop training in the course of the war obviously never was completely eliminated, although under present-day conditions there will be less time and opportunity for this. But the consequences of the insufficient training of commanders, staffs and troops can be even more greivous. In line with this the importance of the quality indicators is sharply increased in the training of the Armed Forces and a constant improvement in the content and methods of military training and indoctrination is needed.

The entire system of military indoctrination and training of the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces should ensure the carrying out of the main tasks set by the USSR Minister of Defense, MSU S. L. Sokolov, "To further vigilantly guard the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people, together with the armies of the other socialist commonwealth countries to securely defend the victories of socialism and to always be ready to rebuff any aggressor."(71)

FOOTNOTES

1. F. Engels, "Izbr. voyen. proizv." [Selected Military Works], Moscow, 1957, p 428.
2. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 35, p 408.
3. Ibid., Vol 39, p 58.
4. Ibid., Vol 37, p 383.
5. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr proizv.," Vol 2, p 318.
6. Ibid., p 320.
7. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 121.
8. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 251.
9. Ibid., Vol 32, p 151.
10. Ibid., Vol 2, p 68.
11. Ibid., p 234.
12. See: "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh....," Vol 1, p 436.
13. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 408.

14. Ibid., Vol 3, p 87.
15. Ibid., p 199.
16. Ibid., Vol 2, p 146.
17. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 2, p 21.
18. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 154.
19. Ibid., p 120.
20. Ibid., Vol 1, p 403.
21. Ibid., Vol 2, p 16.
22. Quoted in: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1972, pp 93-94.
23. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 2, p 172.
24. Ibid., p 17.
25. Ibid., p 37.
26. Ibid., p 171.
27. Ibid., p 18.
28. Ibid., p 80.
29. Ibid., Vol 3, pp 198-199.
30. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 May 1982.
31. TsGASA, folio 7, inv. 3, file 46, sheets 97-98.
32. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 2, pp 236-237./
33. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 208.
34. Ibid., Vol 2, p 19.
35. Ibid., p 19.
36. TsGAV VMF [Central State Archives of the Navy], Orders of M. F. Frunze for 1921: Order No 712 of 30 May 1921.
37. Ibid., Orders of M. V. Frunze for 1923: Order No 1525 of 14 November 1923.
38. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 2, p 160.

39. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 86.
40. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 1, p 123.
41. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, pp 237-238.
42. Ibid., pp 593-594.
43. Ibid., p 595.
44. Ibid., Vol 3, pp 260-261.
45. A. Blondel, "Vzglyad na obyazannosti i dukh voyennogo znaniya" [A View of Duty and the Spirit of Military Knowledge], St. Petersburg, 1836, pp 24-25.
46. See: S. A. Sirotinskiy, "Put Arseniya: Biograficheskiy cherk o M. V. Frunze" [The Path of Arsenius: Biographic Essay on M. V. Frunze], Moscow, 1959, pp 126-127.
47. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 1, p 142.
48. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 359.
49. Ibid., p 200.
50. Ibid., pp 201-202.
51. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 2, p 79.
52. A. S. Makarenko, "Soch." [Works], Moscow, 1958, Vol 5, p 424.
53. Quoted in: "Leninskiy sbornik," 12, p 38.
54. F. Engels, "Izbr. voyen. proizv.," p 420.
55. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, pp 225-226.
56. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 2, p 161.
57. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 287.
58. Ibid., Vol 1, p 542.
59. PRAVDA, 25 August 1940.
60. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 36, p 325.
61. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 August 1984.
62. V. A. Sukhomlinskiy, "O vospitaniy" [On Indoctrination], Moscow, 1973, p 14.

63. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 42, p 77.
64. Ibid., Vol 23, p 68.
65. V. G. Belinskiy, "Sobr. soch." [Collected Works], Moscow, 1948, Vol 3, p 798.
66. Quoted in the book: "B. M. Shaposhnikov i yego...", p 42.
67. Ibid., p 43.
68. S. L. Sokolov, "Leninskiy stil v rabote voyennykh kadrov" [The Leninist Style in the Work of Military Cadres], Moscow, 1983, p 31.
69. V. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya," p 98.
70. V. A. Sukhomlinskiy, "O vospitanii," p 14.
71. S. L. Sokolov, "Leninskiy stil v rabote...", p 37.

CHAPTER 6: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LENINIST IDEAS AND THE THOUGHTS OF M. V. FRUNZE
ON A MODERN SYSTEM OF KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING WAR AND THE ARMY

In the postwar years the CPSU has continued to give great attention to the development of science, directing all efforts at a profound investigation of the patterns of nature and society, at increasing the role of science in creating the material and technical base of communism and in shaping the communist ideology of the workers. Rapid scientific and technical progress and major shifts in all socialist production have led to a new jump in the development of military theory and practice and changes have occurred in all areas of military affairs. The 25th and 26th Party Congresses particularly emphasized that the importance of scientific research on the fundamental problems of social life is ever-increasing, including the problems of the clash of forces over the main question of modern times, the question of war and peace.

The decisions of the CPSU and the other fraternal communist and worker parties have further developed the Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning the war and the army, considering the interests of defending all the socialist commonwealth countries. Of particularly great importance are the conclusions and theses concerning the following: the nature of the modern age and the decisive influence of the world socialist system on the course of social development; imperialism as a source of aggressive wars; the possibility of preventing a worldwide nuclear war; the nature, types and sorts of wars under present-day conditions and the attitude toward them on the part of the communist parties and the socialist countries; the factors determining the course and outcome of modern wars; the growing role of the communist and workers parties in strengthening the defense capability of the socialist countries and in directing the organizational development and training of the armed forces; the functions of a state of all the people and the armed forces of developed socialism; the nature of the fundamental qualitative changes in military affairs related to the appearance of nuclear weapons and rapid scientific and technical progress and so forth.

In light of the decisions of the party congresses and the Central Committee plenums, our military scientific thought has done a great deal in analyzing and resolving methodological and specific pertinent problems related to military theory and practice. The publishing of the fundamental 12-volume work "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny. 1939-1945" [History of World War II. 1939-1945] with MSU D. F. Ustinov as the chairman of the Main Editorial

Commission, contributed to a more profound generalization of the experience of the last war and to establishing a firm base for investigating the present-day problems of war and peace. Also of important significance for systematizing, deepening and clarifying the system of scientific knowledge concerning war and the army was the publishing for the first time in the history of our nation⁽¹⁾ of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia and the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary edited by MSU N. V. Ogarkov.

The pages of military journals have discussed certain general problems of military science. A series of monographs and scientific works has been published on these problems at the Military Academy of the General Staff imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov at the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin, the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze, the Institute for Military History and other VUZes and scientific institutions. A number of works and publications has thoroughly investigated the relationship of war and politics, war and ideology, the sources and mechanism for the outbreak of wars, their types, the political content and military-strategic character have been disclosed, an analysis has been given of the possibilities for the main sociopolitical forces capable of preventing a world nuclear war. The results of this research and the analysis of the development prospects for military theory and practice, like historical experience, have convincingly confirmed the objectivity of the patterns discovered by the founders of Marxism-Leninism and the fundamental methodological provisions worked out by them for a system of scientific knowledge concerning war and the army as well as the views of M. V. Frunze on these questions.

The achieving of a unity of views was largely aided by the conference held in Warsaw in 1977 for the representatives of the military scientific bodies of the Warsaw Pact armies and here they creatively discussed the most important methodological and ideological military-theoretical problems.

In line with the major sociopolitical changes in the world, many disputed questions of war and the army have required a further profound investigation and a review of them within the general system of knowledge concerning war and the army encompassing all the processes and phenomena which comprise the single whole.

Particular urgency has been assumed by methodological questions involving the processes of self-cognition, self-analysis of the sciences and theories investigating war and the army. This is to be explained, on the one hand, by the fact that the complicating of the sociopolitical and military-strategic nature of a war has led to the appearance of a large number of different areas of knowledge and to their further differentiation. This has created a tendency to weaken the ties between them. Sometimes, it turns out, it is easier to see all the examined phenomena and processes in the most minute detail than it is together and as a whole.

On the other hand, the boundaries between the different sciences investigating the problems of war are evermore noticeably becoming obliterated and conditional, and the reverse processes are growing involving the integration of different areas of knowledge and the growing need for analyzing all

objective processes from the same standpoints. "Without the constant delving into details," writes G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, "which by necessity is accompanied by specialization, subsequent synthesis is impossible. But specialization always represents the divorcing (to some degree artificial) of a part of the whole and hence certain violating of the subject's essence. The farther this goes the more acutely one feels a need for bringing together knowledge and for an approach to the subjects and phenomena of nature and society as an organic whole."(2)

For precisely this reason, under present-day conditions, in analyzing all the knowledge concerning war and the army an ever-greater role is being assumed by Marxist-Leninist philosophy and all the components of Marxism-Leninism which comprise a truly scientific and integrated approach to their investigation and cognition.

From the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism and considering present-day scientific achievements, it is advisable within the general system to review the classification of the entire aggregate of scientific knowledge concerning war and the army and clarify the place and role of military science in this system of knowledge, its subject and structure. This is also important because for many of these problems until recently there has not been a unity of views and for some of them even now there are different interpretations.

Methodological Bases for a Classification of Sciences

On the principles of a classification of scientific knowledge. War and armed combat. In the sketch of the general plan "Dialectics of Nature" F. Engels viewed a classification of sciences as their relationship which determines the general architectonics of all scientific knowledge and all relationships running between the various areas of the world in the course of its inherent development as well as between various areas of knowledge concerning the world in the course of the development of human cognition. He proceeded from the fact that a general classification of sciences would reflect the logic of the subject being studied as well as general views concerning the world and its cognition by man.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism, proceeding from the existence of the various forms of the movement of matter, formulated the underlying principles for a classification of sciences: the principle objectivity which means that sciences reflect different processes and laws of nature, society and thought; the principle of development according to which sciences in the general classification are placed in a definite sequence from the simple to the complex and from the inferior to the superior; the principle of the unity of the historical and logical, the unity of theory and practice and so forth.

These general principles of classification make it possible to ascertain the place and role of one or another science in the general system of sciences. But they still do not provide an opportunity to resolve all the methodological problems for classifying the various areas of knowledge within each science as well as their interrelationships. For this reason there can be various approaches to the classification of science or a group of sciences which study the same object.

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With a subject classification one proceeds primarily from what patterns this science studies. Here usually the principle of subordination is employed and this reflects the inner, organic relationships between the sciences when they out of necessity derive (develop) one from the other. Sciences can be classified from the viewpoint of their immediate relationship with practice by a dividing into fundamental and applied.

The interests of the effective development of various areas of knowledge also necessitate a problem classification, when new areas of knowledge develop in relation to the movement of major theoretical and practical problems to the forefront. Here, along with the principle of subordination, the principle of coordination can also be employed and this takes into account only the external relations between sciences which are ranked in a certain order.

The growing processes of the differentiation and integration of sciences, the constant appearance of new areas of knowledge and their ever-greater specialization have brought about growing importance for a systematic review of an entire series of related problems and areas of knowledge and the ever-greater spread of the problem classification of sciences. This serves as one of the ways for bringing theory closer to the needs of practice. Here a problem classification of the various areas of knowledge can be made in such a manner that their subject structure and relationships, as well as the succession of their placement are not disturbed but they are reduced to other groups in accord with the needs of the comprehensive investigation of major theoretical and practical problems. Possibly such an approach could more accurately be called a subject-problem classification.

These are the basic principles proceeding from which a modern classification of knowledge concerning war and the army can be made. This means, in the first place, that the classification of sciences comprising this system should ensure their integrated review in close relationship to one another. Secondly, these sciences and theories must be put into the appropriate groups proceeding from those objective patterns which they directly study and perceive. Thirdly, it is essential to classify them and place them in a logical sequence according to the role which they play in the preparation and conduct of a war at a given historical stage considering the degree and scope with which these encompass the various aspects and facets of a war and the army. Finally, the structure of the knowledge being classified should be mobile, flexible and with maximum completeness reflect the processes of the differentiation and integration of sciences. At the same time, it should provide systematic and primary research on the most important and pertinent problems raised by the needs of practice.

It must also be emphasized that any system of knowledge can be reliable if it correctly reflects objective reality. For this reason a scientifically sound classification is possible only with the deepest elucidation of the contents of the object and the subject of research comprising this system of sciences. Precisely an incorrect approach to an understanding of the essence of this question has given rise to most differences and unsound judgments on the question of classifying the system of scientific knowledge concerning war and the army.

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First of all one must point out with regret that in certain encyclopedic publications and works the concepts of "war" and "armed combat" are considered identical and the entire content of a war, in essence, is reduced solely to armed combat.(3)

The Soviet Military Encyclopedia, the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary and a number of scientific works have convincingly shown the erroneousness of such an interpretation of the definition of a war. But, regardless of this, the Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary which was published in 1983 states: "War is organized armed combat between states (groups of states), classes or nations (peoples)."(4) Subsequently, the article says nothing further about other forms of combating the enemy during a war.

For justifying such a definition, reference is sometimes made to the statement of V. I. Lenin: "In certain periods of acute economic and political crises, the class struggle has developed up to the point of direct civil war, that is, an armed combat between two parts of the people."(5) However, this Leninist thesis does not provide grounds to feel that he identified a war with armed combat. In the given instance he emphasizes what comprises the main content of a war and points out that in a period of war armed combat becomes the main and decisive form of carrying out politics.

Some people generally argue against the term "armed combat," considering it unscientific. At the same time, this term has been used in the works of V. I. Lenin, it has taken its place in our military vocabulary and is completely valid.

The identifying of war and armed combat leads to the ignoring of the class-political essence of a war, since not every armed combat is a war. Without a political goal, the most acute battle will not be a battle but merely a fight, pointed out V. I. Lenin.(6) A war is not restricted merely to the clash and combat of armed forces. It is a more diverse and complex sociopolitical phenomenon which influences the entire life of society.

A war represents a struggle of classes, states, coalitions and social systems. In viewing a war in all its complexity, it reflects not only some contradiction but also all the sociopolitical and economic contradictions and the various forms of struggle stemming from them. A war is a state of all society which represents not only the clash of armed forces but also a struggle in the area of politics, economics and ideology which during the war assumes a particularly fierce and implacable nature.

Although armed combat does comprise a decisive feature of a war and a specific trait, a war is not restricted to this. In addition to armed combat, a war also includes other forms of struggle which during a war are carried out not only by ordinary but also violent means. Here other means of struggle are subordinate to the interests of armed combat. V. I. Lenin emphasized that "a war includes all types of all areas of development" and a war is "the testing of all the economic and organizational forces of each nation."(7)

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With the outbreak of a war "all political and social institutions are subjected to the testing and trial 'by fire and sword.' Strength and weakness of the institutions and orders of any people are determined by the outcome of the war and by its consequences." (8) V. I. Lenin spoke of the change in the entire life of society during a war and of the profound interaction of the front and the rear as well as the diversity of forms of violence in a civil war. In criticizing the views of Kautsky and other opportunists on the essence and content of a war, he referred to Clausewitz: "Everyone knows that wars are caused solely by political relations between governments and between peoples; but usually they are presented in such a manner that with the outbreak of a war these relations halt and a completely different situation occurs subordinate solely to its own particular laws. We affirm the contrary: war is nothing more than the continuation of political relations with the intervention of other means." (9) Lenin even said that Clausewitz 80 years previously had belittled the primitive view that with the outbreak of a war the historically prepared political relations between peoples and classes are broken off and a different situation begins.

The relationship of war and armed combat in our science has always been understood in this manner. M. V. Frunze in the work "European Civilizers and Morocco" wrote: "...The army alone, of course, could not do a great deal if at the same time its struggle were not facilitated by a series of economic and political measures aimed at weakening the enemy." (10) M. N. Tukhachevskiy pointed out: "Of course, war is not the only means of politics and is not exhausted by just military operations. The actions of the armed forces are accompanied by organized and combined pressure and attacks against all the fronts of the struggle (economic, political and so forth)." (11)

The book "Voyna i armiya" [War and the Army] rightly states: "Historical experience teaches that the restricting of the concept of war to armed combat of the troops leads to an underestimation of the decisive role of the masses of peoples, it plays down the importance of political leadership in a war and does not make it possible to correctly ascertain the role of the unity of front and rear. Such flaws would be particularly dangerous in a modern war which has an all-encompassing nature and places extremely high demands on military organizational development. Ensuring the armed defense of the motherland presupposes the complete and all-round use of the economic, political, scientific, moral and specifically military potentials of a nation." (12)

This thesis is established very soundly in the books of S. A. Tyushkevich "Filosofiya i voyennaya teoriya" [Philosophy and Military Theory], N. N. Azovtsev "V. I. Lenin i sovetskaya voyennaya nauka" [V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science] and other works.

The authors of the book "Voyennaya strategiya" [Military Strategy] have endeavored to show that war is fully covered by armed combat. They write: "Precisely as a result of military operations, armed combat and the use of the means of violence and not any 'non-military' and 'indirect' actions during World War I some 10 million persons were killed and over 20 million persons maimed and wounded. World War II carried off almost 50 million lives." (13) Actually, these losses were chiefly the result of military operations. But

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why did such losses not occur in the wars of the 19th Century? Merely because wars were waged not by peoples but by armies half divorced from the people because at that time there was not such a close link between the economy and armed combat.

The sense of economic conflict in the wars of the 20th Century consists in the fact that the economy, in relying on its growing capabilities, should not merely supply armed combat (without which there would not be such mass losses) but also win the contest for economic survival of the state and the people as a whole. There have been periods of a war when military operations themselves were subordinate to the interests of carrying out an economic blockade as was the case, for example, in German operations against England during certain periods of World War II.

In World War I, Germany surrendered because of the economic and moral-political collapse of the nation's rear without still having suffered a complete defeat on the battlefield. One of the reasons for the victory in the Civil War was seen by V. I. Lenin in the fact that "by agitation and propaganda we have removed the Entente's own troops." (14) In the given instance the enemy was deprived of its troops not only as a result of military operations but also as a consequence of the fact that the ideological struggle took away a part of its troops. These are not merely "indirect" actions but actions to a definite degree which are the equivalent of military operations. After this how can one deny the existence of such a form of conflict during a war?

The importance of the diplomatic struggle is even more obvious. Skillful diplomacy not only creates good conditions for conducting military actions; it can lead to the establishing of a completely new military-political situation for conducting armed combat. For example, it is not hard to imagine under what conditions our Armed Forces would have had to fight if in the course of World War II the imperialists had succeeded in a united action of the capitalist states against the USSR, as was planned by them.

Thus, a true Marxist-Leninist understanding of the examined question comes down to the fact that a war is primarily the continuation of politics by violent means. It is a sociopolitical phenomenon and represents a clash (struggle) of classes, nations, states, coalitions and social systems employing armed violence which is combined with other forms and means of struggle (economic, ideological, diplomatic and so forth). Such a definition has been also given in the recent edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. (15)

Armed combat is the basic form of struggle in a war and the aggregate of military actions to achieve certain political goals. It represents one of the most acute forms of social struggle and consists in the organized employment of the armed forces as well as other forces and means (the partisan movement, people's militia and so forth) in the aim of destroying the enemy, capturing or defending territory and national assets.

Certain judgments on the object and subject of the system of knowledge concerning war and the army. Proceeding from one or another understanding of

the essence of war and armed combat in the military literature, the most diverse judgments have been made on the specific content of the system of scientific knowledge concerning war and the army. In our nation during the postwar years over 30 different publications have come out and each of these has given its own definition for the system of military knowledge, including military science.

In particular, a viewpoint has been expressed that this system should include the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, military science, military doctrine, the military questions of scientific communism, military economic knowledge and military history. The opinion also existed that the system of knowledge concerning war and the army, in addition to the above-listed, should also take up the history of party political work, military pedagogics, military psychology and military legal science.(16) The Officer's Manual states that the system of scientific knowledge concerning war and the army includes the Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army, military science and military doctrine.(17)

Frequently an arbitrary and subjective approach has been permitted in the area of defining the structure and content of military knowledge. The authors of certain articles and theoretical works, instead of analyzing the objective processes and patterns and on this basis defining the appropriate areas of knowledge which relate to these, have reduced all of this complex and delicate work to a formal distribution of military problems over the various areas of knowledge, adapting them to the existing structure of the present chairs and training programs.

S. I. Krupnov in his dissertation "Logiko-metodologicheskii analiz voyennykh znaniy" [A Logical-Methodological Analysis of Military Knowledge] has written correctly: "The failures which up to now have pursued scientists in settling the question of the subject of military science are partially to be explained by the fact that they have frequently approached the solution to this problem on a methodologically incorrect basis, that is, outside of a relationship to practice, not historically. Usually first a purely intuitive definition of military science is given and then the appropriate phenomena are fitted to this definition. Thus, the question is put back to front."

The author of this interesting dissertation as a whole has soundly investigated and newly posed a number of methodological questions of military science as a specific form of cognition. In examining them on a general theoretical level, a majority of the theses advanced by the author does not raise any doubt. However, when it is a question of approaching a specific classification of military knowledge, in a number of instances he departs from his own generally correct methodological premises.

First of all, it is impossible to agree that the Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army are only a portion of historical materialism and scientific communism (page 89) as if, for example, political economy did not have any problems related to war.

Furthermore, debatable is the categorical assertion that as a result of the processes of the differentiation and integration of scientific knowledge, "the situation has developed where there is no military science as something

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monolithic and indivisible. Military science has reached the same point as physics, chemistry, biology and other sciences which also, as a consequence of the differentiation and integration of scientific knowledge, have split into individual independent sciences."(18) In accord with such an understanding, S. I. Krupnov has divided all sciences studying the specific laws of war into seven groups: in the first group he includes the sciences studying armed combat, the theory of the organization of armed forces and their control; secondly, military historical sciences; the third group, in the author's opinion, "has as its **object** the means of armed combat" (emphasis mine--M. G., since in the given instance the classification of knowledge is no longer being made according to the subject but only according to the object of cognition); the fourth group is made up of the sciences which study man (military psychology, military pedagogics and so forth); the fifth includes the sciences which study the questions of economic support for military actions; the sixth is the group of military sciences studying the influence of natural conditions on the conduct of military actions (military geography, military topography); the seventh is the military mathematical sciences.

Thus, here we do not see even any attempt, as the author recommended, to initially analyze modern military practice, the ensuing uniform or similar patterns and only then define the sectors of science which actually are capable of understanding them. Instead of this, basic military scientific knowledge is distributed over arbitrarily established groups of sciences, and under the guise of military sciences the author includes a whole series of branches of knowledge which have completely different patterns and no direct bearing on the military area. This is done solely on the grounds that the given areas of knowledge are employed in military affairs. With the same success one could then include here both physics and chemistry as well as the other natural and technical sciences, adding to them the word "military."

Even the theory of party political work in the army and navy is artificially divorced from the science concerning party construction and is included in the "military sciences concerning military indoctrination." However, as is known, the tasks of party political work go beyond military indoctrination.

The author has agreed to call "military science per se" only that knowledge included in the first group, but excludes from it the questions of military indoctrination. Moreover, in the entire system of military knowledge no mention at all is made of the problems of military training. Also not considered is the circumstance that such questions as the method of preparing and conducting exercises cannot be worked out by military pedagogics and no other science, as for this battles and operations would have to be reproduced and this is a question for military science.

In a number of other works and articles, the system of military scientific knowledge includes the teachings concerning war and the army, the teachings concerning the defense of the socialist fatherland, military economics, military psychology, military ethics, the military problems of scientific communism, international relations, law and so forth. Often this is done without any explanation as to what principle has been employed in selecting and listing these areas of knowledge. For example, why do the teachings concerning war and the army and the teachings concerning the defense of the

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socialist fatherland exist separately or why is military economics related not only to political economy but also to concrete economic sciences and military science put in the same row with the components of Marxist-Leninist theory while military science is not mentioned (a system of military scientific knowledge without military science!). At times, an attempt has been made to put military doctrine into a separate group of scientific knowledge, although military doctrine is based upon the entire aggregate of knowledge concerning war and the army and is not a separate scientific area.

Often the theoretical works and articles mention economic, ideological and other forms of struggle but it remains unclear just what sciences study these forms.

The authors of the book "Marksistsko-leninskaya filosofiya i metodologicheskiye problemy voynnoy teorii i praktiki" [Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice] assert that "as an integrated teaching concerning war and the army which synthesizes in a detached form the achievements of political economy, scientific communism as well as generalized conclusions of military science one can draw on the Marxist-Leninist (sociological) teachings about war and the army as a relatively independent branch of historical materialism." (19) It is difficult to understand how it would be possible, in adhering to a Marxist-Leninist methodology, to incorporate the achievements of political economy, scientific communism and the conclusions of military science into historical materialism or view them only as a branch of historical materialism.

In the structure of sociological science one usually establishes three levels: a general theory or historical materialism which also remains a component part of Marxist philosophy, special theories and particular empirical research. Such cooperation and integrating of sciences are also possible in a system of scientific knowledge concerning war and the army. But for this it is essential to proceed first of all from the unity of Marxism-Leninism, including the integrity of the teachings about war and the army, since the entire sense of sociology, as a science dealing with society, is to study the most complex social phenomena as an integral whole. The authors of the mentioned work refer rightly to the statement of V. I. Lenin that Marxism requires an integrated economic and political analysis of each specific war and that on the questions of military organizational development and military organization it is essential to proceed from the positions of Marxism as a whole. (20)

In our military literature, other viewpoints have also been voiced showing a different approach to the structure of the system of knowledge concerning war and the army. A positive aspect of these theoretical works has been that they show a sound desire to examine a series of important areas of the system of knowledge concerning war and the army altogether, in an interrelationship. A completely correct conclusion has been drawn that war, as a complex sociohistorical phenomenon, is studied not only by military science alone but by many sciences in accord with their specific interests. However, in many theoretical works the entire aggregate of knowledge concerning war and the army has not been covered and substantial errors of a methodological sort have been made.

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In studying all these diverse definitions and formulations, one involuntarily wonders with what flippancy at times they have approached the forming of a structure of military-scientific knowledge, ignoring here the scientific bases and criteria for the classification of the sciences. Some authors include, for example, in the theory of the organizational development of the Armed Forces, the questions of training and indoctrination which are related to pedagogical and psychological patterns, while others include in this same theory the problems of the combat employment of the Armed Forces while these are the subject of the theory of military art, exclaiming here: what sort of organizational development of the army and navy can there be without employing these?! Thus, all military science is reduced to the theory of the organizational development of the Armed Forces. With such a confused and methodologically unsound approach there cannot be any clear classification of the sciences. For there cannot be any strategy without operational art and tactics, there cannot be any military affairs at all without considering and utilizing the mathematical or natural and technical sciences, or the appearance of a science, the subject of any sector of it are determined not by what it uses or takes into account but rather by what it itself directly knows.

When it is a question of designing a new type of aircraft engine or missile, not every person would take it upon himself to judge how this could be done better. But when things reach the point of resolving methodological questions, for example, determining the subject or structure of military science, many persons, even without giving particular thought to this, would give out their definitions directly and categorically. Here it is not considered that in the history of science and in the methodological bases of any science there are many special types of knowledge and fine points which are no less complex than any other technical or special questions and in order to judge them, they, like any other scientific knowledge, must be carefully and thoroughly studied and, of course, taken into account without fail.

One thing is clear. It is impossible to agree fully with the above-described methods for approaching the classification of a system of knowledge about war.

In accord with the Marxist-Leninist methodology of classifying sciences and considering an analysis of the present-day objective nature of a war and army--with an integrated examination of war as a complex sociopolitical social phenomenon representing not only the clash of armed forces but also the struggle of classes, states, coalitions and social systems--in our opinion, there clearly are three groups of objective processes and phenomena with their inherent patterns requiring their own examination, cognition and the corresponding scientific depiction in the system of knowledge concerning war and the army; in the first place, the sociopolitical essence of war, its role and place among the other social phenomena, secondly, armed combat; thirdly, the economic, ideological and other non-military means and forms of combating an enemy during wartime.

The first group includes the most general laws of war, the aggregate of cardinal, underlying problems concerning conditions of the rise of war and the army, their relationship with other social phenomena; the philosophical and

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sociological, sociopolitical and socioeconomic essence of war as a whole; the problems stemming from this of all the forms for waging war both by armed violence as well as by other non-military means. These questions are studied by all three component parts of Marxism-Leninism and comprise its teachings concerning war and the army.

The second group of objective phenomena and patterns which are the main and decisive ones in a war is related to the specific features of continuing politics by the means of armed violence in close relation to the moral-political, economic and scientific-technical factors which ensure the conduct of armed combat. These questions serve as the subject of investigation of military science as well as the special areas (military areas) of a number of social, natural and technical sciences which are contiguous (bordering) military science and provide for the preparation and conduct of armed combat.

The third group covers the phenomena and patterns stemming from the particular features of combating the enemy by non-military forms and means. As is known, politics during a war is carried out chiefly by the means of armed violence, but armed combat does not exhaust all the means and forms of politics. For this reason, for carrying out politics during a war as a whole other forms of struggle are needed: economic, scientific-technical, ideological, diplomatic and others with the subordinating of them to the interests of the successful conduct of armed combat. The internal patterns of these forms of struggle are investigated by various social, natural and technical sciences in accord with their specific concern.

From this review we can see that an elucidation of the social essence of war and the army and the study of the various forms of combat involve an investigation of the most diverse sort of patterns including sociopolitical, economic, military, technical and the elaboration of fundamentally different theoretical and applied problems. For this reason, their understanding as a whole cannot be provided by any one science. For investigating all these complex and diverse phenomena it is essential to have the combined efforts of a large number of sciences, including military. Just as there is no one science which could study all aspects and phenomena of nature and society, so there can be no single science about war.

All the listed areas of knowledge study war and consequently they have the same object of cognition. However, the subjects are different; these are caused by the studied patterns, their inherent categories and research methods. In determining the subject of research of any science one must always consider that for any science it is important first of all what comprises its specific features and what distinguishes it from other sciences. At present, there are hundreds of sciences and without such an approach it would be impossible to distinguish between them. The pattern of development is already: the wider and more complex the objective of research becomes the larger the number of sciences studying it.

The most widespread errors frequently leading to futile disputes and unsound conclusions is that the subject of the science is identified with its object. However, the object of a science does not always coincide with its subject. For example, various problems of politics are studied by the theory of state

and law, by philosophy, sociology, political economy, political geography and other sciences. Man is also studied by many sciences including physiology, anthropology, psychology, medicine and so forth. A whole series of sciences studies the earth and space.

There is one object of study for different sciences but there subjects are completely different. Thus, war is the object of investigation for military science. But such questions as the conditions for occurrence,(21) the essence and origin of war and others cannot be considered as among the subject of military science. In studying only wars, it is never possible to answer the question of why they occurred. Military science is unable to understand these questions. The founders of Marxism-Leninism disclosed the source of wars as a result of studying the economic structure of society. They established that wars arose with the appearance of private property and the dividing of society into classes. But this is the subject of historical materialism and political economy and not military science.

It is also perfectly obvious that not all scientific knowledge (economic, political, legal, mathematical and so forth) which is used in military affairs is applied in the practical activities of the armed forces and not all the scientific disciplines which are studied in military schools relate to military science. But sometimes attempts are made to define the subject of research for military science not in accord with the patterns understood by it and which is the only possible scientific approach, but rather proceeding from the erroneous notion that all knowledge which is essential for the preparation and conduct of a war can be incorporated in military science. This is just as incorrect as if all knowledge concerning nature were included in one certain science.

Or, for example, a war must not be reduced solely to armed combat. Economic, political and ideological forms of struggle are most important means which contribute to the successful conduct of a war. It is essential to prepare not only the armed forces for waging war but also the entire country, the economy and all the people. Military science must not stand on the sidelines of these tasks. It, in particular the theory of military strategy, determines the demands on the nation's military preparation, it considers the state's moral and economic possibilities but carries this out not by direct research on these questions but proceeding from the conclusions of other socioeconomic sciences and as a result of studying armed combat.

The establishing of the economic and moral-political potential necessary for waging war is a function of party and state policy as a whole and requires consideration of a whole series of internal economic and moral-political patterns. Even during a war, when everything is subordinated to the aims of achieving victory, one must not direct ideological work and the national economy proceeding solely from the ideas of military science. Political leadership resolves these complicated and diverse problems on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, using the achievements of many sociopolitical, technical and other sciences, including military.

Undoubtedly, armed combat cannot be divorced from the other phenomena of social life and from other forms of struggle and it must not be viewed in

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isolation from the moral-political and economic factors. Military science cannot validly investigate the methods of preparing and conducting armed combat without profound knowledge of the economic and political essence of a war as well as without a knowledge of the laws of the dialectic, but this, as was already pointed out, does not directly investigate the origin and essence of a war but rests, in examining these questions, on the ideas of the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army and the conclusions of other sciences. To directly understand the various phenomena and to consider and utilize the results of an understanding of other sciences are not the same thing.

According to the laws of the dialectic, everything in the world is interrelated but if only this aspect of the matter is considered and the differentiation of scientific knowledge is not taken into account, if all sciences should investigate only one object common to them and did not have a specific subject of cognition for each, then modern science would have remained on a level of ancient philosophy which encompassed the entire aggregate of knowledge concerning nature and society. On this basis it would be wrong to pose the question that both Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army, military science and other areas of military scientific knowledge should continue to study war as a whole, without having their own subject of cognition, as this would eliminate any sense in classifying the system of knowledge about war and would not provide a profound knowledge of all its aspects and diverse phenomena.

It is impossible to agree with the situation where they approach determining the subject of a science from the viewpoint of what department this area of knowledge serves, who uses it, proceeding from the primitive assumption that military science exists only for the military and other sciences have no regard to it. If one were to speak about military science, then of course it serves primarily the Armed Forces. But at the same time recommendations of military science are taken into account by the socioeconomic, technical and other sciences as well as in practical activities and by many other departments. It is completely inadmissible when the question of including knowledge in one or another area of science is viewed from the viewpoint of prestige considerations, from the subordination of one department to another or generally proceeding from subjective desires.

In classifying the system of knowledge about war and the army, it must be considered that the founders of Marxism-Leninism investigated not only the philosophical, economic and sociopolitical bases of war and the army. They also worked out many concrete theses of military science, including the theory of military art. For this reason, it is wrong, as is sometimes done, to incorporate these questions in the appropriate sections of Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army. V. I. Lenin not only developed the teachings of Marx and Lenin about war and the army but also established the foundations of Soviet military science and left a series of very valuable instructions on the concrete questions of military art.

Many of the ideas worked out by M. V. Frunze relate both to the Marxist-Leninist teachings of war and the army and to military science. This scientific knowledge should be examined within the context of the

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corresponding sciences. In this regard of exceptional importance is the idea of F. Engels voiced in the book "Anti-Duhring": "As soon as the demand is posed for each individual science to ascertain its place in the universal connection of things and the knowledge about things, any particular science about this universal connection becomes superfluous. Then out of all previous philosophy, the teachings about thought and its laws, formologic and dialectics, still maintains an independent existence. All the rest is incorporated in the positive science concerning nature and history."(22)

The Marxist-Leninist methodology requires a clear definition of the subject and boundaries of research on all the main areas of the system of knowledge concerning war and the army. In accord with this and considering modern objective conditions, let us examine in a most concise form the content of the sciences and theories comprising this complex system of knowledge.

Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army

A sector of science concerning the general phenomena of war. Marxism-Leninism, as has already been pointed out, studies the most general laws of war and its most cardinal problems, encompassing all phenomena in a most complete form. Prior to the rise of Marxism there was no truly scientific theory concerning war and the army. At the same time, it is essential to point out that even at the beginning of the 19th Century the somewhat hazy understanding had arisen that war is broader than armed combat and that it cannot be examined solely within military science. Opinions of a dual sort were voiced about this.

Some felt that regardless of the fact that war is broader than the actions of the armed forces, the theory of strategy and, consequently, military science should continue to study all social phenomena related to a war, that is, the subject of military science should include questions which it could not directly investigate.

Other, more farsighted researchers raised the question of the appearance of an area of knowledge concerned with the general questions of war which did not fit within the framework of military science. Thus, the Decembrist I. G. Burtsov wrote that "for the full formation of a military leader even military knowledge alone is not sufficient; all political sciences effecting the security of the people, **as contiguous with the military** (emphasis mine.-- M. G.) and on the other hand, all the moral sciences providing the rules to master the human heart should be included in a general, vast theory which controls the actions of true military leaders."(23)

From this statement, the authors of the book "O sovetskoy voyennoy nauke" [On Soviet Military Science] draw the following conclusion: "Thus...the Decembrist Burtsov...defined the necessity for military science not to be confined to the limits of military art but to include the study of other factors in its subject."(24) However, the given excerpt shows that Burtsov was writing completely about something else: for understanding the political aspect of a war military knowledge is not sufficient but there must be a broader area of scientific knowledge. He said directly that this knowledge is not part of military science but is rather contiguous in relation to it.

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Also unsubstantiated are the references of the book's authors to another military theorist from the mid-19th Century A. I. Astafyev who wrote that all considerations which are political relating to state administration, political economy, geographic, statistical and other "which embrace the general question, are combined above the sphere of the military leader and comprise the concern of the government and which should not be embraced by strategy."(25)

On this basis the authors of the mentioned book reached the conclusion that Astafyev understood the subject of military science as wider than military art, although Astafyev unambiguously repudiates these concocted conclusions of the modern interpreters of his views. He writes: "Consequently, a war in a general form belongs to the state or its government; it assigns the conduct of the war only in part and directly to the army. **Here is the second part of a war the aim of which is achieved directly by the army and by the means belonging to it and military science should have its own subject** (emphasis mine.--M. G.)"(26)

Such a viewpoint was voiced by certain other theorists at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries. They to one degree or another began to understand that a war is no longer limited to armed combat and does not fit within the framework of military science and military art.

In bourgeois countries, it is now generally recognized that the highest teachings about war is polemology (from the Greek polemos--war), a science concerning war as a phenomenon of a social nature, its causes and consequences in all aspects: economic, political, demographic, moral and so forth.(27)

In our nation, after the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War, certain military specialists, for example A. Snesev, proposed "in trusting" to military strategy the study of the sociopolitical and socioeconomic phenomena of war and in this context to broaden the limits of strategy, without considering here that these questions could not be the subject of direct investigation for the theory of strategy and that such an approach would disrupt the scientific bases for the classification of sciences.

M. N. Tukhachevskiy proceeded from the view that the Supreme Command which directed the war as a whole, could not be guided solely by military strategy or the old type "pure strategy," and for this reason the necessity had arisen for a certain new, higher strategy. For this higher teaching concerning war, he proposed the term "polemostrategy." M. N. Tukhachevskiy and certain of his followers on this question viewed this teaching about war as a science concerning the essence of war, the preparation and most effective use of the nation's forces and means for victory.(28)

M. V. Frunze also recognized that the teaching about war as a whole could not be fitted into the framework of strategy and that military science cannot directly know the political aspect of war. But he did not consider it necessary to introduce any new area of science concerned with the sociopolitical essence of war. He firmly adhered to the viewpoint that in the general system of scientific knowledge concerning war and the army, Marxist-

Leninist teachings about war and the army provide a knowledge of this aspect of war. On the question of the leadership of a war he assigned the crucial role to political strategy.

Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army. More than 100 years of experience has affirmed that only Marxist-Leninist theory can provide a truly scientific explanation of phenomena. The problems of war and the army are investigated by all the components of Marxism-Leninism which, as an integrated, unified theory, studies them with the aid of laws, categories and principles of philosophy, communism and political economy. Proceeding from this, in the structure of Marxist-Leninist theory it is possible to isolate philosophical-sociological, sociopolitical and political-economic bases (aspects) of the teachings concerning war and the army and these in their aggregate comprise an interrelated, single Marxist-Leninist teaching about war and the army.

In investigating the essence and general laws of war and the army, the leading role is played by Marxist-Leninist philosophy and primarily historical materialism which is the methodological and philosophical basis for the entire system of knowledge concerning war and the army. In particular, historical materialism studies the following: the philosophical and sociological bases of the teachings concerning war and the army; the essence of war and the army, the general sociological patterns of their rise and development; the relationship of war and politics, war and ideology; the social nature and types of wars; the role of war and the army in history; the relationship of the objective and subjective in a war and in military affairs; the role of the masses of people and the individual in a war; philosophical bases for shaping moral-combat qualities in soldiers; philosophical and sociological aspects of militarism and so forth.

In examining these questions under present-day conditions, many new problems arise. In the 1970's, when there was a tendency toward a lessening of international tension, certain bourgeois ideologists wrote about a change in the aggressive essence of imperialism and its pacificness. Now, when the situation in the world has become exacerbated, they, on the contrary, are shouting about the inevitability and necessity of wars. For this reason, exceptional important significance has been assumed by the questions related to investigating the aggressive essence of imperialism under present-day conditions, the specific sources and causes for the outbreak of wars in our times and the questions of the struggle to prevent a world nuclear war.

The sociopolitical aspects of the teachings about war and the army are studied by scientific communism and primarily the teachings about the defense of the socialist fatherland. Scientific communism investigates the problems of war and peace in the modern age, the sources of military danger, the necessity and patterns of defending the socialist fatherland and the sociopolitical principles of military organizational development and the military organization of the socialist state; it discloses the objective necessity of the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party in defending socialism and military organizational development, the military aspects of the political strategy of the communist, workers and national liberation movement. One of the most urgent tasks in this area remains a profound study of the patterns in

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strengthening the military-political union of the socialist states, the military-political aspects of the joint defense of socialism and the cooperation of the socialist armies, the sociopolitical bases for the military might of the socialist countries.

The political and economic aspects of the teachings about war and the army are tied to an understanding of the economic patterns of the war and the army; the influence of the economic factor on the course and outcome of a war; the material bases for the military might of states; the specific actions of economic laws in the period of preparing and conducting wars in various socioeconomic formations.

Under present-day conditions, when the aggressive circles of imperialism have exacerbated the international situation to the limit and have begun a new round of the arms race, while the interests of all mankind demand a reduction in weapons and disarmament, great urgency is being assumed by research on the particular features of the manifestation of the economic laws of capitalism in military production and to what limits it is possible to have an arms race in economic terms. Of important significance is research on the effect of militarism on various aspects of the production relations in a capitalist society.

The political economy of socialism investigates the impact of public ownership on the military-economic processes; the particular features of the social aspect of military production in a socialist society; the role of planned economic development for mobilizing material resources in the interests of defense; the nature of socialist expanded reproduction in the course of preparing and conducting a war; the role of the economy in strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state and other problems.

Thus, Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army are not only a component part of historical materialism, as was portrayed once in our literature and training practices.(29) It is a synthesis of the interrelated study of war and the army by all the component parts of Marxism-Leninism. The necessity and validity of such an integrated examination of the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army are perfectly apparent and are explained by the following considerations.

In the first place, not only the teachings about war and the army but also many other fundamental teachings and concepts of Marxism-Leninism, although being investigated by component parts of Marxism-Leninism from different viewpoints, comprise a uniform teaching concerning the state, classes and the class struggle, proletarian revolution and so forth. For example, historical materialism understands the essence of the state, its role and place in the political organization of society; political economy investigates the economic structure of society and its influence on the structure and nature of the state superstructure; the theory of scientific communism investigates the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the development of the state in the period of socialism. V. I. Lenin in the book "Gosudarstvo i revolyutsiya" [State and Revolution] provided the subheading "The Teachings of Marxism About the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution."

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Secondly, objectively all the phenomena related to war and the army are closely interlinked and they can be split into component parts only arbitrarily. For example, the elaboration of the theory of the defense of the socialist fatherland is impossible without a knowledge of the philosophical-sociological and economic bases of war and the army. A war is a bilateral phenomenon and the problem of defending the socialist fatherland cannot be investigated abstractly, in isolation from such questions as the aggressive nature of imperialism, the possible sources, types and sorts of wars, as well as the general laws and factors determining the course and outcome of a war.

Thirdly, if the Marxist-Leninist teaching about war and the army is examined in the form of isolated, individual teachings and even such a question as the military organization of socialism is considered an individual teaching not comprising the theory of the defense of the socialist fatherland while the latter is not included in the Marxist-Leninist teaching of war and the army, then with such an approach it is impossible to have their systematic examination and, consequently, to view them in all their complexity and fullness. This is without saying that such eclectic theoretical constructs are devoid of elementary logic. One might ask what is the theoretical and practical sense of the Marxist-Leninist teachings of war and the army, if they do not answer the main question: how to defend the socialist fatherland or what could be the defense of the socialist fatherland without a definite military organization, or how is it possible to view war and the army in isolation from one another if without an army there cannot be armed violence and without this a war?

Sometimes concern has been voiced and is voiced over the question of broadening the subject and functions of the teaching about war and the army or the "pulling apart" of this teaching and appeals are heard to maintain the specific subject of the philosophical and sociological system of knowledge concerning war and the army. But these fears are imaginary, for no one has ever proposed or is proposing to "pull apart" the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army and is not attacking its specific features. It is simply impossible to call just the philosophical-sociological part of the teachings the "Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army," since this concept inevitably encompasses the problems of all three component parts of Marxism-Leninism.

When V. I. Lenin examined the teachings concerning the state which had their theoretical sources in all three component parts of Marxism, he did not sweep aside their specific subject, he did not "narrow" or "widen" their content but viewed them in a unity and interrelation, encompassing all aspects and facets of the studied phenomenon and on this basis established an integrated, ordered teaching concerning the state.

Marxism, said V. I. Lenin, was forged out of a single piece of steel. In explaining this Leninist thesis, Academician P. N. Fedoseyev has emphasized: "An essential feature of Marxist theory is the fact that it can be successfully developed only by remaining an integrated teaching, with an organic unity of its component parts, disclosing at each historical moment and at each stage of its development, an inner relationship and intercausality of all its aspects and facets."(30)

There should be the same approach to studying war and the army. Actually, if one consistently adhered to the logic of these teachings, then it would be impossible to view them otherwise. For example, in the book "Marksizm-leninizm o voyne i armii" [Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army], the authors, in identifying the philosophical and sociological portion of the teachings about war and the army with Marxist-Leninist teachings about war as a whole, have endeavored to fit all the contents of the latter to their narrow understanding of its subject. However, when this book sets out the specific questions of the teachings about war and the army, particularly the history of the development of these teachings, the authors convincingly show that over all of history the founders of Marxism-Leninism viewed the theory of the defense of the socialist fatherland and other questions about war as an inseparable part of the teachings about war and the army.

Characteristic is the very title of the book "Marksizm-leninsizm o voyne i armii." Actually in this generally informative and well written book which has undergone five editions, it is a question of the entire range of Marxist-Leninist views on these questions, including the theory of the defense of the socialist fatherland and the problems of war and the army in the other component parts of Marxism-Leninism. This is no accident, for all the theses of the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army objectively and logically exist precisely in such a relationship and only in such a systematized form can they be employed both in the training process as well as in practical activity.

The Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, in withstanding the test of time, under present-day conditions demonstrate their scientific unshakability, vitality and are the organizing and ideological-methodological core of the entire aggregate of knowledge concerning war and the army, including military science.

Military Science

The branches of military science. In the general system of knowledge concerning war and the army, military science holds an important place. Since it most of all is related to an understanding of armed violence as the decisive means of politics during a war, it holds the main role in working out the methods of achieving the political aims by armed means. This also determines its subject.

As was already pointed out above, at one time M. V. Frunze sharply criticized the Trotskyites who asserted that military affairs are based on all sciences, starting with geography and ending with psychology and for this reason there was no need for any separate military science. Mikhail Vasilyevich with profound persuasiveness showed that precisely the presence of a specific subject provides an objective basis for the existence of military science, although in military affairs it is essential to draw on the achievements of other sciences.

What specific objective processes must military science investigate and which, aside from it, no other area of knowledge can understand? Among these are primarily: the nature of armed combat, the methods of its preparation and

conduct on the strategic, operational and tactical scales; the composition, organization and technical equipping of the Armed Forces required to conduct armed combat; the processes of controlling (leading) the troops (naval forces) in peacetime and wartime, their military training and indoctrination; the influence of armed combat on the economy and the economic support for the organizational development, training and combat employment of the Armed Forces; previous military experience.

Proceeding from the possibility of a knowledge of these objective phenomena and their patterns, the subject, content and structure of military science are determined.

The results of many year's of research and the outcome of debates on this question have gained their most correct scientific statement in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia and the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, where military science is viewed as a system of knowledge concerning the nature and laws of war, the preparation of the Armed Forces and the nation for war and the methods of waging it.(31) Armed combat in a war is the main subject of its research.

At first glance, it may seem contradictory that, on the one hand, armed combat is the subject of military science and, on the other, its subject includes the laws of war, the methods of waging it and the questions of preparing for war not only the Armed Forces but also the nation as a whole. This definition emphasizes: **the basic subject of military science is armed combat**, for military science, in being guided by the Marxist-Leninist methodology and the teachings about war and the army and relying on the achievements of other sciences, investigates armed combat in an inseparable tie with the general laws of war, the socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors as well as the influence of armed combat on these factors. With the present nature of war, armed combat cannot be examined in isolation from these factors. But military science investigates only those aspects of the phenomena which comprises its specific features. In particular, when it is a question of preparing the nation for a war, then this means the military aspect of this matter. At the same time, it must be taken into account that armed combat is examined not only by military science but also by other sciences within the range of their concern.

War, as a continuation of politics by the means of violence, is a social phenomenon; the armed forces are a part of the sociopolitical superstructure, a social organism. For this reason, military science, in investigating the phenomena of war within the limits of its subject, studies primarily the social forms of the movement of matter and is a social science. At the same time, it is concerned not only with the social but also the natural-technical processes and phenomena. By this part of its concerns it is also closely linked to the natural and technical sciences.

In determining the structure of military science and the role and place of its various sectors, we use the general principles of classification. But the special nature of war and military affairs also requires the considering of a number of particular features. The branches of military science can not always be ranked according to the principle of from the simple to the complex,

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from the inferior to the superior. As is known, war is a continuation of politics, military strategy is subordinate to politics and derives from it, operational art proceeds from the requirements of strategy and so forth. Here all the questions of the organizational development, training and support for the armed forces are resolved proceeding from the strategic nature and methods of conducting armed combat and which require an answer to the question: what armed forces are needed, for what war must they be prepared and how and so forth. At the same time, the feedback from below is also taken into account. A strategic or operational success is formed from the aggregate of successful combat actions of the subunits, units and formations. It is essential to take into account a multiplicity of complex ties along the horizontal and the diagonal, particularly the influence of the development of weapons and equipment on the methods of combat and a whole series of other relationships and interdependences.

The structure and content of military science should reflect most fully precisely these objective processes examined by it. However, they are often determined without considering these demands and are incompletely disclosed. For example, excluded from military science are the general theory, the theory of the control of the Armed Forces, the theory of the organizational development of the Armed Forces, the theory of the military economy and the rear and certain other areas of knowledge. Proceeding from the above-given definition of the subject of military science, its structure and content can be represented in approximately the following form.

With a subject classification of the areas of military science made in accord with the investigated patterns, military science includes: general bases or general theory of military science, the theory of military art, the theory of the organizational development of the armed forces, the theory of military training and indoctrination, the theory of military economy and the rear of the Armed Forces, the history of the Armed Forces and military art.

Military science, like any other science, has primarily its own general bases or general theory. V. I. Lenin in the work "Materializm i empiriokrititsizm" [Materialism and Empirical Criticism] raised the question of establishing a general theory of political economy and voiced the idea of the need to work it out from the positions of Marxism.(32) This idea is of important significance for all sciences, including for military science. M. V. Frunze spoke about the range of general ideas which comprise the general part of military theory.(33)

The general theory of military science under present-day conditions examines the system of laws of armed combat in relationship with the general laws of war, the subject and structure of military science, its role and place in the general system of knowledge concerning war and the army. At present, when the history of science has appeared, it is very important that this science concerning sciences have its own support points in all areas of knowledge in the form of general bases or theories. A more profound self-understanding of each science will help to bring out the general processes occurring in all sciences.

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The content of general theory of military science was thoroughly examined in the works of Lt Gen V. I. Zemskov and a number of other works. At the same time, it seems wrong to us to include in the general theory of military science questions which are not inherent to it and which comprise the subject of examination of the theory of strategy and other areas of military science (a consideration of economic, moral, military and scientific-technical potentials; forecasting the military-strategic appearance of types of wars; the general patterns and principles of the organizational development of the Armed Forces, studying the probable enemy in the theater of war and so forth). With such an approach the general theory of military science loses its specific features, for it should understand the most general questions relating to military science as a whole and which should be considered by all its other branches.

The theory of military art is the core of military science. It investigates the laws, nature, principles and methods of conducting armed combat on strategic, operational and tactical scales and correspondingly includes the theories of strategy, operational art and tactics.

The theory of strategy, being the higher area of the theory of military art and being uniform for the Armed Forces, investigates the military-strategic nature of war, the laws, principles and methods of armed combat on a strategic scale, and elaborates recommendations on preparing the nation in military terms, the forms and methods of strategic operations, the problems of the control of the Armed Forces, the questions of considering and utilizing the moral-political and economic capabilities of the state in the interests of conducting armed combat and the organization of strategic support.

The theory of operational art studies the nature, patterns, principles and methods of preparing and conducting all-arms (all-fleet), joint and independent operations (military actions) by the field forces of the Armed Forces, the activities of operational units involved in the command of the troops (forces), the questions of considering and utilizing the moral-political and economic factors in preparing and conducting the operations, the organization and methods of operational, rear and special tactical support for the operations. Correspondingly, it includes the theory of all-arms operational art which investigates the principles of operational art which are common to all the Armed Services as well as the theory of employing the Ground Forces; the theory of operational art of the Strategic Missile Troops, the Air Forces, Air Defense Troops, and Navy, the operational rear and civil defense.

The theory of tactics is concerned with the questions of the preparation and conduct of combat by subunits, units and formations in various spheres: on land, at sea and in the air. In accord with this it includes the theory of the tactics of all-arms combat and the theory of tactics of the Armed Services, branches of troops (naval forces) and special troops.

The theory of the organizational development of the Armed Forces investigates the problems of maintaining the troops and naval forces in a high degree of combat readiness to carry out combat missions and for mobilization; the most effective organizational structure of the Armed Forces; the principles and methods of their manning and technical equipping, the training of reserves;

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the system of training military cadres and their military service; the organization of troop services and the strengthening of military discipline; the billeting of the troops (naval forces) in peacetime and wartime and other questions.

The theory of military training and indoctrination works out the forms and methods of operational and combat training, the development in the men of high political and moral-combat qualities, their military indoctrination in the process of all military service and the development of teamwork among the subunits, units (ships) and formations in the aim of ensuring their high combat capability and readiness.

In examining the questions of military training and indoctrination, along with the general pedagogical principles and methods, also considered are such demands as the necessity of indoctrinating in the personnel special moral-combat qualities, not only the training of individual servicemen but also the combat teamwork of the formations and units for joint combat operations, the maintaining of constant combat readiness in the training process for the troops and naval forces and a number of others. This also determines the role and place in the system of military science of the theory of military training and indoctrination and which investigates the specific questions of training the Armed Forces considering the principles of military pedagogics and psychology.

The theory of the military economy and the rear of the armed forces. In our military press and at a conference of military-scientific bodies in Warsaw in 1977, individual statements were made that the entire problem of the military economy should be studied by one so-called military economic science or the theory of the military economy. Doubt was expressed as to the validity of incorporating the theory of the military economy and the rear into military science. But such opinions did not receive support as a consequence of their insufficient scientific soundness. The problem is that the military economy is, in essence, the entire national economy which has been converted to a wartime footing. If in peacetime the economy is studied by hundreds of sciences, then can this same economy converted to a war be studied by just any one science, in particular, military economic science.

In actuality the questions of the military economy and the economic support for the war are studied by many sciences which form a system of military economic knowledge. On the methodological level this can be divided into three interrelated groups.

The first group is the military aspect of political economy which examines the economic bases of the might of a state and its armed forces, the importance of the economic factor and its impact on the course and outcome of a war as well as other fundamental concepts which comprise the methodological basis of the entire system of military economic knowledge.

The second group is the military question (military aspect) of the intersectorial and sectorial specific economic sciences such as: the science of economic planning, labor economics, economic statistics, financial science and many branches of the economics of industry, agriculture, transport,

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communications and so forth. For example, financial science, in studying the laws of the functioning of finances in peacetime, cannot turn over these functions of its in wartime to any other military economic science. Only it, in relying upon the general principles of financial science, can and should study the particular features of the functioning of finances in wartime. No other science is able to be concerned with these problems. This also applies to other economic problems and sciences.

The third group includes the theory of the military economy and the rear of the Armed Forces as a component part of military science. This studies only that which is related to the subject of military science in this area: the military strategic nature of the war and the ensuing demands on the economy, the military aspects of ensuring its viability; the general (military) principles in mobilizing and converting the economy from a peacetime to a wartime status; the economic support for the actions of the Armed Forces (the element of the link of the nation's rear with the rear of the Armed Forces). In terms of the rear of the Armed Forces, the theory should study: the general patterns and principles in the organization and functioning of the rear of the Armed Forces; the system of rear support for the Armed Forces in peacetime and wartime; the organization and activities of the strategic rear, its relationship to the military economy; the role and place of operational and troop rear services in the general system of the rear of the Armed Forces; rear support for all types of operations; economic work in the troops in peacetime. It can be said that precisely in this area of military science one can see most clearly the importance of the subject-problem classification.

The theory of the military economy and the rear of the Armed Forces cannot be a military question for the other economic sciences, as is sometimes proposed, for the above-listed questions are related to the nature of armed combat and for this reason only military science can investigate them.

In examining this and certain other similar questions, sometimes a confusion is made between the science, a branch of science and an academic scientific discipline. For example, completely valid is the existence in the VUZes of the academic scientific discipline "Military Economy," where in a generalized form they set forward the basic information from the existing areas of political economy, military science and specific economic sciences. Here the principle of the approach is the same as in working out textbooks on "Social Science" or "Natural Science" which includes a certain amount of knowledge from various social and natural sciences. But this is done for an educational purpose and not as a classification of sciences, where the above-examined methodological criteria and principles are obligatory.

With a subject-problem classification of the branches of military science, such branches are isolated and viewed as part of military science as the theory of the control of the Armed Forces, the theory of the Armed Services and civil defense. The process of the differentiation of military-technical knowledge and at the same time the necessity of its integrated examination in close relationship to operational-strategic questions, have brought about a tendency toward the isolation and separate examination of weapons theory as a component of military science.

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The establishing of these branches of knowledge as part of military science is a reflection of one of the patterns in the development of scientific knowledge generally, when a problem classification leads to the formation of a number of interdisciplinary sciences. This is one of the forms of the integration of sciences under the conditions of their ongoing differentiation and narrow specialization. As S. T. Melyukhin has written, "with narrow specialization the achievements of related sciences are not utilized and at a price of great effort a narrow path is trod in those areas where nearby, for other sciences a good road has already been laid previously but which, however, remains unknown to the scientific workers."(34)

In accord with the principles of the problem classification, all the above-listed branches of military knowledge can be put among the interdisciplinary branches of military science which coordinate the efforts and methods of various theories and contiguous sciences, just as, for instance, the corresponding sections of physics, chemistry, geology, geography, biology and so forth are concentrated in oceanology.

The necessity of isolating certain branches of military science with a problem classification arose with the systematic examination of all related, interconnected problems arising simultaneously in the different branches of military science as well as due to the establishing of good conditions for the fullest use of the advances in the area of other social, natural and technical sciences in the interests of resolving these problems.

Thus, the theory of control of the Armed Forces is examined primarily in the system of strategic, operational and tactical leadership of the troops (naval forces) in preparing and conducting operations and combat actions. However, the control processes occur not only in conducting military operations but also in the organizational development of the Armed Forces, the training and indoctrination of the personnel and so forth. It is no question of removing the questions of control from these areas of activity of the military cadres. This would be impossible. There are patterns and principles which are equally important for control processes in any area of military activity and which control theory should examine together and from uniform positions, using the achievements of cybernetics and the concepts of control science.

Incidentally, questions of control are examined and worked out in the area of industry, agriculture, transport and in many other spheres, but at the same time there is a universally recognized science of control which examines the common patterns and principles and the bases of control activity as a whole. This also applies to the theory of control of the Armed Forces which cannot be restricted to just the theory of military actions. Leadership over the complex and diverse life of the troops (naval forces) in peacetime--maintaining high combat and mobilizational readiness, organizing operational, combat and political training, the maintaining of weapons and equipment, the organization of troop service and the maintaining of military discipline--this is an enormous area of activity which cannot but have its own scientific bases. It requires a sound theoretical elaboration and practical assimilation by the military cadres. Only under this condition is it possible to increase the scientific level of troop leadership.

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Weapons theory must elaborate scientifically sound conclusions and recommendations for carrying out a uniform military-technical policy in the Armed Forces, proceeding from the nature of armed combat and the requirements of military art. Its major problems are: elucidating the development patterns of weapons and military equipment considering the change in the nature of armed combat; working out long-range strategic and operational-tactical demands on the weapons systems; theoretical bases for developing long-range and current weapons programs and for employing systems analysis methods for determining the optimum ratio of the various types of weapons and military equipment and the directions for coordinated weapons development.

Since war is a two-sided phenomenon, in determining the contents of the various areas of military science, it must be kept in mind that in their subject of research they include the organization, weapons and methods of actions not only of their own groups but also the troops of probable or actual enemies.

On the theories of the armed services and the unity of military science. All the areas of knowledge comprising military science, in turn, have a complex structure. They have close coordinating and coordination ties. The processes of the differentiation and integration of sciences also necessitate a systematic examination of various problems related to the use of the Armed Services in a war. Their complex, practical activities are carried out both in peacetime and wartime and this objective reality should be reflected in science.

In each Armed Service, in addition, certain problem areas of knowledge can be established. This is a completely natural process in the development of any science. Certainly there is a unified Marxist-Leninist theory and at the same time such interrelated components as philosophy, political economy and the theory of scientific communism have become relatively independent theories. There is an integrated system of biological sciences (zoology, botany, medicine and so forth) each of which includes a number of other sciences and theories. There are many such sciences which have a complex structure. No one would dispute this. Even F. Engels, in examining the laws of the evolution of science, pointed out that "in the same manner that one form of movement develops from another, as a reflection of these forms, the various sciences by necessity should derive from one another."(35)

In the course of the development of military science, new theories and scientific schools have also arisen and become established as relatively independent branches. But still military science, under present-day conditions, is viewed as a complex but unified system of interrelated and constantly developing branches of knowledge.

Academician B. M. Kedrov, one of the most prominent scientists in the area of the classification of sciences, in analyzing the basic development trends in modern scientific knowledge, has rightly pointed out: "The process of the differentiation of sciences is presently occurring not from the further break-up of scientific knowledge and the growing separateness of its different sectors but precisely the contrary, that is, due to the interconnecting and joining of its previously isolated branches."(36) This trend is particularly

apparent in the system of military knowledge which investigates armed combat. In line with this it seems wrong to establish separate sciences for the Armed Services. This is explained by the following circumstances.

In the first place, as was already established, according to Marxist-Leninist methodology sciences are distinguished primarily proceeding from what patterns they attempt to understand. In accord with this military science is based upon an understanding of the objective patterns which are common to armed combat and the experience of conducting military operations has not disclosed any particular laws of armed combat inherent to just one or another Armed Service. Although, for example, naval theory possesses the greatest specific features and the richest tradition, it, like the theories of the other Armed Services, is closely tied to other areas of knowledge. The questions of the organizational development and employment of the Navy have been thoroughly and soundly examined in the book by Flt Adm SU S. G. Gorshkov "Morskaya moshch gosudarstva" [Sea Power of a State].(37)

Secondly, the increased importance of the unity of modern military science is determined by the altered conditions of waging war. In the past, when there were two relatively independent armed services (ground forces and navy) in a number of nations and which often proceeded from different strategic concepts and carried out their missions independently of one another, one could still justify the separate existence of military and naval sciences.

But in a modern war there has been a sharp increase in the importance of joint strategic actions by our various Armed Services and also in the role of strategy as a whole which is common to them. In practical terms the different forms of strategic actions and strategic operations, including in sea theaters of war, can now be conducted only by the joint efforts of different Armed Services. Since each Armed Service cannot have its own separate strategy, the existence of individual sciences for the Armed Services is impossible without such an important part of military science which comprises its basic core. Generally under present-day conditions decisive importance has been assumed by the examination of all questions concerning the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces from uniform positions, from the viewpoint of their common interests and considering, of course, the corresponding specific features of the services.

Moreover, the interests of the matter demand the elaboration of an ordered and scientifically sound structure of military science with a uniform approach to all the Armed Services.

Certainly each Armed Service has its own essential operational-tactical and military-technical features. In line with this it is completely valid to view as inseparable parts of a unified military science the theories of the Armed Services which include the theories of military art of the Armed Services, the particular features of their organizational development, troop training and indoctrination as well as the history of the Armed Services. Consequently, it is a question not of denying the long-existing knowledge relating to the Armed Services but merely a correct and scientifically sound formulation of this knowledge. The word "theory" in no way disparages this

military knowledge but merely emphasizes its belonging to a unified military science.

This also applies to all the branches of troops, special troops and services and to all types of operational (combat) and special technical support. The methods of employing these troops and types of support for the operations can and should be viewed altogether in terms of armed combat as a whole, as well as in terms of individual operations, types of combat actions and the combat employment of the branches of troops. All these scientific problems are included both in the corresponding branches of military science as well as in the theories of the Armed Services.

Civil defense theory, being related to many social, natural and technical sciences, in the area of armed combat examines as a single complex: the principles of protecting the population and the national economy as a whole in a modern war; the ways for raising the stability of the economy; methods of organizing work to eliminate the consequences of an enemy attack; methods of actions of the civil defense units and paramilitary formations; the organization and methods of controlling the nation's civil defense forces and means.

Military science has an applied theoretical nature. The theoretical nature of military science consists in the fact that it, on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, studies the laws of armed combat and analyzes the mechanism of their action. A knowledge of the objective laws makes it possible for military science to disclose the essence of phenomena and not merely explain them but also predict the development prospects of military affairs. The predicting of the future is the main goal of any science. If this does not exist we are always beyond the limits of science. The applied nature of military science is manifested in the fact that it, on the basis of a knowledge of objective laws, works out specific recommendations, principles and rules aimed at increasing combat readiness and training of the Armed Forces and at the successful conduct of armed combat. A solution to the applied problems of military science at present is impossible without the elaboration of theoretical problems. The 25th Party Congress stated that "the full flood of scientific and technical progress will dry up if it is not constantly fed by fundamental research."(38)

Since military science is primarily a social science, it cannot have solely a particularly national affiliation. If one speaks about its essence and examines it from party, class positions, it must be pointed out that in practical terms there are a military science of socialism (Marxist-Leninist military science) and bourgeois military science, just as there is no English or Russian political economy but rather the political economy of socialism and the political economy of capitalism. For this reason it is impossible to recognize as valid, for example, the assertion that each capitalist state has its own military science.(39) Here, of course, one cannot deny definite national features of military science.

Marxist-Leninist military science and the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states, like the construction of socialism as a whole, are a unity of the international and national.

Their international character derives from the common socialist social and state system; from the unified Marxist-Leninist ideology and coordinated policy; from the common laws of war and principles of military art and organizational development of the socialist commonwealth armies for defending the victories of socialism. At the same time, the national features related to the specific features of each country and its armed forces are taken into account in the organizational development and training of the armed forces and in working out the questions of military art in the fraternal armies. In this sense with complete justification and pride we can speak about Soviet military science which reflects the achievements of our military scientific thought and the experience of the most powerful and militarily tempered Armed Forces of the Soviet state just as we speak about Soviet science as a whole.

The Military Aspect of Social, Natural and Technical Sciences

The change in the nature of war and the strengthening and broadening of the ties of military science with the social, natural and technical sciences have led to the appearance of the military aspect as part of a whole series of social, natural and technical sciences involved with the preparation of the Armed Forces for war, the development of weapons and military equipment and the all-round support for the preparation and conduct of armed combat.

In actuality, for the successful conduct of a war it is essential to profoundly consider many sociopolitical questions and the influence of natural conditions on its conduct to design and develop weapons and military equipment corresponding to the nature of a future war as well as investigate and work out other questions related to all-round support, the preparation and conduct of operations and combat actions. All of this requires the involvement and use of many sciences in the interests of national defense.

The Soviet Union is against involving science in the sphere of military preparations and it is not aiming at military-technical superiority, but the ever-greater use of scientific and technical progress for military purposes by the imperialist countries has forced the socialist countries to pay proper attention to the technical equipping of the armed forces.

The experience of training the Army and Navy personnel for war, the development of military equipment and its operations under combat conditions show that in the interests of armed combat it is completely insufficient to use the achievements of social, technical and natural sciences in a "ready-made form." The missions carried out in the course of a war differ fundamentally from the tasks carried out in other social processes. The professional, moral-political and psychological preparation of the personnel for a war presupposes the development in the men of special qualities which will be needed in a combat situation. In nature there are no such military-technical mechanisms as missiles, tanks and guns. Combat equipment, as a rule, is not employed in industry and agriculture. The more complex military equipment becomes, the more it differs from the equipment employed in the national economy. In this context, special branches of these sciences occur and they, in having their roots in the area of the corresponding social, natural and technical sciences, interact closely with military science and are

contiguous or adjacent to it. Such an intertwining of sciences also occurs in other areas of knowledge. We might recall that there are physical chemistry, chemical physics and so forth.

In a number of areas of knowledge one can see a tendency when its military aspect becomes so complex and intertwined that, while maintaining its ties with the base sciences, gradually becomes the special branches of military knowledge, in coming close to military science. This to a definite degree has already occurred with military geography, military electronics, automating troop control, military pedagogics and psychology and certain other areas of military scientific knowledge. This is also characteristic of other sciences. Paleontology arose on the border of geology and biology, mathematical logic appeared on the boundary of logic and mathematics as well as other new sciences.

In the area of sociopolitical sciences, in addition to the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, of important significance for the Armed Forces are the science concerned with party construction and its branch, the theory of party political work in the Armed Forces, the theory of military law, military psychology, military pedagogics, military history and so forth.

The theory of party political work, proceeding from the general scientific bases of the construction of the CPSU and remaining part of this social science, works out the questions of party political work considering the specific features of the Armed Forces and armed combat. The forms and methods of political work for the commanders and political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations in a combat situation are completely different than under any other conditions and for this reason these questions can be profoundly worked out solely on the basis of a knowledge of the laws of armed combat and the principles of military art with the decisive significance for general party concepts.

The theory of military law elaborates recommendations on establishing a system of legal standards in the area of the organizational development of the Armed Forces, regulating relations between the servicemen, defining their duties, rights and responsibilities in military service during peacetime and wartime. The standards of military law bear the imprint of the requirements of the Armed Forces (unfailing obedience of superiors, the system of one-man command and so forth). International military law questions are also taken into account.

Military psychology, being a branch of psychological science, discloses the particular features of human psychology in the process of armed combat, Union recommendations on the psychological training of the men, it examines the psychological bases of the formation and actions of military collectives and works out the methods for disclosing a person's abilities to perform various types of military activities. These tasks cannot be carried out by other sectors of psychological science.

Military pedagogics is a branch of pedagogical science which studies the patterns of serviceman training and indoctrination, the particular features of employing pedagogical principles and training methods in the process of

operational, combat and political training. Military pedagogics is closely tied to military science (the theory of military training and indoctrination) and the theory of party political work in the Armed Forces.

Among the related sciences an important role is played by military history which studies the history of wars, the history of the Armed Forces and military art, military historiography and military bibliography, military history statistics and military archeology. As for the history of the Armed Forces and military art, it, in turn, includes the history of military science (military scientific thought), the history of strategy, operational art and tactics, the history of the organizational development of the Armed Forces, the history of the development of weapons and military equipment, the history of the military economy and rear, the history of military training and indoctrination, that is, all those areas of practical military activity and military knowledge which are encompassed by the theory and practice of military affairs.

Being a part of general historical science, military history at the same time is directly in contact with military science as well as its branches such as the history of the Armed Forces and military art, and are a component part of military science. The latter have sometimes been debated, but it is very difficult to agree with this. N. G. Chernyshevskiy has said that without the history of a subject there is no theory of a subject and without a theory of a subject there cannot even be any idea of its history.(40) This is fully understandable. Many sciences organically include the history of their subject. For military science this is particularly important.

The separating of the history of military art from military science is just as wrong as attempts to view the history of philosophy outside of dialectical materialism or along with it, as a separate component of Marxist philosophy. Scientific conclusions cannot be based solely on an analysis of the present state of affairs. "...Not naked conclusions," said F. Engels, "but, on the contrary, study--this is what we need most of all: conclusions are nothing without that development which led to them...."(41)

The path to a knowledge of the development laws of science runs through the study of the history of science and the subject of its examination, since the development of science at present and in the future is a natural continuation of its previous historical development. The main task of any science is to understand the objective patterns of the studied phenomena and this is possible only in viewing them in development. When different states of various phenomena in the past, present and future are examined in isolation from one another, we gain an opportunity merely to compare: what was, is and will be, but we cannot answer the main question of how one phenomenon arose from another and we cannot disclose the mechanism of their ties and relations. A historical work itself, if it is carried out abstractly, loses its sense; it should contribute to the skillful use of past experience for solving present-day problems.

The development of military aspects in the area of natural sciences has led to the appearance of a whole series of such special military sciences as military geography, military cartography, military geodesy, military topography,

military hydrometeorology, military navigation, military medical sciences and others the purpose of which is perfectly obvious.

In the area of technical sciences, a series of branches of knowledge has appeared which could be termed military-technical sciences. Each of these has its particular features, but as a whole they are related to the elaboration of the following main problems: the design and production of weapons; the ways for the effective use of the combat capabilities of weapons and military equipment; principles of operating and repairing the weapons. This includes such sciences as ballistics, firing theory, communications, military radio electronics, military cybernetics, military engineer, military-chemical and many other sciences.

The Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee at the 25th Party Congress commented: "New opportunities for fruitful research both of a general theoretical, fundamental and applied nature are opening up on the borderline of various sciences, in particular the natural and social. These must be fully utilized."(42) This also applies to military science and to the sciences contiguous to it. The appearance on the boundary of military science and other sciences of general problems the solution to which can be achieved within the context of several areas of knowledge ensures a thorough study of the problems of preparing and conducting armed combat considering the moral-political, socioeconomic and scientific-technical factors and the fuller utilization of the achievements of all sciences for strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state and for raising the combat might of its Armed Forces. The broadening and deepening of the ties of military science with social, natural and technical sciences enrich not only its content but also the research methods. Particularly characteristic in this regard is the ever-broader introduction of a systems approach, heuristic, mathematical and other methods into military science.

Branches of Sciences Investigating Non-Military Forms of Combating the Enemy

As was already pointed out, at the basis of all contradictions and conflicts which give rise to wars lie profound social roots and an entire complex of political, economic, ideological and military ties and relationships between the classes and states, stemming from the social system and the political aims of the war. For this reason, a war expresses not any one contradiction but rather all the sociopolitical and economic contradictions and the ensuing different forms of combat.

A clash with the enemy encompasses both armed combat as well as the immediately economic, ideological and diplomatic forms of struggle. Although war is a continuation of politics by the means of armed violence, this is the main but not the sole form of combating the enemy. During a war politics as a whole continues; here it applies all the available forms and methods of combat. In actuality, as was shown by the Great Patriotic War, for achieving victory it is possible to mobilize all the forces and means existing in a state; the entire life of the nation and all its scientific-technical achievements can be subordinated to the interests of waging war.

If military science along with the military aspect of contiguous branches of other sciences ensures the conduct of armed combat, the other social and natural-technical sciences study different forms of struggle against the enemy and the activities of the states: ideological, economic, diplomatic, legal and so forth.

During the war, ideological struggle has a particularly fierce nature. The moral-political factors played, for example, a crucial role in the victory of the Vietnamese people over American imperialism. In a modern war, the clash of ideas and morale of the peoples and armies assumes even greater significance. This form of struggle also occurs in peacetime, but is carried out by different methods and means. And in order to employ it effectively during a war, the appropriate sectors of sciences examine and work out the problems of the ideological struggle.

Economic conflict is carried out in the aim of ensuring economic superiority over the enemy. Under the conditions of employing modern weapons, particularly nuclear missile weapons, the economy of the belligerents becomes the object of even more powerful and intense armed effect. However, the increased difficulties of ensuring the survival of the economy under the conditions of employing nuclear missile weapons do not exclude economic conflict but make it more acute.

Economic sciences examine the specific features of the functioning of the national economy under wartime conditions. In particular, they work out recommendations to convert the national economy from a peacetime status to a wartime one and study the particular features of national economic planning under wartime conditions, the specific work and organization of industry, transport, agriculture, finances under wartime conditions, the questions of manpower and wages, price formation and cost accounting in the military economy, the ratio between military and civilian products in the national economic balance, controlling the allocation of manpower and managing the economy during the war and so forth.

Diplomatic conflict in the course of a war has always played a significant role. V. I. Lenin said: "As long as there is a war, secret diplomacy should also exist as one of the means of war.... The assessment of this diplomacy depends upon the overall assessment of the war."⁽⁴³⁾ Diplomatic conflict has not lost its role under present-day conditions. It is aimed at strengthening the socialist coalition, the struggle for allies and the collapse of the enemy coalition.

On Military Doctrine

In the overall system of knowledge concerning war, military doctrine holds a special place. **Military doctrine in its present-day understanding is a system of scientifically sound guiding views which are officially adopted in one or another state and concern the essence, goals and nature of a war, the preparation of the nation and the armed forces for it and the methods of waging it.**

The political bases of a military doctrine disclose the sociopolitical essence of modern wars, the nature of the political goals and strategic missions of a state in a war, the basic requirements on strengthening national defense and the organizational development and training of the armed forces. The military-technical bases of the doctrine determine what the strategic nature of a future war can be like and for what sort of war and against what enemy one must be prepared to fight; what armed forces are needed for such a war (their effective strength, organization and technical equipping); what the methods could be for carrying out strategic and operational-tactical missions in a future war; what forms and methods can be used to train an army and navy (to carry out military training and indoctrination) considering the nature of a future war.

Military doctrine is not a separate area of science which independently investigates various problems. It selects the necessary data from the entire system of knowledge concerning war and the army. Military practice realizes scientific achievements precisely through military doctrine. M. V. Frunze, in emphasizing that the nature of military doctrine is determined by the factor of the general political line in a state, at the same time felt it necessary to bring Soviet military doctrine into accord with the tenets of military science and military art.(44)

In theoretical terms the sociopolitical aspect of military doctrine is based on the Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army and other social sciences; its military-technical aspect is founded on the ideas of military science and the military aspects of other sciences.

In line with this, the assertions sometimes encountered in literature that military doctrine is shaped with the aid of military (only.--M. G.) science and is based on its conclusions(45) are inaccurate. It is perfectly obvious that the political aspect of military doctrine cannot be based solely on the achievements of military science.

The question is frequently raised why, along with scientific knowledge (teachings about war and the army, military science) there is also a military doctrine. The issue is that in military science various views can and should exist on the methods of carrying out various missions. For a science, this is completely acceptable, for a clash of opinions stimulates its development. But at a certain stage doctrine selects the most effective views and reinforces them in official documents and manuals as guiding concepts which are obligatory for all. For example, with the appearance of nuclear weapons the question arose of what should be the chief means of their delivery: missiles or aircraft. The basic direction in the organizational development and technical equipping of the Armed Forces and the methods of conducting operations depended upon a correct resolution to this question. Certainly proceeding from this the corresponding orders are given to the defense industry. In similar instances, without uniform doctrinal views it is impossible to provide effective organizational development and training of the Armed Forces and strengthen national defense as a whole.

Military doctrine, in having military political and military technical parts, encompasses all aspects of a war, being the result of its study. For this

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reason it plays a major coordinating and organizing role. In practical terms, it proceeds from the specific ideas of politics and the decisions of the political and military leadership. The provisions of military doctrine are obligatory for fulfillment. But, as historical experience shows, they should be not merely proclaimed, rather they should correctly express the entire spirit and sense of military affairs at the present stage, they should penetrate deeply into the Armed forces and be internally accepted by the military cadres. Then military doctrine truly permeates army and navy life in all its manifestations and unifies it. A doctrine which does not correspond to these requirements loses much of its significance. In analyzing the military doctrine of Tsarist Russia which uncritically borrowed in a number of instances from foreign sources, M. V. Frunze said that such a "doctrine is a stillborn child of our few military theorists, remaining alien not only to the entire mass of the ordinary command personnel but also to its superior leaders."(46)

Military doctrine includes not the entire system of knowledge concerning war and the army but focuses solely on its main, basic provisions. While military science includes both reliable and practically tested knowledge and hypotheses which still must be confirmed, a military doctrine selects, as a rule, only the tested and reliable knowledge necessary for practical activities. Soviet military doctrine takes from science all that is progressive, in considering the situation and the capabilities of the state. In this regard it plays an enormous role in the question of introducing scientific and technical achievements into practice. Military doctrine, in turn, influences the development of the system of knowledge dealing with war and the army and it focuses the efforts of science on solving the most important and primarily the new problems and itself develops in accord with this.

Thus, the philosophical-sociological, sociopolitical, economic, military and military-technical, legal, historical, psychological and pedagogical knowledge concerning war and the army form a fully determined system which is unified by a single methodological basis, Marxism-Leninism. They study war and the army from different viewpoints, on a varying scope and with a varying degree of concretization and generalization and answer all the urgent questions of the modern age, starting with determining the place of military violence in the defense of socialism and ending with the elaboration of recommendations on preventing a world nuclear missile war. For this reason, the study of war and the army cannot be a monopoly of one or even several sciences. Inherent to war and the army are patterns, traits and features which are not exhausted by study either within the context of the Marxist-Leninist teachings of war or the army or within the framework of military science. A thorough and full study of all aspects of a war and the army is possible only within the framework of the entire system of designated knowledge.

Sometimes it is proposed that the system of knowledge concerning war and the army be called military theory. But this concept cannot encompass the entire total of complex and diverse scientific knowledge concerning war and the army since in this system we are concerned with completely different patterns and categories many of which do not have a purely military nature.

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Considering all of this, it seems more effective to us to employ the collective concept already established in our science, that is, "a system of knowledge concerning war and the army" as the entire total of knowledge relating to these phenomena. At the same time, in our view, also valid would be the term "military theory" under the condition that it is employed in terms only of the total of military knowledge (the teachings about war and the army, military science and the military aspects of other sciences). The founders of Marxism-Leninism in a generalized manner sometimes termed precisely this aggregate of military knowledge the military sciences in the same collective sense as social or natural sciences.

From what we have examined it can be seen that the classification of sciences is not an end in itself and is a far from abstract question. It should serve as the theoretical basis for practical activity. For example, under the conditions of the existence of a threat of the initiating of war by the imperialists, the interests of the matter demand that all the social, natural and technical sciences, along with their other inherent tasks, be concerned with the questions of strengthening the nation's defense capability. For this is a question of the entire party, all the state and all the people.

In line with this the posing of the question of whether military science should be concerned with the study of war as a whole or the preparation of the entire nation for a war, in addition to its methodological falaciousness, in practical terms does not aid the combined, interdisciplinary research on war with the calling in of other branches of science and does not focus them on resolving the tasks of strengthening the defense capability of the nation. At the same time, a systems approach to the study of war and the army by the joint efforts of many sciences will make it possible to understand them in all their completeness and diversity, to form an ordered system of categories, to establish a more viable theory and formulate effective and concrete principles for practical activities.

Precisely this approach has been employed in determining the nomenclature approved in 1984 by the State Committee for Science and Technology for the specialties of scientific workers in the area of military science and the other social, natural and technical sciences.

A precise classification of scientific knowledge which comprises the content of military science makes it possible to soundly determine on the development of which scientific sectors one must concentrate the main efforts at one or another stage in accord with practical needs; to establish the head organizations responsible for working out the main branches of science, the organization and structure of the scientific institutions; to provide a systems approach to the planning of scientific research, having pooled the efforts of a number of scientific collectives for solving the most complicated and pressing problems; to improve the curriculums of the VUZes as well as the programs for operational and combat training in such a manner that the military cadres would study all the main branches of military science and the military aspects of other sciences and thereby ensure the prompt assimilation of scientific achievements.

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Such an approach will provide the opportunity to thoroughly and profoundly investigate the problems of war and peace in the modern age and with greater effectiveness to carry out the responsible and complex tasks posed in this area by the Communist Party.

Certain Conclusions on Further Improving Military Scientific Work at the Present Stage

An analysis of the views of M. V. Frunze on the questions of military scientific work and as a whole the previous experience in this area indicate that on the question of the organization and execution of scientific work in the Armed Forces each stage in its development had its particular features, there were major advances and definite difficulties were also encountered. The most fundamental problems which M. V. Frunze encountered in the organization of military scientific work have made themselves felt over the entire development of our military scientific thought. Certain major principles in the approach to solving them have kept their importance.

In the first place, the basic sources of the strength and vitality of Soviet military theory, including the military theoretical heritage of M. V. Frunze, have been and remain loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and the creative application of its provisions in scientific and practical activities. As was emphasized in the report of K. U. Chernenko at the June (1983) Plenum of the Party Central Committee, the most important thing in the area of social sciences is "to be constantly guided by revolutionary theory and to skillfully apply the tested Marxist-Leninist methodology of scientific search.... Philosophical clarity, if you wish, methodological discipline of thought are an indispensable condition for the successful development of social sciences."(47) Only on this basis are sound conclusions and forecasts of the future as well as truly scientific prediction possible, including in the area of military theory.

M. V. Frunze considered a fundamental question in all military scientific work to be the correct elucidation of the nature of a future war, subordinating all research both on the experience of previous wars as well as modern military affairs to this goal. The solving of this problem has been and remains a most important task for military science. At the same time, the prediction and elaboration of the theoretical bases for a still-to-come armed combat, as there has been a greater qualitative gap between the means of waging a previous and future war, become evermore difficult.

Under the present-day conditions of rapid scientific and technical progress not only in military affairs but also in other areas of human activity, more and more frequently it is essential to take decisions without relying on experience and in the absence of any experience. Military practice in peacetime has always been comparatively restricted. In exercises it is impossible to fully reproduce everything that can occur in a war, particularly under the conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy. For precisely this reason the existing experience of previous wars, the conducted exercises and as a whole military practice have assumed even greater value.

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In his research M. V. Frunze convincingly showed that in history frequently after a major war (Franco-Prussian, Russo-Japanese and World War I) there were attempts to present things as though nothing remained of previous military art. But the following war, in engendering new methods of conducting armed combat, also preserved many of the previous ones. At least, up to now in history there has still not been a war which eradicated everything that had existed in military art prior to this.

In the 1920's and 1930's, our military science as a whole succeeded in correctly determining the development sequence of military affairs and the elements of the new in this. But in the 1930's, certain errors were made when, for example, from the experience of military actions in Spain (in particular, on the use of tanks) we sometimes took what did not actually derive from this experience. In the given instance, as in certain others, the failure was not the experience of the war itself but rather the incorrect conclusions which were drawn from it. V. I. Lenin taught that any positive phenomenon or any accomplishment under certain circumstances can be turned into a shortcoming; if these accomplishments "are extended more than should be, are brought out not when they should be or where they should be, then they are shortcomings." (48)

For use in the future it is essential to have not merely the existing experience, not what lies on its surface but rather those profound, sometimes concealed permanent processes and phenomena which have a tendency toward further development and which manifest themselves at times in new, completely different forms than was the case in the previous war. Such experience from any war will never completely lose its significance.

At the same time, it must be considered that each subsequent war keeps ever-less elements of the old and more and more engenders the new. This pattern not only remains but is assuming new potential strength. In line with this, under present-day conditions particularly pertinent is the question of the scientific prediction and forecasting of the nature and methods for waging a possible future war. For this, in addition to the traditional methods of historical analytical research of past and present experience, research and experiments conducted in exercises and weapons testing as well as other known procedures of scientific search, particularly major significance is being assumed by the modeling of future operations (combat actions) and as a whole the broader use of mathematical research methods for the most complicated problems of military science.

Secondly, in accord with Marxist-Leninist methodology, the appearance of new weapons and new human material is having a decisive impact on the methods of conducting combat operations and, consequently, on the development of military theory. Both in the times of M. V. Frunze as well as in subsequent years, our military science has assessed these major sources of its development in basically a correct manner. But in our times this task has become immeasurably more complex, particularly in line with the accelerated development of weapons and military equipment.

The development of military science and its increased role have been enormously influenced by the new qualitative jump in improving weapons and in

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developing both nuclear and conventional types of weapons and military equipment of the new generation based upon the most recent scientific and technical achievements. On the part of Soviet military science this circumstance requires the theoretical elaboration of many important problems related to the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces, presupposing a shift of the center of gravity into the area of military-scientific and scientific-technical research.

The prompt elaboration of a sound operational-tactical ideology of weapons development has assumed particularly important significance. The thesis of Engels that the development of weapons determines the development of the methods of conducting armed combat remains true today. But now military science can no longer restrict itself to just considering this influence. Under present-day conditions, there has been a sharp rise in the reverse impact of military science which itself should more actively determine the most important areas for the development of weapons and equipment, having placed the chief emphasis on the most promising types of weapons which in the future will be of crucial significance.

Here it must be considered that the arms race caused by the imperialists is assuming an unprecedented scale, weapons are becoming evermore expensive and we are opposed by enemies that are economically significantly more powerful than ever before. For this reason military-theoretical thought should be working constantly on how to most rationally utilize the means allocated for military needs within the limits of strict necessity so that defense be reliable and at the same time not too burdensome for the state. The essence of this problem, the chief thing which should permeate all scientific research is the greatest possible rise in the effectiveness of all the measures carried out related to the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces, a stricter and more profound consideration of military-economic factors, a better scientific level of leadership over the troops and naval forces and the fuller utilization of scientific achievements in practical activities.

Thirdly, according to Lenin's teachings, for the elaboration and development of revolutionary theory it is essential to have a combination and organic unity of the activities of major theorists with the revolutionary creativity of the masses. Proceeding from this, M. V. Frunze felt that for the effective development of military science, it was essential, on the one hand, to have the participation of a broad range of command and political personnel in military scientific work and, on the other, the presence of special scientific research institutions headed by prominent scientists for interdisciplinary research on the most complicated scientific problems. Along with more active military scientific work on the staffs and in the troops, he constantly sought the training of widely specialized young scientists who would be capable from Marxist-Leninist positions to analyze the complex phenomena of war encompassing all the sociopolitical, economic and military factors.

The necessity of training such cadres in our times is particularly apparent, for the higher the degree of specialization and differentiation in the various areas of military knowledge concerning the Armed Services and branches of troops, the greater the importance assumed by systematic research on the

complex problems of war and military science considering all the factors influencing their development and showing the profound sense of the fundamental qualitative changes in military affairs and the prospects of their development. For this, in addition to the creativity of the leading cadres, it is essential to have modern scientists with high skills, with a broad range of military-political, operational-strategic and military-technical thinking.

The opinion prevalent in a number of instances that military theory is worked out and developed basically in the process of the practical activities of the leading cadres and the scientists merely establish and formulate the proposed ideas has led to a drop in the scientific-theoretical level of the tasks being carried out.

The issue is that not all military knowledge has the same scientific level. In their activities the military cadres encounter first of all two types of military knowledge: ordinary, practical-specific encompassing usually only the external aspect of military practice and worked out by employing already existing knowledge and the scientific-theoretical. The latter presupposes a profound penetration into the essence of phenomena and an understanding and elucidation of their patterns. K. Marx rightly pointed out that science would be unnecessary if the external appearance and the inner essence of phenomena coincided.(49) Scientific work involves, as a rule, the discovery of new knowledge and new ways for resolving practical problems. V. I. Lenin in his work "Chto delat?" [What Is To Be Done?] emphasized that such scientific knowledge is the result of research activity by educated people.(50) He then went on to explain that this, of course, does not mean that workers do not participate in the elaboration of a socialist ideology, "but they participate in it not as workers but rather as the theorists of socialism...they participate, in other words, only when and to the greater or lesser degree that they have been able to master the knowledge of their century and advance this knowledge."(51)

This Leninist thesis applies fully to military affairs. In truth, in the area of military art more frequently than in any other sphere, precisely the military leaders and chiefs were the pioneers of new ideas. But still broad scientific generalizations and fundamental science are created usually by prominent scientists, military thinkers, including military chiefs, relying on the experience and practical activities of the masses. For fundamental scientific research it is essential to have not only knowledge and experience but also sufficient time, the necessary skills and abilities. As is shown by the example of V. I. Lenin and such students of his as M. V. Frunze who skillfully combined practical work with science, the main thing, of course, is their ability for great and profound theoretical generalizations.

The complexity of military scientific tasks even in the 1930's showed that research on major problems cannot be the concern of individual scientists but for this there must be large scientific collectives which have at their disposal the necessary experimental facilities and, in our times, also computers. In the area of the development of new types of weapons and equipment, this idea was immediately understood and realized. No one figured that each commander himself would invent a weapon in the troops. But in the

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military theoretical area, the necessity of such well organized scientific research by highly trained specialists was sometimes underestimated.

At the same time, it is well known that in science no less than in combat one must rely not on numbers but ability. Everyone realizes that if one attempted to establish a literary institute numbering several thousand men and assigned it to create an artistic work like "War and Peace" by L. Tolstoy, nothing would happen. And in science they sometimes endeavor to solve creative problems in this manner. Life has convincingly shown that even where large scientific collectives are involved in scientific research they can function fruitfully only in the instance that among them there are leading, prominent scientists who act as the pacesetters of scientific thought.

Academician M. A. Lavrentyev in recalling the history of the establishing of the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences, related: "We proceeded from the view that each institute should have an authoritative scientific leader who would also determine (at least in the first years) the appearance of the institute. In brief, we adhered to the principle of establishing an institute 'for the director' and not to seek a director for the planned (even a good) institute. Here it was important to find scientific leaders for all the main areas of science which would be necessary for establishing an interdisciplinary scientific center." (52) As the military-technical area needs its own general and chief designers, so in the other areas of military science there must be major authorities whose opinion should be followed by everyone who is involved in the theoretical elaboration or practical solution to one or another question. But such authorities do not arise by themselves. For their appearance a good creative situation in science is required. Under the conditions of a socialist society the best opportunities are opened up for this. And these tell favorably on the general development level of Soviet military theory and practice.

However, in the area of social sciences, including in the area of military science, it has not always been possible to fully realize these possibilities. The decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 30 July 1956 "On Overcoming the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences" points out that the cult of personality had certain negative consequences for the development of science. In the area of military theory this was expressed in a desire to fit scientific conclusions and even the experience of the war to certain statements or ideas and to substitute quotations for the search for truth, arguments and proof; there was an impatience with other opinions and in a number of instances a lack of publicity in science and social criticism. Under these conditions the scientific sphere could easily be penetrated by a mass of mediocrities which created the blank wall on which many new ideas and discoveries crumbled in the history of science. This, in turn, sometimes led to a decline in the theoretical level of the training and indoctrination of the cadres and the forcing of them to accept ready-made ideas and conclusions instead of a reasoned and creative assimilation of scientific knowledge. In such a situation true scientific knowledge and abilities were not always properly regarded and individual insufficiently principled persons lost the habit of hard work.

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Moreover, certain commanders who had fought well during the first years after the Great Patriotic War remained too long in a state of complacency with previous successes and did not show much respect for theory which, due to the above-given factors, sometimes lagged behind the enormous combat experience and the highest level of military skill of our cadres gained during the war. Certainly life teaches that at times it is easier to draw lessons from defeat than from victory.

All of this as well as certain other subjective factors related to shortcomings in the leadership of scientific work to a definite degree impeded the creativity of the military cadres and prevented the appearance of major military authorities and scientists.

But, as was pointed out in the above-mentioned decree of the CPSU Central Committee, the deviations related to the cult of personality from the standards of party and state life could not nullify the enormous advantages of socialism in the development of science and in other areas of social life. The measures adopted by the party to intensify scientific work and accelerate scientific-technical progress led to enormous advances in scientific and technical development, including in the development of military theory and practice and which were marked by a true revolution in military affairs.

Regardless of the achieved successes, the need to constantly encourage creativity in science and establish better conditions for its development has not been eliminated; here there can be no limit to improvement. The task of increasing the effectiveness of scientific work has become evermore sharply posed in recent years at the party congresses and Central Committee plenums. A number of decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government points to existing shortcomings in this area and define the ways to eliminate them.

The establishing of a creative situation in science presupposes primarily objectivity of research, for the main purpose of any science is to understand objective patterns. For this reason, in scientific research our party demands that we proceed from that reality which exists, with all its pluses and minuses. Where there is even the slightest deviation from objectivity, where reality is represented not as it is in fact but as one wishes to see it, when one avoids acute questions raised by life and one tries to create the appearance of seeming well being, truly scientific research is impossible. It is essential, V. I. Lenin taught, to proceed not from the possible but from the actual and "assimilate the indisputable truth that a Marxist should consider true life and the accurate facts of reality...."(53)

This circumstance also predetermines the exceptional importance of the informing of scientists and generally scientific workers on those questions which they are investigating. Only under this condition is it possible to realize Lenin's instructions that with scientific research it is essential to take not individual, arbitrarily seized upon facts but rather their entire aggregate without exception, with all complexities and contradictory manifestations. Without a knowledge of all the circumstances of the question, without possessing exhaustive data on the essence of one or another question, a truly scientific, objective truth cannot be found. This is why it is also

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important that the researcher not close himself off in a circle of just theoretical speculation but be constantly tied with real life and military practice. He must carefully study all aspects of the investigated question and derive all his conclusions from an analysis and generalization of the phenomena of objective reality and not fit the phenomena of life to a previously predetermined theoretical scheme. It has long been established that a true scientist needs not only a good knowledge of his specialty but also great general culture, breadth of thinking, the ability not to circumvent but be the first to spot newly arising contradictory phenomena which go beyond the framework of existing views, to dig down to the deepest essence, to the roots of each new phenomenon and more boldly pose new questions. "When the waves of the technical revolution are crashing around us..." said F. Engels, "fresher, bolder heads are needed...."(54)

M. V. Frunze considered as a most important condition for the development of military science the holding of discussions on its fundamental questions with the broad involvement of the command and political personnel. The entire history of science shows that its development is possible only by overcoming contradictions, in a struggle of opinions. For this reason, there is particularly great importance in the holding of military scientific conferences and other forms of scientific debates. As scientists aptly put it, when in any science there are no contradictory views or no struggle, then this science is on the way to bury itself. V. I. Lenin on the question of the work by N. A. Rubakin "Sredi knig" [Among Books] was against the author's assertion that polemics obscures the truth by all sorts of emotions. V. I. Lenin wrote that "in the first place...there never has been, it not and cannot be the human search for truth without 'human emotions.' The author forgets, in the second place, that he wants to provide a review of the 'history of ideas' but the history of ideas is the history of the alternation and, consequently, the struggle of ideas."(55)

But discussions with an active debate of urgent questions cannot arise by themselves and be conducted spontaneously. These must be skillfully cultivated and directed. First of all, the scientific conferences must be preceded by great research work, including at various exercises, so that there be something to be discussed. In the course of the conferences and meetings it would be desirable to devote one main report and not more than one or two co-reports to setting out the results of the conducted research. And these should not be like a lecture with a statement of all the known questions on the given subject. In them it is advisable to raise the most acute, problem questions which actually require a collective discussion so that the conference participants in their speeches can thoroughly discuss these. A more lively and interesting discussion of the questions is aided by the method when the co-reporters do not limit themselves to additions to the main report but also act as opponents. If there is no active discussion and each speaker reports only on his own questions, as if he had not been in the auditorium during the reports, the conference usually does not achieve its aim.

A great deal depends upon the leader of the conference or meeting and he should be able to create a creative atmosphere and work to cause lively debates. M. V. Frunze, for example, in the course of scientific debates did not shy, when necessary, from directing the course of the statements,

demanding that the speakers talk to the essence and without fail voice their view on the posed questions. At the same time he did not restrict them, he did not try to lead them to preset conclusions but in every possible way encouraged the voicing of opposite viewpoints in order in the clash of opinions to bring out the truth more profoundly and better, seeing in this the main purpose of any scientific discussion. And in order that the clash of opinion and disputes did not have a negative impact on a healthy and creative atmosphere, in accord with the Leninist tradition in a scientific dispute there could and should be opponents but no enemies.

Fourthly, in accord with the Marxist-Leninist thesis on the unity of theory and practice, the purpose of a scientific work reaches its logical conclusion only with the prompt introduction of the scientific achievements into practical activity. M. V. Frunze was greatly concerned for this. As the experience of military scientific work shows, the development of science ultimately rests on the problem of realizing its achievements; the solution to this problem remains the most complex and topical.

For example, we have already said that certain theoretical ideas on the initial period of a war by the end of the 1930's were significantly richer than they were embodied in practice. Not all the scientific achievements had been fully realized either for other questions. This problem has not been eliminated now.

Yu. V. Andropov at one time said: "Unfortunately...things are still going badly...precisely with the introduction of our scientific and technical achievements into practice." (56) And this to a definite degree also applies to military theory and practice. The question is so acute with good reason. Without the prompt introduction of new scientific ideas into practical reality, science is largely debased and loses its sense. What is the sense of the best scientific developments, research or works if they are not noticed or are not employed by those who should carry them out, or if they are judged by persons who do not have the opportunity to study or think about these problems and hence draw their own conclusions by rule of thumb, without sufficient qualification. This gives rise to indifference and reduces the interest in science.

Of crucial significance in this area are competence and an interest in the new ideas of science on the part of leading cadres. If any rank of leader is not on top of the scientific knowledge, he is unable to understand it or, let alone, carry it out. In military affairs, this question is particularly acute, for practically in military service any new idea, any new undertaking can be carried out in one or another area of work only with the agreement and approval of a senior chief. From this viewpoint, greater exactingness on the training and indoctrination of the cadres and their accustoming to military scientific work are of enormous significance.

But this is not all. The problem is significantly more complex. At times even the most progressive leader needs a good deal of effort and tenacity to introduce advanced experience and new initiatives in the troops. In principle no one argues against the new, but in life the breaking of old ideas and

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habits and the introduction of new scientific achievements and initiatives always occur with some difficulty.

In looking back and reviewing the distance come from the heights of today, it is perfectly apparent to any man how right M. V. Frunze was when he said that Soviet military science can develop only on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and when he with great tenacity raised the question of the need to elaborate a unified military doctrine as well as other questions of the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces and the methods of their employment in a war. At present, it even seems strange that at one time they had to work so hard to prove and defend all of this in a fierce struggle against open and covert enemies who often did not shun intrigues, scandals and the most evil fabrications which distorted the true viewpoint, and at times simply had to deal with ordinary misunderstanding.

A. M. Gorkiy was indignant over the desire of the philistine to belittle the unusual person at whatever the cost and to reduce him to a level of the philistine's understanding. Everything unusual prevents the philistine from living as he wishes. But unusual people do not want to accept the existing views and habits of this ordinary life.⁽⁵⁷⁾ New discoveries and ideas never take hold without a struggle against the old. As the research of certain scientists has shown, the conservatism of many people is partially explained by the fact that the search for new ideas usually begins where the logic of already known knowledge and facts disappears. Where a majority of people sees only pat answers, an innovator sees new questions posed by life. Even a conservatively thinking person in our times now realizes that, for example, Suvorov and Frunze were correct. But the great misfortune is that this person is unable to understand the truth of the discoverers of modern ideas.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, K. U. Chernenko, in his speech at the jubilee plenum of the Board of the USSR Writers Union pointed out that "constant work is needed to increase the awareness of the masses and to bring about a certain, if you wish, reorientation of public awareness so that it more quickly assimilates new ideas put forward by the party and more decisively escapes from obsolete, backward views."⁽⁵⁸⁾

For this reason, in recognizing the inevitability and naturalness of the struggle of the new against the old, thought must also be given to by what ways under present-day conditions we can better instill in the military cadres a breadth of thought, creativity and the ability to understand and accept all the new that is put forward by life. In the age of scientific and technical progress, this is one of the most important and fundamental problems.

A particularly urgent and difficult task is to realize and introduce into practice not merely scientific ideas but ideas which look to the future, the ability to find and employ in today's practice those ideas which are still in the shadow but have the promise of growth and development. As is known, the founders of Marxism-Leninism with great foresight and a view to the future worked out the theoretical bases of the proletarian revolution and the construction of socialism, setting in this regard a great example for subsequent generations of revolutionaries. To act with an eye to the future

and to promptly spot arising trends remains an indispensable demand of the party on scientific work under present-day conditions.

At theoretical exercises and meetings this, as a rule, has been and is recognized by everyone. But in actuality this is not always the case. For example, one of the arguments used by the opponents of the theory of a depauperation and combat was that at the beginning of the 1930's our army still did not have the necessary material conditions for carrying it out in practice. Such "arguments" on certain questions are sometimes raised today. But such judgments have nothing in common with the Marxist-Leninist approach to theory and practice. If one were to reason in this manner, how could Marx, Engels and Lenin talk about the fundamentals of socialism when this still did not exist?

A theory which proves only that which exists and does not look to the future does not have any great scientific value. For this reason it is essential that our modern scientific theory not fear to look ahead and more boldly bring out the prospects in the development of military affairs. At the same time, one must remember constantly that the sprouts of the new are even now being constantly introduced into practice and that new scientific data are being verified on this basis.

Not all fundamental theoretical ideas can have an immediate and direct access to practice. But any, even the most abstract scientific ideas should ultimately be assessed from the viewpoint of practical needs. When various theoretical searches are made outside of any contact with life, then such "circumscientific" research produces a product fit only for internal consumption of a narrow range of persons who pursue one or another area of science out of the carelessness or laxness of the corresponding scientific bodies and the scientific community.

Academician P. L. Kapitsa on this issue recalled Calvin who compared theory with the millstones and experimental data with the grain which was being fed into these millstones. It is perfectly obvious that the millstones themselves, no matter how they turned, did not produce anything useful (theory is concerned only with itself). But the quality of the flour is determined by the quality of the grain and rotten grain cannot provide nourishing flour.(59)

In a word, as V. I. Lenin taught, it is essential "that our science remain not a dead letter or a fashionable phrase...that science truly becomes flesh and blood and is turned into a component element of everyday life in a complete and real manner."(60)

In speaking about the prospects for the further development of military science and the improvement in military scientific work under present-day conditions, it is essential to emphasize the ever-increasing influence on them of the sociopolitical and economic factors. First of all, it must be considered that in the politics of imperialism at present one can see evermore clearly an adventurism and a readiness to wager the vital interests of mankind for the sake of political and economic goals. Never since World War II has the situation been so serious. What specific factors have caused this?

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First of all, under the conditions of the deepening economic and general crisis in capitalism, the aggressiveness of imperialism has risen and this remains the main source of wars. Imperialists have always sought the way out of a crisis by the militarization of society, an arms race and military provocations. But the main thing is that a political justification is needed for the constantly widening arms race and for this reason the military-industrial magnates are demanding a stronger aggressive policy and the wide use of threats and adventures which are fraught with their evolution into a war. Also related to this is the abrupt about-face in U.S. policy and the course of the American administration to sharply intensify military preparations and direct material preparation for war at a pace and in forms never noted before.

The increasingly uneven development of capitalism has exacerbated contradictions between the capitalist states up to the point of military clashes (the Greco-Turkish, Anglo-Argentine and other conflicts). At the same time, the historical process of the weakening of capitalist forces and the growth of socialist forces has caused the imperialist countries to draw together on a common platform of anticommunism; the influence of the aggressive American policy on them is growing. All of this increases the possibility of a united action by the capitalist states against the socialist commonwealth countries. The development of the class struggle on the world scene confirms the law established by V. I. Lenin: "...The force of the revolution, the force of impact, the energy, decisiveness and triumph of its victory at the same time increase the force of resistance from the bourgeoisie. The more we are victorious the more the capitalist exploiters learn to unite and switch to more decisive offensives."(61)

The increase in the contradictions between the imperialist states and the peoples conducting the national liberation struggle, particularly in line with the desire of the imperialist states to establish their domination over areas with rich energy resources and the developing countries to defend their national interests, has engendered and will engender a whole series of military conflicts. The imperialists give special significance to the preparation and initiating of local wars in the aim of eliminating progressive regimes conducting an anti-imperialist struggle.

Thus, at the present stage and in the foreseeable future, the threat of a war will objectively remain, being a consequence and continuation of the aggressive policy by the imperialist powers and the states siding with them. The growth of this threat can be checked and put back but, as long as imperialism exists, it cannot be fully eliminated.

All these reasons and objective factors intensify the danger of the outbreak of wars or military conflicts which at any moment can take on the most unexpected turn, in closely involving the state interests of the USSR and the other socialist countries.

The constant threat to the socialist countries deriving from the aggressive essence of imperialism, the great dynamicness of world processes and the possibility of abrupt changes in the military political situation make all the more difficult a scientific definition of the nature of local wars and

military conflicts which can be instigated by imperialism, as well as the strategic nature of a world war and the conditions of its outbreak and conduct. Miscalculations on these questions have always been fraught with severe consequences and now they are simply inadmissible. For this reason there must be daily painstaking work on a profound and thorough analysis of the basic areas of military policy in the imperialist states at the present stage and in the immediate future, of the militarily potentially dangerous areas of the world and the main directions in the development of the military strategic situation.

Certainly in resolving these questions Soviet military science is guided by the conclusions and ideas of the scientifically sound policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government and by the achievements of other sociopolitical sciences. Proceeding from them military science can and should provide sound forecasts for the outbreak and development of possible critical situations, the probable variations of the start of a war as well as the forms and methods of waging it.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, K. U. Chernenko, in his speeches at the February and April (1984) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out that the teachings of Marxism-Leninism must be developed creatively and with a profound analysis of modern reality. He urged that this work be continued constantly in all areas of science. The task is not merely to study but also to be able to apply in practice the great ideas of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and to develop them in all areas in terms of modern conditions.

Soviet military theory in its development has reached enormous heights and has great achievement in all areas. It has become one of the main factors in increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces and in strengthening the nation's defense capability. MSU N. V. Ogarkov has pointed out: "In elaborating new concepts on the basis of the results of scientific research and an analysis of the experience of the war and postwar exercises and maneuvers, many theoretical concepts of military art and the organizational development of the army and navy have been critically reworked and an optimum combination has been found for new and previously existing views on the preparation of the nation and its Armed Forces for war as well as the methods of conducting military operations."(62)

We now can speak about a period of fundamental change in the development of military science and military art. As a whole a new qualitative shift is maturing in the development of military affairs related both to the further improvement in nuclear weapons as well as particularly to the appearance of new types of conventional weapons. In line with this the need arises to rethink the fundamental military-political and operational-strategic problems of defending the socialist fatherland.

From all of this derive new, higher demands upon the organization of scientific work in the Armed Forces. As in carrying out other tasks, on this question we are guided by the instructions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee which have demanded the focusing of the main efforts of science primarily upon the prompt solution to

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the major practical problems, a sharp rise in the effectiveness and quality of the scientific research and the more effective introduction of scientific achievements into practical activity.

The new tasks demand the corresponding scope and higher pace in carrying out scientific work. In the past, when the material basis of a war changed comparatively slowly, the scientific elaboration of certain problems took years. Under present-day conditions the situation has fundamentally changed and a delay in working out the urgent problems of military science is completely inadmissible. The rapid modernization of weapons and equipment and the related frequent changes in the methods of conducting armed combat demand a constant rise in the intensity of scientific research, in the promptness of working out the most important problems as well as a widening of the forms and methods of military scientific work.

Particularly urgent is the question of elaborating future problems on the basis of short- and long-term forecasts. In this context important significance is assumed by a rational combination of fundamental and applied research in such a manner that along with the resolution of practical problems, research be conducted widely on the fundamental problems of military affairs, the elaboration of key problems be ensured and a definite scientific back-up be established for the future.

The major qualitative changes in military affairs have demanded a clarification of the principles of planning and organizing the research, the forms and methods of scientific work, the criteria for assessing its effectiveness and the procedure for utilizing the achievements of military theory in the life and activities of the troops. The most important demand on scientific work is to ensure a high quality of the research carried out. The main thing in assessing the state of scientific work is not the quantity of measures carried out, research works of defended dissertations, but rather the real contribution which is made to increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Decree of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee states that scientific developments should develop into practical recommendations and give sound social forecasts.(63)

Particularly important significance is assumed by the theoretical soundness and accuracy of the conducted military scientific research. The more complex and diverse the arising tasks, the more centralized and effective the leadership of the scientific research should be. This is essentially primarily in order to focus the chief efforts on the most important and pertinent problems, to achieve greater coordination and effectiveness in the scientific work and ensure a systematic approach to elaborating the most important problems.

In all areas of military science, in addition to the fundamental problems which are basically the concern of military academies as the main centers of military theoretical research, the need has arisen for a large amount of applied research. With the rapid change of weapons and combat equipment, it is not always possible in a centralized manner to work out new methods of their combat employment considering the specific features of each theater of war. All of this can be done promptly and effectively with the active

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participation in the military scientific work of a broad group of generals, admirals and officers in the troops and fleets. Here an ever-greater proportional amount is being assumed by the scientific elaboration of problems and the carrying out of research directly at the headquarters and staffs, where these questions are solved so that the practical solution to each problem is preceded by its profound theoretical study.

As has been demanded by the USSR Minister of Defense, MSU S. L. Sokolov, the practical activities of all directorates, staffs and military schools as well as military cadres should be organically combined and fused with scientific search. Military scientific work cannot be viewed as something separate from service activities. It is the most important duty of all officials and without it it is impossible to successfully carry out the complex and responsible tasks which confront the Army and Navy.

As a whole, Soviet military theory at the present stage must help to solve the main problem of ensuring the secure defense of the state interests of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist commonwealth.

Our progressive Marxist-Leninist military theory provides a scientifically based nature for Soviet military doctrine which derives from the peace-loving policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government. The adherence to the cause of peace and peaceful collaboration with other countries is determined by the essence and nature of the socialist society. In our nation there are no and cannot be any persons interested in an aggressive policy and war. The defensive focus of Soviet military doctrine stems invariably from this.

Over all its history the USSR has never threatened anyone with a war and has attacked no one and this in actuality shows the focus and nature of Soviet military doctrine. M. V. Frunze even in 1922 at the 11th Party Congress stated: "...I consider as a most harmful, stupid and childish undertaking to speak now about offensive wars on our behalf." (64) We have repeatedly had to conduct military operations but each time these were defensive wars in the defense of the Soviet state or the carrying out of treaty obligations to allies in repelling attacks on them.

At present, our military doctrine is aimed solely at ensuring the reliable security of the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist commonwealth. It has no other goals. The Soviet Union has solemnly assumed the obligation not to use nuclear weapons first. Along with the other Warsaw Pact states, the USSR has proposed the concluding of a treaty with the NATO countries on the mutual repudiation of military force and the maintaining of relations of peace, in other words, repudiating the use first against one another of either nuclear or conventional weapons or any force at all.

In the West there are many people who assert that the USSR supposedly threatens other states. Such slanderous fabrications have been voiced before. On the eve of World War II, when Naziism was threatening the world, the West was trumpeting about the "Soviet threat." Considering these historical lessons, the present militaristic course of NATO headed by the United States has forced us to maintain the nation's defense capability on the proper level. In order to defame the defensive focus of our doctrine, reference is made to

the high combat readiness to the Soviet Armed Forces and to the active and decisive nature of the methods of combat. However, these are different things. The defensive nature of a military doctrine does not exclude either high combat readiness of the Armed Forces or active offensive operations against the aggressor should it attack our country or its allies.

As was pointed out by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, K. U. Chernenko, in a speech in a pre-election meeting of voters in the Kuybyshev Electoral District of Moscow, the difficult international situation "forces us to pay the most serious attention to strengthening national defense. The Soviet people do not want to increase weapons but rather reduce them on both sides. But we must be concerned about the sufficient security of our nation, its friends and allies. This is being done. And let everyone know that no proponents of military adventures will catch us unaware and no potential aggressor can hope of escaping a crushing retaliatory strike."(65)

FOOTNOTES

1. The publishing of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia commenced in 1932-1933, it was published in two volumes and after this publication was halted.
2. G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, "Sotsialisticheskaya sudba chelovechestva" [The Socialist Destiny of Mankind], Moscow, 1978, p 39.
3. See: "Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [Small Soviet Encyclopedia], Moscow, 1958, Vol 2, p 544; "Voyennaya strategiya," 2d Edition, Moscow, 1963 and so forth.
4. "Filosofskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary], pp 88-89.
5. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 14, p 8.
6. See: Ibid., p 113.
7. Ibid., Vol 40, p 76; Vol 39, p 321.
8. Ibid., Vol 20, p 245.
9. Quoted in: Ibid., Vol 26, p 224.
10. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 2, p 221.
11. M. N. Tukhachevskiy, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 2, p 11.
12. "Voyna i armiya: Filosofsko-sotsiologicheskii ocherk" [War and the Army: Philosophical-Sociological Essay], Moscow, 1977, p 72.
13. "Voyennaya strategiya," p 218.

14. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 40, p 125.
15. See: "Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 5, pp 282-284.
16. See: G. V. Telyatnikov, "Filosofskiye voprosy teorii upravleniya voyskami" [Philosophical Questions of the Theory of Troop Control], Dissertation Resume, Moscow, 1974, p 38.
17. See: "Spravochnik ofitsera" [Officer's Reference], Moscow, 1971, p 47.
18. S. I. Krupnov, "Logiko-metodologicheskiy analiz...", p 88.
19. "Marksistsko-leninskaya filosofiya i metodologicheskiye problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki" [Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice], Moscow, 1982, p 245.
20. See: V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 32, p 77; Vol 27, p 93; Vol 38, p 138.
21. See: "Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 2, p 506.
22. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 20, p 25.
23. Quoted in the book: "O sovetskoy voyennoy nauke" [On Soviet Military Science], S. N. Kozlov, M. V. Smirnov, I. S. Baz, P. A. Sidorov, Moscow, 1964, p 162.
24. Quoted in the book: "O sovetskoy voyennoy nauke," p 162.
25. A. I. Astafyev, "O sovremennom voyennom iskusstve" [On Modern Military Art], St. Petersburg, 1856, Part 1, p 143.
26. Ibid., pp 25-26.
27. See: "Slovar inostrannykh slov" [Dictionary of Foreign Words], Moscow, 1979, p 396.
28. See: VOYNA I REVOLYUTSIYA, No 10-11, 1927, p 26; V. D. Ryazanov, "Marxism and Military Affairs," VOYENNY VESTNIK, No 3, 1926, pp 14-15.
29. See: "Marksizm-leninizm o voyne i armii" [Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army], 5th Edition, Moscow, 1968, p 346.
30. P. N. Fedoseyev, "Dialektika sovremennoy epokhi" [Dialectics of the Modern Age], p 9.
31. See: "Sovetskaya Voyennaya entsiklopediya," Vol 2, pp 183-188; "Voyenny entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Military Encyclopedic Dictionary], pp 136-137.
32. See: V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 18, pp 363-364.
33. See: M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 227.

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34. S. T. Melyukhin, "Filosofskiye problemy sovremennoy fiziki" [Philosophical Problems of Modern Physics], Moscow, 1966, pp 3-4.
35. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 20, p 565.
36. B. M. Kedrov, "Marxist Philosophy: Its Subject and Role in the Integration of Modern Sciences," VOPROSY VILOSOFII, No 1, 1982, p 52.
37. See: S. G. Gorshkov, "Morskaya moshch gosudarstva," Moscow, 1976.
38. "Materialy XXV syezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 48.
39. See: M. A. Milshteyn and A. K. Slobodenko, "O burzhuaznoy voyennoy nauke" [On Bourgeois Military Science], 2d Edition, Moscow, 1961, p 11.
40. See: N. G. Chernyshevskiy, "Izbrannyye filosofskiye sochineniya" [Selected Philosophical Works], Moscow, 1950, Vol 1, p 303.
41. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 1, p 585.
42. "Materialy XXV syezda KPSS," p 72.
43. "Leninskiy sbornik," 36, p 132.
44. See: M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 217.
45. See: N. N. Azovtsev, "V. I. Lenin i sovetskaya voyennaya nauka" [V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science], p 17.
46. M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv.," Vol 2, p 12.
47. "Materialy Plenuma Tsentralnogo Komiteteta KPSS" [Materials of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee], Moscow, 1983, pp 34-35.
48. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 44, p 323.
49. See: K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 25, Part 2, p 384.
50. See: V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 6, p; 30-31.
51. Ibid., p 39.
52. "Sovetskiye uchenyye: Ocherki i vospominaniya" [Soviet Scientists: Essays and Memoirs], Moscow, 1982, p 255.
53. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 31, p 134.
54. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 22, p 395.
55. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 25, p 112.

56. Yu. V. Andropov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stati" [Selected Speeches and Articles], 2d Edition, Moscow, 1983, p 288.
57. See: A. M. Gorkiy, "Literaturnyye portrety" [Literary Portraits], Moscow, 1983, p 28.
58. PRAVDA, 26 September 1984.
59. See: P. L. Kapitsa, "Teoriya, eksperiment, praktika" [Theory, Experiment, Practice], Moscow, 1966, p 19.
60. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 45, p 391.
61. Ibid., Vol 40, p 244.
62. N. V. Ogarkov, "Military Science and the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland," KOMMUNIST, No 7, 1978, p 115.
63. See: "Materialy Plenuma Tsentralnogo...", p 70.
64. M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 397.
65. PRAVDA, 3 March 1984.

CONCLUSION

Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze lived just 40 years. All his life was marked by ebullient activity. He participated in all the major events during the period of the preparation and carrying out of the socialist revolution in our nation, the Civil War and the first years of peacetime construction. On the day of his death, PRAVDA wrote: "The underground, the barricades, death row, forced labor, the revolution, the leadership of revolutionary troops and the glory of great victories--this was the path of Comrade Frunze."⁽¹⁾ His accomplishments to the revolution, the party and the Soviet state were enormous. They were determined primarily by the large number of brilliantly executed, remarkable deeds and feats for the sake of the revolution, by his wholehearted dedication and self-sacrifice in carrying out the party's assignments.

A profound ideological conviction and passionate thirst for the revolutionary struggle, a clear mind, great all-round knowledge, organizational talent, enormous energy and capacity for work made it possible to M. V. Frunze to rapidly win trust and high authority wherever he worked and mobilize the people to carry out the most complicated tasks. Along with thousands of other Communist Party members he brought into the ranks of the revolutionary fighters and the RKKA the Leninist ideological and party loyalty inherent to the Bolsheviks, a spirit of revolutionary creativity and energy, discipline and organization, decisiveness and boldness.

M. V. Frunze was an outstanding revolutionary and military leader; he won many brilliant victories and did not know defeat. Along with this he was and remains a major Soviet military theorist who enriched the theory and practice of the proletariat's revolutionary struggle, military science and military art with new concepts which for a number of questions predetermined their development for many years to come and have maintained their importance under present-day conditions. Fate gave him too little time and he was unable to carry out much that he saw. But, as V. I. Lenin said, "each month of such work and such experience is worth 10 if not 20 years of our history."⁽²⁾

M. V. Frunze possessed a special gift for a profound penetration into the essence of phenomena, creative perception and employment of Marxist-Leninist teachings and other scientific knowledge in carrying out specific practical tasks of the revolutionary struggle as well as party, state and military work. In terms of his nature and calling he was a pioneer who relied upon the creativity of the masses of people.

M. V. Frunze can rightly be considered a founder of military scientific work in the Soviet Armed Forces. The principles, forms and methods worked out by him for planning, organizing and carrying out military scientific work have not lost their importance today. His personal passionate involvement in science, his dedicated scientific research to generalize the experience of the wars and work out the problems of a future war, the ability to inspire by creative enthusiasm and involve the broad masses of command and political personnel in scientific research as well as the ability to organically combine scientific and practical work, to constantly rely and utilize scientific achievements in his activities--all of this has served, serves and will always serve as the greatest example and model of how in fact one must carry out Lenin's legacy concerning the scientifically sound organization of the defense of the socialist fatherland.

In the works of Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze the reader today will find many profound thoughts and statements on the general problems of military science, the theoretical and practical questions of military art, military organizational development, training, political and military indoctrination of the personnel. No matter how far ahead military affairs move, the dialectics of their development, the methods of a creative approach to solving urgent problems, the penetration into the profound processes of the studied phenomena and analysis of the concrete historical conditions which M. V. Frunze so skillfully applied in the future will serve as dependable guidelines in scientific work.

Over the 67 years of their existence, the Soviet Armed Forces have been fundamentally changed. The military-technical revolution of recent years has brought about fundamental qualitative changes in the organization, technical equipping of the Army and Navy, in the development of military art and in all areas of military affairs. But none of this arose from a vacuum. The present achievements of military science and military art include all the preceding military experience and above all the experience of the Soviet Armed Forces and are a continuation of this on a qualitatively new level. For this reason the men from all the armies of the socialist nations and the peoples fighting for their liberty and independence with enormous gratitude and reverence will always esteem the memory of the first pioneers in organizing the new worker-peasant army and who under the leadership of our party under unbelievably difficult conditions of hardship, adversity and severe trials established the bases for victorious Marxist-Leninist military science.

A careful study of the works by one of the most talented students of V. I. Lenin, Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze, the further research and development of his military-theoretical heritage will contribute to a more profound elucidation of the genesis of military theory and practice of the socialist state and the present-day processes in the development of military affairs as well as to the creative resolution of the complex and responsible problems posed by the Communist Party and history before the Soviet Armed Forces.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 31 October 1925.
2. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 36, p 499.

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Figure 1
The Republic of Soviets in a Ring of Fronts




Figure 2
Counteroffensive by Southern Group
of the Eastern Front, April-June 1919




Figure 3
Operations on Turkestan Front, 1919-20






Figure 4
Operations to Defeat Vrangl, November 1920



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